Shooting to Kill by Doyle, Hannah




   iii
Shooting to Kill





 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers 
 the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education 
 by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University 
 Press in the UK and certain other countries. 
 Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 
 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. 
 © Oxford University Press 2016 
 Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly
permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization.
This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a
Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0
International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. 
 You must not circulate this work in any other form 
 and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. 
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Miller, Seumas, author.
Title: Shooting to kill : the ethics of police and military use of lethal
force / Seumas Miller.
Description: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2016] | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifi ers: LCCN 2016010572 | ISBN 9780190626143 (pbk. : alk. paper) | 
ISBN 9780190626136 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780190626174 (online)
Subjects: LCSH: Police ethics. | Military ethics. | Police shootings—Moral
and ethical aspects. | Combat—Moral and ethical aspects. | Public
safety—Moral and ethical aspects. | National security—Moral and ethical
aspects.
Classifi cation: LCC HV7924 .M553 2016 | DDC 172/.2—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016010572 
 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada 
 Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America 
   v
For Tony Coady, and all the good times
vi




 1. Morally Permissible Use of Lethal Force: A Taxonomy  15
 2. Killing in Self- Defense  44
 3.  Police Officers, Regular Soldiers, and Normative  
Institutional Analysis  78
 4. Police Use of Lethal Force  108
 5. Police Use of Lethal Force and Suicide Bombers  138
 6. Military Use of Lethal Force  158
 7. Civilian Immunity  185
 8. Humanitarian Armed Intervention  212
 9. Targeted Killing  237




   ix
Acknowledgments
i  w i s h  t o  thank the editors of the following academic publica-
tions for use of some of the material of mine contained therein: 
Ethical Issues in Policing (Keon, 1996); Police Ethics (with J. Blackler 
and A. Alexandra) (Allen and Unwin, 1997); Ethical Issues in Policing 
(with John Blackler) (Ashgate, 2005); Terrorism and Counter- terror-
ism (Blackwell Publishing, 2009); Investigative Ethics (with I. Gordon) 
(Wiley- Blackwell, 2014); “Shootings by Police in Victoria” in Violence 
and Police Culture (eds. T. Coady, S. James, S. Miller, and M. O’Keefe) 
(Melbourne University Press, 2000): “Human Rights and the 
Institution of the Police” in Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities 
of Corporate and Public Sector Organisations (eds. T. Campbell and S. 
Miller) (Kluwer, 2004); “Collective Responsibility and Humanitarian 
Armed Intervention” in Ethics of Humanitarian Interventions (ed. 
G. Meggle) (Ontos Verlag, 2004); “Collective Responsibility and Armed 
Humanitarian Intervention” in Righteous Violence (eds. T. Coady and 
M. O’Keefe) (Melbourne University Press, 2005); “Civilian Immunity, 
Forcing the Choice and Collective Responsibility” in Civilian Immunity 
(ed. I. Primoratz) (Oxford University Press, 2007); “The Fatal Police 
Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes: Is Anyone Responsible” (with Ian 
Gordon) in Shooting to Kill: Socio- legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal 
Force (eds. S. Bronitt, M. Gani, and S. Hufnagel) (Hart Publishing, 
2012); “Robopocalypse?: Autonomous Weapons, Military Necessity and 
Collective Moral Responsibility” in Super Soldiers: The Ethical, Legal 
and Social Implications (eds. J. Galliott and M. Lotze) (Ashgate, 2015); 
“Just War Theory— The Case of South Africa,” Philosophical Papers, 
vol. xix, no. 2 (1990); “On the Morality of Waging War Against the 
State,” South African Journal of Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1 (1991); “Joint 
Action,” Philosophical Papers, vol. xxi, no. 3 (1992); “Self- defense and 
Acknowledgmentsx
x
Forcing the Choice between Lives,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
vol. 9, no. 2 (1992); “Killing in Self- defence,” Public Affairs Quarterly, 
vol. 7, no. 4 (1993); “Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and 
the Rwandan Genocide,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
vol. 12, no. 2 (1998); “Judith Jarvis Thomson on Killing in Self- Defence,” 
Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, vol. 3, no. 2 (2001); 
“Collective Responsibility,” Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (2001); 
“Collective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Account” in Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXX (ed. P. A. French) (2006); “The Ethics of 
Assassination and Targeted Killing,” Annual Review of Law and Ethics, 
vol. 19 (2011); “Police Detectives, Criminal Investigations and Collective 
Moral Responsibility,” Criminal Justice Ethics, vol. 33, no. 1 (2014); “The 
Ethics of Targeted Killing: Osama bin Laden, Drones and Counter- ter-
rorism,” Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3 (2014); “Just War Theory 
and Counter-terrorism” in Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War (eds. 
F. Allhoff,  N. Evans, and A. Henschke) (Routledge, 2013).
   xi
Shooting to Kill
xii
   1
Introduction
t h e  w a r s  i n  recent decades in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria against the 
forces of Saddam Hussein, the Taliban, al- Qaeda, and, most recently, ISIS 
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria); the humanitarian armed interventions 
in Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere; the targeted killings of 
terrorists by Israeli and US security forces; the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs, or drones) by the United States to conduct lethal strikes 
in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere; the fatal shooting 
of an innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, by British police in 
London in 2005; the recent shooting by a police officer of Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, and the ensuing riots; the shooting in the 
back of an unarmed black man, Walter Scott, by a police officer in North 
Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015; and the shooting by police snipers of 
various crazed gunmen in the United States, Australia, and elsewhere in 
recent years— these events have all contributed to the creation of renewed 
interest in the ethics of police and military use of lethal force, and in the 
moral justification or justifications for the use of lethal force. The devel-
opment of drone technology, in particular, has raised important issues 
of moral responsibility for such use. For example, there is now the possi-
bility to deploy “human- out- of- the- loop” weapons, notably drones, that— 
once programmed and activated by their human operators— can track, 
target, and deliver lethal force without further human intervention.1
There have, of course, been many philosophical works concerned with 
the moral justification of killing in personal self- defense or in war; and 
there has also been some, albeit limited, discussion in the philosophical 
1. Bradley Jay Strawser, ed., Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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literature of the justification for police use of lethal force. More recently, 
there have been discussions of specific uses of lethal force, such as lethal 
strikes by drones. In this work I seek to unearth and analyze the underly-
ing moral justifications and moral responsibilities in play in the some-
what diverse uses of lethal force mentioned above. In doing so, I compare 
and contrast the use of lethal force by ordinary citizens, police officers, 
and military personnel. On the one hand, police and military use of lethal 
force is morally justified in part by recourse to fundamental human moral 
rights and obligations, especially the right to personal self- defense and 
the moral obligation one has to defend the lives of innocent others under 
imminent threat— if one can do so without risking one’s own life. On the 
other hand, arguably, the moral justification for police and military use of 
lethal force is to some extent role- specific. Both police officers and mili-
tary combatants evidently have a moral duty to put themselves in harm’s 
way to protect others and, at least in the case of military combatants, put 
their own lives at high risk. Moreover, the moral justifications for police 
and military use of lethal force appear to be, in part, institutionally based. 
Thus police, under some circumstances, have an institutionally based 
moral duty to use lethal force to uphold the law, and military combatants 
have an institutionally based moral duty to use lethal force to win (just) 
wars. Moreover, in recent times there has been a blurring of the police 
and military roles. In particular, there has been a militarization of some 
police services, as was the case in Ferguson, Missouri, and the utilization 
of police in war zones, such as the peacekeeping operations in East Timor.
This work offers a distinctive teleological, institutionally based per-
spective on the morally justifiable use of lethal force by police and the 
military. This teleological account is not to be understood as a species of 
consequentialism, whether in its direct act- based or indirect rule- based 
form.2 Consequentialism, as I  understand it, determines the rightness 
or wrongness of actions on the basis of the actual consequences of those 
actions, irrespective of whether these consequences were intended or 
otherwise aimed at.3 My teleological account has it that the rightness 
or wrongness of actions, specifically the lethal actions of police offi-
cers and soldiers, derives in large part from the outcomes aimed at by 
2. Seumas Miller, Social Action: A Teleological Account (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).
3. For recent criticisms, see James Griffin, What Can Philosophy Contribute to Ethics? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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these role occupants. Moreover, my account contrasts with individual-
ist reductionists— so- called revisionists (e.g. Cecile Fabre, Helen Frowe, 
and Jeff McMahan4)— on the one hand, and nonreductionist collectivists 
(e.g. Christopher Kutz and Michael Walzer5), on the other. It analyzes the 
different salient moral justifications for police and military use of lethal 
force, and compares both of these with the standard moral justifications 
for the use of lethal force by noninstitutional actors (e.g., in personal self- 
defense). However, as already mentioned, in doing so, it compares and 
contrasts these institutional and noninstitutional uses with a view to iden-
tifying the underlying moral considerations.
In addition to providing analyses of the main moral justifications for 
the use of lethal force by the police and the military, the work analyzes 
the moral responsibility for the use of lethal force by these institutional 
actors. Here there is a need to distinguish between individual and collec-
tive moral responsibility (e.g., the use of lethal force by members of an 
armed collective, the collective responsibility to engage in humanitarian 
armed intervention), and also between direct and indirect moral responsi-
bility (e.g., the delivery of lethal force by autonomous drones).
The contents of the chapters are as follows. Chapter 1 maps the con-
ceptual terrain in the state of nature (so to speak) in respect of the morally 
justified or morally excusable use of lethal force, and thereby paves the 
way for the more detailed discussions of particular institutional and non-
institutional cases of the use of lethal force. Institutional cases are ones 
in which the lethal force in question is deployed by institutional actors in 
their capacity as institutional actors; noninstitutional cases are ones in 
which lethal force is used by ordinary human beings in their noninstitu-
tional, natural capacities. The paradigmatic cases of institutional actors 
who deploy lethal force are police officers and military combatants, and it 
is these actors that receive detailed treatment in Chapters 3– 10.
The paradigm cases of noninstitutional use of lethal force are ones in 
which one person, B, mounts a morally unjustified lethal attack against 
4. Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Helen Frowe, 
Defensive Killing (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014); Jeff McMahan, Killing in War 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2009).
5. Christopher Kutz, “The Difference Uniforms Make:  Collective Violence in Criminal 
Law and War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 148– 180; Michael Walzer, Just 
and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic 
Books, 2006), 36:  “the war itself isn’t a relation between persons but between political 
entities and their human instruments.”
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another person, A, and A responds by killing B in self- defense, or person 
B attacks A and a third person, C, responds by killing B in defense of A. 
These are essentially cases in which A’s negative rights and, in particu-
lar, A’s right not to be killed are being violated or, at least, are about to be 
violated. However, other cases involve killing in defense of so- called posi-
tive rights.6 Moreover, acts of lethal attack, defense, and enforcement are 
sometimes individual actions and sometimes joint ones; the joint actions 
in question being ones involving agents acting together to achieve the 
common end of killing, successfully defending, and/ or enforcing, respec-
tively. It is this notion of joint action7 that I use in the construction of 
organizational action. Roughly speaking, organizational action comprises 
multilayered structures of joint action.8 Specifically, I employ the notion 
of joint lethal action to provide an understanding of the lethal actions of 
institutional actors. In doing so I am, in effect, importing relatively recent 
theoretical findings from the subdiscipline of social ontology into discus-
sions of the ethics of police and military use of lethal force. However, I am 
doing so from a distinctive standpoint; namely, one in which although 
certain basic features of morality are institutionally prior, institutions nev-
ertheless generate additional moral rights and duties. The institutionally 
based moral rights and duties, for example, of police officers and military 
combatants, are derived in part from basic natural rights and obligations, 
such as the right to self- defense and the obligation to defend the lives of 
others. However, they also derive in part from the collective goods real-
ized by the social institutions in question.
On the standard view of morally permissible killing in self defense— 
whether by ordinary citizens, police, or military personnel— killing in 
order to defend one’s own life is morally justified on the grounds that 
each of us has a right to life. Moreover, self- defense (in its various permu-
tations) is evidently one of the fundamental moral justifications in play 
6. On the distinction between positive and negative rights inter alia, see Leif Wenar, 
“Rights,” in Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015), http:// plato.
stanford.edu/ entries/ rights/ . On the enforcement of positive rights, see Seumas Miller, 
The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 202– 209; and Seumas Miller, “Civilian Immunity, Forcing the 
Choice and Collective Responsibility,” in Igor Primoratz, ed., Civilian Immunity in War 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 113– 135.
7. Seumas Miller, “Joint Action,” Philosophical Papers 21, no. 3 (1992): 275– 299; and Miller, 
Social Action, Chapter 2.
8. Miller, Social Action, Chapter 5; Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 48– 50.
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in police and military use of military force, as well as in personal self- 
defense. Hence there is a need to provide an acceptable moral analysis of 
it. I say this notwithstanding my view that personal self- defense and the 
related justification of (noninstitutionally based) other- person defense are 
not the only moral justifications for police and military use of lethal force.
In Chapter 2 the concern is principally with the natural right to self- 
defense. I argue against prevailing influential theories of the right to 
self- defense, including those of J. J. Thomson9 and Philip Montague.10 
Moreover, I elaborate my own novel account, the fault- based internalist 
suspendable rights- based theory (FIST).11 On this account, you have a 
right not to be killed by me, and I have a concomitant obligation not to kill 
you. However, you suspend your own right not to be killed by me if you 
come to have all the following properties:
1. You are a deadly threat to me.
2. You intend to kill me and are responsible for having this intention to 
kill me.
3. You do not have a strong and decisive moral justification for killing me, 
and you do not reasonably believe that you have a strong and decisive 
moral justification for killing me.
Note that FIST posits that a culpable attacker suspends his right not 
to be killed by a defender even in cases in which it is not necessary 
for the defender to kill the attacker to save his own life. Moreover, 
each person, X, has a set of suspendable rights not to be killed rel-
ativized to every other person; FIST is a partialist account. Thus X 
has a right not to be killed by Y, and a right not to be killed by Z, 
and so on. X also has a set of suspendable obligations not to kill:  X 
has an obligation not to kill Y, and an obligation not to kill Z, and 
so on. Here my right not to be killed generates an obligation on 
your part not to kill me. However, if X’s right not to be killed by Y 
is suspended by virtue of X attacking Y, it does not follow that X’s 
9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self- Defense,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 4 (1991): 
283–310.
10. Philip Montague, “Self- Defense and Choosing between Lives,” Philosophical Studies 40 
(1981): 207– 219.
11. Initially elaborated in Seumas Miller, “Killing in Self- Defence,” Public Affairs Quarterly 
7, no. 4 (1993): 325– 340.
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right not to be killed by Z has been suspended, although this right of 
X’s might be overridden, allowing Z to justifiably kill X.
In respect of a moral right or duty to kill in defense of others, we need 
to distinguish between ordinary human beings per se and persons with 
institutional roles that are defined in part in terms of such rights and duties 
to kill in defense of others— specifically, the roles of police officer and mil-
itary combatant. Arguably, in the contemporary context of nation- states, 
the needs of members of a given community for protection from internal 
(e.g., criminal organizations) and external (e.g., foreign powers) threats to 
life and limb can only adequately be met by the organized membership of 
specialist occupational groups within that community, specifically police 
organizations and military forces, respectively. Accordingly, the collective 
responsibility of members of a community to provide mutual protection 
is relativized to that community; it is partialist and, therefore, does not 
necessarily extend to the members of other communities.12 Moreover, such 
collective responsibilities are often most effectively discharged by estab-
lishing police and military institutions comprising institutional role occu-
pants with special rights and duties.
In Chapter 3 I undertake a normative comparative institutional analysis 
of police officers and regular soldiers in the context of the contemporary 
liberal democratic nation- state, as a precursor to the detailed discussion in 
later chapters of police and military use of lethal force.13 As mentioned above, 
the normative analysis of institutions is in large part to be understood in 
teleological terms. Such institutional analysis has, for the most part, been 
eschewed by philosophers in favor of analyses based on the assumption that 
the moral justifications for the use of lethal force must ultimately consist 
either of personal self- defense or of (noninstitutional) other- person defense. 
An important exception to this is the justification for waging war in terms 
of defense of the nation- state. David Rodin, for example, has argued against 
understanding this justification in terms of saving individual human lives.14
Differentiating police officers from soldiers might seem straight-
forward enough. The role of the police officer is to maintain order and 
12. This is consistent with holding, as I do, that the members of one community may also 
have collective responsibilities with respect to the members of other communities, and 
that some of these are based on the positive right to assistance when one’s natural right to 
life is threatened. See Chapter 8.
13. Seumas Miller, “Police, Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries: A Comparative Normative 
Institutional Analysis,” Journal of Military Ethics 15 (2016).
14. David Rodin, War and Self- Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
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enforce the domestic criminal law of the land— paradigmatically by arrest-
ing offenders, but on occasion, and only if necessary, by using lethal force. 
By contrast, the role of the soldier (or sailor or airman), whether a member 
of a standing professional army, a member of a voluntary citizen- militia, 
or a conscripted citizen, is to defend the state (or like political entity) 
against armed aggression by other states (or like political entities)— 
paradigmatically by the use of lethal force. Evidently, in recent times there 
has been a blurring of the distinction between police officers and regular 
soldiers. Arguably, this is in part due to the rise of international terrorism 
(e.g., al- Qaeda, ISIS), and, as a consequence, the need for closer coopera-
tion between domestic police agencies and military organizations in coun-
terterrorist operations.15 At any rate, whatever the precise nature, extent, 
and causes of the blurring of the distinction, I seek (in Chapter 3), first, to 
clarify these related occupational roles and, second, to unearth the implica-
tions in general terms for the morally permissible use of lethal force by the 
police, on the one hand, versus by the military, on the other.
My approach here is a novel one, relying on my philosophical the-
ory of social institutions developed elsewhere:  a normative teleological 
account.16 Suffice it to say here that I frame the problems in question in 
normative and institutional terms. That is, I  take it that differentiating 
between police officers and regular soldiers is, or ought to be, principally 
a matter of demarcating their respective institutional roles. This in turn 
requires a specification of the nature and function of the institutions of 
which these roles are, or ought to be, constitutive elements. Such speci-
fication is, I suggest, essentially a normative undertaking, as opposed to, 
for example, an exercise in purely descriptive organizational sociology. 
That said, it is a normative exercise that needs to be anchored in appro-
priate institutional description. Accordingly, my approach is at odds with 
some individualist reductivist conceptions, such as so- called revisionist 
accounts put forward by theorists such as McMahan, Fabre, and Frowe,17 
15. Seumas Miller, “On the Morality of Waging War against the State,” South African Journal 
of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1991): 20– 27; Seumas Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism: Ethics 
and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009); Stephen Nathanson Terrorism and the 
Ethics of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
16. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions.
17.   McMahan, Killing in War, and “Collectivist Defenses of the Moral Equality of 
Combatants,” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 1 (2007): 50– 59; Fabre, Cosmopolitan War; 
Frowe, Defensive Killing.
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but nevertheless also inconsistent with nonreductionist collectivist views 
of theorists such as Walzer and Kutz.18
Chapter 4 comprises a moral analysis of the use of lethal force by 
police officers.19 With the establishment of police services in modern 
societies, the responsibility for defending oneself, and especially for pro-
tecting others, has to a large extent devolved to the police. Crudely, the 
idea is that if someone’s life is threatened, whether my own or someone 
else’s, the first step should be to call the police. However, this in no 
way means that the rights of ordinary citizens to self- defense and to 
defend the lives of others have been alienated. In Chapter 4 I argue that 
the standard view (presented by John Kleinig20 and Jeffrey Reiman,21 for 
example) of the moral justification for police use of lethal force being 
entirely dependent either on personal self- defense or (noninstitutionally 
based) defense of the lives of others is not adequate, and instead put for-
ward a different account based in part on the specific institutional role 
of police officers.
The use of lethal force by police in many counterterrorism operations 
does not raise moral problems that are essentially different from those 
that arise in combating other kinds of violent crime. Nevertheless, there 
do seem to be some important differences when it comes to the use of 
lethal force against suicide bombers, in particular. In Chapter 5 I focus on 
some of the moral problems arising from the use of lethal force against 
suspected suicide bombers operating in well- ordered, liberal democratic 
states.22 I do so because these operations seem to require a less restrictive 
use of lethal force on the part of police than do police responses to other 
related murderous criminal actions, such as, for example, a lone gunman 
18. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; Kutz, “The Difference Uniforms Make.”
19. Seumas Miller, “Shootings by Police in Victoria: The Ethical Issues,” in Tony Coady, 
Steve James, Seumas Miller, and Michael O’Keefe, eds., Violence and Police Culture 
(University of Melbourne Press, 2000), 205– 219; Seumas Miller and John Blackler, Ethical 
Issues in Policing (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2005), Chapter 3.
20. John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
21.  Jeffrey Reiman, “The Social Contract and the Police Use of Deadly Force,” in Frederick 
Elliston and Michael Feldberg, eds., Moral Issues in Police Work (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and 
Allanheld, 1985) 237– 249.
22.  Ian Gordon and Seumas Miller, “The Fatal Police Shooting of Jean Charles de 
Menezes: Is Anyone Responsible,” in Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani, and Saskia Hufnagel, 
eds., Shooting to Kill: Socio- Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 
215– 239.
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shooting dead numerous passers- by who is himself eventually shot dead 
by a police sniper. One concern in this chapter is to circumscribe the 
police role in a manner that enables the traditional distinction between 
police use of lethal force and the military use of lethal force to be main-
tained, notwithstanding the pressure upon the distinction arising from 
suicide bombers operating in civilian settings.
A second concern is that of collective moral responsibility for the use of 
lethal force, given that police officers who shoot suspected suicide bomb-
ers dead rely on other police officers for intelligence about the identity of 
these suspects, rather than relying merely on what is happening before 
their own eyes. If a police firearms officer shoots dead a suspected suicide 
bomber on the basis of intelligence provided by other police officers, and 
the suspect turns out not to be a suicide bomber, then who, if anyone, is 
to be held morally responsible? Is it only the firearms officer who fired the 
fatal rounds? Is it not only the firearms officer, but also the members of 
the surveillance team who provided the incorrect intelligence with respect 
to the identity of the suspect? Or is it simply an unfortunate outcome for 
which no one is morally responsible? My discussion at this point relies on 
a distinctive relational individualist analysis of collective moral responsi-
bility, developed in detail elsewhere.23
Chapter 6 is concerned with the ethics of the use of lethal force by 
military combatants (much discussed within the framework of just war 
theory). Military combatants principally use lethal force in the context 
of ongoing armed conflicts between the armed forces of political enti-
ties such as, but not restricted to, nation- states.24 Such armed conflicts 
between armed forces include wars between nation- states and wars involv-
ing nonstate actors. The latter include civil wars, wars of liberation, and 
nonconventional wars between state actors and terrorist groups. Given 
the organizational, indeed institutional, character of military combat, the 
use of lethal force by military combatants is, I suggest, importantly dif-
ferent from that of the essentially noninstitutional use of lethal force by 
23. Seumas Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Account,” in Peter 
A. French, ed., Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (2006):176– 193.
24. Seumas Miller, “Just War Theory:  The Case of South Africa,” Philosophical Papers 
19, no. 2 (1990): 143– 161. For a well informed discussion of the morality of political vio-
lence across a broad range of issues see C. A.  J. Coady Morality and Political Violence 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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individuals in self- defense or in defense of the lives of others (discussed 
in Chapter 2).
Here my notion of organizational action as multilayered structures 
of joint action and my notion of collective moral responsibility as joint 
moral responsibility are again salient. These notions allow me to reframe 
the “moral equality of combatants” debate between so- called tradition-
alists, such as Walzer, and so- called revisionists, such as McMahan, in 
terms of the collective, or joint, moral responsibility of actors engaged 
in multilayered structures of joint action. While not discounting the 
moral difference between combatants fighting a just war and those fight-
ing an unjust one, this provides, I suggest, a more nuanced and realistic 
model of moral responsibility in large- scale collective enterprises, such as 
armies fighting (just or unjust) wars. In such contexts, decision making 
is necessarily joint and, therefore, required to be binding on all or most 
if it is to be effective. For example, no single Australian citizen, whether 
that person be the prime minister, the chief of the armed force, or merely 
a low- ranking regular soldier or civilian, can unilaterally decide whether 
Australia will wage war or refrain from doing so. Likewise, disengaging 
from a war that is underway requires a joint decision. Accordingly, there 
is a presumption in favor of an individual who disagrees with such joint 
decisions to go along with them, her disagreement notwithstanding. 
Moreover, individual nonparticipation in a collective enterprise such as 
war may be extremely costly for the individual concerned, and this will be 
an important moral consideration in their decision making.
Further, the institutional purposes served by military personnel and 
the nature of military combat are importantly different from the pur-
poses and activities of police. Accordingly, the institutionally based use of 
lethal force by the military is different from that of the police (discussed 
in Chapter 4). Importantly, once actually engaged in war military com-
batants have evidently waived their right to decide whether or not to use 
lethal force against enemy combatants, and have done so in favor of their 
superiors (assuming their superiors issue lawful orders). By contrast, 
police officers do not waive their corresponding right. In general terms, 
the moral principles governing military use of lethal force are a good deal 
more permissive than those governing the use of lethal force by police 
officers.25 More specifically, there are important differences in the applica-
tion by military personnel— as opposed to ordinary citizens, on the one 
25. Miller, “Police, Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries.”
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hand, and police officers, on the other— of the moral principles that gov-
ern the use of lethal force, notably the principles of imminence, necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination. Moreover, these differences are not 
simply ones explicable in terms of the larger numbers of defenders and 
attackers typically involved in military conflict, or so I argue.
In Chapter 7 I explore the principle of discrimination and the closely 
related notion of civilian immunity in war.26 I  do so in the context of 
(a) the rights- based just war theoretical account of the moral justification 
for waging war elaborated in Chapter  6, and (b)  the contrasting moral 
duties that police officers contemplating the use of lethal force have to 
innocent bystanders. As argued in earlier chapters, a police officer’s use 
of lethal force ought not to put the lives of innocent third parties at risk. 
This requirement derives in part from the primary institutional role of 
police officers to protect citizens from serious harm— and this typically 
trumps their other primary role of arresting offenders. By contrast, mili-
tary combatants can put the lives of innocent citizens at considerable risk 
on grounds of military necessity. So the principle of discrimination in 
play is far more permissive.
In relation to civilian immunity, I first address the issue of moral dif-
ferences between combatants and civilians. In particular, I engage with 
the argument that, contrary to the standard view, the lives of one’s own 
combatants ought to be given priority over the lives of noncombatants of 
the enemy state or other collective political entity. I argue in favor of the 
standard view. Second, I  argue that there are two neglected categories 
of civilians that ought not to enjoy civilian immunity in war.27 The first 
category consists of the members of civilian groups who have a share in 
the collective moral responsibility for the violation of non- life- threatening 
rights violations, yet are not morally responsible for the enforcement of 
these rights violations. Such persons are neither combatants nor their 
leaders; nor do they necessarily assist combatants qua combatants, as do 
(say) munitions workers. The second category consists of the members 
of civilian groups who are collectively morally responsible for culpably 
refraining from assisting those who have a moral right to assistance from 
26. Miller, “Civilian Immunity.”
27. Miller, “On the Morality of Waging War against the State,” 24– 26, and “Civilian 
Immunity,” 123– 135.
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them. Once again, such persons are neither combatants nor their leaders; 
nor do they necessarily assist combatants qua combatants.
The general issued discussed in Chapter 8 is the ethics of armed human-
itarian intervention.28 In recent times there have been a number of armed 
humanitarian interventions by nation- states in conflicts taking place within 
the borders of other nation states. Here one thinks of Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor and, very recently, Iraq (in the context of the 
rise of ISIS) and Syria (in the context of both the Assad regime and ISIS). In 
some instances, such as the genocide in Rwanda, armed intervention is or 
was morally required, but the armed forces deployed were inadequate and/ 
or arrived too late.29 In other instances, such as Kosovo, armed intervention 
might have been justified and timely, but arguably the force deployed was 
excessive, or at least of the wrong form. In still other cases, such as Iraq in 
the context of ISIS and Syria in the context of the Assad regime and ISIS, 
armed intervention is morally justified but there are dilemmas concerning 
not only the precise form it should take, but also who should be the ones to 
undertake the intervention. At any rate, in this chapter my more specific 
concern is to explore the notion of collective moral responsibility as it per-
tains to nation- states contemplating humanitarian armed intervention in a 
variety of settings involving states or groups perpetrating human rights vio-
lations. I do so on the assumption that such interventions are the collective 
moral responsibility of the community of nation states. Accordingly, there 
is a distinction to be made between the institutionally prior, patriotic, and 
essentially partialist collective responsibility of members of a given military 
force in respect of the protection of the rights of their own citizens and this 
cosmopolitan and impartial collective responsibility in respect of the protec-
tion of the rights of the citizens of other nation- states.
Chapter 9 concerns the ethics of targeted killing30. Assassination of 
one’s political enemies in the context of a well- ordered, liberal democratic 
28. See, for example, James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
29. Seumas Miller, “Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan 
Genocide,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 2 (1998): 223– 239.
30. See, for example, Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators:  The Duty to Employ 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 342– 348. See also 
Michael L. Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail 
in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Claire 
Oakes Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, eds., Targeted Killing: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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state is murder and, given the potentially destabilizing effects, a very seri-
ous political crime. Accordingly, it ought not to be tolerated; it is both 
unlawful and morally unjustifiable. What, then, of targeted killing? Here 
there is a need to get clear on the specific contexts in which targeted kill-
ing might take place, such as targeted killing by a military combatant 
of an enemy combatant in a theater of war versus by a police officer of a 
suspected terrorist in a civilian setting. Arguably, the former is morally 
permissible but the latter is not. This raises (again) questions of the insti-
tutional role of police versus military, and of war versus civilian settings.
I provide a definition of targeted killing (which serves to differentiate it 
from assassination, on the one hand, and the use of drone strikes in civil-
ian areas, on the other), and argue that in theaters of war it is, in principle, 
morally permissible.31 However, there are a range of hard cases, such as 
the killing of Osama bin Laden, which may or may not be morally permis-
sible depending on various factors. I discuss some of these, notably the 
killing of bin Laden.
Another kind of hard case is the use of drone strikes in counterterror-
ist operations such as those conducted by the US in the FATA (Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas) of Pakistan and in Yemen. Insofar as these 
drone strikes have been genuine cases of targeted killing in a theatre of 
war and have not violated the principles of jus in bello, then, other things 
being equal, they are morally permissible.
In Chapter  10 I discuss the morality of autonomous weapons.32 The 
advent of autonomous weapons has raised the issue of the moral respon-
sibility for killing in war in a particularly acute form. Indeed, some the-
orists33 have argued, in effect, that autonomous weapons “outsource” 
human responsibility for killing to machines. Are human beings mor-
ally responsible for killings “done” by autonomous weapons? If so, is this 
responsibility indirect? What are the implications for the use of autono-
mous weapons? Should they be banned, for instance?
Autonomous weapons are weapons system that, once programmed 
and activated by a human operator, can— and, if used, do in fact— identify, 
31. Seumas Miller, “The Ethics of Targeted Killing: Osama bin Laden, Drones and Counter- 
Terrorism,” Public Affairs Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2014): 317– 340.
32. Seumas Miller, “Collective Responsibility for the Robopocalypse,” in Jai Galliott 
and M. Lotze, eds., Super Soldiers: The Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (Aldershot, 
U.K.: Ashgate, 2015), 153– 166.
33. Rob Sparrow, “Killer Robots,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007): 63– 77.
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track, and deliver lethal force without further intervention by a human 
operator. By “programmed” I mean, at least, that the individual target or 
type of target has been selected and programmed into the weapons sys-
tem. By “activated” I mean, at least, that the process culminating in the 
already programmed weapon delivering lethal force has been initiated. 
This weaponry includes weapons used in nontargeted killing, such as 
autonomous antiaircraft weapons systems used against multiple attack-
ing aircraft or, more futuristically, against swarm technology (e.g., mul-
tiple lethal miniature attack drones operating as a swarm so as to inhibit 
effective defensive measures); and ones used, or at least capable of being 
used, in targeted killing (e.g., a predator drone with face- recognition tech-
nology and no human operator to confirm a match).
I argue that the use of autonomous drones is, in principle, morally 
impermissible. A key claim on which the argument in favor of autono-
mous weaponry is based is that moral principles, such as military neces-
sity, proportionality, and discrimination, can be reduced to rules, and 
these rules can be programmed in to computers. However, the irreduc-
ibility of moral properties to physical properties34 (i.e., properties detect-
able by the sensors of computerized robotic weaponry) presents a critical, 
if not insurmountable, problem at this point. Specifically, I provide what 
I refer to as the ramification argument: The combination of conceptual 
interdependence between the three jus in bello principles, the irreducibil-
ity of moral properties to physical ones, and their applicability at inter-
connected individual and collective levels gives rise to moral ramification; 
moral ramification, in turn, gives rise to the need for complex decision- 
making such that one cannot simply apply one of these principles (or 
some proxy principle) in a given conceptually discrete and self- contained 
context involving the use of lethal force without taking into account the 
other principles and other contexts at other levels. Accordingly, there is 
a need for context sensitive moral judgment of a kind not able to be ren-
dered into an appropriate form for programming into computers.
34. Seumas Miller, “The Irreducibility of Moral Properties to Physical Properties,” 
(unpublished).
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1
Morally Permissible Use  
of Lethal Force
A TAXONOMY
i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  the focus is on the morality of the use of lethal force by 
and against single individuals, or members of small groups, in the state 
of nature; that is, the focus is on natural, i.e. non- institutional, actors. It 
is an assumption of this work that institutions presuppose natural (i.e. 
non- institutional) moral principles, rights and obligations governing the 
behaviour of non- institutional actors, but also further specify these prin-
ciples, rights and obligations in order to render them fit for purpose in 
particular institutional settings.
It is widely accepted that the use of lethal force is morally justified, or at 
the very least morally permissible, in individual self- defense and by third 
parties to protect human life. These are the two fundamental moral justifi-
cations for the use of lethal force. In due course, however we shall complicate 
the picture. Here, as elsewhere in this book, I assume moral permissibility 
is a weaker notion than moral justification. If an action (or intentional omis-
sion), x, is morally justified, then there are good and decisive, or at least 
sufficient, moral reasons to perform it. By contrast, an action, x, might be 
morally permissible even though there are no good, let alone decisive, moral 
reasons to perform it; rather, there are merely no good or decisive moral 
reasons not to perform x. I also assume that there is a distinction between 
moral responsibility and blameworthiness; blameworthiness entails moral 
responsibility but moral responsibility does not entail moral blamewor-
thiness (or praiseworthiness).1 An agent might be morally responsible for 
1. Seumas Miller “Against the Moral Autonomy Thesis” Journal of Social Philosophy vol.38 
no.3 2007 pp.389- 391
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some morally wrong (avoidable) action but not moral blameworthy since, 
for example, the agent had a valid excuse for performing the action. I refer 
to agents who are blameworthy for performing morally wrong actions as 
morally culpable.
It is argued by many that the protection of human rights— including, 
but not restricted to, the right to life— justifies the use of lethal force or, 
at the very least, renders it morally permissible. In this view, if a moral 
entitlement is a human right, then it is a very strong entitlement indeed. 
As Ronald Dworkin says, “Rights are trumps”2 and held to be enforceable. 
So, other things being equal, coercion may be, and perhaps ought to be, 
used to ensure that such rights are respected. But it is not obvious from 
this that the use of, or the threat of the use of, lethal force is always morally 
permissible in relation to human rights protection, even in situations in 
which other lesser forms of coercion are unavailable or ineffective.
In this book I adopt a broadly rights- based approach.3 In relation to 
the question of the conceptual underpinning of rights, I favor a pluralist 
approach over monist conceptions, such as interest- , needs- , or agency- 
based approaches.4 Let me begin my making some distinctions with 
respect to moral rights that are germane to my purposes.
Human rights are to be distinguished from institutional rights, and 
negative rights from positive rights. Human rights, as opposed to insti-
tutional rights, are rights possessed by virtue of properties one has qua 
individual human being. Thus the right to life is a human right. By con-
trast, the moral (and legal) right a police officer might have to arrest an 
offender is an institutional right. I return to the matter of institutional 
rights, and, in particular, to institutional rights that are also moral rights, 
2. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University 
Press, 1977).
3. There is a voluminous literature on rights. See James Nickel, Making Sense of Human 
Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), for a useful introduction. This literature covers, among 
other things, the logical categorization (so to speak) of rights (e.g. so- called claim rights, 
liberty rights, privileges and immunities). While not denying its importance, in this work, 
as far as is possible, I sidestep this level of analysis; to do otherwise would divert me from 
my central concerns. For a useful discussion of rights in the context of war see Rodin War 
and Self- Defense, Chapter 1.
4. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), for 
an interest- based approach; David Wiggins, Needs, Values and Truth (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1987), for a needs- based one; and James Griffin, On Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), for an agency- based conception.
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in later chapters. Here I note that the primary notion contrasted with 
institutional rights is that of natural rights; natural rights are noninsti-
tutional rights. Human rights are also noninstitutional rights; they are 
a species of natural rights. However, natural rights are not necessarily 
human rights, as I am using these terms, since some natural rights are 
not possessed merely by virtue of properties that their possessors have qua 
individual human beings. For example, human persons have a natural 
right to have sex with one another and to form friendships. But these are 
not moral rights an individual person can possess on his or her own; sex 
and friendship both require another person who is agreeable to having 
sex or to forming a friendship. In such cases I suggest that the individuals 
in question have a jointly held natural right not to be prevented from their 
joint activities by others.5
Negative rights are rights one has not to be interfered with by others. 
So the rights not to be killed or not to have one’s freedom restricted are 
negative rights. By contrast, the right to have sufficient food to keep one 
alive is a positive right; it is a right to assistance from others, if such assis-
tance is required and they are able to provide it at a relatively small cost to 
themselves.
As is well known, both of these sets of distinctions are problematic in vari-
ous ways. Indeed, the very notion of a moral right is problematic. Nevertheless, 
for my purposes here, I am going to assume that there are natural rights of 
which human rights are a species, and that these rights include at least some 
of the ones typically referred to as positive rights. In particular, I am going to 
assume that natural rights are, or at least include, some or all of those rights 
that Henry Shue refers to as basic rights.6 Basic rights include the right to 
physical security and the right to a subsistence level of food.
Moreover, I  am also assuming certain properties of natural rights. 
First, many natural rights generate concomitant moral obligations on oth-
ers. So A’s right to life generates an obligation on the part of B not to kill 
A. Second, natural rights are justifiably enforceable.7 So A has a right not 
5. An alternative to this might be to define such joint rights as joint human rights, in 
which case the notion of a human right and that of a natural right would be more or less 
interchangeable.
6. Henry Shue, Basic Rights:  Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
7. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 202– 209; Miller, “Civilian Immunity,” 
113– 135.
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to be killed by B, and if B unjustifiably attempts to kill A, then (other 
things being equal) C is morally justified in using lethal force to prevent 
B from killing A (if no other means of prevention are available). Note that 
C might in fact be A, in which case it is an instance of justifiable killing in 
self- defense, as opposed to killing in defense of another person.
My task in this chapter is to map the conceptual terrain of interest to 
us in our discussion of the morally justified or morally permissible use of 
lethal force, and thereby pave the way for the more detailed discussions 
of particular institutional and noninstitutional (typically, natural) cases 
of the use of lethal force. Institutional cases are ones in which the lethal 
force in question is deployed by institutional actors in their capacity as 
institutional actors; noninstitutional cases are ones in which lethal force 
is used by ordinary human beings in their noninstitutional (typically, nat-
ural) capacities. The paradigmatic cases of institutional actors who deploy 
lethal force are police officers and military combatants, and it is these that 
will receive detailed treatment in Chapters 3– 10.
The paradigm cases of noninstitutional use of lethal force are ones in 
which one person, B, mounts an unjustified lethal attack against another 
person A, and A responds by killing B in self- defense; or, alternatively, 
person B attacks A and a third person, C, responds by killing B in defense 
of A. These are essentially cases in which A’s negative rights, particularly 
A’s right not to be killed, are being violated. Notice that in these paradigm 
cases, the threat to A posed by B is an imminent threat; so A’s (or C’s) lethal 
response is not a preemptive attack on B. Moreover, it is necessary for A (or 
C) to kill B if A’s life is to be preserved. Finally, the killing of B is not a 
disproportionate response; after all, it is A’s life that has been deliberately 
and unjustifiably put at risk by B.
These three principles— imminence, necessity, and proportionality— 
are in part constitutive of justifiable use of lethal force in our paradigmatic 
noninstitutional cases. However, as we shall see below in this chapter, 
and in the chapters following this one, the nature or, at least, applica-
tion of these principles can vary greatly depending on the institutional or 
noninstitutional context. For example, the principle of military necessity 
applicable to the use of lethal force by military combatants in a theater of 
war is quite different from the notion of necessity applicable in noninsti-
tutional cases of personal self- defense in peacetime settings. There is a 
fourth salient principle; namely, the principle of discrimination. Roughly 
speaking, this principle captures the fundamental moral intuition that it 
is only those that are morally responsible for an unjustified lethal attack 
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that can be justifiably killed by the person attacked or by some third party. 
However, there are important complications arising from the application 
of this principle in war and other settings. I  discuss these in detail in 
Chapter 7.
In many of the paradigm cases of noninstitutional justifiable use of 
lethal force, the agents involved, whether they be defenders or attack-
ers, are acting on their own as single individuals. However, I want to 
complicate matters in two main ways. First, I introduce cases in which 
although B does not attack A, A nevertheless has some positive right to 
assistance from B. For example, A might have a moral right that B pro-
vide A with food and water to enable A’s survival. If so, then A may well 
have an enforcement right against B. Moreover, in such a scenario involv-
ing a third person, C, A’s positive right to assistance from B may well be 
enforceable by C. Note that although such positive rights are, at least in 
principle, enforceable, it does not follow that enforcement by means of 
lethal force is morally justified or permissible; perhaps only the use of a 
lesser form of force is justified or permissible. The reason for this might 
be that positive rights are, other things being equal, less morally weighty 
than negative rights. I return to this issue below.
The second complication is the introduction of cases of joint action, as 
opposed to cases of single action. I offer a more detailed account of joint 
action below.8 However, joint action is action in which two or more agents 
each perform an individual action in the service of some shared or com-
mon end, such as an end that each has but which neither could readily 
achieve by acting alone. (I refer to such ends as collective ends.) Imagine, 
for example, that agents B1 and B2 want to kill A, but neither can achieve 
this acting alone. However, acting together, for instance by B1 restraining 
A while B2 stabs A, they can kill A. If B1 and B2 act in this manner, then 
they will have jointly brought about A’s death, notwithstanding that each 
acting on his own would not have done so.
In the discussion of joint action scenarios involving violations of nega-
tive rights, for the most part I assume that in any given scenario there are 
multiple attackers, multiple defenders, and multiple third- party enforcers 
(in cases involving defense of the rights of others), and, in particular, that 
8. Miller, “Joint Action”; Miller, Social Action, Chapter 2; Miller, Moral Foundations of 
Social Institutions, Chapter 1. See also Seumas Miller, “Joint Action: The Individual Strikes 
Back,” in S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John 
Searle’s Social Ontology (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2007), 73– 92.
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there is a joint attack and a joint defense (either by the defenders them-
selves or by third- party enforcers). Similarly, in the case of joint action sce-
narios involving violations of positive rights, for the most part I assume 
that there are multiple persons deliberately refraining from discharging 
their positive obligations (multiple refrainers, so to speak), multiple per-
sons whose positive rights are being violated (defenders), and multiple 
third- party enforcers (in cases involving defense of the rights of others), 
and, in particular, that there is a joint omission (by the refrainers) and a 
joint defense of positive rights (either by the defenders themselves or by 
third- party enforcers).
In section 1.1, I discuss single action scenarios, or scenarios in which 
there is a single rights violator (either an attacker or, in the case of posi-
tive rights violations, a refrainer), a single defender, and a single enforcer 
(albeit the defender might be the enforcer). In subsection 1.1.1, I consider 
the use of lethal force in the defense of so- called negative human rights. 
In subsection 1.1.2, I turn to a consideration of the use of lethal force in 
order to enforce positive human rights.
In section 1.2, I  consider multiple action scenarios, or scenarios in 
which there are multiple rights violators (whether attackers or refrainers), 
multiple defenders, and/ or multiple rights enforcers, and in which the 
violators and/ or enforcers are acting jointly. For example, a defender’s life 
might be unjustifiably threatened by a number of attackers who are acting 
jointly— perhaps because none of them could kill the defender if acting 
alone. Again, a number of persons intervening to protect a defender from 
an unjustified attack might act jointly, and they might do so because none 
of them could hope to protect the defender’s life if they acted alone. In sub-
section 1.2.1, I consider joint action cases in which the use of lethal force 
is in the defense of negative human rights. In subsection 1.2.2, I turn to 
a consideration of joint action cases in which the use of lethal force is in 
order to enforce positive human rights.
1.1  Morally Justified/ Permissible Use of Lethal 
Force: Single Action Scenarios
1.1.1  Use of Deadly Force in the Defense of Negative 
Human Rights
There is a human right to life, and killing another person can only be mor-
ally justified or, at the very least, rendered morally permissible in extreme 
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circumstances. The basic such circumstance is that of self- defense. I am 
morally entitled to kill another person if that person is trying to kill me 
and will succeed if I do not kill him or her first. However, self- defense is 
not the only justification for taking the life of another person. It is widely 
accepted that each of us also has the right to kill in defense of the lives of 
others. I am morally entitled to kill someone attempting to kill my wife or 
husband if this is the only means of prevention. Notice that in such cases 
of other- person defense, it is widely believed not only that it is morally 
permissible9 for a third party to use lethal force, but also that such use of 
lethal force is a moral obligation, supposing the third party can intervene 
without incurring any serious cost to him or herself. Accordingly, there 
is a good and decisive moral reason to use lethal force, and so killing the 
attacker is the morally preferable alternative.
Killing in order to defend one’s own life or the life of another is mor-
ally justified on the grounds that each of us has a right to life or, more 
specifically in the context of a discussion of negative rights, a right not 
to be killed.10 Speaking generally, we are entitled to defend the right not 
to be killed by an attacker posing an imminent threat, and to do so by 
killing our attacker under three conditions (I provide a more detailed 
and nuanced account of justifiable killing in self- defense in Chapter 2). 
First, the (single) attacker is deliberately trying to kill someone— either 
oneself or another person— and will succeed if we do not intervene. We 
are not entitled to shoot dead an attacker whom we know is threaten-
ing us only with (say) a replica of a gun. Second, we have no way of 
preserving our own or the other person’s life other than by killing the 
attacker (the above- mentioned necessity condition). The defender may be 
unable to flee to safety, for example. Third, and more problematically, our 
attacker does not have a justificatory moral reason for deliberately trying 
to kill. If all these conditions are met, then the attacker poses a morally 
culpable unjustified threat to life, and therefore a lethal response is not 
disproportionate.
9. Note that the use of lethal force might, at least in theory, be morally permissible even 
though there was a morally equivalent alternative.
10. For a range of accounts of the moral justification for killing in self- defense, see 
Thomson, “Self- Defense”; Montague, “Self- Defence and Choosing between Lives”; Jenny 
Teichman, “Self- Defence,” in Pacifism and the Just War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Seumas 
Miller, “Killing in Self- Defence,” Public Affairs Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1993): 325–340; Suzanne 
Uniacke, Permissible Killing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jeff McMahan, 
“The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 386– 405.
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Having outlined the standard account of killing in self- defense or in 
defense of the life of others, let me now consider a somewhat different, or 
at least an expanded kind of, moral justification for killing in defense of a 
self; namely, killing in defense of moral rights to properties constitutive 
of selfhood other than life. Note that I am here concerned with violations 
of negative rights, so my focus is on unjustifiable attacks on rights to prop-
erties constitutive of selfhood. I discuss the corresponding violations of 
positive rights in subsection 1.1.2.
In speaking of killing in defense of rights other than the right not 
to be killed, one would obviously not want to include all negative moral 
rights, or at least not all violations of all negative moral rights (let alone all 
violations of all positive rights). For example, property rights are arguably 
moral rights, but for someone to kill someone else to prevent them stealing 
a handbag, for example, would be morally unacceptable; indeed, it would 
not only be morally unjustifiable, it would also be morally impermissible.
So the first question is: Are there any negative moral rights, apart from 
the right not to be killed, the protection of which would justify the use of 
lethal force, or at the very least render it morally permissible? Candidates 
for such rights might include a right not to be assaulted or to have one’s 
freedom curtailed. And in the light of my notion of properties constitu-
tive of selfhood, the second (narrower) question is: Are there any nega-
tive moral rights to things constitutive of selfhood, other than life, the 
protection of which would justify the use of lethal force or render it mor-
ally permissible, such as the right not to be attacked by someone bent on 
inflicting severe brain damage?
What is this distinction between rights to things constitutive of an 
individual human being’s selfhood and rights to things not so constitu-
tive? More specifically, what are some of the rights to things which are 
not constitutive of the self? I suggest that they include many institutional 
rights, such as the right to property, and perhaps the right to a fair trial 
and the right to hold offices of various kinds. I further suggest that it is 
morally justifiable to use lethal force to protect rights to things constitu-
tive of selfhood— where it is understood that such things include, but 
are not restricted to, life. In particular, there is a justification for killing 
in what is quite literally self- defense— the defense of the self— and for 
protecting the self of others. In later chapters I argue that in some circum-
stances the use of lethal force to protect certain other rights that are rights 
to things not constitutive of selfhood is morally permissible, if not morally 
justified. Before doing so, however, I want to briefly deal with the claim 
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that there is no acceptable distinction to be made between rights to things 
constitutive of the self and rights to things not constitutive of the self.
Surely some such distinction is necessary. For we need to be able to 
distinguish between, say, a right to life and a right to property. If I defend 
myself against someone trying to kill me, it is defense of the self, as it is 
literally the destruction of myself that is in question. Similarly, if I defend 
myself against someone trying to irreparably damage those parts of my 
brain by virtue of which I have the capacity to perform intellectual tasks, 
then it is defense of my selfhood. Such capacities are constitutive of self-
hood. However, if I defend my property— say, my car, or an intrusion by 
an unarmed trespasser in my home— then I am not necessarily defend-
ing myself. Neither my car nor my home are constitutive elements of my 
selfhood. If my car is wrecked, or I sell my house, I am nevertheless still 
intact.
Moreover, it is important not to assimilate the various rights to defend 
freedoms to the right to defend selfhood, since the various freedoms 
cut across the distinction between properties constitutive of selfhood 
and properties not so constitutive. Consider locking someone in a room. 
This is a violation of their freedom of movement. Yet we can distinguish 
between the capacity of the agent in herself to freely move and the exis-
tence of external impediments to the exercise of that capacity. The former, 
but not the latter, is constitutive (in part) of selfhood. To see this, consider, 
first, the resistance of a person, A, to an attempt by another person, B, to 
inject A  with a drug that would permanently and irreversibly paralyze 
A.  Here A’s capacity to move is destroyed. Contrast this with the case 
where A is locked in a five- star hotel room for two days— with full room 
service! Here no constitutive element of A’s selfhood is destroyed.
Finally, it is important to recognize that some rights to things not con-
stitutive of selfhood have violation thresholds, such that at points beyond 
the threshold, violations threaten things that are constitutive of selfhood. 
For example, if someone is incarcerated and suffers severe and longstand-
ing limitations of their freedom of expression, privacy, and freedom of 
movement, this may, over time, undermine that person’s capacity to think 
and act independently. Such a loss of agency may come to constitute a par-
tial destruction of selfhood. Likewise, an act of rape or assault may reach a 
threshold where it threatens to destroy aspects of selfhood, including the 
capacity to relate sexually or socially with other people.
I do not claim to have precisely drawn the distinction between elements 
of selfhood and other sorts of things to which one has rights. I do not 
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even claim that the distinction can be precisely drawn. I merely claim that 
it is evident that there is some such distinction to be drawn. This being so, 
we need to distinguish between killing in self- defense, or in the defense 
of other selves— understood as defense of the self— and what I am calling 
killing in defense of rights not constitutive of selfhood. I note that actions 
typically or colloquially regarded as actions of self- defense are not acts of 
self- defense in my (somewhat artificial) sense. For example, if A kills B in 
order to prevent B slapping A, this might be held colloquially to be an act 
of self- defense, whereas it would not be held so in my stipulated sense. Let 
us now turn to positive rights.
1.1.2   The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Positive 
Human Rights
Shue’s basic moral rights include the right to security and the right to sub-
sistence.11 Shue argues that these basic rights generate rights to protection 
and assistance. Let us accept Shue’s general line of argument here. Such 
basic moral rights are not restricted to negative rights; rather, they include 
some positive rights, such as the right to subsistence. Accordingly, lethal 
force might be justified, or at least it might be morally permissible, in a 
situation in which someone is refusing to provide for the basic material 
needs of someone else. Let us consider a simple example to test our intu-
itions in favor of this theoretical claim: the case of a drowning man who 
could easily be saved by a bystander on an adjacent overwater walkway. 
The bystander simply needs to release the life jacket she is holding and it 
will drop down to the drowning man. However, she refuses to do so since 
he is a stranger and she dislikes the look of him. But the drowning man 
has a speargun and threatens to shoot her dead if she does not release the 
life jacket to him. She calls his bluff, perhaps doubting his ability to simul-
taneously tread water and fire an accurate shot. At any rate, the drowning 
man shoots her dead. As she falls from the narrow unfenced walkway 
into the water she automatically releases the life jacket thus enabling the 
drowning man to save himself.12
11. Shue, Basic Rights.
12. Naturally, the mere threat of lethal force might be sufficient. The bystander might delib-
erately drop the life jacket when threatened so as to save her own life.
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In this scenario, we are assuming that the threat to the life of the 
drowning man is imminent; that is, he will drown if he is not rescued 
within a minute or two. Second, the bystander has a moral obligation to 
save the drowning man, since she can do so at virtually no cost to herself. 
Third, it is necessary for the drowning man to shoot the bystander dead if 
he is to save his own life; he has no other options. Finally, the drowning 
man’s lethal response is not disproportionate, at least in the sense that he 
is taking one life to save his own life— and, indeed, the life of someone 
who is morally culpable by virtue of violating the drowning man’s positive 
right to assistance. Accordingly, the scenario is analogous to the paradigm 
cases described above of killing in defense of one’s negative right not to 
be killed.
Notwithstanding this analogy, the drowning man scenario is in an 
important respect morally different from the corresponding negative 
rights violations scenarios. Specifically, the bystander who is killed by the 
drowning man is not the (intentional or unintentional) cause of the life- 
threatening situation in which the drowning man finds himself; indeed, 
she is not responsible, causally or morally, for bringing about the life- 
threatening situation of the drowning man, albeit had he not acted she 
would have been morally responsible for failing to save him (and, to that 
extent, for his death). Accordingly, the justificatory moral reasons for the 
drowning man killing the bystander have less moral weight than the 
reasons that the defender (or the third- party enforcer) has for killing his 
attacker in our corresponding negative rights violation scenario.13
Notwithstanding the weaker moral case for the drowning man’s lethal 
response, my intuition is that the drowning man’s action is morally per-
missible.14 The drowning man has a positive and enforceable right to be 
assisted, and the bystander is deliberately and unjustifiably refraining 
from carrying out her moral obligation to assist. Moreover, the assistance 
in question can be rendered at a very small cost to the bystander. In addi-
tion, the three conditions of imminence, necessity, and proportionality 
obtain.
13. There is a large philosophical literature on these issues of the stringency of positive 
versus negative rights, of the morality of doing versus allowing, and of acting versus 
refraining. Suffice it to say here that my claims here are disputable. See, for example, 
Bruce Russell, “On the Relative Strictness of Negative and Positive Duties,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1977): 87– 97.
14. I have argued for this in Miller, “Civilian Immunity,” 116– 119. See also Miller, Moral 
Foundations of Social Institutions, 202– 209.
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It might be argued, contra what I have assumed, that positive rights 
to assistance are not enforceable, or at least that this one is not. This is 
implausible. Consider a variation in the scenario in which the drowning 
man could only shoot non- life- threatening, but nevertheless injurious, 
rubber bullets at the bystander. Surely he would be morally justified in 
doing so to save his life. This suggests an alternative qualified view and 
a corresponding more nuanced argument against the claim that positive 
rights are not enforceable. This alternative view holds that the positive 
right to assistance is enforceable, but it also maintains that it is, never-
theless, not enforceable by means of lethal force. Lethal force would be 
excessive in this second (qualified) view. Therefore, in this qualified view, 
it is morally impermissible for the drowning man to shoot the bystander 
dead. However, it is permissible for him to use nonlethal, injurious force, 
such as rubber bullets.
I do not find the qualified view compelling. Certainly it is incomplete. 
For surely it would be morally excusable, even if not morally justified, 
for the drowning man to kill the bystander in our scenario. Aside from 
the impartialist moral considerations detailed above, there is a partialist 
moral consideration in play. Arguably, the drowning man is entitled to 
give some additional weight to his own life over that of the bystander, 
given that the bystander is culpably failing to assist. I  conclude that it 
is morally permissible or, at least, morally excusable for a person to use 
lethal force to enforce some of his or her positive rights under some 
circumstances.
In this subsection I have put forward an argument based on the 
enforceability of positive rights, along with the existence of intuitively 
appealing scenarios, to the conclusion that it is morally permissible for 
a person to use lethal force to enforce some of his or her natural positive 
rights. However, I accept that my arguments in this regard are not entirely 
compelling. Specifically, it might be claimed that although the positive 
rights in question are enforceable, the use of lethal force to enforce posi-
tive rights, while morally excusable in some cases, is not morally permis-
sible, because it is too extreme a response. Presumably, this claim rests on 
the moral difference between culpable unjust killing and culpable unjust 
refraining from preserving life; the latter being a lesser evil than the for-
mer (other things being equal).
Thus far we have been discussing scenarios in which the person 
whose life is at risk is the one who is using or threatening to use lethal 
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force to enforce their positive right to assistance. But what should we now 
make of the moral obligation of third parties to enforce positive rights? 
Presumably, it is permissible, and perhaps obligatory, for a third party 
to enforce some positive rights to assistance under some circumstances. 
However, the question arises as to whether it would be morally permis-
sible for the third party to use, or to threaten to use, lethal force to ensure 
compliance. This is less certain. On the other hand, I have argued that one 
can justifiably, or at least excusably, use lethal force to enforce one’s own 
positive rights, including (presumably) rights to subsistence. Moreover, 
it is generally agreed that both oneself and third parties can justifiably 
use lethal force to enforce one’s negative rights. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear whether it is morally justifiable, or at least excusable, for third 
parties to use lethal force to enforce positive rights. Let us pursue this 
matter further.
Consider the following version of our drowning scenario. A young boy 
is drowning, and a bystander is refusing to discharge her moral obligation 
to assist him, even though she could easily do so if she dropped down to 
him the life jacket that she is holding. Now assume that the boy’s father— 
a crippled war veteran— is nearby but unable to help his son, since no life 
jacket is within his reach. Perhaps he is without his wheelchair. However, 
the father does have a handgun and— as in the drowning man scenario— 
he first threatens and then kills the bystander, thereby ensuring that his 
son is rescued. Surely the father’s action is morally excusable, even if not 
morally justified. For as in the earlier version of this scenario, there is a 
partialist moral consideration in play, albeit a different one. Arguably, the 
boy’s father is entitled to give some additional weight to the life of his son 
over that of the bystander, given that the bystander is culpably failing to 
assist.
I suggest that this scenario demonstrates that it is morally justifiable, 
or at least excusable, for some third parties to use lethal force to enforce 
positive rights to life (and perhaps rights to other properties constitu-
tive of selfhood); namely, third parties with an especially strong and 
stringent moral obligation to protect the persons whose positive rights 
are being, or are about to be, violated, such as third parties who are 
parents of, or otherwise have special moral duties to, the persons in 
question. Let us now turn to the morally justifiable use of lethal force in 
joint action scenarios. We begin with an analysis of the concept of joint 
action.
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1.2  Morally Justified Use of Lethal Force: Joint 
Action Scenarios
Joint actions are actions involving a number of agents performing interde-
pendent actions in order to realize some common goal. Examples of joint 
action include two people dancing together, a number of tradespeople build-
ing a house, and a group of robbers burgling a house. Joint action is to be dis-
tinguished from individual action, on the one hand, and from the “actions” of 
corporate bodies, on the other. Thus an individual walking down the road or 
shooting at a target are instances of individual action. A nation declaring war 
or a government taking legal action against a public company are instances 
of corporate action. Insofar as such corporate “actions” are genuine actions 
involving mental states, such as intentions and beliefs, they are, in my view, 
reducible to the individual and joint actions of human beings. However, I am 
not going to press this point here, since I take it up in later chapters.
Over the last decade or two, a number of analyses of joint action have 
emerged. These analyses can be located on a spectrum, at one end of which 
there is so- called (by Frederick Schmitt) strict individualism, and at the other 
end of which there is so- called (again by Schmitt) supraindividualism.15 
A number of these theorists have developed and applied their favored basic 
accounts of joint action in order to account for a range of social phenomena, 
including conventions, social norms, and social institutions.16 One such the-
ory is my collective end theory (CET), which is elaborated elsewhere.17 CET is 
a form of individualism, and I will use it throughout this book.18
15. Frederick Schmitt, Socializing Metaphysics:  The Nature of Social Reality (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), Chapter 1.
16. John R. Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” in Philip R. Cohen, Jerry L. Moran, 
and Martha E. Pollack, eds., Intentions in Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1990) 401–415; Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Michael Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” 
Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 327– 341. A fourth relevant influential theorist is Raimo 
Tuomela. However, Tuomela’s view oscillates between the views of the other three. See 
Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). For criticisms of these theorists, see Seumas Miller, “Intentions, 
Ends and Joint Action,” Philosophical Papers 24, no.1 (1995): 51– 67.
17. Miller, “Joint Action”; Miller, Social Action, Chapter 2; Miller, Moral Foundations of 
Social Institutions, Chapter 1.
18. Of the related individualist accounts, Bratman’s is the most salient. However, it is not 
serviceable in later chapters since it does not generalize to social institutions. See his Shared 
Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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Individualism, as I see it, is committed to an analysis of joint action 
such that ultimately a joint action consists of (1)  a number of singular 
actions, and (2) relations between these singular actions. Moreover, the 
constitutive attitudes involved in joint actions are individual attitudes; 
there are no sui generis we- intentions or we- attitudes. It is important to 
stress that individualism can be, and in the case of CET certainly is, a form 
of relationalism. So I will dub my account “relational individualism.” It is 
relational in two senses. First, as mentioned above, singular actions often 
stand in relations to one another (e.g., two partners dancing), and the joint 
action in part consists of singular actions, and in part consists of the rela-
tions between the singular actions. Second, the agents who perform joint 
actions can have intersubjective attitudes to one another, (e.g., they mutu-
ally recognize each other), and some (but not all) of these attitudes are sui 
generis. Specifically, some cognitive (but not conative) intersubjective atti-
tudes may well be sui generis (e.g., mutual consciousness of one another’s 
consciousness).19 In virtue of such intersubjective attitudes, they will also 
typically have interpersonal relations with one another. Intersubjectivity 
and interpersonal relations in this sense are not necessarily, or at least are 
not by definition, social or institutional. To suggest otherwise would be to 
beg the question against individualism (specifically, relational individual-
ism) in any interesting sense of the term.
By contrast, according to supraindividualists, when a plurality of indi-
vidual agents perform a joint action, the agents necessarily have the rel-
evant propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) in an irreducible 
“we- form” which is sui generis, and as such not analyzable in terms of 
individual or I- attitudes. Moreover, the individual agents constitute a new 
entity, a supraindividual entity not reducible to the individual agents and 
the relations between them.
Basically, CET is the theory that joint actions are actions directed 
toward the realization of a collective end. However, this notion of a col-
lective end is a construction out of the prior notion of an individual end. 
A  collective end is an individual end more than one agent has, and is 
such that, if it is realized, it is realized by all, or most, of the actions of the 
agents involved; the individual action of any given agent is only part of the 
19. C. D. Broad, in The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Kegan Paul, 1928), appeared 
to have this kind of notion in mind when he spoke of “extraspection.” See also Naomi 
Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Johannes Roessler, eds., Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Chapter 14.
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means by which the end is realized, and each individual action is interde-
pendent of the others in the service of the collective end. Thus when one 
person dials the phone number of another person, and the second person 
picks up the receiver, each of them has performed an action in the service 
of a collective end— a collective end that each of them has: to communi-
cate with each other.
On the basis of this individualist notion of a joint action, a number of 
related notions can be constructed, including the notion of a convention. 
A convention can be understood as being, in essence, a set of joint actions, 
each of which is performed in a recurring situation.20 Thus, driving on 
the right- hand side of the road is a convention that each of us adheres to 
in order to realize the collective end of avoiding collisions. Accordingly, a 
convention is a construction out of the prior notions of a joint action and 
what I will refer to as a procedure. One has a procedure if one more or less 
automatically performs a given type of action in a recurring situation. 
So, for example, habits are procedures. Armed with the notion of a joint 
action, let us turn to the matter of the moral justifiability, or at least moral 
permissibility, of the use of lethal force in joint action scenarios, begin-
ning with those involving the violations of negative rights.
1.2.1  Joint Action Scenarios: Negative Rights Violations
Consider the following collective action situation in which the outcome 
of the collective action is overdetermined by the actions of the agents 
involved. Suppose that each of five men inflicts a single stab wound on a 
sixth man, John Smith, intending to kill him. The stabbings are simul-
taneous, and Smith dies from his wounds.21 However, three stab wounds 
would have been causally sufficient to kill him. That is, three stab wounds 
are individually causally necessary, and jointly causally sufficient, to kill 
Smith. Therefore, no single stab wound (of the five) is either causally 
20. Miller, Social Action, Chapter 3; and Seumas Miller, “On Conventions,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 4 (December 1992): 435– 445. Conventions are to be distin-
guished from social norms. The latter, but not necessarily the former, have a moral dimen-
sion. See Seumas Miller "Social Norms" in (ed.) G. Holmstrom- Hintikka and R Tuomela 
Contemporary Action Theory (Volume 2:  Social Action) (Dordrecht:  Kluwer  – Synthese 
Library Series, 1997) pp.211- 229
21.   Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility.” See also Seumas Miller, “Collective 
Responsibility,” Public Affairs Quarterly 15, no. 1 (2001):  65– 82; Miller, Social Action, 
Chapter 8; and Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapter 4.
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necessary or sufficient for Smith’s death. So while each of the men per-
formed an action (a stabbing) that was causally necessary and sufficient 
for wounding Smith, not one of the five men performed an action that was 
either causally necessary or causally sufficient for Smith’s death. So each 
of the men is individually morally responsible for wounding Smith, but 
what about the moral responsibility for killing him? It might be thought 
that if a person has not performed an action that was either causally nec-
essary or sufficient for a person’s death, then that person cannot be held 
responsible for the person’s death. In that case, none of the five men is 
responsible for Smith’s death. But if none of the five is responsible, then 
presumably no one is responsible. For the cause of Smith’s death was the 
stab wounds, and these were made by the five men.
Notwithstanding the above claimed lack of individual moral responsi-
bility, it might be held that the five men were collectively morally respon-
sible for Smith’s death. But even this appears to be false, since only the 
actions of three of the men were necessary for Smith’s death. So at best 
we are entitled to conclude that (an unspecified and perhaps unspecifi-
able) three of the five men were collectively responsible for Smith’s death, 
but no individual was responsible. This conclusion is very unpalatable, 
indeed. For one thing, it sets up an unbridgeable gap between collective 
responsibility and individual responsibility; a collective can be morally 
responsible for an outcome, even though none of its members are.22 For 
another, it licenses the commission of immoral acts, so long as they are 
collective actions involving overdetermination; individual perpetrators are 
thus not morally responsible for heinous crimes, so long as they commit 
those crimes collectively, and their actions overdetermine the outcome.
We first need an analysis of the kind of collective actions at issue. We 
have one at hand— the above- described account of joint actions. So we can 
conceive of such cases of collective action as actions directed to a collective 
end; in our example, the collective end is the death of Smith. Each of the 
five men has the collective end as an end. Moreover, each of the five per-
forms the act of stabbing as a means to the collective end he has. Further, 
the actions of the five agents are interdependent. That is, each performs his 
contributory action if he believes the others will perform theirs, and each 
22. Some theorists, however, such as Russell Hardin, in Morality within the Limits of 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), are prepared to bite the bullet. For 
criticisms, see Seumas Miller and Pekka Makela, “The Collectivist Approach to Collective 
Moral Responsibility,” Metaphilosophy 36, no. 5 (2005): 634– 651.
32 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
32
does so only if he believes this. Why are the actions interdependent? They 
are interdependent by virtue of the existence of the collective end pos-
sessed by each of the five agents, and toward the realization of which each 
of the individual acts is directed. Indeed, there is also interdependence 
with respect to the shared end that each has, for each would not have as 
an end the death of Smith if the others did not, since none can realize that 
end on his own. So there is a shared and interdependent end (a collective 
end), and there is interdependence of action (i.e., each stabbed only on 
condition that the others stabbed). So the full set of five acts of stabbing 
can be regarded as the means by which the collective end was realized; 
and each act of stabbing was a part of that means. Moreover, in virtue of 
interdependence, each act of stabbing is an integral part of the means to 
the collective end. Since killing someone is significant, I  conclude that 
all five agents are jointly— and therefore collectively— morally responsible 
for killing Smith.23 For each performed an act of stabbing in the service 
of that (collective) end (Smith’s death), and each of these acts of stabbing 
was an integral part of the means to that end. Moreover, each agent can be 
held fully morally responsible for Smith’s death; the moral responsibility 
of each is not diminished by the fact that each of the others is also morally 
responsible. I am not, of course, suggesting that in all cases of morally 
significant joint actions, each participating agent is fully morally respon-
sible for the aimed at outcome of the joint action, i.e. the realization of the 
collective end. In many cases, especially ones involving large- scale joint 
actions, each participating agent may only be partially morally responsible 
for the realization of the collective end. (I return to this issue in  chapter 5.)
This example demonstrates that an individual’s action need neither 
be a necessary nor a sufficient condition of an outcome for the individual 
to be fully morally responsible for that outcome. If an individual inten-
tionally makes a causal contribution to an outcome, and does so in the 
service of a collective end to realize that outcome, then this may well be 
sufficient— other things being equal— for the individual to be fully mor-
ally responsible for that outcome. Or, at least, this is so in some cases 
of morally significant joint actions involving only a small number of 
participants.
Let us now assume that the victim of the stabbing attack has a gun 
and is able to defend himself by shooting his attackers. Bear in mind that 
he (the defender) does so only when the threat is imminent, so our first 
23. Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility.”
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principle of imminence is met. Moreover, we know from the example 
that the defender only needs to shoot three attackers in order to save his 
life. Therefore, he ought only to shoot three of the five on pain of breach-
ing the necessity principle. So far, so good— but what of the propor-
tionality principle? Would it not be disproportionate for the defender to 
take the lives of three attackers to save only one life (albeit his own life)? 
Presumably, it is not disproportionate, given that— as we saw above— 
each of the three attackers would be fully morally responsible for his 
murder, were he not to defend himself by shooting them. Naturally, mat-
ters might be different if each of the attackers was only partially responsi-
ble, i.e. each only had a share of the overall responsibility for the plurality 
of deaths. Joint action in which moral responsibility for the realization 
of the collective end is shared tends to involve large numbers of partici-
pants. Thus in a scenario involving a very large numbers of attackers, 
each with only a small share of the overall moral responsibility for the 
realisation of the collective end, matters become less morally clear cut. 
Consider, for example, a mass killing in which there are a 1000 attackers 
and a 1000 victims but in which each attacker only kills one victim, albeit 
each attacker does so in the service of the collective end of the deaths of 
the 1000 victims. I return to the discussion of the proportionality prin-
ciple in the next chapter on self- defense and of collective responsibility 
for large- scale killing in Chapter 8.
I now want to discuss a variation of the above scenario— a variation 
in which there are five victims rather than one. Moreover, the attackers 
attack the five victims by shooting at them, and each attacker has a gun 
with three bullets in its chamber. Further, to be shot dead it is necessary 
for each of the victims to be hit with two or more bullets. So if the attack-
ers are to kill all five victims, they will need to coordinate their shooting 
actions. Suppose, for example, each of the five attackers fires his three 
bullets at the same two victims as the other attackers do. This would have 
the consequence that three of the victims— those not shot— would escape 
with their lives. In this scenario, as in the original stabbing scenario, it 
is obvious that each of the attackers is fully morally responsible for any 
harm he causes to any of the five victims he hits with one or more of the 
bullets he fires. But, assuming the attackers do coordinate their actions, 
is each of the five attackers fully morally responsible for the deaths of 
all five victims, notwithstanding that any given attacker has shot at most 
three of the five victims? In the light of the above argument concerning 
the stabbing scenario, each of the five attackers in this shooting scenario 
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is fully morally responsible for the outcome consisting of the five deaths. 
For that outcome was the jointly held collective end of each attacker, and 
each made his individual causal contribution interdependently with the 
others and as an integral part of the means to that collective end. This is 
consistent with an attacker who fires one bullet at a given victim being 
individually fully morally responsible for wounding that victim, since the 
attacker shot the victim having as an individual end to wound the vic-
tim. It is also consistent with an attacker who fires two bullets at a given 
victim being individually fully morally responsible for killing that victim, 
since two bullets is sufficient to kill the victim and the attacker shot the 
bullets at the victim having as an individual end to kill the victim. So the 
fact that one attacker, B1, is individually fully morally responsible for kill-
ing one victim, A1, does not exclude attacker B1 from being fully morally 
responsible (jointly with the other attackers) for all five deaths. Nor does 
it exclude each of the other attackers (B2, for example) being fully mor-
ally responsible (jointly with the other attackers, including B1) for all five 
deaths – including the death of A1.
Here it is important to note the following. First, the content of the col-
lective end (the death of the five victims) is not the same as the content 
of any of the merely individual ends (e.g. the death of A1). This is to be 
expected since the collective end is the end of the joint action whereas 
merely individual ends are the ends of merely individual actions (albeit, 
the individual actions in question are also in part constitutive of the joint 
action).
Second, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between indi-
vidual moral responsibility tout court and individual moral responsibility 
held jointly with others and, moreover, to ascribe moral responsibility in 
both senses to participants in morally significant joint actions. Each par-
ticipant in a morally significant joint action has individual responsibility 
tout court for her own individual actions. However, each participant has 
individual responsibility jointly with the others, both for the realization of 
the collective end of the joint action and, via the interdependence of the 
individual contributing actions, for the plurality of the individual actions 
constitutive of the joint action. Thus at one level of description B1’s indi-
vidual action (of firing two bullets into victim A1) considered on its own 
was causally necessary and sufficient for A1’s death and, since B1 delib-
erately intended his action, B1 was individually morally responsible tout 
court for A1’s death. At this individual level of description of B1’s action 
(B1’s action qua merely individual action, so to speak), B1 is individually 
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morally responsible for A1’s death, and this responsibility is not possessed 
by B1 jointly with B2, B3 etc. Moreover, as we saw above, at another wider 
level of description (the collective level, let us say), B1 is individually mor-
ally responsible jointly with the others for the realization of the collective 
end, namely, the plurality of deaths (A1, A2 etc.). Further, via the interde-
pendence of the individual actions constitutive of the joint action, another 
participant in the overall joint action, say B2, was also morally responsible 
for A1’s death, notwithstanding that B2 did not (let us suppose) fire any 
bullets into A1. For in the joint action in question B1 and B2 (and B3 etc.) 
have as a collective end to kill all five victims and, as a consequence, B1’s 
action is interdependent with B2’s action (e.g. in relation to B2’s shooting 
dead of another victim, say, A2). Accordingly, B1 would not have fired any 
bullets into A1, if B2 had not fired bullets into A2 (and B3 had not fired 
bullets into A3, and so on). So B2 aimed at A1’s death (as part of the content 
of B2’s collective end viz. the death of all five victims) and B2 contributed 
indirectly to A1’s death by (directly) killing A2 in the context of the inter-
dependence of this action with B1’s direct killing of A1. Likewise, B2 would 
not have fired any bullets into A2, if B1 had not fired bullets into A1. So 
B1 aimed at A2’s death (as part of the content of B1’s collective end viz. the 
death of all five victims) and B1 contributed indirectly to A2’s death via the 
interdependence of this action with B2’s direct killing of A2. Accordingly, 
at this collective level of description24, B1 and B2 are jointly (with B3 etc.) 
morally responsible for the deaths of all five victims and, more specifically, 
B1 is individually morally responsible for A2’s death jointly with the others. 
Likewise, B2 is individually morally responsible for A1’s death jointly with 
the others.
Now let us assume, as we did in the case of the stabbing scenario, that 
the victims are armed with guns and able to defend themselves by shoot-
ing their attackers. However, in this shooting scenario, involving, as it 
does, multiple attackers and multiple defenders, the defenders (and not 
simply the attackers) need to coordinate their actions. For each defender 
24. There are, of course, various different collective levels and structures of interdepen-
dence, even in simple joint action scenarios. Regarding interdependence, each might per-
form her contributory action if and only if a sufficient number (but not necessarily all) of 
the others performed theirs, i.e. a number sufficient in total to realise the collective end. 
Regarding collective levels, one might refer to the collective level as the level of the aggre-
gate of individual actions, each of which is constitutive of the joint action. Typically, some 
such aggregate is causally sufficient to realise the collective end in question. If not stipu-
lated, context should make it clear what structure of interdependence of action or sense of 
collective level I have in mind on any given occasion.
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has only three bullets, and if, for example, each defender was to fire his 
three bullets at the same two attackers as the other defenders do, then the 
defenders’ defense would not succeed; four would likely still be killed by 
the attackers. In addition, assume that the threat from the five attackers 
is imminent. In that case, the victims’ compliance with the imminence 
requirement will be met if they respond immediately with lethal force. 
What of the necessity principle? Presumably, it is necessary to kill all five 
attackers, since if any one of them is not shot dead he may well kill one 
of the defenders. Moreover, unlike in the earlier scenario involving only 
one defender, there is evidently no question of a disproportionately large 
number of dead attackers. For although there are five dead attackers, it is 
also the case that there are five defenders’ lives saved, and, crucially, the 
five dead attackers attacked without any moral justification whatsoever, 
whereas the five defenders had a good moral justification for their actions.
Notice that in this multiple attackers/ multiple defenders scenario, any 
one shot fired by a defender considered on its own is not a necessary con-
dition for saving anyone’s life. Indeed, in some versions of the scenario it 
may well be that two, or even all three, shots fired by any given defender 
is not necessary to save anyone’s life. To see this, consider the following 
version of the scenario. Assume that defender A1 fires one shot at each 
of attackers B1, B2, and B3; defender A2 fires one shot at each of attack-
ers B2, B3, and B4; defender A3 fires one shot at each of attackers B3, 
B4, and B5; defender A4 fires one shot at each of attackers B4, B5, and 
B1; and defender A5 fires one shot at each of attackers B5, B1, and B2. 
Here, each attacker gets hit with three bullets, so one bullet is unneces-
sary for his death. Moreover, each defender only fires one bullet at any 
given attacker. Accordingly, no single shot of any defender is necessary to 
kill any attacker. Indeed, no shots of any single defender— whether these 
shots are taken singly or in aggregate— is necessary to kill any attacker. 
Therefore, no shots of any single defender— whether these shots are taken 
singly or in aggregate— is necessary to save any defender’s life. Moreover, 
none of, for example, A1’s shots (whether taken singly or in aggregate) is 
sufficient to kill any attacker, or, therefore, to save anyone’s life. The same 
point holds for A2, A3, A4, and A5. On the other hand, each of A1’s shots 
made a causal contribution; that is, a causal contribution to, respectively, 
the death of B1, B2, and B3, and, therefore, to saving at least one per-
son’s life— the life that would have been lost had B1, B2, and B3 fired their 
shots. For B1, B2, and B3, if they fired nine bullets between them must 
have killed at least one victim (with two bullets fired into him). Similarly, 
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each of A2’s, A3’s, A4’s and A5’s shots made a causal contribution to the 
death of three attackers, and, therefore, to saving at least one person’s life.
The point to be stressed here is that it was common knowledge among 
the defenders that any given defender’s set of actions (consisting of firing 
three bullets), considered on its own, was neither necessary nor sufficient 
to realize the collective end of the defenders— namely, the outcome of 
saving the lives of all the defenders.25 So the principle of necessity is not 
operative at the individual level. We saw above that the principle of neces-
sity is operative at the collective level in the sense that it is necessary for 
the defenders to kill all five attackers if they are to achieve their collective 
end of saving the lives of all the defenders. Let us pursue further this 
notion of the application of the principle of necessity at the collective level, 
and let us do so in the context of the assumption made in our scenario 
that the action of any one of the five defenders considered on its own was 
not causally necessary to the outcome— and therefore to the realization of 
the collective end— of saving all five defenders’ lives.
Here we need to distinguish two separate propositions: (1) it is neces-
sary for the defenders to kill all five attackers in order to achieve the out-
come of saving the lives of all five defenders, and (2) the action (consisting 
of firing three bullets) of any one of the defenders is necessary to achieve 
this outcome. While proposition 2 is false, 1 is true. However, it is prop-
osition 1 that instantiates the relevant principle of necessity. Moreover, 
the truth of proposition 1 is not undermined by the falsity of proposition 
2. The joint action of the defenders consists in killing all five attackers, 
and when this is done, the defenders act in compliance with the principle 
of necessity at the collective level (the level of joint action). The fact that 
no single action of any of the defenders was a necessary condition for real-
izing the collective end of the joint action, and therefore for killing all five 
attackers, is irrelevant.
An analogous point can be made in relation to the principle of propor-
tionality. To see this, consider yet another variation on our five attackers/ 
five defenders scenarios. This time the five attackers do not have firearms 
or knives and are intent on merely giving the five defenders a severe beat-
ing with their fists, and want to stop well short of killing them or even seri-
ously injuring them. Moreover, all this is a matter of common knowledge 
25. I note that in the five defenders/ five attackers’ version of the scenario, no single 
defender and no single attacker can make a causal contribution to the deaths of all five 
attackers or to the deaths of all five defenders, respectively.
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between all the attackers and all the defenders. However, as in our earlier 
scenario, and unbeknown to the attackers, the defenders each have a gun 
with three bullets. In this new scenario, each defender fires his three bul-
lets into three separate defenders, having as a proximate individual end to 
severely wound each of the three attackers in question, but having as an 
ultimate collective end— held jointly with the other five defenders— to kill 
all five of the attackers, and thereby save all five defenders from a severe 
beating. At the individual level, each defender has severely wounded three 
attackers, and this is not disproportionate, let us assume, to the adverse 
outcome each was seeking to prevent, which was the severe beating of 
all five defenders. However, at the collective level (the level of the joint 
action), the defenders have killed all five attackers, and, arguably at least, 
this is a disproportionate response to the threat of the five defenders being 
given a severe beating.
1.2.2  Joint Action Scenarios: Positive Rights Violations
Assume that there are multiple persons whose lives are at high risk, but 
that there are multiple bystanders who could, if they coordinated their 
efforts— by performing a joint action, for example— save these lives with-
out significant cost to themselves.26 The bystanders in such scenarios 
have a collective, or joint, moral responsibility to save those at risk by 
virtue of the (aggregate) positive rights of the latter. Accordingly, each 
bystander has an individually possessed moral obligation to perform his 
or her individual action as a contribution to the joint action, and thus to 
the realization of the collective end of saving the multiple lives at high 
risk. However, this obligation is possessed interdependently with the oth-
ers; it is a joint moral obligation. So joint moral obligations can be derived 
from collective moral responsibilities to realize morally required collective 
ends. Roughly speaking, the realization of such a collective end calls for 
the performance of some salient joint action. The determination of this 
joint action, in turn, enables the specification of the contributory individ-
ual actions, and thereby the generation of the individual moral obligations 
of the participants. Each participant has a moral obligation to perform 
a contributory action. However, just as the action of each participant is 
26. Seumas Miller, “Collective Responsibility and Omissions,” Business and Professional 
Ethics Journal 20, no. 1 (2001):  5– 24; Miller, “Civilian Immunity,” 113– 135; Miller Moral 
Foundations of Social Institutions, 133– 139, 202– 209.
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performed interdependently with the actions of the others, so are the cor-
responding individual moral obligations interdependent. This is because 
each individual action is only part of the means to realize the collective 
end, and its performance would have no point if the others refrained from 
performing their contributory actions. Accordingly, the moral obligation 
of each to perform his or her contributory action would lapse if the oth-
ers did not perform theirs; hence these moral obligations are joint moral 
obligations.
Let us now turn to the matter of the enforcement of such positive 
rights. Consider a scenario in which a boat at sea, Boat A, is sinking, and 
its five passengers are about to drown. Assume that there is a second boat, 
Boat B, with five crew on board who could cooperate with one another to 
rescue the passengers, but who are refusing to do so. Suppose further that 
the joint efforts of only three of the crew would be sufficient to prevent 
Boat A  from sinking, and thereby save the lives of all five passengers. 
Clearly, the members of Boat A (A1, A2, etc.) have a positive right to be 
rescued, and the crew members of Boat B (B1, B2, etc.) have a joint moral 
obligation to rescue them; so each has a moral obligation to assist interde-
pendently with the others. Suppose Boat A has a heavy machine gun on 
deck but it has broken off its mount. However, if A1, A2, etc. combine their 
efforts to hold the gun steady, sight it, and fire it, they can make it work. 
They proceed to combine their efforts in this manner, to perform the joint 
action in question, and now threaten to begin shooting the crew members 
of Boat B dead one by one if they do not assist. The crew members of Boat 
B are steadfast in their refusal. So the passengers on Boat A utilize the 
machine gun and fire a volley at Boat B, killing B1. The remaining Boat 
B crew members have second thoughts and immediately commence the 
rescue operation, which ultimately proves successful.
In this scenario, there is an imminent threat to the lives of the passen-
gers, and the members of Boat B’s crew have a joint moral obligation to 
assist them. Moreover, it is necessary for the passengers on Boat A to per-
form a joint lethal action against one of Boat B’s crew members if their lives 
are not to be lost; that is, if they are to enforce their own positive rights. 
Accordingly, the passengers on Boat A have a joint right, if not a joint obli-
gation, to use lethal force in the manner described. So each is individually 
possessed of a moral right (if not obligation) to perform the contributory 
action. However, this right— insofar as it is derived from the collective end 
of the joint action (i.e., the end of saving the lives of all the passengers), 
is possessed interdependently with the other enforcers; it is a joint moral 
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right. Thus joint moral rights can be derived from morally required collec-
tive ends in a manner analogous to the derivation of joint moral obligations 
discussed above in relation to the joint moral obligations of the members of 
the crew of Boat B.
Moreover, unlike in the analogous single- action positive- rights drown-
ing scenario in subsection 1.1.2 above, the action of killing one person to 
save five self- evidently not only complies with the proportionality principle, 
it seems to be required by it (other things being equal).27 For if the passen-
gers had refrained from killing one crew member, there would have been 
a morally disproportionate outcome: one life would have been spared, but 
five would have been lost. However, there are other moral considerations 
in play. There is the matter of the moral stringency of positive versus 
negative rights. For the moral rights of the passengers to be rescued are 
positive rights whereas the (pro tanto) right of B1 not to be killed is a nega-
tive right, and, as noted above, violating a negative right is, other things 
being equal, morally worse than violating the corresponding positive 
right. Specifically, the members of the crew, and B1 in particular, are not 
the source of the threat to the lives of the passengers in the sinking boat; 
the crew members of Boat B are not violating the negative rights of the 
passengers. Accordingly, it might be argued— as it was in subsection 1.1.2 
above— that notwithstanding the disproportionate loss of life, it is not 
morally permissible to use lethal— as opposed to merely injurious, 
nonlethal— force to enforce positive rights. Or, to put it another way, the 
negative right of B1 not to be killed by the passengers is not extinguished 
or overridden by B1’s refusal to respect the positive rights of the passen-
gers to be rescued. On the other hand, it would surely be morally excus-
able for the passengers to kill B1 in order to save their lives.
Moreover, this line of reasoning could be maintained in relation to a 
third- party (members of Boat C) intervention of exactly the same kind 
(shooting B1 dead) to enforce the positive rights of the passengers in Boat 
A. Naturally, it could be argued that in the case of the third party, the 
moral obligation to rescue might be more stringent or stronger if, for 
example, the crew members of Boat C comprised the parents of, or other-
wise had special moral duties to, the passengers in Boat A. However, as 
we saw with the single action drowning scenario in 1.1.2, this might not 
be sufficient to move those whose intuitions tell them that it is not morally 
permissible to use lethal force to enforce positive rights even if it is morally 
27. Considered merely in terms of the outcomes of the available options.
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permissible to do so to enforce (some) negative rights. Yet again, it would 
surely be morally excusable for the crew members of Boat C to use lethal 
force to save the lives of their children in Boat A.
Moral intuitions may well vary one way or the other if adjustments 
are made to our boating scenario. On the one hand, the scenario could be 
adjusted so that it was necessary to kill all five crew members of Boat B to 
save all five passengers’ lives. This adjustment might serve to strengthen 
the initial intuition among some that the passengers’ use of lethal force 
to enforce their positive rights was not morally permissible.28 Suppose, 
for example, that the two possible outcomes were the following: [1] the 
crew members of Boat B towing Boat A to safety, or [2] the passengers 
killing all of the crew of Boat B by means of a single cluster bomb and 
then commandeering Boat B as the means to preserve their own lives. On 
the other hand, the scenario could be adjusted in the opposite direction 
by stipulating that the number of passengers on Boat A is one hundred, 
and that the equation therefore involved saving one hundred lives versus 
killing one person. This might generate the intuition that killing a single 
crew member would be morally permissible. If not, let us ramp up the 
numbers even further to (say) one thousand saved versus killing one cul-
pable wrongdoer. Surely it is morally permissible to kill the one culpable 
wrongdoer in these circumstances.
As with our joint action scenarios in 1.2.1, there is a distinction to be 
made between the application of principles at a collective level and at the 
individual level. The relevant principle of necessity operates at a collective 
level level rather than at the individual level. In this case, the collective 
level in question is that of the joint action of the passengers. That is, pas-
sengers A1, A2, etc. jointly killed B1, and their killing B1 was necessary to 
save their lives. This is so, notwithstanding that a number of their single 
contributory actions might not have been necessary for this outcome (e.g., 
the actions of only two of the passengers might have been sufficient to 
mount the gun and hold it steady, even though three did so). An analo-
gous point holds for the application of the proportionality principle. In 
a variation on the above cluster- bomb boating scenario, let us assume 
that there are five passengers on Boat A and ten crew members on Boat 
B. Assume further that firing the cluster bomb at Boat B will kill all ten 
crew members, albeit this is the only means for the five passengers to save 
28. Or it might generate this intuition among some of those who did not originally have 
this intuition in the version of the scenario in which only one crew member is killed.
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themselves (given the refusal of these crew members to rescue them). In 
this version of the boating scenario the (joint) action of firing the cluster 
bomb and killing ten crew members is, let us assume, disproportionate 
to the outcome of saving five lives. This might be so, notwithstanding 
that it might reasonably be maintained that at the individual level some 
actions were not disproportionate. For example, it might be held that the 
single action— considered on its own— of one of the three passengers 
who assisted in the mounting of the launcher by holding it steady was not 
morally disproportionate.
1.3  Conclusion
In this chapter I have developed a taxonomy of the morally permissible 
use of lethal force across two main dimensions:  individual and joint 
action, on the one hand, and negative and positive moral rights, on the 
other. The claim that it is morally permissible to use lethal force to enforce 
some negative rights, notably the right not to be killed, is relatively uncon-
troversial. However, I have argued that it may well be morally justifiable, 
or at the very least morally excusable, to use lethal force to enforce some 
positive rights, notably the right to preserve one’s life. Moreover, if there 
is a large number of persons whose positive rights are being violated, and 
the number of positive rights violators to be killed to bring about a ces-
sation of these rights violations is small, then the use of lethal force may 
well be morally justifiable and not merely excusable.
In cases of multiple attackers/ refrainers and multiple defenders/ enforc-
ers, the use of lethal force typically involves joint actions. Therefore, I have 
provided an analysis of such joint actions. I note that philosophical analy-
ses of the moral permissibility of the use of lethal force are typically framed 
in terms of individual, as opposed to joint, actions,29 albeit the “individu-
als” in question are sometimes collective entities, such as military forces.30
29. Jeff McMahan, “War as Self- Defense,” Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 
(2004): 75.
30. Some theorists argue that such collective entities are irreducibly collective agents; see, 
for example Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992); and Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status 
of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For an individualist response, 
see Seumas Miller, “Against the Moral Autonomy Thesis,” Journal of Social Philosophy 
38, no. 3 (2007): 389– 409. I have argued in a number of publications, commencing in 
1992, that there are multilayered structures of joint action; see, for example, Miller, “Joint 
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In light of my analysis of joint actions, an individual whose action is a 
causal contribution to, and is performed in the service of, some morally 
significant collective end can be held morally responsible— jointly with 
others— for the realization of that end, notwithstanding that the action 
considered on its own was neither necessary nor sufficient for the realiza-
tion of the end. In addition, of course, the individual can be held morally 
responsible tout court for the performance of his or her individual action 
(considered on its own), and for any benefit or harm that it may have 
directly and exclusively caused. It is also evident that the contributory 
action of an individual participating in the joint enforcement of negative 
or positive rights often makes a causal contribution to the enforcement 
outcome (a collective end) without in itself being either necessary or suffi-
cient for that outcome. Nevertheless, such an individual can be held mor-
ally responsible (jointly with others) for the outcome— a cessation of the 
rights violations in question— and should be praised accordingly.
Further, the members of a group of bystanders confronting members of 
another group with positive rights to assistance are possessed of a collective 
(i.e., joint) moral responsibility to provide assistance by performing a joint 
action, should this be necessary. In such scenarios, each bystander has a 
moral obligation to perform a contributory action. However, this obligation 
is possessed interdependently with the other bystanders; it is a joint moral 
obligation. So joint moral obligations can be derived from collective moral 
responsibilities to realize morally required collective ends. Importantly, 
each member of a group of third- party enforcers who are possessed of a 
collective (i.e., joint), moral responsibility to intervene by performing a 
joint (lethal) action to bring about the cessation of some positive or negative 
rights violation is individually possessed of a moral obligation to perform a 
contributory action. As just mentioned, this individual obligation is a jointly 
held moral obligation, and as such it is derived from, in this case, the col-
lective moral responsibility to bring about the cessation of rights violations.
Finally, my analysis of lethal joint actions, and their associated joint 
moral rights and obligations, enables the distinction between necessity 
at the level of the individual action considered on its own and necessity at 
the wider level of the joint action (at a collective level) to come into view. 
The moral principle of necessity, in respect of lethal joint actions, is fre-
quently applicable at this collective level rather than at the individual level.
Action”, Social Action Chapter  3, and Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 
Chapter 1. For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 3 of this work.
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Killing in Self- Defense
c h a p t e r  1  y i e l d e d  a taxonomy of the morally permissible uses of lethal 
force by noninstitutional actors engaged in both individual and joint action. 
This chapter1 provides a more detailed analysis of the moral permissibil-
ity of noninstitutional actors’ use of lethal force in defense of their own 
lives (self- defense). To provide such an analysis is both important in its own 
right and a necessary preliminary to the moral analysis of the (in part) insti-
tutionally based use of lethal force by police officers and military combat-
ants. For according to my favored conception, the morally permissible use 
of lethal force by institutional actors, such as police officers and military 
combatants, both presupposes the natural moral right to self- defense (and 
the natural right to defend others) and yet is somewhat different from it by 
virtue of the larger institutional purposes served by these actors. This point 
is illustrated and elaborated in Chapters 3, 4, and 6, in particular.
Under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible or morally jus-
tified for one person to kill another person? This question is asked in 
a variety of contexts, and it receives a variety of answers. Prima facie, 
the central cases in which a person is entitled to kill another person are 
of two sorts. First, there is the standard self- defense situation.2 Second, 
1. An earlier version of much of the material in this chapter appeared in Miller, “Killing 
in Self- Defence.”
2. See, for example, G. P. Fletcher, “Right to Life,” The Monist 63 (1980): 135–155; Montague, 
“Self- Defense and Choosing between Lives”; Paul H. Robinson, “Causing the Conditions 
of One’s Own Defense,” Virginia Law Review 71, no. 1 (1985): 1– 63; Cheyney C. Ryan, “Self- 
Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing,” Ethics 93, no. 3 (1983): 508– 524; Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, “Self- Defense and Rights,” in W. Parent (ed.), Rights, Restitution, and Risk 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 33– 48; David Wasserman, “Justifying 
Self- Defense,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 4 (1987): 356– 378; Jenny Teichman, 
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there is the case where some third person kills the attacker; this is killing 
in defense of another. Killing in self- defense is my focus in this chapter, 
albeit my account has implications for killing in defense of others. I note 
that, in respect of both categories, there are instances in which life is not 
being threatened, but nevertheless the wrong done, or about to be done, 
warrants a life- threatening response.3 For example, arguably, I am mor-
ally justified in killing an attacker who, while not seeking to kill me, is 
nevertheless seeking to do me grievous bodily harm (i.e., my selfhood is 
at high risk— see Chapter 1, section 1.1.1).
2.1  The Simple Right to Life Theory
Most of the available accounts of the justification of killing in self- defense 
have come under attack.4 The most obvious theory is the simple right to 
life account. This views posits a basic right to life or right not to be killed. 
On this view, I am entitled to kill in self- defense in virtue of my having a 
right to life, coupled with the fact that my life is under threat, and I will be 
killed unless I intervene by killing my attacker. The general problem here 
is that the attacker himself has a right to life (or right not to be killed), and 
it is not clear how it is not being violated by the person killing the attacker 
in self- defense.5
There are three obvious permutations of the simple right to life view. 
First, there is the possibility that the right to life is an absolute right; sec-
ond, this is a right that can be forfeited; and third, it is a right that is 
neither absolute nor able to be forfeited, but one that can be overridden.
“Self- Defence,” in Pacifism and the Just War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), Chapter 8; J. J. 
Thomson, “Self- Defense”; Seumas Miller, “Self- Defense and Forcing the Choice between 
Lives,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (1992): 239– 243; Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral 
Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 386– 405.
3. See, for example, Kai Nielsen, “On Justifying Violence,” Inquiry 24, no. 1 (1981): 21– 57; 
C. A. J. Coady, “The Morality of Terrorism,” Philosophy 60 (1985): 47– 69; Miller, “On the 
Morality of Waging War against the State”; Miller, “Just War Theory.”
4. See especially Thomson, “Self- Defense and Rights”; Thomson, “Self- Defense”; and 
Wasserman, “Justifying Self- Defense.” On Thomson’s positive account, see Teichman, 
“Self- Defence.” See also Miller, “Self- Defense and Forcing the Choice between Lives.”
5. See Ryan, “Self- Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing”; and Thomson, “Self- 
Defense and Rights,” 5. This point is made by a number of commentators. See, for example, 
Thomson, “Self- Defense and Rights,” 35. For general attacks on the notion of forfeiture, 
see Ryan, “Self- Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing,” 511.
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The view that the right to life posited by the simple right to life the-
ory is an absolute right has untoward consequences.6 If everyone has an 
absolute right to life, then attackers have an absolute right to life. But if 
attackers have an absolute right to life, then there are no circumstances in 
which defenders are justified in killing their attackers in self- defense. The 
notion of an absolute right to life is too robust. It has the effect of ruling 
out the possibility of justified killing in self- defense. We need a less robust 
notion of the right to life.
On the forfeiture account, any agent’s right not to be killed is for-
feited if that agent tries to kill another agent, and will kill her unless the 
defending agent intervenes to defend himself. However, this account also 
has untoward consequences. Consider a man who tries to kill someone, 
and would have killed that person if the person had not intervened. The 
defender saves her own life, but his defensive action is such as to cause 
the attacker to lose an arm and a leg (albeit, the attacker does not lose his 
life). Assume that this attacker is arrested, convicted of attempted murder, 
and serves a thirty- year sentence. Assume also that he feels remorse for 
his action and that while in jail he undergoes a process of moral regenera-
tion. This causes him to spend all the money he earns in jail on educating 
the children of the man he tried to murder. On the theory under consid-
eration (the forfeiture account), such a would- be murderer does not have 
any right not to be killed. His right was forfeited by virtue of his attempt 
on someone else’s life. Accordingly, he has no right to self- defense.
Now suppose that shortly after completion of his jail sentence he is 
attacked by three robbers who will kill him if he does not kill all of them. 
Ex hypothesi, he— even though now a defender— has no right to life or 
right not to be killed, and he has no right to defend himself. So, arguably, 
his attackers do not forfeit their rights to life or rights not to be killed by 
virtue of their attack, for the defender has no right to life or right not to 
be killed. Accordingly, the defender is obligated to allow the attackers to 
kill him on pain of violating their rights not to be killed. Moreover, even 
if his three attackers do forfeit their rights not to be killed, say, by virtue 
of attacking someone who is not attacking them, the defender is, never-
theless, not permitted to kill these attackers. In this situation, neither the 
attackers nor the defenders has any rights to self- defense; however, other 
things being equal, it is better that one life be lost than three. So, presum-
ably, the defender is morally obligated to allow them to kill him.
6. This point is made by Wasserman, “Justifying Self- Defense,” 359.
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The version of the simple right to life theory in terms of forfeiture is 
highly problematic. Unlike the notion of an absolute right, the notion of 
a right that is able to be forfeited is not robust enough. We thus need a 
more robust notion of the right to life. As we saw above, the notion of an 
absolute right to life has the consequence that a person cannot justifiably 
kill an attacker in self- defense. While the notion of a right to life that 
can be forfeited enables justified killing in self- defense, it does so at too 
high a cost. The cost is that unsuccessful attackers lose their own right to 
self- defense forever, and consequently are not morally entitled to defend 
themselves against any future unjustified attacks. Accordingly, we need 
a different notion: one that permits killing in self- defense but does not 
entirely extinguish the right to self- defense of attackers. The obvious can-
didate is a right to life (or right not to be killed) that cannot be forfeited 
but can be overridden.
On this account, while neither the attacker nor the defender has an 
absolute right to life, both the attacker and the defender maintain their 
right to life (or right not to be killed). Accordingly, in the standard self- 
defense case, there is a choice to be made between two persons, both of 
whom have an (overridable) right not to be killed. So we need to find a 
moral consideration that overrides the attacker’s right not to be killed, but 
not the defender’s right not to be killed. This moral consideration can-
not be merely that the attacker is a deadly threat to the defender, or that 
the attacker intends to kill the defender— or both of these considerations. 
For in our standard self- defense case, the defender, in defending him or 
herself, will constitute a deadly threat to the attacker and intends to kill 
the attacker.7
Perhaps the difference between the attacker and the defender is that 
the attacker, but not the defender, intends to kill the defender without 
having any reasonable justification for doing so:  the attacker intends to 
kill the defender because (say) the defender is an irritating person. By 
contrast, the defender has a moral justification for killing the attacker; the 
defender kills to preserve his or her life. So the moral difference between 
7. There are some cases in which the defender does not intend to kill her attacker but, 
nevertheless, the attacker is killed in the course of the defensive actions. However, there 
are many other cases in which the defender cannot avoid intentionally killing her attacker 
if she is to survive his attack, e.g. if her only means of defense is to fire her anti- tank gun at 
him. For my purposes the theoretically interesting cases are the latter ones and I will focus 
on these. Unless otherwise indicated, I assume that the intentions in question are under 
the agent’s control, i.e. in my terminology the intention to kill is deliberate.
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the attacker and the defender consists in the difference between the rea-
sons each has for intending to kill the other.
On the view under consideration, we have the following justification 
for killing in self- defense. In the self- defense scenarios in question, some-
one’s right not to be killed will be infringed; the only question is whether 
it will be the right not to be killed of the defender or that of the attacker. 
It is morally preferable to infringe the right not to be killed of a person 
who intends to kill without a moral justification than it is to infringe the 
right not to be killed of a person who intends to kill in order to save his or 
her life. Accordingly, it is morally permissible for the defender to kill the 
attacker in self- defense.
Evidently, this account accommodates cases involving one attacker and 
one defender. But what of cases in which a single defender confronts a 
number of attackers engaged in a single joint attack? Assume that it is a 
joint attack by five men in which the actions of the attackers are jointly 
sufficient to kill the defender, but no single action on its own is sufficient. 
Assume further that the actions of three of the attackers (any three) are 
necessary (and sufficient) to kill the defender. In this scenario it will not 
be sufficient for the defender to kill one of the attackers; if the defender 
is not to be killed, he or she will have to kill at least three of the attackers.
The question that now needs to be asked of this version of the sim-
ple right to life theory is as follows: How does the fact that the attack-
ers’ attempt to kill the defender had no moral justification override the 
competing consideration based on the number of lives lost? After all, if 
the defender kills in self- defense, then three persons— each with a right 
not to be killed— will be killed, whereas if the defender does not kill in 
self- defense, then only one person will be killed (and there will be only 
one infringement of the right not to be killed). That is, how can three 
infringements of the right not to be killed— albeit a set of infringements 
committed in order to save a (single) life— be morally preferable to one 
infringement of the right not to be killed— albeit an infringement with-
out any justification whatsoever?
The general problem with this version of the simple right to life theory 
is that the notion of an overridable right not to be killed, while less robust 
than the corresponding absolute right and more robust than the corre-
sponding forfeitable right, is nevertheless inadequate; it still does not get 
the correct balance between the right to life of the attacker and the right 
to self- defense. Specifically, the right to self- defense is a right that one is 
entitled to exercise whether an attack is perpetrated by one or by many. So 
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while the right to life it posits is less robust than an on absolutist account 
it is, nevertheless, excessively robust.
The failure of the simple right to life theory, whether it is presented 
in terms of a right to life that is absolute, able to be forfeited, or able to be 
overridden, suggests that we ought to look to the notion of a suspended 
right. A suspended right is akin to a forfeited right in that it is a non- abso-
lute right. However, a right that is suspended under certain conditions 
is not necessarily forfeited. On the other hand, a suspended right is not 
simply a right that is overridden; unlike a right that is overridden, in the 
case of a suspended right there is a period of time— the period of suspen-
sion— in which, in effect, one does not have the right. The notion of a 
suspended right not to be killed is taken up in section 2.6.
The failure of the simple right to life theory also suggests that we need 
to look at theories that either abandon or significantly complicate the 
notion of a right to life. I will now look at three influential theories, each 
of which does one or another of these things.
2.2  Forcing the Choice
Philip Montague provides the first of these accounts.8 Another who fol-
lows him is Jeff McMahan.9 Montague’s is a fault- based account of justi-
fied killing in self- defense— whether or not one agent is entitled to kill 
another in self- defense is partly a matter of whether the attacker was at 
fault in constituting a threat to her life. However, there is a difference 
between Montague’s theory and standard fault- based accounts, in that 
Montague construes justified killing in self- defense as a species of forced 
choosing between lives. That is, the attacker is forcing the choice between 
two lives, his own and the defender’s.
On the forced- choice conception, attacker B forces a choice on defender 
A between two lives, namely A’s life and B’s life. A has to choose between 
allowing herself to be killed by B, on the one hand, and killing B (and 
thereby saving herself), on the other. But, so the argument goes, that 
A confronts this choice is the fault of B— B forced this choice on A. So 
A, in choosing between her own life and B’s life, can take B’s fault into 
8. See Montague, “Self- Defense and Choosing between Lives.” I discuss the forced- choice 
theory in Miller, “Self- Defense and Forcing the Choice between Lives.”
9. McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing.”
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consideration. The relevant difference between the two options facing 
A is that it is B’s fault that the choice between these lives has to be made. 
Therefore A is morally entitled to kill B.
I have three objections to this account. First, it simply fails to justify 
killing in self- defense. The basic problem for any theory seeking to jus-
tify killing in self- defense is that the defender, in trying to save her own 
life, intentionally kills another person (the attacker). Accordingly, the 
defender apparently commits a very serious wrongdoing, and one that is 
as bad, or nearly as bad, as that of the attacker. On one way of taking the 
forced- choice account it works by trying to undercut our normal assump-
tion that the defender is responsible for killing her attacker.10 The idea 
here would be that the attacker, by forcing the choice on the defender, is 
somehow, albeit indirectly, responsible for his own death. If this is not 
the case, then it remains unclear how the theory justifies the act of kill-
ing in self- defense. Rather, we are simply left with the defender being 
fully morally responsible for killing the attacker, and the attacker morally 
responsible only for attempting to kill the defender. But in that case we 
are back to where we started from; we have apparently made no progress 
in the attempt to justify killing in self- defense. It seems that the forced- 
choice conception interpreted in this manner fails to relieve the defender 
of full moral responsibility for the death of the attacker, and therefore fails 
to show why killing in self- defense is morally justifiable.
It is not the case that in our (above described) standard self- defense 
situation the attacker is forcing a choice between lives, in any sense of 
forcing the choice that would enable the attacker to be held fully morally 
responsible for his own death. B does not intend to bring about a situa-
tion in which A faces a choice between killing B and allowing A to die. 
Nor does B typically have any knowledge that his actions will bring about 
this situation. Indeed, if the attacker, B, has any intention or belief with 
respect to bringing about a situation of choice for the defender, A, it is the 
intention that A not have, or the belief that A will not have, such a choice. 
Therefore, B does not negligently or recklessly bring about the situation in 
10. Montague states in his reply to earlier criticisms of mine (Miller “Self- Defense and 
Forcing the Choice between Lives”) that defenders are responsible for the deaths of the 
attackers that they kill but, nevertheless, he apparently maintains that attackers are respon-
sible (in some sense) for the situation in which defenders have to choose between allowing 
themselves to be killed and killing their attackers. Certainly, attackers are causally respon-
sible for this situation. See Phillip Montague “Forced Choices and Self- Defense” Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 12:1 1995 90.
Killing in Self-Defense 51
   51
which A faces a choice between killing B and allowing A to die. Consider, 
for example, a scenario in which B ambushes A with the intention not 
only to kill A, but also to ensure that A has no opportunity to defend her-
self. Accordingly, let us assume that the attacker does not believe, let alone 
intend, that the defender will have an opportunity to defend herself but, 
nevertheless, this opportunity does arise and the defender takes it and 
kills the attacker in self- defense. Presumably, in this scenario it cannot be 
the attacker, but must rather be the defender, who is fully morally respon-
sible for the killing of the attacker. But in that case, we have not yet been 
provided with a reason for thinking that the defender is morally entitled 
to kill the attacker. We are left with a situation in which the defender, 
A, is responsible for killing the attacker, B, and B is responsible only for 
attempting to kill A. So, to reiterate, we are back to our starting place.
It might be argued, however, that we are not quite back to where we 
started from. For we have isolated an additional morally relevant element; 
namely, the element of forced choice in a narrow causal sense. The fact 
that the attacker, B, unintentionally and unknowingly brought about a set 
of circumstances in which the defender, A, had to choose between her 
own life and that of B, is morally relevant. The attacker, B, has (uninten-
tionally, and unknowingly, let us assume) structured the choice options of 
the defender, A. In short, B is causally responsible for the choice situation 
A now finds herself in. This is undoubtedly true. However, the question 
now arises as to whether B is culpable for bringing about these circum-
stances, especially since he did so unintentionally and unknowingly. 
Perhaps it was foreseeable that A might face this choice if attacked by B, 
and thus avoidable. However, there are many relevant cases in which this 
choice outcome does not eventuate. These are of two main types: (1) cases 
in which there is no possibility of A even contemplating self- defense (e.g., 
an ambush scenario in which A is asleep or unconscious and B comes 
upon him and shoots him dead), and (2) cases in which A has a third 
option (e.g., to disable B without killing him or to flee to safety).
In type 1 cases the attacker does not structure the defender’s choice 
options; defender does not have any choices to make, e.g. she is sim-
ply killed in her sleep. Therefore, these are not instances of forcing the 
choice. Nor, of course, are they cases of self- defense. Nevertheless, these 
cases raise a question about the moral significance of forcing the choice. 
For there does not seem to be any relevant moral difference between an 
attacker who culpably and unjustly kills someone in her sleep, and an 
attacker who culpably and unjustly kills someone who wakes up in time 
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to try to defend herself by killing the attacker but who is unsuccessful 
(and is, therefore, killed by her attacker). In the former case, the attacker 
did not force any choice on the victim, whereas in the latter case he did. 
So whether or not the attacker forced the choice on the defender does 
not seem to make any difference to the culpability or, moral fault of the 
attacker.
In type 2 cases the attacker does structure the defender’s choice 
options. However, the defender’s option set is wider than merely killing 
the attacker or allowing herself to be killed. Nevertheless, again there 
does not seem to be any relevant moral difference between an attacker 
who culpably and unjustly kills someone in her sleep, and an attacker who 
culpably and unjustly kills someone who unsuccessfully tries either to 
flee or to defend herself. In the former case, the attacker did not force any 
choice on the victim, whereas in the latter case he did. So, again whether 
or not the attacker forced the choice does not seem to make any difference 
to the culpability or, moral fault of the attacker.
In all this it is crucial that we distinguish between forcing the choice 
in its narrow causal sense and being culpable or otherwise at fault for 
forcing the choice. A drug- crazed attacker might be forcing the choice but 
might not be morally responsible for doing so, and therefore is nonculpa-
bly doing so. Let us try to get clearer on the notion of culpable or, at least, 
fault- based forcing the choice.
Consider the following scenario. Agent X puts a gun at agent Y’s head 
and orders Y to kill Z or be killed herself. Here X is forcing a choice on 
Y.  But notice two differences between this case and the standard self- 
defense case. First, X does not simply intend to kill Y in the sense that 
killing Y is the content of X’s intention (i.e. X intends [X kill Y]). Rather, at 
most X has an intention with the following conditional content: X kill Y if 
Y does not kill Z (i.e., X intends [X kill Y if Y does not kill Z]). Second, X’s 
act of forcing a choice consists in more than the fact that X will (intention-
ally) kill Y unless Y intervenes by killing someone (in this case, Z). For X 
intentionally creates a situation in which Y has to make a choice between 
lives (i.e., X intends [Y has to choose between killing Z and being killed 
by X]). The X/ Y/ Z example serves to highlight the existence of a thick and 
a thin sense of forcing the choice between lives. In the thick sense— the 
sense involved in the X/ Y/ Z example— forcing the choice is intentionally 
creating a situation which consists in someone having to make a choice 
between lives, i.e. the choice between lives is intentionally created. In the 
thin sense— the sense involved in the standard self- defense case— forcing 
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the choice between lives is simply our above notion of (unintentionally 
and unknowingly) causing a situation in which there are two choices fac-
ing the defender (either kill the attacker or allow oneself to be killed by 
the attacker). This thin causal condition is not the simple causal condi-
tion of being a deadly threat, for that latter condition is intended by the 
attacker. But now we can see that describing the standard self- defense 
case as a forced- choice situation is false, if we mean forced choice in the 
thick sense. What of the notion of forced choice in the thin sense? We 
saw above that the fact that the attacker is forcing the choice in the thin 
sense does not relieve the defender of moral responsibility for killing the 
attacker, supposing she does kill him. Thus we are left with the matter 
of the moral justification for the defender’s killing of the attacker. Here 
one thing is clear: the moral justification for killing in self- defense can-
not consist merely in the fact that the attacker is forcing the choice in the 
narrow causal sense. This brings me to my second objection to the forced 
choice conception.
My second objection to the forced- choice conception is that it fails 
to invoke a consideration that surely must be invoked, if killing in self- 
defense is to be shown to be morally justifiable. Speaking loosely, there 
are two things the attacker might be said to have done in the standard 
self- defense scenario. He might be said to have (unintentionally and 
unknowingly) brought about a situation in which the defender had to 
choose between two lives. The attacker forced a choice between lives in 
the thin sense of forcing a choice. Secondly, the attacker intended to kill 
the defender. Now the attacker’s second “doing” constitutes a morally rel-
evant consideration in the defender’s decision as to whether or not to kill 
the attacker. To see this, consider the possibility of a deaf, dumb, blind, 
and radioactive man who— unaware that he is radioactive— tries to put 
his arms around a woman in an expression of friendliness. She is aware 
that he is radioactive, and that his action is threatening her life. But she is 
also aware that she cannot communicate this to him. Moreover, she knows 
that she cannot escape his clutches other than by spraying him with a 
substance that she knows will prevent him from getting too close for too 
long, but will do so by killing him. He is unintentionally and unknow-
ingly forcing a choice between lives. But it is by no means clear that she 
is entitled to kill him. Certainly the moral grounds for killing him are 
much weaker than in the standard self- defense case. So, in the standard 
self- defense case, the fact that the attacker is performing the “action” of 
intending to kill the defender is a morally relevant consideration. Since, 
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on the thin forced- choice conception, this other “doing” of the attacker 
is not morally relevant, that account is defective. Of course, Montague’s 
forced choice conception is not merely the thin forced choice conception; 
rather it is the latter supplemented by the notion of fault, e.g. an intention 
to do what is wrong. However, as we saw above the intention in question 
on the forced choice conception must be an intention with respect to the 
act of forcing the choice (thin sense). But even supposing this intention 
exists  – and we have seen that it typically does not - this is the wrong 
intention. The intention that is relevant to the moral fault of the attacker 
is his intention to kill the defender, not an intention to bring about a situ-
ation in which the defender must choose between the attacker’s life and 
her own. Further, the intention to kill is an intention with respect to the 
causal condition that consists in being a deadly threat to the defender. 
Accordingly, it is this causal condition (being a deadly threat) that provides 
(part of) the justification for the defender’s lethal response rather than the 
causal condition that consists in forcing the choice.
My third objection is that the forced- choice conception has the effect 
of obliterating a morally important distinction. It seems clear that in our 
standard case of killing in self- defense, (1) the defender, A, has a right but 
not an obligation to kill the attacker, B; and (2) a third party, C, has an 
obligation to kill B, if that is the only way to prevent B from killing A (and 
C can kill B without harming C or any D). In other words, the defender is 
entitled not to exercise her right to self- defense, if he or she wishes. But 
matters are different for the third party, C. The third party ought to inter-
vene on behalf of the defender. (And the only form of successful interven-
tion in the type of case in question consists in the killing of the attacker.) 
The third party does not have a right that he or she can choose not to 
exercise; the third party is not entitled to allow the defender to be killed, 
even though the defender is entitled to allow herself to be killed by not 
exercising her right to self- defense. (I note that the right to self- defense is 
not identical with the right to life or the right not to be killed. Arguably, 
these latter rights are inalienable or, at least, the defender is not entitled 
to waive them in the face of a culpable attacker.)
However, on the forced- choice conception, the situation of the defender 
(morally speaking) is precisely the same as that of the third party. Each is 
confronting a choice between two lives, and each must invoke the same 
morally relevant consideration in making that choice. This consideration 
is the fact that the attacker is forcing the choice (and at fault in doing 
so). Accordingly, both defenders and third parties are under obligations 
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to choose in favor of the life of the person who is not forcing the choice 
in this sense. But, as we have just seen, the defender is not under any 
such obligation; the defender· has a right, but not an obligation, to kill 
the attacker. In assimilating the moral situation of the defender to that 
of a third party, the forced- choice conception obliterates a morally signifi-
cant difference between these situations or, at the very least, needs to help 
itself to some further moral consideration it has not yet countenanced.
2.3  The Hobbesian Rights- Based Approach
The second theory is a new version of the Hobbesian rights- based account. 
This account gives a priority to self- defense over other moral requirements. 
The emphasis here is on the importance to an individual of his or her own 
life, and the special responsibility an individual has for preserving his or her 
own life. This account makes a significant adjustment to the basic right to 
life account by positing an absolute but agent- centred right to self- defense.11
It is a strength of Teichman’s quasi- Hobbesian account that this mor-
ally significant distinction is preserved. On her account, in the standard 
self- defense case a defender has a right of self- defense, but a third party 
has a duty and not a right to preserve the life of that defender. Moreover, 
Teichman’s recourse to Hobbes’s notion of a basic and absolute right 
to self- defense enables many of the familiar objections to rights- based 
accounts of self- defense to be met.12 However, as we shall see, the account 
is problematic in other ways.
The Hobbesian rights- based approach has a weak and a strong form. In 
the strong form, I have an absolute right to self- defense, even if the threat 
to my life is innocent— e.g the (so- called) attacker does not intend to kill 
me. Now such cases do not seem to be cases of self- defense, rather they 
seem to be cases of self- preservation. But this makes little difference here. 
In such cases is there a right to preserve one’s life by killing the innocent? 
This is disputable. Firstly, it is surely the case that, other things being 
equal, an intentional killing is a greater evil than an unintentional killing.13 
11. Since it is the right to self- defense, rather than the right to life, that is absolute, and since 
this right is agent- centered, the Hobbesian account differs from the absolutist right to life 
account discussed above.
12. Unless pacifism is true. In that case, no one is ever entitled or obligated to kill.
13. See Frances Kamm, Ethics for Enemies:  Terror, Torture and War (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 78. Kamm makes the normative theoretical claim that when an 
56 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
56
But in that case, arguably, it is better to allow oneself to be killed unin-
tentionally than intentionally to kill the innocent person threatening one.
A stronger objection to this view is that it fails to take into account the 
possibility that the defender is in some way culpable. Consider a person, 
B, who dislikes another person, A, and wants to kill A. B puts a bomb in 
A’s lunch box. However, A, rather than going off to lunch in the park, 
confronts B in the office. A has been told by C that B has switched sand-
wiches on him. B rushes down the stairs to get away from A, but A threat-
ens to throw the lunch box down at him. With time running out, and 
A  dismissing B’s claims about a bomb, and insisting on throwing the 
lunch box down to him, B turns around and shoots A dead. Presumably 
B is not entitled to kill A, notwithstanding the fact that he does so in 
self- defense. The relevant moral consideration is the fact that B culpably 
placed the bomb in A’s lunch box. This consideration overrides any right 
to self- defense B may have had.
On the weaker Hobbesian view, there is an absolute right to self- 
defense, if the threat to one’s life is intended. But once again this fails to 
take into account relevant moral considerations. The defender may have 
culpably brought it about that the attacker is trying to kill him. Or the 
defender may in some other way have provided the attacker with a mor-
ally justifiable reason to kill him. Or both of these conditions may obtain.
An example of the first possibility would be one in which B attempts to 
murder A by shooting him. Assume that A grabs the gun, and that each 
is now trying to kill the other; each is thus trying to kill the other in self- 
defense. But surely the fact that B initially attempted to murder A defeats 
B’s right to self- defense.
An example of the second possibility would be the case of the prisoner 
in a concentration camp who tries to kill one of the guards. The guard is 
not threatening her life, but he has murdered all her family, and contin-
ues to murder others. Surely the guard is responsible for so much evil, 
and will be responsible for so much more evil, that he has provided the 
prisoner with a morally justifiable reason for killing him. Moreover, this 
reason overrides any right to self- defense the guard may have.
act is otherwise morally permissible (notwithstanding the harm it produces), intending 
the harm need not affect the permissibility of the act; however, her argument for this 
seems to me not to work. For in her examples of morally permissible actions involving 
bad intentions, these bad intentions are constrained by good second- order intentions with 
respect to the bad first- order intentions. See my review of Ethics for Enemies in Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews (2012). See also Chapter 7.2.2.
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An example of the third possibility is even more convincing. Suppose 
an SS guard in a concentration camp wants to be attacked by one of the 
prisoners so he can kill the prisoner. The SS guard shoots the prisoner’s 
family in front of the prisoner and then offers a knife to the prisoner. The 
prisoner then attacks the SS guard, who pulls out his gun and shoots the 
prisoner dead. The SS guard has intentionally, indeed culpably, brought 
it about that the prisoner will try to kill him. He has forced the prisoner’s 
choice in the thick sense (see section 2.2). Moreover, he has also pro-
vided the prisoner with an adequate moral justification for killing him. 
In this case, any right to self- defense the SS guard may have is clearly 
overridden.14
2.4  The No- Fault Rights- Based Theory
The third theory is the no- fault rights- based theory. On this account, 
whether or not an attacker is at fault in constituting a deadly threat to 
some defender is irrelevant to the question of the justifiability of killing 
in self- defense. It is the fact that the attacker is a deadly threat— coupled 
with the fact that the defender cannot disarm the attacker— that is criti-
cal. This account focuses on the attacker qua deadly threat. In her paper 
“Self- Defense,” Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that considerations of fault 
are irrelevant to the justification of killing in self- defense.15 In place of 
fault- based theories of self- defense, she puts forward her own account. In 
this section I will attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of Thomson’s 
account.
Under what conditions is it permissible for agent A  to kill agent B 
in self- defense? According to Thomson, other things being equal, every 
agent has a right not to be killed by any other agent.16 What make other 
things unequal? Thomson provides one condition that does not make 
things unequal; namely, the fact of being a bystander. If C is a bystander, 
then C has a right not to be killed. On Thomson’s account, C is a bystander 
14. See Teichman, “Self- Defence.”
15. Thomson, “Self- Defense.” Thomson does not think that considerations of fault are 
always irrelevant to the justification of killing in self- defense. They can be relevant in some 
cases of self- defense in which the defender does not have to choose between his or her own 
life and the life of the attacker. See Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self- Defence 
Justification of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
16. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 299– 300, 303– 305.
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if C is not causally involved in the situation that consists in the agent, A, 
being at risk of death.17
On the other hand, things are not equal— which is to say attacker B 
does not have a right not to be killed by defender A— if B is a deadly threat 
to A, and indeed B will kill A unless A intervenes and kills B.18 Thomson 
construes the concept of killing quite narrowly.19 Agency is not required 
in order for someone to kill someone else. So if a fat man is pushed off a 
cliff and lands on a person below, crushing the person to death, then the 
fat man killed the person.
It is important to stress here that, on Thomson’s account whether or 
not B intends to kill A, or is otherwise at fault in constituting a threat to 
the life of A, is not necessary for B not to have a right not to be killed by 
A. Fault, she says, is irrelevant to determining the justifiability of killing 
in self- defense.20
A final feature of Thomson’s account is that, morally speaking, an 
agent stands to her would- be killer as a third party stands to that killer.21 
Thus, if it is permissible for A to kill B in self- defense, then it is permis-
sible for some third party, C, to kill B, given that A is unable to defend 
herself. So if B does not have a right not to be killed by A, B does not have 
a right not to be killed by C, or D, and so on.
I have three objections to Thomsoǹ s account. My first objection 
makes use of Thomson’s example of the drug- crazed truck- driver (agent 
B). Thomson claims that it would be morally permissible for agent A to 
kill the driver to save himself even though (since drug crazed) B is not at 
fault.22 We have seen that Thomson claims that one cannot use bystanders 
17. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 288.
18. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 289, 300– 301, 303– 305. In fact, as we will see, there is some 
confusion as to Thomson’s precise position.
19. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 299.
20. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 285, 294– 295. At times (e.g., p.  301), Thomson seems to 
think that there is some distinction to be made between her theory of self- defense and her 
commitment to the irrelevance of fault in the justification of killing in self- defense. But 
this distinction makes little difference to her commitments. For she commits herself to the 
theory taken independently of the irrelevance of fault thesis— the theory that B does not 
have a right not to be killed by A, if (1) B is a deadly threat to A and (2) B will kill A if A does 
not kill B— and she commits herself to the irrelevance of fault thesis.
21. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 306. McMahan’s liability theory shares this feature 
(McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing”).
22. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 284.
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to save oneself. But let us complicate her example. Assume that A could 
throw bystander C in front of the trunk, and thereby save himself. Now 
the difference between the truck driver and the bystander, on Thomson’s 
account, is that the truck driver, but not the bystander, is the threat. 
Therefore, A is not entitled to throw the bystander, C, in front of the truck. 
So far, so good. But now let us assume that the bystander is in fact the 
person who injected the truck- driver with the drug in order to get the 
truck- driver to kill A. On Thomson’s account, this makes no difference; 
it would still be wrong for A to throw C in front of the truck. For the only 
morally relevant consideration is that C is a bystander; the fact that C is at 
fault is morally irrelevant. But surely the defender, A, would be entitled to 
throw the bystander, C, in front of the truck to save himself, and for the 
reason that C was at fault in injecting the drugs into the truck driver. This 
example demonstrates that at least one sort of fault is relevant to killing in 
self- defense. The sort of fault in question is (roughly) that of intentionally 
setting in train a causal process that will result in a person being killed, 
and doing so for the purpose of achieving that result. Indeed, the example 
is sufficient to show that in at least some cases one ought to kill the person 
at fault rather than the person who constitutes a threat to one’s life.
It might be argued that the bystander is the threat to one’s life in that 
he caused the truck driver to go berserk. Certainly persons at fault— in 
the sense of fault at issue here— are causally involved. But on Thomson’s 
account, agent C being a threat to A’s life means C’s action of injecting 
drugs into B is in part constitutive of the situation that consists in A being 
at risk. Thomson does not think being causally involved is sufficient for 
being in part constitutive of the situation that consists in someone being 
a risk.23 Instead she says that the presence or absence of the initiating 
villain— the one who injected the truck driver— makes no difference to 
A’s right to kill B.24 In the truck- driver case, the bystander, C, is not about 
to bring about the death of A, and thus C is not the threat to A’s life; rather, 
B is the threat. Accordingly, by Thomson’s lights, A has a right to kill B 
but not C. This is strongly counter- intuitive.
However, let us consider a revised version of Thomson’s account in 
which being causally involved, even indirectly, is sufficient for being in 
part constitutive of the situation. Here we can imagine a similar case 
23. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 298– 299.
24. Thomson, “Self- Defense,” 305.
60 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
60
in which C had unknowingly (and without fault) injected the drug into 
the truck driver. On the assumption that C (although without fault) is the 
ultimate cause of the threat to A’s life, Thomson (on this more permissive 
cause- based account) would have to hold that it is permissible for A  to 
kill C. But under these circumstances, it would surely not be permissible 
for A to throw C in front of the truck. The reason is simply that C is not 
at fault.
We have seen that Thomson’s no- fault account is problematic. So it 
might now be accepted that, contra Thomson, fault is indeed relevant to 
determining the permissibility of an agent’s act of killing in self- defense. 
Contra Thomson, A is entitled to kill bystander C, rather than attacker B, 
given that C is at fault and B is not. Nevertheless, it might be claimed that 
Thomson has provided a sufficient condition for extinguishment of an 
agent B’s right not to be killed, namely, that B is a deadly threat to A, and 
B will kill A unless A kills B.
Moreover, in the light of the admission that fault can be relevant to 
determining the permissibility of an agent’s act of killing in self- defense, 
let us now allow that if an agent, C, is at fault by virtue of intentionally, 
albeit indirectly, causing a threat to another agent, A, then C no longer has 
a right not to be killed. Accordingly, in the drug crazed driver scenario, 
neither attacker B nor bystander C have a right not to killed, or at least 
neither would have a right not to be killed, absent the other. So if C was 
not present, it would be permissible for A to kill B. And if B leapt out of the 
truck, leaving A with the option only of throwing C in front of the truck, 
then it would be permissible for A to so kill C.
So on this revised conception, it is permissible for A to kill either B 
or C, but there is no substantive moral consideration by means of which 
to make a choice between them should the need arise. Rather, there are 
simply two sets of sufficient conditions for losing one’s right not to be 
killed:  (1) B is a deadly causally direct threat to agent A, and B will kill 
A unless A kills B; (2) C is a culpable deadly indirect threat to A, and C will 
indirectly cause A’s death unless A kills C. This alleged moral equivalence 
of the two conditions is counterintuitive. Surely we have a strong moral 
preference in favor of killing C and sparing B, rather than killing B and 
sparing C.25
25. It might be thought that neither A nor C has lost their right not to be killed. If so, 
then the objection to the sufficiency of Thomson’s conditions still stands. Moreover, this 
thought is consistent with there being a moral difference between killing A and killing C, 
but it would not be the moral difference between justified and excusable killing.
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Moreover, there is a readily available explanation for the existence of 
this strong moral preference. In cases where there is no choice to be made, 
since only C can be killed, it is permissible for A to kill C. In cases where 
a choice can be made between either killing C or killing B, it is impermis-
sible for A to kill B. In cases where there is no choice to be made and it 
is only possible to kill B, then it is at best only excusable for A to kill B. If 
this explanation is accepted— and I believe it should be— then the weaker 
Thomson thesis is false. Thomson has not provided a sufficient condition 
for extinguishment of an agent B’s right not to be killed. The fact that B is 
a deadly threat to A, and that B will kill A unless A kills B, is not sufficient 
to extinguish B’s right not to be killed.
I conclude that the drug- crazed truck driver example (in its various 
versions) demonstrates that Thomson’s account of self- defense is inad-
equate in two important respects. First, Thomson is wrong to maintain 
that fault is irrelevant to determining the permissibility of an agent’s act 
of killing in self- defense.26 Second, it is not the case that a sufficient condi-
tion for extinguishment of an agent B’s right not to be killed is that B is a 
deadly threat to A, and B will kill A unless A intervenes and kills B.
A second problem with Thomson’s account concerns the grounds for 
an agent not having a right not to be killed. Here it is important to note 
three things. First, the right not to be killed is, by definition, a negative 
right, unlike the related right to life. Second, the right not to be killed is an 
individual natural right, as opposed to an institutional or collective right. 
Third, (and more controversially) the right not to be killed is an intrinsic, 
as opposed to a derived, right. The right not to be killed does not derive 
from some other right, or rights, such as a right to autonomy.27
According to Thomson, B being a deadly threat to A is not sufficient 
for B losing his right to not to be killed. Yet she rejects the possibility that 
a further necessary condition is that B is in some way at fault. Rather, 
26. To suggest that fault is relevant to determining whether or not one has lost one’s right 
to life is not to suggest that fault provides a sufficient condition for losing one’s right to 
life. Certainly fault, in the sense of intention to kill, is not a sufficient condition. But we 
have been speaking of fault as involving not only simply intentions and the like, but also 
causal involvement.
27. Perhaps the right not to be killed derives from the right to life. At any rate, some 
have argued that the right to life itself is derived. For discussion, see Jonathan Glover, 
Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), Chapter 3. Glover argues against 
the influential view of the sanctity of life (i.e., that killing is intrinsically wrong, since life 
has value in itself). He argues that killing someone is directly wrong even in the absence of 
harmful side effects, but that it is not intrinsically wrong.
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Thomson believes that the further necessary condition is (roughly) that 
the defender cannot preserve his life other than by killing the attacker. 
I take it that the intuition guiding Thomson’s account at this point is that 
one ought not to kill one’s attacker unless one really has to. If one can 
disarm one’s attacker, then one ought to disarm him. I do not dispute the 
validity of this intuition. I do, however, dispute that the basis of this intu-
ition is that the attacker retains his right not to be killed if the defender can 
disarm him. So I am distinguishing between conditions under which an 
attacker loses the right not to be killed by a defender, on the one hand, and 
conditions under which it would be morally permissible for an attacker to 
be killed by a defender, on the other. Accordingly, an attacker might not 
have a right not to be killed by a defender, but it might nevertheless be 
morally impermissible for the defender to kill the attacker. At any rate, 
I will argue against Thomson’s claim that a necessary condition for an 
attacker losing the right not to be killed is that the defender cannot dis-
arm the attacker.28
Suppose there is a not insignificant possibility that a defender will 
be killed if he chooses the option of disarming, rather than killing, his 
attacker. Now, on the rendering of Thomson’s account under consider-
ation, the defender would nevertheless be under a strong moral obligation 
to try to disarm the attacker. For the attacker has a right not to be killed if 
the defender can disarm the attacker. But surely, in this kind of case, the 
defender is not obliged to put his life at risk to preserve the life of some-
one who is culpably and unjustifiably trying to kill him. So the condition 
needs to be weakened to accommodate this kind of counter- example. It 
should read: the defender cannot disarm the attacker without putting the 
defender’s life at risk.
But it might be the case that the defender’s life is not at risk, but that he 
will lose an arm and a leg in the process of trying to disarm the attacker. 
Presumably, the condition needs to be further weakened to: the defender 
cannot disarm the attacker without either putting his own life at risk or 
incurring serious harm to himself.
But what if the attacker has tried to kill the defender in the past and 
will try to kill the defender in the future (and neither the police nor anyone 
else is able to provide adequate protection for the defender)? Presumably, 
the defender is entitled to kill to prevent an otherwise unavoidable and 
28. I argued for this in my 1993 paper, “Killing in Self- Defense”. Since then others have done 
so, e.g. Uwe Steinhoff in his “Self- Defense and the Necessity Condition” (unpublished).
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certain future deadly threat of this sort.29 We now have a double- barreled 
condition of the form: (a) the defender cannot disarm the attacker without 
putting his own life at risk or incurring serious harm himself, or (b) the 
defender’s disarming of the attacker will not remove an unavoidable and 
certain (probable?) future threat posed by the attacker to the life of the 
defender.
Unfortunately, even this heavily qualified and complicated condition is 
inadequate. Imagine a defender who also happens to be an agent- centered 
pacifist. Assume that this defender will have to either severely wound or 
kill his attacker if he is to preserve his own life. The pacifist has a three-
fold choice: (1) allow himself to be killed, (2) kill his attacker, or (3) severely 
wound his attacker by severing the attacker’s weapon- using right arm. 
The pacifist chooses to allow himself to be killed, and is killed. In this sce-
nario, the option of disarming rather than killing the attacker is available 
to the pacifist defender. Therefore, on Thomson’s account, the attacker 
retains his right not to be killed. But in this pacifist scenario, this seems 
incorrect; surely the attacker does not have a right not to be killed. To 
see this, imagine that there is a nonpacifist bystander with a gun who is 
unable to disarm attacker, but who could kill the attacker and, thereby, 
preserve the pacifist defender’s life. It is clearly morally permissible for 
the bystander to kill the attacker, and indeed the agent- centered pacifist 
defender may thank him for doing so. However, by Thomson’s lights, 
the attacker has a right not to be killed since the pacifist defender could 
have disarmed the attacker. Therefore, it would be morally wrong for the 
bystander to kill the attacker. So much the worse for Thomson’s account. 
The example shows that yet another modification of the necessary condi-
tion for losing one’s right not to be killed is called for.
We have now arrived at the following proposition: A necessary condi-
tion for an attacker losing his right not to be killed is:  (a)  the defender 
cannot disarm the attacker without either putting his own life at risk or 
incurring serious harm to himself, and/ or (b) the defender’s disarming 
of the attacker will not remove an unavoidable and certain future threat 
posed by the attacker to the life of the defender, and/ or (c) the defender 
chooses not to disarm the attacker, even though the defender knows that 
if he so chooses the attacker will kill him.
29. On this issue, see Miller, “Shootings by Police in Victoria,” and Miller and Blackler, 
Ethical Issues in Policing, Chapter 3.
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Even this host of qualifications is incomplete. For example, what of 
future threats to the lives of the defender’s family? Surely the attacker 
does not have a right not to be killed by the defender if the defender knows 
that if he spares the attacker the attacker will, at some future date, kill the 
members of the defender’s family.
What is the upshot of this discussion of Thomson’s second necessary 
condition for a defender losing his right not to be killed? The first point 
to be made is that the condition cannot be the simple and straightfor-
ward one that she has provided. Rather, if it exists— and this is far from 
self- evident— this necessary condition is an enormously complicated and 
heavily qualified version of the condition she has provided.
The second point is that, contra Thomson, this putative condition, even 
if it can be precisely specified, is in all probability not a necessary condi-
tion for someone having a right not to be killed. It needs to be stressed 
that the required condition is not a condition under which the right not to 
be killed is overridden, or under which a defender might be excused for 
killing in self- defense. Rather, it is a central and necessary condition for 
the possession by an agent of the right not to be killed.
It is implausible that such a contingent, complex, and changing set of 
facts about other agents could ground a basic, negative, individual human 
right, such as the right not to be killed. Perhaps positive rights, institu-
tional rights, and derived rights may go in and out of existence, depend-
ing on various contingent, complex, and changing circumstances that 
are external to the bearers of those rights. And any right, including the 
right not to be killed, might be overridden, or its violator excused, on the 
basis of various, contingent, and external circumstances. But what is in 
question is whether the existence of a basic, negative, individual natural 
right could depend on such contingent, complex, and changing circum-
stances that are external to the rights bearer. Surely such a natural right 
is only dependent on natural properties possessed by the rights- bearer 
qua human being. At any rate, I have argued that the required recourse to 
a wide variety of contingent, external circumstances for the existence of 
this natural right renders Thomson’s account of the right not to be killed 
implausible.
The upshot of this discussion is as follows: Thomson has claimed that 
a necessary condition for an attacker losing the right not to be killed is 
that the defender cannot preserve his or her own life other than by killing 
the attacker. But this condition is unacceptable as it stands. It needs to be 
replaced by some notional condition that describes a complex, changing, 
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and contingent set of facts external to the attacker— facts such as the abil-
ity or willingness of the defender to defend him or herself. Thomson has 
not provided an adequate specification of such a condition. More impor-
tant, the view that any such condition grounds a basic, negative, indi-
vidual natural right, such as the right not to be killed, seems inherently 
implausible.
My third objection concerns Thomson’s claim that if it is permissible 
for you to intervene by killing your attacker, then it must be permissible 
for a third party to intervene on your behalf (given that you are unable 
to intervene on your own behalf.) My argument here is directed against 
Thomson’s claim that such a third party is in the same moral predica-
ment as the (self) defender.
Let us consider a variation on Thomson’s fat man example. Assume 
that the man at the bottom of the cliff has no means to prevent the fat 
man landing on him and killing him. Assume further that there is a third 
party with a bazooka who could fire this weapon and, thereby, cause the 
disintegration in midair of the fat man. (Note that, other things being 
equal, the fat man will survive the fall. He will die only if someone kills 
him by, for example, shooting him with a bazooka.) Now, on Thomson’s 
account, the fat man has no right not to be killed by the third party, and 
the man at the bottom of the cliff has a right not to be killed by the fat 
man. Therefore, she ought to conclude, it is permissible for the third party 
to kill the fat man, just as it would have been permissible for the person at 
risk to kill the fat man if he had been able to.
According to Thomson, the man at the bottom of the cliff has a right 
not to be killed and the fat man has no such right. But if this is so, then it 
is not simply permissible for the third party to kill the fat man. Rather, it 
is morally obligatory for the third party to kill the fat man in order to save 
the man at the bottom of the cliff. The third party is under an obligation to 
remove the deadly threat, to kill the fat man. For the third party confronts 
a choice between killing a person who does not have a right not to be killed 
(in order to save the life of a person who has a right not to be killed) and 
allowing a person with a right not to be killed to be killed (by a person who 
does not have a right not to be killed).30 (If the reader is unhappy as I am 
30. It might be suggested that whereas some third parties, such as police officers, 
might have this obligation to kill, by virtue of their institutional role to intervene in life- 
threatening situations involving others, most third parties do not have any obligations to 
intervene by killing. So if the third party was a police officer, he or she would be under an 
obligation, but not if the third party was an ordinary citizen. I do not agree with this, but 
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with Thomson’s claim that it is in fact permissible for the person at risk 
to kill an innocent fat man, no matter. Simply assume that the fat man 
is guilty; assume that he was not pushed but rather jumped intending to 
kill the person below.) But now we can see how the logic of Thomson’s 
position works against her impartialist claim that the third party is in 
the same moral predicament as the defender. For that logic leads to the 
partialist conclusion that she wants to resist, namely, that there is a dis-
analogy between the moral predicament of the third party and that of the 
person at risk. For the person at risk— if he was able to defend himself, 
and could do so only by killing the fat man— would not be under an obli-
gation to kill the fat man, as is the case with the third party; rather, at 
most it would be permissible for the person at risk to kill the fat man. The 
man at the bottom of the cliff is presumably entitled— if he so chooses— 
not to exercise his right to self- defense.
2.5  The Responsibility Account
The failure of Thomson’s no- fault theory suggests a variation on it:  an 
impartialist account that strengthens the conditions under which an agent 
does not have a right not to be killed. Here there are a number of possibili-
ties, but perhaps the most salient is that provided by Jeff McMahan.31 On 
McMahan’s account, agent A does not have a right not to be killed (or, to 
use McMahan’s terminology, A is liable to be killed) if A is a deadly threat 
to agent B; A is responsible for being a deadly threat, and it is necessary 
for B to kill A to remove the threat.
Notice that McMahan endorses the necessity condition,32 and is there-
fore open to the objections to that condition made above (section 2.4) in 
respect of Thomson’s account. However, in this section I focus on other 
aspects of McMahan’s account that differentiate it from Thomson’s— 
in particular, on his invocation of a notion of responsibility. Consider 
McMahan’s case of the conscientious car driver, B, who is an acciden-
tal (but non- negligent and non- reckless) deadly threat to a pedestrian 
even if it is accepted, my basic point against Thomson holds; to see this, simply assume 
that the third party is in fact a police officer or like official.
31. McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing.”
32. McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing.” See also McMahan, 
Killing in War, 9.
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A. A can prevent A being killed by B, but only by killing B. Here B is 
responsible for being a deadly threat to A, since B is intentionally driving 
his car knowing that in so doing there is some small risk to the lives of 
pedestrians. Accordingly, in these circumstances the car driver does not 
have a right not to be killed, and so the pedestrian is justified in killing 
the car driver in self- defense.33 Moreover, since the car driver, B, does not 
have a right not to be killed and the pedestrian, A, retains her right not to 
be killed, then some bystander, C, would also be morally entitled (indeed, 
perhaps morally obliged) to kill B in order to save A. This putative right 
or obligation of bystander, C, to intervene by killing B seems counter- 
intuitive. I return to this point shortly.
In McMahan’s conscientious car driving scenario we need to distin-
guish between B not having a right not to be killed and B having a right 
to be killed that is, nevertheless, overridden by other moral consider-
ations. I suggest that while the latter may well be true, the former is not. 
Accordingly, and contra McMahan, the example ought to be understood 
as follows: The pedestrian retains her right not to be killed, as does the 
conscientious car driver. However, in the circumstances in question, the 
pedestrian’s right to self- defense overrides the right of the driver not to 
be killed.
To see this, consider another version of this scenario, in which the 
principles of proportionality and impartiality play a decisive role. In this 
version, the conscientious car driver is actually five drivers who jointly 
drive (let us say) a goods train, and the only way to prevent the train from 
accidentally running off the track and killing the single pedestrian now 
in the path of the train is for a third party, C, to fire a rocket at the train 
which will kill all five drivers. As was the case with the conscientious 
car driver, the train drivers are conscientious; they are an accidental (but 
non- negligent and non- reckless) deadly threat to the pedestrian. Surely C 
would not be morally justified in firing the rocket. For, on the one hand, C 
(unlike, I suggest, the pedestrian in both McMahan’s car- driving example 
and in the train- driving scenario) must act impartially, and, on the other 
hand, killing five innocents to save one is a disproportionate response. 
Yet on McMahan’s account, C would be morally justified in firing the 
rocket, since, unlike the pedestrian, none of the drivers has a right not 
to be killed (i.e., each of the drivers is liable to be killed). They are each 
liable, since they jointly cause the accident (or rather will cause it absent 
33. McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” 394.
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C’s intervention). Their joint action is as follows, let us assume: Driver 
B1 shovels the coal to keep the engine running, B2 monitors the speed 
of the train, B3 scans the track ahead, and so on. So each driver makes a 
causal contribution to the accident in the course of performing their joint 
action of driving the train. Moreover, while each is conscientious in his 
or her role, each knows that there is a small risk of a derailment in which 
an innocent pedestrian may be killed; indeed, this is a matter of mutual 
knowledge.34
Like the no- fault theory, McMahan’s responsibility account is an 
impartialist theory of the morality of killing in self- defense, and this 
makes it vulnerable to further objections. Consider McMahan’s render-
ing of the tactical bomber scenario, in which a tactical bomber foresee-
ably, but unintentionally, kills a small number of innocent civilians in the 
course of bombing a strategically important munitions factory. His action 
is morally justified because he does not intentionally kill the civilians, 
and because the bombing saves the lives of a considerably larger numbers 
of other innocent civilians. According to McMahan, the tactical bomber 
is not liable to defensive killing— he retains his right not to be killed— 
because his action was morally justified.35 However, since the innocent 
civilians about to be bombed have not wronged anyone or violated any-
one’s rights, they are not liable to be killed either; they also have a right 
not to be killed. Thus the innocent civilians would be morally justified in 
shooting down the tactical bomber in self- defense, just as he is morally 
justified in unintentionally but foreseeably killing them. So far, so good; 
this accords with our intuitions.
However, it is not clear that this view of the matter can be consistently 
adhered to by an impartialist such as McMahan. For partialism intrudes; 
specifically, in respect of the right to self- defense. Let us assume that it is 
not the innocent civilians that are in a position to shoot down the tactical 
bomber, but rather some third party. From an impartialist standpoint the 
third party is confronted with the same two options that confront the inno-
cent civilians contemplating shooting down the tactical bomber; morally 
speaking, the third party and the civilians are in the same predicament. 
The first option is to shoot down the tactical bomber and, thereby, save the 
small number of innocent civilians from being (unintentionally) killed 
34. Each knew, and each knew that all the others knew, etc.
35. McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” 399.
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by the tactical bomber, but at the expense of the much larger number of 
innocent civilians who would be saved by the tactical bomber’s action. 
The second option is not to shoot and, thereby, allow the small number 
of civilians to be killed but preserve the lives of the much larger group 
of civilians. For the third party the principle of proportionality is surely 
decisive; the third party does not have a partialist right of self- defense in 
play, as do the innocent civilians about to be killed by the tactical bomber. 
Accordingly, the third party applies the test of proportionality and, as a 
result, correctly decides not to shoot down the tactical bomber on the 
grounds that the death of the small number of innocent civilians killed 
by the tactical bomber is outweighed by the larger number of lives saved 
by his destruction of the munitions factory. That is, given the principle 
of proportionality, it is morally impermissible for the third party to shoot 
down the tactical bomber. This also seems correct. But if impartialism 
is correct, how can it be morally permissible for the innocent civilians to 
kill the tactical bomber but impermissible for the third party to do so? 
It is agreed on all hands that both the tactical bomber and the innocent 
civilians retain their right not to be killed. However, the principle of pro-
portionality requires that the innocent civilians, rather than the tactical 
bomber, be killed. Specifically, if impartialism is correct, then there can 
be no decisive moral difference between the justification available to the 
innocent civilians for killing or not killing the tactical bomber and that of 
the third party. Accordingly, consistent with his impartialism, McMahan 
ought to hold that it is not morally permissible for the innocent civilians to 
kill the tactical bomber. However, it is surely morally permissible for the 
innocent civilians to kill the tactical bomber (on grounds of self- defense), 
notwithstanding the requirements of the proportionality principle. So 
much the worse for impartialism— and therefore so much the worse for 
McMahan in so far as his account is to be understood as impartialist.36
2.6  The Fault- Based Internalist Suspendable 
Rights- Based Theory (FIST)
All the theories we have considered are inadequate. However, their failure 
points to a number of criteria of adequacy for any account of justifiable 
36. From an institutionalist perspective, it might be argued that whereas the tactical 
bomber, as a military role occupant, is morally obliged to apply the proportionality prin-
ciple, innocent civilians are not thus obliged. I return to this issue in Chapters 6 and 7.
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killing in self- defense. First, the justification of killing in self- defense is 
not simply that there is a deadly threat or that there is a deadly threat 
that can only be removed by killing the person who constitutes the deadly 
threat. Fault is involved in the justification of self- defense. The objection 
to the no- fault theory brings this point out. Second, any right to life, or 
right not to be killed, that an individual might have is dependent on, or in 
some way linked to, that individual discharging his or her obligation not 
to kill others. In other words, the moral value of an agent’s life is partly 
dependent on the value that agent puts on the lives of others. The objec-
tions to the Hobbesian account bring this out. Third, the linkage has to 
be such that the right not to be killed is suspended, and not canceled or 
overridden. The objections to the simple right to life theories seem to 
justify this claim. I note that suspension of a right is consistent with the 
right in question being inalienable; at a deep level one retains and can-
not transfer one’s suspended right even though it is not in effect. Fourth, 
the linkage has to relativized, to some extent, to the defender and the 
attacker. The defender is not obligated to respond to the life- threatening 
attack in the way that a third person is obligated to respond. One’s legiti-
mate interest in one’s own life, and the responsibility for it, is different 
from another person’s legitimate interest in, or responsibility for, one’s 
life. The third objection to the force- choice theory evidences this consid-
eration. Moreover, whatever force the Hobbesian account has— and it has 
some force— rests on this intuition. Fifth, the attacker’s reason for attack-
ing is a morally relevant consideration. The objections to the Hobbesian 
view brings this out. Sixth, whether or not the attacker forced the choice 
(thick sense) can be a morally relevant consideration in some scenarios. 
Whatever appeal the forced- choice theory has— and it has some appeal— 
rests on this thought.
Given these criteria of adequacy, I  suggest the following fault- based 
internalist suspendable- rights theory (FIST).37 You have a right not to 
be killed by me, and I  have a concomitant obligation not to kill you.38 
However you suspend your own right not to be killed by me if you come 
to have all the following properties:
37. See John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Chapter 3. Montague (in “Self- Defense 
and Choosing Between Lives,” 214) discusses this matter in relation to Locke.
38. So the right in question is a so- called claim right.
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1. You are a deadly threat to me.
2. You intend to kill me and are responsible for having this intention to 
kill me.
3. You do not have a good and decisive moral justification for killing me, 
and you do not reasonably believe that you have a good and decisive 
moral justification for killing me.
Accordingly, each person, X, has a set of suspendable rights not to be 
killed: X has a right not to be killed by Y, and a right not to be killed by Z, 
and so on. X also has a set of suspendable obligations not to kill: X has an 
obligation not to kill Y, and an obligation not to kill Z, and so on. Here my 
right not to be killed generates an obligation on your part not to kill me.
There are three conditions on the suspension corresponding to three 
features of the attacker, it being understood that the attacker himself sus-
pends his right in virtue of possessing these three features. Condition 1 
simply states what being an attacker consists in— namely, being a deadly 
threat. Condition 2 expresses the requirement that the attacker must be 
morally responsible for the fact that he is a deadly threat. Finally, condition 
3 signals the relevance to justified killing in self- defense of the attacker’s 
justification for his attack. This justification is neither objectively suffi-
cient nor reasonably believed to be sufficient.
Note that the above definition provides a set of necessary conditions 
that are jointly sufficient but not jointly necessary for the suspension of 
the right not to be killed. One reason for this is that there may well be 
closely related sets of conditions that are jointly sufficient (e.g., that the 
attacker seeks to torture me for the rest of my life or cause severe brain 
damage of a kind that disables my intellectual faculties, although I remain 
alive and conscious).
These rights are such that when one member of the set of rights is sus-
pended, the other rights (and concomitant obligations) remain in force. 
Thus, if B’s right not to be killed by A  is suspended, then A no longer 
has an obligation not to kill B (based on that right). However, B still has a 
right not to be killed by C, and thus C’s obligation not to kill B remains in 
force. Accordingly, this is not an impartialist account, as are those of, for 
example, Thomson and McMahan.
It must also be noted that these rights not to be killed are not only able 
to be suspended, they can also be overridden. So while B might still have 
a right not to be killed by, say, C, it might be the case that it is morally 
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permissible for C to kill B. This would be the case if B’s right not to be 
killed by C was overridden (but not suspended).
Moreover, B might still have a right not to be killed by A in circum-
stances in which B intentionally tries to kill A  because B wrongly, but 
reasonably, believes he has a good and decisive justification. Suppose, for 
example, A is the twin brother of a mass murderer and A knocks on B’s 
door seeking assistance with a broken- down car. Person B wrongly but 
reasonably believes A is the mass murderer and tries to kill A. A responds 
by killing B in self- defense. Here B’s right not to be killed is not sus-
pended. Rather, B’s right not to be killed is overridden by A’s right not to 
be killed, given B wrongly, but excusably, is trying to kill A. Notice that 
A would not be justified in killing B unless it was necessary to do so.
According to FIST, that a person stands to his attacker in a different 
way from the way in which a third person stands to that attacker makes a 
crucial difference to the kind of moral justification available to the third 
person for killing the attacker.39 If she can decisively intervene to save the 
defender’s life, but only by killing the attacker, the third person confronts 
a choice between two lives, one guilty and one innocent. From the point 
of view of the third person, both the defender and the attacker have a right 
not to be killed, and consequently the third person has a stringent obliga-
tion not to kill the attacker (or the defender). However, the third person 
confronts a choice between killing a would- be murderer and allowing an 
innocent person to be killed. In that case, she ought to choose to preserve 
the life of the innocent person. Here the third person’s obligation not to 
kill the attacker remains, but it is overridden. The duty of the third person 
to preserve an innocent life, coupled with the fact that the attacker is the 
guilty party, is sufficient to override the attacker’s right not to be killed by 
the third person.
Moreover, even in cases where an attacker’s right not to be killed by 
a defender is not suspended, there are moral differences between the 
defender and a third party due to the partialist nature of the right to self- 
defense. For in cases in which the rights of both defenders and attackers 
not to be killed have not been suspended, it is morally permissible, other 
things being equal, for a defender to give greater weight to his or her 
own life than to the life of a defender, whereas this is not so for a third 
party; other things being equal, third parties have to act impartially. This 
39. Ryan (in “Self- Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing,” 519) makes this kind of 
point in his discussion of “negative bonds.”
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moral difference is evident in my versions of McMahan’s conscientious 
car driver and tactical bomber scenarios discussed above. In these scenar-
ios the third party ought to act impartially, whereas it is excusable for the 
defender to act partially in his or her own favor. Accordingly, it is morally 
excusable for the defenders (the pedestrians and the innocent civilians, 
respectively) to kill their attackers (the car driver, the joint train- drivers, 
and the bomber, respectively) but not for the third party to do so.
An important feature of FIST is that the attacker suspends his right 
not to be killed in cases in which the defender does not have to kill the 
attacker to save his life.40 In this respect, FIST is different from most 
contemporary accounts, including those of Montague, Thomson and 
McMahan. There are two general background intuitions here. First, 
whether or not a person has such a fundamental right as the right not 
to be killed must depend on properties of that person. It cannot depend 
on whether someone else, such as the defender, has or does not have a 
capacity to defend himself. Second, if a person deliberately kills other 
people without any justification whatsoever, then that person has called 
into question their very entitlement to live; a person’s right to live is not 
something that exists independently of the respect that that person has 
for the right to life of others. However FIST focuses, in particular, on the 
absence of any right of the attacker that he be spared by the defender— the 
one the attacker sought to kill. When the defender disarms the attacker, 
everything is not as it was before the attack. Before the attack, the pre-
sumption is that the attacker- to- be recognizes the defender’s right not to 
be killed. The attack reverses this presumption. The presumption must 
now be that the attacker does not recognize the existence of his obliga-
tion not to kill the defender.
Notwithstanding my commitment to FIST, an account in terms of 
an attacker’s suspension of his right not to be killed, I am still able to 
maintain, and do maintain, that the defender has, or might have, a moral 
obligation (of a different kind) not to kill the attacker in cases in which 
it is not necessary to kill the attacker to preserve her own life. If so, this 
obligation is not the obligation generated by the right that each agent has 
not to be killed. Rather it would be one of a number of obligations. Some 
of these are generated by features of the attacker. For example, there is the 
obligation not to destroy what has moral value, and the life of the attacker 
still has, or may well have, moral value. And there is the related obligation 
40. See Ryan, “Self- Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing,” 512.
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to be merciful to those who have wronged you. Other obligations involve 
considerations that are external to the attacker. For example, there may be 
dire consequences for the attacker’s family if you kill him. Importantly, 
there will be dire consequences for the community if defenders generally 
kill their attackers. Hence the existence of laws to the effect that one must 
not kill in self- defense unless one has to. So my account is able to accom-
modate the intuition that one ought not to kill in self- defense unless one 
has to.
In FIST the right not to be killed is relativized to single agents. 
Nevertheless, FIST can accommodate killers who seek not to kill victims 
qua individuals, but qua members of some group. Suppose some person 
has a policy of killing people who belong to a certain category, such as 
a certain racial group, or persons with a price on their head. Suppose 
also that I am a member of this category and have reason to believe that, 
unbeknown to the killer, I am the next person belonging to that category 
that he will try to kill. Perhaps my name is on the latest hit list the killer 
is about to receive. In this kind of case, the killer has an intention to kill 
someone belonging to the category to which I belong, and as a result will 
kill me unless I intervene. In such cases, although the killer only has an 
intention to kill me qua member of some category— it is not personal, 
so to speak— his right not to be killed by me is nevertheless suspended. 
Potentially, at least, this has implications for military combatants fighting 
wars, as we shall see in Chapter 6.
2.7  Objections to FIST
Having outlined my favored account of the justifiable killing in self- 
defense, namely FIST, I will now deal with a number of objections to it. 
First, it might be objected that the intuition that one ought not to kill one’s 
attacker, unless one really has to, is not sufficiently catered for by FIST. In 
particular, it might be claimed that the right of the attacker not to be killed 
by me is not suspended if I can defend myself without killing my attacker. 
On this view, the fact that the attacker is a deadly threat who intends to kill 
the defender without good reason is not sufficient for it to be the case that 
the attacker’s right not to be killed is suspended. The further condition 
required is that it is not the case that the defender can disarm the attacker. 
Let us term this alternative conception to FIST the fault- based externalist 
suspended rights- based theory, or FEST. However, I have already argued 
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above in relation to Thomson’s account that it is not a necessary condi-
tion of the attacker’s right not to be killed by the defender being forfeited 
or suspended that the defender can defend himself without killing the 
attacker.
To recap: The argument revealed that a necessary condition for an 
attacker’s right not to be killed being suspended is (a) the defender cannot 
disarm the attacker without either putting her own life at risk or incur-
ring serious harm to herself, and/ or (b) the defender’s disarming of the 
attacker will not remove an unavoidable and certain future threat posed 
by the attacker to the life of the defender, and/ or (c) the defender chooses 
not to disarm the attacker, even though the defender knows that in this 
event the attacker will kill her. However, as we saw, even this host of quali-
fications is incomplete.
There are two relevant points to be made concerning FEST. First, it 
is gradually moving away from its original position, and closer to FIST. 
Eventually, the positions will become more or less indistinguishable. 
FEST becomes weak FEST becomes very weak FEST . . . becomes FIST. 
At that point, FEST will have surrendered to FIST; FIST has remained 
unchanged through the objector’s process of transformation.
Second, as argued above in relation to Thomson’s account, FEST is 
committed to the existence of the natural right not to be killed being 
dependent on a variety of contingent, complex, and changing circum-
stances that are external to the rights bearer. Surely such a natural right 
is only dependent on natural properties possessed by the rights- bearer 
qua human being. More specifically, FEST requires that the possession 
or not of the natural right of the attacker not to be killed depends on 
facts about the ability or willingness of the defender to defend herself. 
Surely, whether or not an agent has such a basic right cannot be located in 
facts about another agent. For these reasons, FIST ought to be preferred 
to FEST.
A second objection to FIST is as follows: Whereas this conception of a 
suspended right not to be killed has some plausibility when we consider 
the moment of the attack, it becomes implausible when we consider later 
times. Surely the former attacker has a right not to be killed by his for-
mer defender when they meet ten years later. Yet according to FIST, there 
would be no such right.
On FIST, the presumption is that the former attacker does not rec-
ognize any obligation not to kill the former defender, and is therefore a 
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deadly threat to the former defender. However, presumptions can be over-
ridden. So the matter turns on whether or not the former attacker has— in 
virtue of his actions in the ten year period— overturned the presumption.
If it is not the case that there is strong evidence that the former 
attacker now accepts the right of the (former) defender not to be killed, 
and is therefore no longer a standing deadly threat, then the presumption 
has not been overridden. Such evidence might consist of such things as 
remorse on the part of the former attacker that he once tried to kill the for-
mer defender, and a sustained attempt on the part of the former attacker 
to reform his character.
Moreover, even if the presumption against the attacker has not been 
overturned there are various other moral barriers to the former defender 
killing the former attacker. For there are obligations to preserve what has 
moral value, to obey the law, to take into account consequences, and so 
on. The passage of time has possibly strengthened some of these. For 
example, if the former attacker has completed a prison sentence, and this 
has had a deterrent effect on him, then there might now be strong conse-
quentialist grounds for leaving him be.
A third objection is as follows: By the lights of FIST in the case of 
justified lethal intervention by a third party, the right of the attacker not 
to be killed remains but is overridden. However, it might be argued that 
if that is the case then the attacker (or, at least, the attacker’s family or 
some such) is owed compensation by the third party for infringing this 
right. But surely the attacker is not owed compensation. At this point 
we need to distinguish between (1) suspending a right, (2) violating a 
right, and (3) justifiably infringing a right. In the case where the right 
of the attacker is suspended, obviously there is no entitlement to com-
pensation. By contrast, in the case where a right is violated, compensa-
tion is called for. What of the case of justifiable infringement? This is 
the kind of case of interest to us. Here there are multiple possibilities; 
sometimes compensation is warranted, sometimes not. In the standard 
scenarios of justified killing in defense of others no compensation is 
warranted, since the attacker culpably brought about the circumstances 
in which (a) the third party is morally obliged to intervene, and (b) the 
third party has no option but to intervene if this obligation is to be 
discharged.
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2.8  Conclusion
In this chapter I have elaborated and criticized the main contemporary 
theories of justifiable killing in self- defense, and also elaborated my own 
alternative account, namely, the fault- based internalist suspendable- rights 
theory (FIST).41 As the name indicates, FIST is a fault- and rights- based 
account, and to this extent it is familiar. However, it has two distinctive 
features. First, it is a partialist account in the following respect:42 The 
rights not to be killed are such that when one member of the set of rights 
is suspended, the other rights (and concomitant obligations) remain in 
force. Thus if A’s right not to be killed by B is suspended, then (other 
things being equal) B no longer has an obligation not to kill A. However, 
A still has a right not to be killed by C, and thus C’s obligation not to kill 
A remains in force. This condition is conservative in that it has the effect 
of curtailing the putative right of third parties to kill in defense of the 
lives of others. Nevertheless, it is morally permissible for third parties to 
intervene when the moral considerations for doing so override the right 
not to be killed of culpable attackers.
The second distinctive feature pertains to the necessity condition. 
According to FIST, a culpable attacker suspends his right not to be killed 
by a defender even in cases in which it is not necessary for the defender 
to kill the attacker to save her own life. This feature of FIST is permis-
sive in that it has the effect of strengthening the right to self- defense. 
Nevertheless, the defender typically has a moral obligation not to kill the 
attacker in cases in which it is not necessary to kill the attacker to pre-
serve her own life. This moral obligation is based in large part on the dire 
consequences for the members of a community if defenders are generally 
allowed to kill their attackers. For such a practice, if it goes unchecked, it 
will almost certainly lead to interpersonal and communal violence spiral-
ing out of control.
41. I first elaborated FIST in 1993 in my article “Killing in Self- Defense”. Recently, other 
theorists have proffered accounts that are similar in some respects, e.g. Uwe Steinhoff 
“Self- Defense and the Necessity Condition (unpublished).




Police Officers, Regular Soldiers, 
and Normative Institutional 
Analysis
i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I undertake a normative, comparative institutional 
analysis of police officers and regular soldiers in the setting of the con-
temporary liberal democratic nation- state. This will serve as a precursor 
to the detailed discussion in later chapters of police and military use of 
lethal force.1 I do so in the overall context of my favored normative teleo-
logical account of institutions and institutional roles, according to which 
the latter presuppose logically prior natural moral rights, obligations, and 
goods (the natural right to self- defense and natural obligation to defend 
the lives of others, in particular), but I nevertheless adjust or further 
specify these natural rights and obligations in light of the institutional 
purposes or, more precisely, collective ends served by these institutions.
The occupational roles of police officers and regular soldiers are related 
by virtue of an important feature that they share in common— a feature 
that is evidently one, but not the only, defining feature of each. The fea-
ture in question is their use of coercive, indeed lethal, force. That this is 
a defining feature of the police, in particular, might be controversial in 
some quarters, but it is, to say the least, an influential view,2 and one that 
1. An earlier version of much of the material in this chapter appeared in Miller, “Police, 
Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries.”
2. See for example, Egon Bittner, The Functions of Police in Modern Society (Washington, 
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1970). For social contract justification of police use 
of lethal force, see Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, Chapter  6; and Reiman, “The Social 
Contract and the Police Use of Deadly Force.”
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I have defended elsewhere.3 At any rate, it is an assumption of this chapter 
and elsewhere in this book. Granted that this defining feature— the use 
of coercive or lethal force— serves to demonstrate that the two roles are 
related, how are they to be differentiated?
Differentiating police officers from regular soldiers might seem 
straightforward enough. The role of the police officer is to maintain order 
and enforce the domestic criminal law of the land— paradigmatically by 
arresting offenders, but on occasion, and only if necessary, by using lethal 
force. By contrast, the role of the regular soldier (or sailor or airman), 
whether they be members of a standing professional army, members of 
a voluntary citizen- militia, or conscripted citizens, is to defend the state 
(or like political entity) against armed aggression by other states (or like 
political entities4)— paradigmatically by the use of lethal force. I will refer 
to naval and air force personnel, as well as army personnel, as regular 
soldiers, in part for ease of exposition, and in part to signal that they are 
members of the armed forces of the nation- state— specifically, the con-
temporary liberal- democratic state. The contrast here is with irregular sol-
diers, such as mercenaries, armed insurgents, terrorist- combatants, and 
the like.
In recent times this way of differentiating police from soldiers has 
come under some pressure. Are not many regular army soldiers engaged 
in peacekeeping missions, and as such focused on maintaining order 
and upholding the law? Are not these soldiers essentially functioning as 
police? Consider also armed police squads engaged in shoot- outs with 
heavily armed bank robbers or terrorist groups in, for example, India and 
South Africa. Are not these police essentially functioning as combatants?
Evidently, there has been a blurring of the distinction between police 
officers and regular soldiers. Arguably, this is in part a consequence of the 
rise of international terrorism (e.g., al- Qaeda and ISIS), and, as a conse-
quence, the need for closer cooperation between domestic police agencies 
and military organizations, for example, in the intelligence- gathering/ 
sharing area.5 The so- called war on terror has also, one way or another, 
3. Miller and Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing, Chapter 1. For a different view, see Kleinig, 
Ethics of Policing, Chapter 2.
4. I would include some, but not all, terrorist and/ or revolutionary organizations among 
these political entities.
5. Arguably, it is important to have an institutional demarcation between intelligence- 
gathering agencies, such as the CIA, and military forces, and also, within the intelligence- 
gathering community, between those with a domestic focus (e.g., MI5 in the UK) and 
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led to a great expansion of security agencies and an attendant outsourc-
ing of security functions to the private sector, notably to private military 
forces (PMFs) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.6 At any rate, whatever 
the precise nature, extent, and causes of the blurring of the distinction, 
in this chapter I seek, first, to clarify these related occupational roles, and, 
second, to unearth the implications in general terms for the morally per-
missible use of lethal force by the police, on the one hand, versus the 
military, on the other.
My general approach here is to frame these problems in normative and 
institutional terms. That is, I  take it that differentiating between police 
officers and regular soldiers is, or ought to be, principally a matter of 
demarcating their respective institutional roles.7 This, in turn, requires a 
specification of the nature and function (or end or telos) of the institutions 
of which these roles are, or ought to be, constitutive elements. Such speci-
fication is, I suggest, essentially a normative undertaking, as opposed to, 
for example, an exercise in purely descriptive organizational sociology. 
That said, it is a normative exercise that needs to be anchored in appropri-
ate institutional description.
In proceeding in this manner, I eschew the essentially noninstitutional, 
individual- based approach favored by many contemporary philosophers.8 
In doing so, I am not engaging in sociology, much less endorsing some 
those with an external focus (e.g. MI6 in the UK). The CIA’s use of UAVs (unmanned 
aerial vehicles), or “drones,” is a concern in this regard.
6. Perhaps the initial impetus for privatization was the ending of the Cold War, which 
brought with it not only the discharging of millions of soldiers, but also the end of seri-
ous resistance to free- market ideology. See P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of 
the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), and Andrew 
Alexandra, “Mars Meets Mammon,” in Andrew Alexandra, Deane- Peter Baker, and Marina 
Caparini, eds., Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics: Policies and Civil- Military 
Relations (London: Routledge, 2008), 89– 101. More recently, the rise of the Chinese state 
and economy— dominated as these are by hybrid public/ private sector state- owned enter-
prises (SOEs)— has arguably tempered the enthusiasm for markets, at least in their pure 
form, and perhaps caused a rethink of the privatization/ outsourcing, etc. of security func-
tions in particular. At the very least there is growing concern in respect of Chinese firms 
taking over the operation of critical infrastructure and, more generally, of the security risks 
China Inc. poses (e.g., in the area of cybersecurity).
7. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions.
8. See, for example, McMahan, “Collectivist Defenses of the Moral Equality of Combatants.” 
I broadly agree with McMahan’s criticisms of collectivist views, such as that espoused in 
Kutz, “The Difference Uniforms Make.” However, my institutional view offers a relational 
individualist analysis and, as such, sidesteps both narrowly individualist as well as col-
lectivist accounts.
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metaphysical view to the effect that institutions are suprahuman agents, the 
actions of which cannot be reduced to those of individual human agents. 
Far from it; sociologist tend to reject normative analysis, and I  certainly 
reject the metaphysical extravagance of the likes of Peter French, Margaret 
Gilbert, and some Hegelians of old.9 Rather, I  am insisting on defining 
the notions of police officer and regular soldier by recourse to normatively 
specified, descriptively anchored, organizational roles— a procedure that 
might be referred to as institutional ascent. Institutional ascent contrasts 
with the noninstitutional, individual- based approach of attempting to iden-
tify features of salient individuals who have, or might have, occupied the 
occupational roles in question, and using these features to generate a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to be a police officer or 
regular soldier.
On the other hand, given my rejection of supraindividual institutional 
agents, the procedure of institutional ascent needs to offer a theoretical 
account of the relationship between institutional roles and the individ-
ual human beings who occupy those roles and, in particular, their pre- 
institutional (logically prior) natural rights and obligations. Here I invoke 
the quasi- theoretical notion I have analyzed elsewhere of acting qua mem-
ber of an institution.10 I explain this notion in the context of my outline of 
the key theoretical concept for my purposes in this chapter— namely, that 
of an institutional role.
I stress that my procedure of institutional ascent is consistent with 
individualism broadly understood. Within individualism, we need to dis-
tinguish between atomistic accounts and relational accounts. Historically, 
atomism has been associated with methodological individualism and 
posits rationally self- interested actors who cooperate only insofar as each 
believes it to be in his or her own individual interest, or at least a means 
to his or her own individual end.11 McMahan offers an atomistic indi-
vidualistic account of war in that he seeks to generalize from the individ-
ual case of self- defense to ever more complex cases involving numerous 
individuals attacking and defending one another over extended periods 
9. Peter A. French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly 
16, no. 3 (1979):  207– 215; Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton 
University Press, 1992).
10. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 52– 54.
11. David- Hillel Ruben, The Metaphysics of the Social World (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1985), Chapter  4; Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15– 57.
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of time.12 However, war involves joint action, particularly joint action in 
organizational settings. Yet there is no easy theoretical route from indi-
vidual action to organizational action. Indeed, most contemporary social 
ontology theorists hold that organizational action is conceptually irreduc-
ible to individual action.13 At any rate, at this point McMahan and other 
reductive individualists require an adequate individualistic theoretical 
account of joint action and of joint action in organizational settings, in 
particular— something that they have not provided. My own account pro-
vides the required theoretical account of joint action in organizational set-
tings (see below).
3.1  Institutional Roles
The occupational roles of police officer and regular soldier are institutional 
roles; that is, they are constitutive in part of social institutions, namely, 
police organizations and military forces, respectively. So how are we to 
understand social institutions? In this discussion, social institutions are to 
be understood, in the first instance, as organizations and systems of orga-
nizations. As such, they have three key dimensions: function, structure, 
and culture. The function is the goals or ends or purposes— collective 
ends, in my parlance— that the institution serves— military institutions 
have as a purpose to fight and win wars, for example. The structure is the 
(usually formal) structure of task- defined roles constitutive of the insti-
tution, such as the rank structure favored by most police and military 
organizations. The culture is the ethos, or “spirit,” that pervades an organi-
zation; it consists in the informal attitudes that influence the way in which 
tasks are performed, and, on occasion, whether they are performed at all. 
Notoriously, for example, police culture is solidaristic and puts a premium 
on loyalty to fellow officers, even to the point of shielding corrupt officers.
Elsewhere14 I have argued for what I term a teleological normative the-
ory of contemporary social institutions and their constitutive occupational 
12. Jeff McMahan, “War as Self- Defense,” Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 
(2004): 75. I am not suggesting that he is committed to the rationally self- interested ver-
sion of atomism.
13. John Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology:  Collective Intentionality and 
Group Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Gilbert, On Social Facts.
14. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapter 1.
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roles.15 Put simply, on this account social, institutions are organizations and 
systems of organizations that not only realize collective ends, but also pro-
vide collective goods by means of joint activity (i.e., the collective ends are 
collective goods). This is what might be referred to as the general theory of 
social institutions. However, the collective goods in question vary from one 
institution to another. They include the fulfilment of a variety of aggregated 
moral rights, such as needs- based rights for security (police organizations), 
material well- being (businesses operating in markets), education (universi-
ties), governance (governments) and so on. Hence the requirement for what 
might be referred to as special theories of particular social institutions, 
such as the normative theory of a police force as opposed to a military force.
The central concept in the teleological account of social institutions 
is that of joint action.16 As we saw in Chapter 1, joint actions are actions 
involving a number of agents performing interdependent actions in order 
to realize some common goal or collective end (e.g., members of a mortar 
squad loading and firing a mortar having as a common goal to destroy an 
enemy gun emplacement). I defined a collective end as an individual end 
more than one agent has, and which is such that, if it is realized, it is real-
ized by all, or most, of the actions of the agents involved; the individual 
action of any given agent is only part of the means by which the end is 
realized, and each individual action is interdependent with the others in 
the service of the collective end.
Organizational action typically consists in, what I  have elsewhere 
termed, a multilayered structure of joint actions.17 As I have argued in vari-
ous places,18 one important illustration of the notion of a layered structure 
of joint actions is an armed force fighting a battle. Suppose at an organi-
zational level a number of joint actions (“actions”) are severally necessary 
and jointly sufficient to achieve some collective end. Thus the “action” 
of the mortar squad destroying enemy gun emplacements, the “action” 
of the flight of military planes providing air cover, and the “action” of 
the infantry platoon taking and holding the ground might be severally 
15. In relation to professional roles in particular.
16. The notion of joint action can in turn be used to construct more complex notions, such 
as that of joint activity and joint task, in the manner in which action can be used to con-
struct notions of activity, task, and the like.
17. See, for example, Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapter 1.
18. Miller, “Joint Action”; Miller, Social Action; Miller, Moral Foundations of Social 
Institutions.
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necessary and jointly sufficient to achieve the collective end of defeat-
ing the enemy; as such, these “actions,” taken together, constitute a joint 
action. Call each of these actions “level- two actions,” and the joint action 
that they constitute a “level- two joint action.” From the perspective of the 
collective end of defeating the enemy, each of these level- two actions is an 
individual action that is a component of a (level- two) joint action: the joint 
action directed to the collective end of defeating the enemy.
However, each of these level- two actions is already in itself a joint action 
with component individual actions; and these component individual actions 
are severally necessary (let us assume this for purposes of simplification, 
albeit it is unlikely that every single action would in fact be necessary) and 
jointly sufficient for the performance of some collective end. Thus the indi-
vidual members of the mortar squad jointly operate the mortar in order 
to realize the collective end of destroying enemy gun emplacements. Each 
pilot, jointly with the other pilots, strafes enemy soldiers in order to realize 
the collective end of providing air cover for their advancing foot soldiers. 
Further, the set of foot soldiers jointly advance in order to take and hold the 
ground vacated by the members of the retreating enemy force.
At level one, there are individual actions directed to three distinct col-
lective ends: the collective ends of (respectively) destroying gun emplace-
ments, providing air cover, and talking and holding ground. So at level one 
there are three joint actions: the members of the mortar squad destroy-
ing gun emplacements, the members of the flight of planes providing 
air cover, and the members of the infantry taking and holding ground. 
However, taken together, these three joint actions constitute a single level- 
two joint action. The collective end of this level- two joint action is to defeat 
the enemy; and from the perspective of this level- two joint action, and its 
collective end, these constitutive actions are (level two) individual actions.
I note that the relationship between an officer and his or her subor-
dinates may involve a second- order joint action that consists in coordi-
nation of a first- order joint action. The officer commanding the mortar 
squad, for example, may issue commands to the members of the mortar 
squad in the course of their activities, such as commanding them to fire 
more rapidly, or to adjust the direction in which they are firing. The offi-
cer’s commands are joint with the members of the mortar squad insofar 
as members of the squad adjust their actions in compliance with these 
orders.19 It follows that the individual actions constitutive of a joint action 
19. Miller, “Joint Action,” 287.
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are not necessarily autonomously performed, any more than an intention-
ally performed single action is necessarily autonomously performed.
The notion of acting qua occupant of an institutional role (e.g. that 
of foot soldier) is simply that of performing the tasks definitive of the 
institutional role (including the joint tasks), conforming to the norms and 
regulations that constrain the tasks to be undertaken, and pursuing the 
purposes or ends of the role (including the collective ends).
Collective goods of the kind I  have in mind have three proper-
ties: (1) they are produced, maintained or renewed by means of the joint 
activity of members of organizations or systems of organizations (i.e., by 
institutional role occupants); (2) they are available to the whole community 
(at least in principle); and (3)  they ought to be produced (or maintained 
or renewed) and made available to the whole community, since they are 
desirable goods and ones to which the members of the community have 
an (institutional) joint moral right.20 Notice that the institutional role occu-
pants in question have a collective, or joint, moral responsibility to pro-
duce, maintain, or renew these collective goods, and this responsibility is 
to the members of the particular community in question. So it is a partial-
ist collective responsibility. Moreover, the rights and duties constitutive 
of the occupational roles in questions are special rights and duties in two 
respects. First, they are partialist rights and duties, and, second, they are 
rights and duties that other members of the community may not have.
Notwithstanding that natural rights, such as the right to life and the 
right not to be tortured, and their correlative obligations are logically prior 
to social institutions, many moral rights, duties, values, principles, and so 
on are not logically prior to social institutions. Such institutional moral 
rights and duties include ones that are (a) derived at least in part from 
collective goods, and (b) constitutive of specific institutional roles, such 
as the rights and duties of a fire officer, police officer, or regular soldier.
Importantly, institutional arrangements assign moral rights and duties 
to natural persons (so to speak) that those persons did not previously have, 
and in some cases that no person previously had.21 They are institutional 
rights and duties that are also moral rights and duties. Indeed, they are 
special moral rights and duties. In the case of the institutional role of police 
20. Miller, Social Action, Chapter 7.
21. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions. For a contrary view see Bernard Gert, 
Common Morality (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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officer, for example, the moral basis appears to be something like the col-
lective good of aggregate human security in the jurisdiction in question. 
Perhaps each member of a community has an individual human right to, 
say, some minimum level of security, if he or she needs it. However, it is 
only when a certain threshold of aggregate need exists that the establish-
ment of an institution takes place (and ought to take place). For example, 
a police organization with its constitutive institutional role occupants 
(police officers) is not established because a single person’s right to secu-
rity is not being realized. When such a threshold of aggregate need exists, 
what is required is collective or joint action on the part of many persons 
(indeed, a multilayered structure of joint actions). Accordingly, a coopera-
tive enterprise or institution is established that has as a collective end the 
provision of security to the needy many by means of the joint activity of 
the police officer members of the institution.
The (collective) moral obligation to assist may, then, in certain cases, 
imply the obligation to establish and support institutions to discharge the 
original obligation to assist. Once such institutions with their specialized 
role occupants are in place, it may be that those of us outside the institu-
tion generally have no further duty to assist within the area of the institu-
tions’ operations. Indeed, it may be that, generally, we should not even 
try to assist, given our relative lack of expertise and the likelihood that 
we will get in the way of the role occupants. Moreover, these specialized 
role occupants have duties that they did not have before, and that in fact 
no one had before the establishment of the institutional role with its spe-
cific duties. For example, police officers may have an institutional and, 
indeed now, moral duty to put themselves in harm’s way in a manner and 
to an extent (e.g. by arresting armed and dangerous offenders across the 
entire community (jurisdiction)) that is not morally required of ordinary 
citizens, and that was never morally required of anyone prior to the estab-
lishment of police organizations. Notice that the special (institutional and 
moral) rights and duties of police officers are jurisdictionally relative; an 
Australian police officer, for example, does not have these institutional 
rights and duties in China.
Once institutions and their constitutive roles have been established 
on some adequate moral basis, such as the duty to aid, then those who 
undertake these roles necessarily put themselves under obligations of 
various kinds— obligations that attach to, and are in part constitutive of, 
those roles. To understand the specific content of institutional role moral-
ity, then, we need to examine the purposes— to meet aggregate security 
Police Officers, Regular Soldiers, and Normative Analysis 87
   87
needs, in the case of police officers— that the various institutions and 
their constitutive roles have been formed to serve, and the way in which 
roles must be constructed in order to achieve those purposes. Of course, 
one only comes to have an institutional role through voluntary action, but 
the morality that comes with that role is not itself ultimately grounded in 
the individual’s choice, but rather in the larger purposes (collective ends 
that are collective goods) of the role.
A further point to be made here is that any given institution is typically 
one component in an overall structure of institutions, and the single insti-
tution in question serves its institutional purpose (produces the relevant 
collective good) in the context of the other institutions serving theirs. For 
example, the police are a component in the overall criminal justice sys-
tem. Moreover, some institutions, notably governments, are meta- institu-
tions; that is, they coordinate and regulate other institutions. The point to 
be stressed here is that single institutions have important structural and 
functional relationships to other institutions within the nation- state, and 
frequently, in a rapidly globalizing world, to institutions in other nation- 
states; indeed, many institutions are transnational in character. Hence my 
emphasis in the sections following this one on normatively appropriate 
institutional relationships between different security agencies, (e.g., the 
military and the police), on the one hand, and between security agencies 
and fundamental institutions (e.g., the judiciary and the democratically 
elected government of the day), on the other hand. This might involve the 
need for a degree of institutional independence of police agencies from 
government).22
In light of the above general normative teleological- cooperation theory 
of contemporary social institutions and their constitutive occupational 
roles, a number of points can now be made in relation to security agencies, 
in particular. First, the general theory requires that the special normative 
theory of any given security agency be anchored in empirical reality. If 
the Australian Defence Force, for example, never trained for, or engaged 
in, any wars of national self- defense, then this would put pressure on the 
special normative theory that the Australian Defence Force ought to exist 
to protect the Australian citizenry from external aggression.
22. The importance of a degree of police independence is obvious when one considers that 
police officers need to investigate the criminal activities of, for example, politicians. On 
this issue see Seumas Miller and Ian Gordon Investigative Ethics: Ethics for Police Detectives 
and Criminal Investigators (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2014) Chapter 4.
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Moreover, new security needs may well give rise to the establishment 
of new or substantially redesigned institutional roles and, therefore, new 
structures or configurations of special moral and institutional rights and 
duties. National cyberwarfare forces are a case in point. Arguably, cyber-
warfare, understood as involving offensive cyberattacks on the communi-
cation and information technology infrastructure of an “enemy” state, for 
example, is a form of conflict short of war in the conventional sense, but 
not really police work, since it is (presumably) a matter of national defense 
rather than an attempt at (domestic or international) law enforcement. 
Normatively speaking, the establishment and ongoing maintenance of 
such institutional roles (cyberwarfare roles) would only be justified if the 
needs in question persisted and cyberwarfare roles were fit for purpose. 
If so, then an appropriate special normative theory of cyberwarfare forces 
should be developed; a normative theory anchored in empirical reality. 
Indeed, it seems that such normative theorizing is currently underway.23
Second, at the level of the individual role occupant, as opposed to the 
institution per se, there is conceptual, and typically also some actual, 
space between, on the one hand, the collective end and activities that are 
definitive of an occupational security role by the lights of the relevant nor-
mative theory, and, on the other hand, the ends and activities actually 
pursued by a given role occupant. Accordingly, any actual role occupant 
can be closer to or further away from the institutional ideal. For example, 
a good police officer would correctly exercise his or her expertise in the 
service of, say, deterring gangs of youths from engaging in assault, and 
thereby protect the personal security of vulnerable citizens; a bad police 
officer might ignore the problem or take ineffective measures, and thus 
fail to realize these ends. Naturally, at some point a bad or incompetent, 
putative police officer will cease in reality to be a police officer (e.g., if the 
officer is incapable of understanding any of the laws she or he is supposed 
to be enforcing).
Third, the relevant special theory will prescribe the appropriate nor-
mative relationship of a given security agency to the state or other political 
entity and do so by recourse to the collective good(s) that the agency in 
question exists to provide. For example, the above- mentioned indepen-
dence of police agencies vis- à- vis other institutions derives from their 
defining collective good of upholding law and order.
23. Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke, and B. J. Strawser, eds., Binary Bullets: The Ethics of 
Cyber- Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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Here it is important to note that market- based, commercially driven 
organizations, such as private military forces (PMFs) do not, and ought 
not, have the same institutional relationship to, for example, the executive 
branch of government as do public sector agencies, such as most mili-
tary forces. For market- based organizations and public sector agencies 
by their very nature have disparate institutional commitments. Markets 
are a specific institutional arrangement in which organizations engage 
in commercial competition with one another under conditions of more 
or less free and fair competition, and each pursues profit maximization 
as an organizational goal. The collective good is realized indirectly— not 
by each organization consciously aiming at it, but by virtue of the so- 
called invisible hand. The government via its regulators intervenes only 
to ensure a given market is functioning as it should: there is free and fair 
competition and the invisible hand is working. PMFs are market actors 
operating under this institutional arrangement. The market is not the 
institutional arrangement in which public sector agencies, such as most 
police and military forces, operate.24 The latter are tax- funded organiza-
tions that directly and consciously aim at their relevant defining collective 
good (e.g., law and order, national security). Moreover, the appropriate 
normative institutional relationship between each of these different kinds 
of security agency and government is, in both cases, a complex matter. I 
seek to unravel these two institutional relationships in the relevant sec-
tions below. Suffice it to say here that neither of these institutional rela-
tionships is that which obtains between governments and market actors 
such as PMFs.
By the lights of the normative theory of institutional roles outlined 
above, there is a need to distinguish the institutional point to the effect 
that someone is acting qua this or that occupational role occupant, (e.g., 
a police officer or soldier intentionally doing his duty) from the noninsti-
tutional, individual- based points about the actual motives of individual 
regular soldiers and police officers (e.g., that some regular soldiers are 
primarily motivated by money, whereas most regular soldiers are not, 
or that all have mixed motives). These latter points are to be understood 
24. Free market ideology has to some extent permeated the public sector in recent years, 
and this has led to attempts to introduce market- derived “reforms” of various kinds into 
the public sector. Insofar as these have not simply consisted in wholesale privatization, 
they have resulted in public sector agencies with some of the trappings of the market and, 
I would argue, a degree of institutional confusion, notably in relation to their institutional 
purposes (collective ends).
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as statements to the effect that someone (or many or most persons) is 
acting qua individual person, in his or her personal— as opposed to 
institutional— capacity.
Finally, I should point out that by the lights of my normative teleological- 
cooperation model, the existence of the phenomenon of individuals acting 
qua occupants of an occupational or other institutional role does not imply 
that there are agents other than individual human beings in play here; it 
does not imply, in particular, that there are supraindividual, institutional 
agents. The above invocation and description of multi- layered structures 
of joint action ought to allay this concern.
3.1.1  Institutional Responsibility
An important aspect of institutional roles is the ascription of institutional 
responsibility and, specifically, the relationship between institutional 
responsibility and moral responsibility. This relationship is a difficult 
one to unravel, not the least because the notion of moral responsibility is 
itself theoretically complex and a matter of controversy. Moreover, I can-
not in this short section elaborate on these complexities and controver-
sies. However, there are some general points that can be raised. In raising 
them I assume that (roughly speaking) an agent, A, is morally responsible 
for an action (or omission), x, or the foreseeable and avoidable outcome of 
x, if x is morally significant (and A is aware, or should be aware, of this 
moral significance), A intentionally performed x, A’s intention to x caused 
x, and A’s intention to x is under A’s control.
Obviously some institutional actions  – actions performed by the 
human occupants of institutional roles in their capacity as institutional 
actors - are not morally significant and some morally significant actions 
are not institutional. On the other hand, as we have seen in respect of 
police officers and military personnel, many institutional actions are mor-
ally significant and not the least of these is the use of lethal force.
Let us henceforth consider only institutional actions that are morally 
significant and known to be so by the relevant institutional actor – or, at 
least, the institutional actor should know the actions in question are mor-
ally significant. A question now arises as to whether or not with respect to 
these actions at least, moral responsibility tracks institutional responsibil-
ity. If so, then an institutional actor who performs a (morally significant) 
institutional action, or fails to perform one, is necessarily morally respon-
sible for the performance of that action or omission, and for its foreseeable 
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and avoidable outcomes. However, this appears not to be case. Consider, 
for example, a senior government official, such as a cabinet minister, 
a number of whose subordinates engage in serious and ongoing war 
crimes, such as torture. Such acts are morally significant and the subor-
dinates are morally responsible for perpetrating them. What of the senior 
government official? Under some institutional arrangements, the senior 
official might be held institutionally responsible for failing to ensure that 
such crimes as this did not take place and, consequently, might be forced 
to resign. Nevertheless, the senior official might not be morally respon-
sible for failing to prevent these crimes.25 Let us assume that the senior 
official could have prevented these crimes, if he knew about them and 
he could have known about them if he had spent a good deal of his time 
focused on war crimes prevention. However, he did not; he had other 
legitimate and more pressing priorities. Perhaps the senior official took 
all the steps that might reasonably be expected of him to prevent these 
crimes but his job is an onerous one, the war criminals were exception-
ally clever, and so on. In short, whereas he is institutionally responsible 
for failing to prevent these crimes he is, arguably, not morally responsible. 
So apparently institutional responsibility does not necessarily track moral 
responsibility. Nor is it obvious that such an institutional arrangement, 
supposing it exists, is necessarily deficient qua institutional arrangement. 
I note that Schauer, for example, has argued in detail26 that institutional 
arrangements, including laws, are necessarily blunt instruments and, as 
such, cannot be sensitive to all the requirements of morality.
A second claim concerning the relationship between moral respon-
sibility and institutional responsibility is that institutional arrange-
ments can sometimes make a difference with respect to whether moral 
responsibility is full or partial. Thus, as a consequence of institutional 
arrangements put in place to deal with some collective action problem, 
each agent might, it is claimed, have full moral responsibility (jointly 
with others) for some adverse outcome O – notwithstanding the fact that 
each only made a very small causal contribution to the outcome. Suppose 
25. But, of course, his culpability may be rightly suspected and, indeed, proven in a court 
of law. In relation to torture (or so- called ‘enhanced interrogation’) by US military and 
CIA officials in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq see the Torture Memos prepared by the US 
Department of Justice.
26. Frederick Schauer Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes, (Harvard University 
Press, 2003).
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the impoverished members of sailing ships’ crews in the 18th century 
are informed of a law to the effect that anyone stealing one or more of 
the (somewhat expensive) screws inserted into their ship’s woodwork to 
hold its wooden planks together will be flogged and, further, if the ship 
sinks as a consequence of multiple screws being removed in this manner 
then anyone who has removed at least one of these screws will be held to 
be fully legally responsible for any deaths resulting from the ship sink-
ing and to be legally liable to the death penalty. Let us assume that this 
admittedly harsh criminal law is morally justified in the circumstances, 
perhaps in part because of the difficulty of identifying which sailors 
removed screws. At any rate, this apparently harsh law is the only means 
to prevent these wooden ships frequently sinking and, therefore, the only 
means to prevent great loss of life. In that case it might be thought to 
be morally justified for each screw- thief who contributed to causing a 
ship to sink be held fully legally responsible for the loss of life, notwith-
standing that his causal contribution to the sinking might be minute. 
This being so, it might be further argued that each such screw- thief is 
also fully morally responsible for any loss of life. If so, then the establish-
ment of institutional arrangements can evidently transform prior partial 
moral responsibility for an adverse outcome (e.g. prior to the existence of 
a relevant law) into full moral responsibility (post the enactment of the 
law). Moreover, it can do so notwithstanding that the underlying causal 
responsibility is unchanged and is only partial causal responsibility for 
the adverse outcome.
A final claim concerning the relationship between moral responsi-
bility and institutional responsibility is one we have already discussed, 
namely, that institutional arrangements assign moral responsibilities to 
agents that those agents did not previously have and, indeed, in some 
cases that no agent previously had. We have already mentioned a number 
of these in relation to police officers and military personnel and we return 
to this issue below and in Chapters 4 and 6, in particular.
3.2  The Institutional Role of Police Officer
In this section I discuss the institutional role of the police officer, with a 
view to differentiating it from that of the soldier. I also address the question 
of what the implications would be for the role of the police officer of any 
attempt to introduce market- based, commercially driven police services. 
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Elsewhere,27 I have defined the police role in terms of (1) the collective end 
of protecting the legally enshrined, justifiably enforceable, moral rights 
of citizens from violation by fellow citizens,28 including citizens who are 
also institutional actors, such as government officials29 (i.e., the collective 
good of internal security30); (2) the exercise of this role by means of the use 
of coercive force, or the threat thereof; and (3) a jointly held moral obliga-
tion on the part of all citizens to protect the moral rights of fellow citizens 
from their fellow citizens (i.e., to provide the collective good of internal 
security). This latter, jointly held, moral obligation could be discharged by 
an all- citizen police service, but in contemporary societies it is discharged 
by establishing the institution of the police and its constitutive occupa-
tional role of police officer. (I return to this issue in Chapter 4).
An important aspect of all this is the institutional division of labor 
involved. It is by means of a kind of institutional division of labor that 
the members of various institutions in a given community or nation- state 
discharge different sets of jointly held obligations that are in fact held by 
all (e.g., soldiers in a standing professional army, police in a police service). 
However, it remains true that all able- bodied citizens have a jointly held 
obligation to provide for security. It is just that if a subset of the community 
(e.g., the members of a police service) provide collective security for all, 
then their fellow citizens are not needed to perform policing duties, and so 
are not obliged to perform them. Nevertheless, members of the citizenry 
who are not police officers have residual joint obligations in relation to col-
lective internal security, such as paying for police salaries, assisting the 
police by reporting crime, appearing as witnesses, and so on. Indeed, to do 
their job properly, police rely on the assistance of the citizenry at large.
27. See Miller and Blacker, Ethical Issues in Policing, Chapter 1.
28. This is not quite right since the violations in question might be perpetrated by resi-
dents who are not citizens, for example.
29. When institutional actors violate the rights of citizens they might be doing so in their 
private capacity or their institutional capacity. If the latter, they are typically also violating 
the law, at least in liberal democratic states. However, this is not necessarily the case, e.g. a 
given law might itself be a violation of moral rights as past laws banning homosexual acts 
between consenting adults were.
30. I have argued elsewhere that order, in law and order, is not reducible to respect for legally 
enshrined moral rights, since there can be order and yet rights violations. However, I also 
argue that if there is respect for the law and the law enshrines moral rights, then there will 
be a high degree or order. See Miller and Gordon, Investigative Ethics, Chapter 1. I do not 
need to pursue these complications here.
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So even when the institution of the police is set up, the jointly held obliga-
tion of the citizens to provide for their collective security does not disappear; 
rather, there is no need for it to be directly discharged by, for example, engag-
ing in police work. However, if the police were found to be incapable of pro-
viding collective security, then citizens might need to once again discharge 
their jointly held obligation by engaging in activities akin to those under-
taken by members of specialized police organizations (e.g., by establishing 
neighborhood patrol groups in townships in South Africa during the break-
down of law and order in the apartheid years). However, it is important to 
stress that this jointly held obligation of citizens to provide for their collective 
security (directly or, more likely, indirectly) is relatively inchoate and unspec-
ified and, therefore, stands in considerable contrast with the well- developed 
and clearly specified rights and duties constitutive of the role occupants of 
police and military institutions (of which more in Chapters 4 and 6).
This jointly held moral obligation on the part of all citizens to pro-
vide collective internal security is a weighty, albeit relatively inchoate and 
unspecified, moral obligation that must be discharged, even if citizens 
incur significant costs in so doing. In well- ordered, contemporary, liberal 
democracies, such costs would typically consist in large part in the pay-
ment of taxes to fund police organizations. The moral obligation to see to 
it that security is provided is a weighty one, because security is a human 
good of great importance; indeed, it is a necessary condition for the enjoy-
ment by humans of most, if not all, other collective goods.
We have been speaking somewhat loosely in terms of collective inter-
nal security. However, it is now time to return to our initial specification 
of the institutional ends of police organizations provided at the begin-
ning of this section— namely, the collective end of protecting the legally 
enshrined, justifiably enforceable, moral rights of citizens from violation 
by fellow citizens. I want to discuss the relation of the police to the law 
on this account; specifically, that the moral rights in question are legally 
enshrined, notably in criminal codes (e.g., laws against murder, assault, 
fraud, and theft). My focus is on the implications that the institutional end 
of upholding the law has for the role of police officer.
There are three points to be made here. First, as argued above, the 
primary and (typically) overriding commitment of the police must be to 
ensure that the law31 is upheld, as opposed to ensuring that they comply 
31. Of course, the law is here to be understood as enshrining the justifiably enforceable 
moral rights of the citizens.
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with the directives of government. In this respect police have a quasi- 
judicial role,32 and are therefore somewhat different from civil servants 
and the military, who are essentially the instruments of the elected gov-
ernment. Please note that this point should not be confused with the 
requirement that all citizens and institutional role occupants, includ-
ing police, comply with the law. Second, and notwithstanding their pri-
mary and overriding commitment to law enforcement, the police must 
be responsive to the elected government of the day. In this regard they 
are somewhat different from the judiciary, for example. Moreover, this 
requirement stands in some tension with their quasi- judicial role. Third, 
in order to ensure that they are able to enforce the law in a given juris-
diction (which might be a city or other subpolitical entity rather than 
the state itself) they must enjoy a monopoly of coercive force in that 
jurisdiction.
Let me now discuss each of these three points in somewhat more 
detail, beginning with the first one. Evidently, police need to have a 
considerable degree of operational autonomy, if they are properly to 
discharge their functions of upholding the law, investigating crime, 
and the like. This is partly a matter of efficiency and effectiveness; the 
police are, or should be, not simply competent practitioners, but (so to 
speak) the experts. In this regard the police are no different from the 
military.
However, given their primary institutional end of ensuring that the 
law is upheld, the police need to have a substantial degree of institutional 
independence of government in particular; something which the military 
do not need and ought not to have to the same degree. Politicians, for exam-
ple, need to be subject not only to an independently adjudicated law (the 
role of the judiciary), but also to an independently enforced law (the role 
of the police). If a powerful politician, or powerful group of politicians, act 
unlawfully, the police must investigate, arrest, and charge them. In order 
to ensure that the police effectively carry out these investigative tasks in 
relation to government, the police need to have a substantial degree of 
institutionally based independence from government. Naturally, what 
32. The terminology used in by the UK’s commission into the police in arguing for police 
independence, The Royal Commission on the Police: Cmnd. 1728: Final Report, 1962, paras. 87 
and 88. For a similar argument on the importance of police independence, see also Justice 
Lusher, Report of the Commission to Inquire into New South Wales Police Administration 
(Sydney: NSW Government Printer, 1981), 680.
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must go hand in glove with independence is accountability; police must 
be held accountable for the exercise of their independence.
This institutional independence needs to be seen in the context of the 
so- called separation of powers. Specifically, the executive, the legislature, 
and the judiciary ought to be kept separate; otherwise, too much power 
is concentrated in the hands of a unitary state agency. It is highly danger-
ous for those who make laws also to be the ones who apply those laws. 
Politicians, for example, need to be subject to laws adjudicated by judges 
who are institutionally independent of politicians, on pain of undue influ-
ence on judicial processes and outcomes. Likewise, the enforcement of 
these laws needs to be undertaken by an agency with some independence 
from those it might have to enforce it against, including government 
officials.
There are grave dangers attendant upon police coming simply to 
be the instrument of government, rather than to have as their priority 
to serve the law and, on my account, to protect moral rights enshrined 
in the law. In this connection, consider the police states of communist 
Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and the 
like. These former police states serve to illustrate the importance of a sub-
stantial degree of police independence from government in favor of serv-
ing legally enshrined moral rights. Indeed, police operational autonomy 
has on occasion been abridged by democratically elected governments in 
order, for example, to create and preserve a manageable level of public 
disorder from which the incumbent political party and its supporters may 
politically or materially benefit.
We have been discussing institutional independence in the context of 
the interface of police and the government of the day. Enough has been 
said by way of demonstrating that the notion of the police as simply the 
instrument of government is unsustainable. On the other hand, deter-
mining the precise nature and extent of police independence is extremely 
difficult, given a contrasting institutional constraint on police forces— 
namely, their need to be responsive to the democratically elected gov-
ernment of the day (of which, more below). Moreover, there are dangers 
attendant upon high levels of police independence. After all, the police 
are the coercive arm of the state, and historically the abuse of their powers 
has been an ever- present threat. Specifically, the police institution as the 
coercive arm of the state does need to be subjected to (at least) the con-
straint and influence of the community via democratically elected bodies, 
notably the government of the day.
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If independence is a key requirement for police and police organiza-
tions, then it is presumably also a requirement for investigators in other 
sectors. In recent times there has been a rebirth of private policing, 
most prominently in the protective services area (e.g., armed guards for 
banks, armed escorts for personnel), but also in the investigations area. 
For example, in the important area of fraud investigation, many corpora-
tions are employing their own investigators. The increase in the numbers 
of private sector security personnel raises the important ethical issue of 
their independence. For example, conflicts of interest can and do arise 
for private sector personnel when the interests of the employing private 
company or corporation are held to be of greater importance than those of 
bringing the lawbreaker to justice.
Our second point, standing in some tension with the need for police 
independence, was the requirement that police be responsive to the demo-
cratically elected government of the day. The argument made above for 
this requirement is in essence that police services are established in accor-
dance with the principle of a division of labor to discharge the joint moral 
obligations of all citizens to contribute to their own collective internal 
security; “collective internal security” being understood as a state of gen-
eral compliance with the law (which in turn enshrines the moral rights of 
the citizenry). On this view, the police are ultimately the servants of the 
citizenry, and they therefore must be responsive to the government as the 
representative body of the citizenry.
So the question arises as to whether a market- based, commercially 
driven organization could reasonably be expected to have the required 
level of responsiveness to government, as opposed to, for example, its own 
shareholders. Given its commercial imperatives, this seems extremely 
doubtful. Consider in this connection the “responsiveness” of private 
sector banks to governments in the lead up to the global financial crisis 
of 2007– 2008. This “responsiveness” consisted in large part in attempt-
ing, and often achieving, regulatory capture. The tail ended up wagging 
the dog.
Our third point pertained to the need for police in a given jurisdiction 
to have a monopoly of coercive force in that jurisdiction. Police services 
not only must have the capacity to use coercive force to uphold the law 
on behalf of the community, they must also have a monopoly on the use 
of coercive force within the bounds of their own jurisdiction, on pain of 
not being able to guarantee the upholding of the law in the jurisdiction 
in question. In short, neither the government, the state’s police force, 
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nor, more importantly, the citizenry can countenance the possibility of 
competing private sector, or otherwise entirely government- independent, 
security agencies possessed of sufficient coercive capacity to challenge the 
state’s police force in this regard.
At this point an even more radical proposal might be put forward; 
namely, one in which the state’s police force is disestablished in favor of a 
market in which private security agencies compete. This would effectively 
denude the state of its authority. Without the capacity to enforce the laws 
it promulgates, the state would be at the mercy of the privacy security 
agencies in question, and would in time simply go out of existence. The 
proposition that the state could enforce its will domestically, notwithstand-
ing the presence of private domestic organizations possessed of greater 
enforcement capacity is incoherent. If X (private security company) is pos-
sessed of a greater enforcement capacity than Y (state police force) then— 
other things being equal— X can enforce its will at the expense of Y doing 
so. Thus, in the envisaged scenario, the state and, in a liberal democracy, 
the citizenry could no longer reliably enforce its will.33 The related, but 
nevertheless distinct, issue of the state’s externally focused enforcement 
capacity (i.e., military force), is considered in the next section. In short, the 
notion that commercially driven organizations operating in a free mar-
ket could effectively substitute for police services in a liberal democratic 
state— as opposed to providing subsidiary and complementary security 
services— is evidently profoundly misguided.
I have outlined the institutional role of police officers and argued that 
it is required of police services by virtue of this institutional role that they 
have institutional independence, be responsive to government, and pos-
sess a monopoly of coercive force in their respective jurisdictions. I have 
further argued that market- based commercially driven private security 
firms cannot meet these requirements, and therefore cannot intelligibly 
replace public sector police services (which is not to say that they might 
not have a legitimate subsidiary role). I also suggested in passing that mil-
itary forces do not, by virtue of their institutional role, require the degree 
33. The possibility of a weak state requiring temporary assistance to, for example, quell an 
illegitimate internal armed insurrection does not affect this fundamental point about the 
need for the state to have a monopoly (or near monopoly) on the use of force. Such a weak 
state fails a key test of legitimacy if its inability to deal with internal armed insurrections 
is permanent rather than merely temporary. In short, I suggest that the state’s monopoly 
of the use of force domestically is a necessary condition of its legitimacy. See Miller, Moral 
Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapters 9 and 12.
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of institutional independence of government that police forces do. Let us 
now turn directly to external collective security, and therefore to the role 
of the regular soldier.
3.3  The Institutional Role of Regular Soldier
Regular soldiers who are members of a professional standing army, a citi-
zen militia, or citizens operating under a system of universal conscription 
have jointly held obligations to protect the moral rights of fellow citizens, 
as do their fellow citizens who are not soldiers.34 As is the case with the 
police, it is by means of an institutional division of labor that this comes 
to be. So all citizens, including the professional soldiers in the standing 
army— have a jointly held moral obligation to protect the moral rights 
of fellow citizens. However, well- ordered, contemporary liberal democra-
cies typically rely on soldiers who are members of a professional stand-
ing army to discharge the jointly held obligation of all citizens to provide 
collective external security; or at least they rely on professional soldiers. 
Accordingly, ordinary citizens do not need to discharge their jointly held 
obligation by taking up arms; instead, they are able to discharge it by pay-
ing taxes that fund a professional standing army (and navy and air force). 
However, the jointly held moral obligation of all citizens to provide col-
lective external security does not disappear; it remains, although, under 
the terms of an institutional division of labor, others discharge the obli-
gation on their behalf. Indeed, should a professional standing army be 
no longer able to adequately provide collective security against external 
threats as was the case in the Second World War then ordinary citizens 
may well need to take up arms under, for example, a system of universal 
conscription.
As is the case with police, the jointly held obligations of soldiers are 
relativized to their fellow citizenry. Thus soldiers have a jointly held moral 
obligation to protect the moral rights of their fellow citizens only (i.e., the 
citizens or residents of their communities or nation- states), but not neces-
sarily the citizens of other communities or countries. This is not to say 
that citizens of one community or nation do not have moral obligations to 
assist the citizens of other communities or nations; far from it. For exam-
ple, there was a clear moral obligation on the part of the United Nations to 
34. For a related view, see Fabre, Cosmopolitan War. For a somewhat different view, see 
Rodin, War and Self- Defense.
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intervene to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.35 Rather, the moral 
obligations to assist the members of other communities or nations have 
less moral weight. I return to this issue in Chapter 8 on armed humani-
tarian intervention. Thus citizens might not be obliged to bear significant 
costs to assist members of other communities to the point, for example, 
of risking their lives.
The institutional role of the regular soldier can be roughly defined in 
terms of: (1) the realization of the collective end of protecting the moral 
rights of fellow citizens from violation by members of the armed forces of 
external communities/ nations (i.e., the collective good of external secu-
rity); (2) by means of the use of deadly force, or the threat thereof; and (3) 
on the basis of a jointly held obligation on the part of all citizens to protect 
fellow citizens from external threats (i.e., to provide the collective good of 
external security).36 This latter, jointly held, moral obligation could be dis-
charged by a citizen- militia to which all citizens belong. However, as noted 
above, in contemporary liberal democracies it is typically discharged by 
establishing standing professional armed forces (possibly supplemented 
in wartime by an armed force of citizen conscripts).
Notice that in contrast with the threat to collective internal security—
a threat paradigmatically involving the rights violations of individual or 
groups of citizens by fellow citizens or groups thereof— external secu-
rity paradigmatically (e.g., in wars of conquest) involves a threat to the 
integrity of the state or community. Accordingly, it is not simply a matter 
of individual lives or other goods to which individuals have moral rights 
(e.g., individual freedom), even in aggregate, being at stake— although 
these things are also at stake. Rather, to say that the integrity of the liberal 
democratic state or community is at stake is to say such things as that the 
existing citizenry will no longer be the joint decision makers (via their 
elected government) with regard to their territorial exclusion rights, their 
laws, their policies, their way of life, and so on.37 Naturally, there are many 
wars fought on lesser issues than the integrity of the state.
The claim that a liberal democracy’s military forces have as their pri-
mary and (typically) overriding institutional purpose the collective good 
of the nation’s external security needs to be distinguished from two other 
35. See Miller, “Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide.”
36. Miller, “Police, Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries.”
37. Sometimes referred to as self- determination.
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related claims. First is the claim that no other nation’s military forces 
have this as their primary institutional purpose. This claim is in fact true. 
However, it would not follow from this that a liberal democracy’s military 
forces might not also have as a secondary institutional purpose the collec-
tive good of a fellow liberal democracy’s external security, as in the case, 
for example, of the members states of NATO.
Second is the proposition that the nation- state claims a monopoly on 
the use of force in the pursuit of its external security. This proposition is 
ambiguous. It could mean that each nation- state claims a monopoly on 
the use of force vis- à- vis other nation- states in pursuit of its external secu-
rity. This proposition is false since some nation- states have less military 
power than others and some might on occasion need to rely on their more 
powerful allies for their external security. Alternatively, the proposition 
could mean that each nation- state claims a monopoly on the use of force 
vis- à- vis other internal domestic entities, such as domestic private compa-
nies, in pursuit of its external security. This proposition is true. There is 
a need for the state to have a monopoly on the use of force internally and 
externally relative to other actors within the state.38
This jointly held obligation to protect collective external security does 
not include infringing the rights of foreign citizens or members of other 
communities by, for example, engaging in wars of conquest on behalf of 
one’s own national leadership. There is no such institutional moral obli-
gation. Accordingly, the members of nationalist armed forces, such as the 
German armed forces under Hitler, do not have jointly held obligations 
to prosecute wars of conquest. The so- called ius ad bellum is an attempt 
to spell out the relevant moral principles governing the waging of war, 
including by liberal democratic states.39 However, in accepting various 
38. There is a further issue in relation to the possibility of transnational private military 
companies. However, such companies are jurisdictionally based (e.g., incorporated in some 
nation- state such as the United States or the United Kingdom. As such, they are under the 
authority of some nation- state or other; or, if not, they ought to be, on pain of not being 
subject to enforceable law. Accordingly, at least in principle, they cannot, or at least ought 
not, threaten the monopoly on the use of force of their parent nation- state. This is not to 
say that some PMC’s might not be possessed of greater coercive force than some nation- 
states. This has clearly been the case (e.g., in Sierra Leone). See Dimitrios Machairas, “The 
Ethical Implications of the Use of Private Military Force,” Journal of Military Ethics 31, no. 1 
(2014), 58f, for discussion of these and related issues.
39. These principles and, of course, just war theory more generally, are the subject of a 
voluminous philosophical, not to speak of legal literature and the literature of other fields. 
However, Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, is a useful starting point.
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moral constraints on waging war derived from the institutional role of 
regular soldiers in a liberal democratic state, one does not have to endorse 
that doctrine in all its particulars.
Moreover, there is a moral obligation on the part of military forces and 
individual soldiers to comply with moral principles constraining the use 
of lethal force in wartime— the so- called jus in bello principles,— such as 
not to intentionally kill innocent civilians (principle of discrimination), 
only to use an extent of deadly force that is militarily necessary (principle 
of military necessity), and, when deadly force is militarily necessary, to 
avoid a disproportionate extent of (unintended) civilian deaths (principle 
of proportionality).
Having provided ourselves with an explicit, albeit rough, definition 
of the role of regular soldier, let us now compare it with that of the police 
officer elaborated in the last section. As already stated, the two roles are 
similar in two fundamental respects, namely that (1)  they both involve 
the use of coercive force as a means, and (2) they are both performed in 
the service of the collective end, indeed collective good, of protecting the 
moral rights of fellow citizens. What of the differences?
The first and perhaps most obvious difference is that the police defend 
citizens against one another (i.e., their orientation is internal to the state), 
whereas soldiers defend the citizenry against threats external to the state 
(e.g., armed aggression by other nation- states). Moreover, the external 
threats in question are threats to the state, or at least to its vital inter-
ests, and as such are ultimately political threats posed by political entities, 
though typically the threat is a military one in the first instance.
This picture is complicated by the existence of international terror-
ist groups such as al- Qaeda and ISIS. However, it is not fundamentally 
altered, or so I have argued in other places.40 For insofar as terrorist groups 
have a substantial lethal capability and constitute a serious external threat 
requiring a military response, they are simply a different kind of external 
political entity. On the other hand, insofar as terrorist groups41 constitute, 
as they often do, an internal threat, they are a matter for the police to deal 
with; this is terrorism as domestic crime.
Naturally, an insurrection, whether orchestrated by terrorist groups 
or nonterrorist ones, can get to the point where a police response is no 
40. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
41. And, for that matter, nonterrorist insurrectionary groups.
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longer adequate. The liberal democratic state in question may need to 
move to a temporary and geographically limited state of emergency, as 
India has had to do frequently in the recent past. Beyond this there is the 
possibility of all- out civil war in which government- led military forces are 
pitted against large sections of the state’s own people; indeed, in these 
circumstances, the nation’s military forces are often themselves divided. 
However, I suggest that in fighting on one side in a civil war, the regular 
army (and navy and air force)— as distinct from other kinds of military 
force— is operating outside its institutional role.42 For in an all- out civil 
war, the moral and institutional legitimacy of the erstwhile state has itself 
been undermined, and the members of the armed forces are therefore 
simply taking sides in a politically based armed conflict being waged to 
decide who is to constitute the state, and perhaps what form it will take.
The second important different between the institutional role of regu-
lar soldier and that of police officer also pertains to the nature of their 
institutional ends. Unlike the police, the military do not have as their pri-
mary institutional purpose to enforce the law, even the international law 
(by analogy with the police as enforcers of domestic law). Rather, military 
forces are essentially instruments of the citizenry via their elected govern-
ments acting in the service of the national interest in external security (as 
outlined above in terms of protection of the moral rights of the citizenry 
from external threats).
Naturally, the military ought to comply with international law in their 
operations, as police officers ought to comply with the domestic law in 
their law enforcement activities, and, for that matter, citizens ought to 
comply with the domestic law in their day- to- day activities. However, it 
does not follow from the fact that an agent ought to comply with a law or 
rule that the agent has an institutional role as an enforcer of that law or 
rule; players have to abide by the rules of the game, but this does not make 
them umpires.
This point is not undermined by the fact that in recent times, as 
already mentioned, military forces have undertaken policing roles, such 
as United Nation peacekeeping operations. For in undertaking such 
operations, the military forces of nation- states are undertaking a second-
ary role; this is not their primary institutional role. It might be argued 
that it would be a very good thing if the military forces of nation- states 
42. In saying this, I am not denying that in some circumstances it might not be morally 
permissible, even morally obligatory, for it to do so.
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abandoned their primary role in national defense or, at least, reduced it to 
the status of a secondary role, and did so in favor of international peace-
keeping operations, international law enforcement, and the like. Maybe 
so, but this would be possible only if the international order ceased to 
be, at bottom, one of nation- states, and for example, there came to be 
some form of world government that deployed erstwhile military forces 
as police forces. This is, to say the least, highly unlikely in the foresee-
able future. In the meantime we are stuck with a world in which the de 
facto highest authority is the nation- state, since no other putative higher 
authority, such as the United Nations, has the capacity to enforce its laws 
and policies in the event that one or other of the major powers, (e.g. the 
US or China) chooses to ignore them.
Since military forces (in the world order as it is currently constituted), 
unlike police forces, do not have as a primary institutional role to enforce 
the law, there is not the same requirement for them to have a substan-
tial degree of independence of government; they do not have the quasi- 
judicial character of police organizations and their officers.
A third and final set of differences between the role of regular soldier 
and that of police officer pertains to their use of lethal force. In essence, 
soldiers use greater levels of lethal force, and they do so more frequently 
and with less legal and moral constraints. For example, soldiers are legally 
and morally allowed to ambush and kill enemy soldiers, whereas police 
officers are not allowed to ambush and kill offenders. Moreover, the indi-
vidual soldier’s use of lethal force is in large part determined by orders 
from above. More specifically, if a military combatant is given a lawful 
order from a superior officer to use lethal force against particular enemy 
combatants in a theater of war then he is institutionally and morally obli-
gated to do so; likewise if he is ordered not to use lethal force against these 
combatants then he is institutionally and morally obliged not to do so. For 
having decided to occupy the institutional role of military combatant and 
having embarked on war, the individual military combatant has waived 
his or her discretionary right to use lethal force, and done so in favor of 
his or her superiors. In this respect military combatants differ from police 
officers. I return to this issue in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
As mentioned above, regular soldiers’ use of lethal force is constrained 
by the principles of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimina-
tion. As we will see in Chapter 4, it is morally (and, typically, legally) per-
missible for a police officer to use lethal force under the following far 
more restrictive conditions: (1) the threat is imminent; (2) it is necessary 
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for the officer to use lethal force to protect the life of the police officer (or 
third party), or, at least, to prevent the commission of some other serious 
crime; (3) the use of lethal force by the officer is proportionate to the threat 
posed by the offender, (e.g., there is a threat to life or the likelihood of 
grievous bodily harm).
What is the justification for this difference in respect of allowable 
lethal force between regular soldiers and police officers? Certainly in well- 
ordered, law- abiding, liberal democratic states, police interactions with 
offenders do not necessitate the use of lethal force other than on rare occa-
sions; it is typically possible to arrest offenders without recourse to lethal 
force, and in these circumstances police are required by law, as well as 
by the dictates of morality, to eschew lethal force. By contrast, a soldier’s 
encounters with enemy soldiers in a theater of war frequently necessitates 
a lethal response, if the soldier is to preserve his own life and that of his 
fellow combatants.
However, this does not fully explain the difference. For it omits the 
fact that individual soldiers are not only engaged in personal self- defense 
or defense of the lives of their fellow soldiers. Soldiers are also engaged in 
lethal attacks on enemy soldiers; they are trying to kill enemy soldiers and 
not simply avoid being killed themselves.
Police- citizen lethal encounters are typically one- off, self- contained 
interactions in the overall context of a legal framework that is enforced by 
a police organization enjoying a monopoly of coercive/ lethal force. If the 
police are trying to arrest an offender using lethal force to resist arrest, the 
presumed illegality of the offender’s actions will in due course be inde-
pendently adjudicated, and the police organization’s monopoly of coer-
cive/ lethal force is not at stake.
By contrast, the use of lethal force by a soldier against an enemy com-
batant on a particular occasion takes place in the context of an ongoing 
conflict between the armed forces of political entities and outside the 
framework of laws actually enforced by a police service, or other secu-
rity agency, with a monopoly of coercive/ lethal force. I say this notwith-
standing the existence of international law. For the latter has no effective 
enforcement mechanism; this is, in large part because there is no enforce-
ment agency with a monopoly of coercive/ lethal force.
More specifically, the lethal action of a regular soldier on a specific 
occasion is (1) performed jointly with the actions of other soldiers at vari-
ous levels (e.g., members of the mortar squad and of the battalion); (2) per-
formed as one element of a causally and means/ end connected, dynamic, 
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and unpredictable unfolding series of lethal actions directed at short- term, 
mid- term, and long- term collective ends (e.g., winning this skirmish, this 
battle, the war); and (3) done in the context of a standing joint lethal threat 
from enemy combatants. In relation to point 2, it is important to note that 
soldiers are often engaged in lethal attacks on enemy soldiers in order to 
degrade the enemy force and, thereby, win the war; they are trying to kill 
enemy soldiers in order to reduce their number, and not simply to avoid 
being killed themselves. Even if, as I have argued, the ultimate moral jus-
tification for the use of military force is to protect the moral rights of the 
citizenry, the proximate purpose of the use of lethal force by soldiers is to 
win wars. Crucially for our concerns here, this proximate purpose is in 
large part definitive of the institutional role of the military, whereas it is 
not definitive of the police role. Rather the analogous role of the latter, to 
reiterate, is in essence to use coercive force to effect arrests.
In light of the above, there is a presumption in favor of killing enemy 
soldiers during armed conflict in a theater of war, and it is not necessary 
that the threat from an enemy soldier be imminent; nor is it a necessary 
condition for permissibly killing an enemy soldier that one is doing so to 
protect one’s own life (personal self- defense) or that of one’s fellow sol-
diers (defense of the lives of copresent others).
3.4  Conclusion
In this chapter I  have provided a normative, comparative institutional 
analysis of police officers and regular soldiers in the setting of the con-
temporary liberal democratic nation- state. In doing so, I have relied on 
my normative teleological account of social institutions. I have defined 
the roles of police officer and regular soldier by recourse to normatively 
specified, empirically anchored, organizational roles— a procedure I refer 
to as institutional ascent. Two key theoretical notions employed are those 
of multilayered structures of joint action and collective goods. The moral 
rights and duties constitutive of institutional roles are derived in part 
from the collective goods that are the raison d’être of particular institu-
tions, including police and military institutions. Moreover, these institu-
tional moral rights and duties differ somewhat from institutionally prior 
natural moral rights and obligations. Indeed, they are special rights and 
duties: they are rights and duties that other natural persons may not have, 
and they are partialist in that they are rights and duties with respect to 
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the members of a given community, but not necessarily members of other 
communities.
The institutional roles of police officers and regular soldiers are similar 
in two fundamental respects, namely that: (1) they both involve the use of 
coercive, indeed lethal, force as a means; and (2) they are both performed 
in the service of the collective end, indeed collective good, of protecting 
the moral rights of fellow citizens, albeit in one case (police) from inter-
nal threats, and in the other (military) from external threats. However, 
these two roles are also importantly different in a number of respects. For 
example, military forces, unlike police forces, do not have as a primary 
role to enforce the law, and soldiers use lethal force with less legal and 
moral constraints than police officers. Moreover, military combatants, but 
not police officers, waive their right to use (or not to use) lethal force when 
given a lawful order by their superiors to do so (or not to do so).
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i n  c h a p t e r  3  I defined the police role in terms of (1) the collective end 
of protecting the legally enshrined, justifiably enforceable, moral rights 
of citizens from violation by fellow citizens; and (2) the use of coercive, 
including lethal, force in pursuing this end. Moreover, in Chapter 1 the 
following properties of moral rights were identified. First, moral rights 
generate obligations on others; for example, A’s right to life generates an 
obligation on the part of B not to kill A. Second, moral rights are justifi-
ably enforceable.
As we saw in Chapter 2, justifiable enforceability implies the right to 
use lethal force to enforce respect for the right to life. Person A has a 
right not to be killed by B, and so B has an obligation not to kill A. But 
what if B ignores his obligation and attempts to kill A? In that event, A 
has a right that B be prevented by someone (either A or some other per-
son, C) from killing A; A’s right to life is justifiably enforceable. Here the 
means of prevention could include the use of lethal force, if it is necessary. 
Indeed, in the case of self- defense— as opposed to defense of others— it 
was argued that under certain conditions the defender might not be vio-
lating the right of his attacker not to be killed if she killed the attacker, 
even if it was not necessary to do so. Moreover, in the case of defense of 
the life of another— as opposed to self- defense— it was argued that the 
third party, C, may well have an obligation to kill B to protect A, given that 
it was necessary, and given that C could do so without any threat to C’s 
own life. Consider, in this connection, a situation in which A is C’s child 
or spouse who is being threatened by B. Arguably, C is under an obliga-
tion to A to kill B, if this is the only means of preventing B from killing A 
(i.e., C’s child or spouse).
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So there are justifiably enforceable moral rights, and it is the central 
and most important purpose of police to protect legally enshrined, jus-
tifiably enforceable, moral rights. However, there are laws that do not 
enshrine moral rights. Many of these laws are fair and reasonable, and 
the conformity to them enables collective goods to be provided, such as 
anti- litter laws, for example. But what is the justification for their enforce-
ment by police? The fact that they provide collective benefits, or that they 
are fair and reasonable, does not of itself necessarily provide an adequate 
justification for their enforcement. Perhaps consent to the enforcement of 
just and reasonable laws that enable the provision of collective benefits 
provides an adequate moral justification for such enforcement. Here there 
is an issue with respect to the degree and type of enforcement that might 
be justified in this way. Lethal force might not be justified, even if it is 
consented to in relation to fair and reasonable laws that enable collective 
benefits to be provided. Certainly recourse to lethal force— as opposed 
to nonlethal coercive force— is not justified in the case of many unlaw-
ful actions. Specifically, unlawful actions not regarded as serious crimes. 
Indeed, the validity of this point is acknowledged in those jurisdictions 
that have made it unlawful for police to shoot at many categories of “flee-
ing felons.” It is more often than not now unlawful, because it is immoral, 
to shoot at, say, a fleeing pickpocket.
At any rate, in this chapter I examine in some detail the moral justi-
fication for police use of lethal force and, as a consequence, the types of 
situations in which police use of lethal force is morally permissible.1 Of 
particular interest here is my claim that police officers have an institu-
tional moral right and duty to use lethal force that ordinary citizens do 
not have. Police officers have, as we have seen, an institutional moral right 
and duty to uphold the law. This generates an institutional moral right 
and duty to use lethal force to uphold the law, or at least some laws under 
certain circumstances.
1. Earlier versions of the material in this chapter appeared in Seumas Miller, Issues in 
Police Ethics (Wagga Wagga, Australia:  Keon Publications, 1996), Chapter  3; Seumas 
Miller, John Blackler, and Andrew Alexandra, Police Ethics (Sydney:  Allen and Unwin, 
1997), Chapter  6; Miller, “Shootings by Police in Victoria”; Miller and Blackler, Ethical 
Issues in Policing, Chapter 3.
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4.1  The Institutional Role of Police and Police Use 
of Lethal Force
My argument in relation to the special institutional moral right and duty 
of police to use lethal force to uphold the law relies both on my norma-
tive theory of the police role and on the claim argued for in Chapter 2 
that, quite independently of the existence of police services, individual 
persons have a natural (i.e., noninstitutional) moral right to kill in self- 
defense and (relatedly) a natural moral obligation to kill in defense of oth-
ers. This natural right and obligation derive from the more basic natural 
right to life.
Notwithstanding the existence of a natural right to self- defense and a 
natural obligation to defend the lives of others, with the establishment of 
police services in modern societies the responsibility for defending one-
self, and especially for protecting others, has to a large extent devolved to 
the police. More specifically, as we saw in Chapter 3, there is a jointly held 
moral obligation on the part of all citizens to protect the moral rights of 
fellow citizens from their fellow citizens (i.e., to provide the collective good 
of internal security). This latter jointly held moral obligation could, at least 
in principle, be discharged by an all- citizen police service. However, in 
contemporary liberal democratic states, there is a division of labor such 
that it is discharged by establishing the institution of the police and its con-
stitutive occupational role of police officer. As a consequence, if someone’s 
life is threatened, whether my own or someone else’s, the first step should 
be to call the police. However, to reiterate, this in no way entails that the 
natural rights of ordinary citizens to self- defense and to defend the lives of 
others have been alienated, but rather only that they have been curtailed.
My rights- based account of the moral justification of police use of 
deadly force is consistent with some versions of social contract theory. For, 
as I have argued elsewhere, in a liberal democracy the legally enshrined, 
moral rights justifiably enforced by the police are, and ought to be, con-
sented to by the population at large by virtue of having been enacted by a 
democratically elected legislature.2 However, this contractarian aspect of 
my theory stands in some contrast with some versions of contract theory.3 
2. Miller and Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing, Chapter 1.
3. While some contractarians would concede retention of the right to self- defense, they 
may well not do so in relation to the right to defend others. Thus, according to Hobbes, 
“A Covenant not to defend my self from force, by force, is alwayes voyd” (Thomas Hobbes, 
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On my conception, the rights to self- defense and, in particular, the obliga-
tion to defend the lives of others are logically prior to police services, and 
indeed to government itself. Moreover, objective moral principles govern-
ing the exercise of these rights— specifically, the principles of imminence, 
necessity, and proportionality— are also logically prior to police services 
and governments. Indeed, these rights and the moral principles govern-
ing their exercise constrain, or ought to constrain, the actions of police 
and the laws enacted by governments. So on this conception there isn’t 
a Hobbesian state of nature in which there are no moral rights or obliga-
tions and in which everyone is entitled to use force in accordance with his 
or her own rational self- interest— indeed, at his or her own subjective dis-
cretion and in accordance with his or her own subjectively chosen rules. 
Accordingly, persons do not renounce this morally unrestricted freedom 
when they come to embrace the state and, more specifically, the liberal 
democratic nation- state. The reason for this is twofold. First, no one ever 
had, or could have had, a moral right to use force solely in their own per-
sonal interest or at their own subjective discretion (i.e., independently of 
objective reasons). Or at least no one could have had a moral right to use 
lethal force against others solely in their own personal interest or at their 
own subjective discretion. Second, whatever objective moral right to use 
lethal force individual persons have outside institutional settings (e.g., the 
natural right to kill in self- defense) they retain in some form in institu-
tional settings, notwithstanding that the existence of governments and 
police services qualifies this right.
Note that my rights- based account in relation to the use of lethal force 
is consistent with citizens reasonably accepting that governments and, 
more specifically, the police, have a monopoly or near- monopoly in the 
use of coercive force within their communities, and that the police rea-
sonably have some additional (institutional) moral rights and duties in 
relation to the use of lethal force that are not possessed by ordinary citi-
zens. What precisely these rights and duties are is a matter discussed 
in some detail below. Here I simply note that citizens might reasonably 
grant special (institutional) moral rights to police on the basis of the need 
for a division of labor in relation to the protection of legally enshrined, 
justifiably enforceable, moral rights. However, such a division of labor is 
Leviathan, Chapter  14, any edition). For one influential recent contractarian view, see 
Reiman, “The Social Contract and the Police Use of Deadly Force,” 237– 249. See also 
Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 109.
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consistent with citizens retaining enforcement rights, such as the right 
to the defense of others albeit in a qualified form. Indeed, it is because 
citizens retain such rights that it is permissible, indeed obligatory, that 
they protect themselves and others, given the unavailability of police to 
do so on some occasions. Moreover, the retention of these rights in the 
context of a division of labor serves to explain why it is that citizens have 
a moral duty to assist the police in the enforcement of the moral rights 
in question, such as a duty to assist a police officer to arrest an escaping 
murderer, if it is required.
Accordingly, I do not accept some of the main arguments that might 
be thought to be available to some contractarian theories of police use of 
deadly force. Specifically, I do not accept the claim that an individual per-
son, A, can somehow transfer to others the right to kill B in self- defense. 
Here we need to keep in mind the distinction between transferring a right 
and delegating the exercise of a right.4 I take it that if I transfer a right I no 
longer possess it, whereas this is not the case with delegating the exercise 
of a right that I continue to possess. Moreover, if I transfer a right then the 
right has not merely been suspended. For if my right has been suspended 
it has not, thereby, been transferred; if my right is suspended it remains 
my right, albeit it is not in force. Non- transferable rights are often referred 
to as inalienable human rights, and include the right to life and the right 
to autonomy.5 These fundamental natural human rights, in particular, 
cannot be transferred to or from others since they are possessed, and only 
possessed, by virtue of properties one has as a human being.6
Of course, it is often the case that others do have a right to kill 
some agent A for things that A has done or failed to do (e.g., the right 
4. One can, of course, transfer to others the right to such things as one’s property, and one 
can transfer the right to enforce contracts one has entered into. Moreover, a third party 
may have an independent right to use lethal force to enforce a contract, e.g. if lives would 
be put a risk if the contract is not fulfilled. Further one can delegate the exercise of some 
rights, as opposed to transferring the rights themselves, including the exercise of rights 
to enforce by means of lethal force. But I am denying that one can transfer the right to use 
lethal force to enforce such contracts.
5. Inalienable rights are not necessarily absolute rights; the right to life is inalienable, but 
it does not follow that it is absolute. The existence of a right to self- defense demonstrates 
that the right to life is not absolute.
6. This is consistent with human rights underpinning various institutional rights, these 
institutional rights varying from one institutional setting to another, and with there being 
room for collective discretionary decision- making in relation to the precise character of 
such institutionalized human rights. For example, the human right to autonomy can 
underpin a variety of different voting arrangements.
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to kill A in self- defense or in other defense) but in doing so they do not 
need to have that right transferred to them by A. Rather they possess 
the right independently or, in some cases, they might have the exercise 
of the right delegated to them.
Here we need to stress the role of natural rights, especially human 
rights, in relation to practical moral reasoning. The first point is that 
the institutional and, more broadly, social activities of entering into con-
tracts, promise- making, and consenting take place against a background 
assumption of natural rights and, in particular, certain inalienable human 
rights, especially the rights to life and to autonomy.7 Thus contracts to 
enter into slavery or hand over one’s right to life to another are self- nullify-
ing. Secondly, while human rights are not absolute rights, human rights 
nevertheless normally “trump” other considerations, such as social util-
ity; in general, a decision to infringe a human right can only be justified 
by recourse to other human rights considerations. So human rights ought 
not to be overridden for the sake of other benefits to the community, such 
as social order. It should be remembered that while social order is a neces-
sary condition for human rights being respected, it is far from sufficient. 
Totalitarian states are characterized by high levels of social order, not-
withstanding the massive human rights violations that they involve.
On my account, to reiterate, there is a justifiably enforceable natural 
right to life, and this right gives rise both to a natural right to use lethal 
force in self- defense and a natural obligation to use lethal force to defend 
the lives of others. It follows that police officers, like ordinary citizens, 
have a right to use lethal force in self- defense and in defense of others.
However, it is widely assumed that the only morally acceptable jus-
tifications for police use of lethal force are self- defense and the defense 
of others. For example, according to the Australian National Committee 
on Violence’s Recommendation 85.1, “Uniform laws throughout Australia 
regarding the use of firearms and other lethal force by police,” “These 
laws should reflect the principle that lethal force should only be used as 
a last resort, involving self- defence or the defence of others.”8 However, 
I argue that the matter is more complex than this, and that there is an 
additional moral justification for police use of deadly force; namely, to 
7. Although an inalienable right cannot be transferred to another person, as already men-
tioned, its exercise might be able to be be delegated to another person.
8. National Committee on Violence, Violence: Directions for Australia (Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 1990).
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uphold the law. But let us consider each of these moral justification for 
police use of lethal force in turn, beginning with police use of lethal force 
in self- defense.
4.2  Police Use of Lethal Force in Self- Defense
As we have just seen, killing in order to defend one’s own life or the life 
of another is morally justified on the grounds that each of us has a right 
to life. Moreover, speaking generally,9 we are entitled to defend that right 
to life by killing an attacker under three conditions, if we do so in compli-
ance with the three principles of imminence, necessity, and proportion-
ality. First, there is the condition that the attacker is intentionally trying 
to kill someone— either oneself or another person— and will succeed if 
we do not intervene effectively. Moreover, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of imminence, the deadly threat needs to be imminent. We are not 
entitled to shoot dead an attacker whom we know is threatening us with a 
replica of a gun, nor can we (speaking generally) preemptively kill some-
one who is planning to kill us in the distant future. Nor are we entitled 
to kill an attacker who is only engaged in a minor assault (principle of 
proportionality).
The second condition is that we have no way of preserving our own 
or the other person’s life other than by killing the attacker (principle of 
necessity).10 For example, we are not able to flee to safety. This condition 
obtains notwithstanding my commitment to FIST (fault- based internalist 
suspended- rights theory), according to which an attacker’s right not to 
be killed by a defender might be suspended, notwithstanding that it is 
not necessary in the circumstances for the defender to kill the attacker 
to preserve his or her life. For, as I argued in Chapter 2, there are other 
moral considerations underpinning the necessity condition in cases of 
self- defense. Moreover, FIST is not directly concerned with cases of kill-
ing in defense of others.
The third condition is the one requiring that our attacker does 
not have a morally justifiable reason for trying to kill us. This is 
9. There are, of course, exceptions, such as a standing and unavoidable lethal threat that 
might justify a preemptive strike. Moreover, I am here setting aside cases of ongoing col-
lective violence such as wars. I address the matter of war in Chapter 6.
10. As already noted, the principle of necessity operates in a different manner in cases of 
collective violence, such as war. See especially Chapter 6.
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straightforward in many cases, as in the case of an armed robber who 
attempts to kill a defender in order to get her or his money. Other cases 
are less straightforward. Consider a legally appointed executioner and 
a serial killer sentenced to death. Suppose that the executioner has a 
good and decisive moral justification for carrying out the death penalty 
in the case of the convicted serial killer. If so, then arguably the serial 
killer is not morally justified in trying to kill the executioner in self- 
defense, supposing the opportunity arose.11 On the other hand, if the 
executioner does not have a good and decisive moral justification in 
such cases, then arguably the serial killer is morally justified in trying 
to kill the executioner in self- defense.
The killing of Mark Militano by police officers in in Victoria, Australia, 
1986 is evidently a case of justified killing in self- defense, and perhaps 
killing in defense of the lives of others. Police were following Militano 
and had evidence in the form of an overheard conversation, which was 
probably sufficient to charge him with conspiracy to commit armed rob-
bery. Police cars converged on Militano, and one car swerved in front of 
Militano’s vehicle, causing him to brake. Militano reached for his hand-
gun and pointed it at one of the police officers. A  number of officers 
then fired at Militano. Militano, apparently unharmed, ran from his car. 
A police officer fired a shot in the air, calling for him to stop. Militano 
turned, raised his pistol, and aimed at the police. Sergeant Ray Watson, 
the man who had overheard the conversation concerning the planned 
bank robbery, fired one shot from his .38 revolver. The bullet hit Militano 
in the head, and minutes later he died.12 Clearly, at the point when Watson 
shot Militano, the above- mentioned three conditions for justifiable kill-
ing in self- defense— and defense of the lives of others— obtained. First, 
Militano was intentionally trying to kill someone— either Watson or 
another officer— and would have probably succeeded if Watson did not 
intervene. Second, Watson had no way of preserving his own or the other 
police officers’ lives other than by killing Militano. Third, Militano did 
not have a morally justifiable reason for trying to kill Watson or the other 
police officers. More specifically, in terms of our theory of self- defense, 
FIST, Militano’s natural right not to be killed by Watson was suspended. 
11. But see Teichman, “Self- Defence.”
12. Tom Noble, Untold Violence: Crime in Melbourne Today (Melbourne: John Kerr, 1989), 
142– 143.
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Moreover, the other important moral condition, necessity— a condition 
which, as already noted, is not a requirement under FIST for suspension 
of one’s right not to be killed by a defender— did obtain in the case of 
Watson’s lethal shooting of Militano.
The case of Gary Abdallah illustrates the distinction between jus-
tified killing in self- defense and excusable killing in self- defense. 
Abdallah was suspected by Victorian police of involvement in the Walsh 
St. (Melbourne) killings of two police officers. However, there was 
insufficient evidence to prosecute him. There was, however, evidence 
of his attempted murder of a senior policeman’s son. Detectives Clifton 
Lockwood and Dermot Avon were sent to arrest Abdallah. It was alleged 
that Abdallah produced a revolver, aimed it at Lockwood, was warned 
by Lockwood to put it down, and was shot dead by Lockwood when he 
failed to do so. The revolver turned out to be an imitation gun. The 
police officers were charged with murder, but found not guilty. While 
the gun was an imitation gun, it was reasonably believed to have been a 
real gun.13 Accordingly, the first of the above- mentioned conditions for 
justifiable self- defense— that the attacker will in fact kill the defender 
unless the defender intervenes— can be weakened to generate a set of 
conditions for morally excusable self- defense. The relevant new condi-
tion is that the defender reasonably believes the attacker will kill him 
unless he intervenes (by killing the attacker).
I note that, consistent with FIST, Abdallah retained his right not 
to be killed by Lockwood, since he was not in fact a deadly threat to 
Lockwood. On the other hand, Lockwood also retained his right not 
to be killed by Abdallah, supposing Abdallah had been able at the 
critical point to get his hands on another gun, a real gun this time, 
and shoot Lockwood dead in self- defense. For Lockwood did not meet 
the third condition for having his right not to be killed by Abdallah 
suspended— namely, that he did not reasonably believe that he had a 
good and decisive justification for killing Abdallah. For Lockwood did 
reasonably, even if wrongly, believe he had such a justification— the 
justification of self- defense— when he formed the intention to shoot 
Abdallah at the point in time when Abdallah aimed his replica gun at 
Lockwood.
13. Hal Hallenstein, Investigation into the Death of Gary John Abdallah:  Inquest Findings 
(Melbourne, Australia: State Coroner’s Office, 1994).
Police Use of Lethal Force 117
   117
4.3  Police Use of Lethal Force in Defense of the 
Rights of Others: An Institutional (Moral) Duty
Police have a natural moral right to use lethal force in self- defense and 
a natural moral obligation to use lethal force in defense of the lives of 
others. In these respects, they are no different from ordinary citizens. 
But police also have an institutionally based moral duty to use lethal force 
to protect innocent lives under certain circumstances. Indeed, they can 
be held legally liable if they fail to take the opportunity to shoot dead an 
armed and dangerous criminal who then goes on to, say, take the lives of 
innocent citizens.
What of ordinary citizens? Do they have a moral obligation to use lethal 
force to protect others, at least in cases where the threat to life is immedi-
ate, is certain, and there is no alternative? As we have already argued, the 
answer is a qualified affirmative. The qualifications are threefold. First, 
the obligation of ordinary citizens to use lethal force to protect others is 
a general natural moral obligation and not a special institutionally based 
moral duty, as is the case with the police. Second, in the context of a well- 
ordered, contemporary, liberal democratic nation- state, this moral obliga-
tion of ordinary citizens is only triggered in the absence of police; in the 
first instance, it is the moral and institutional duty of police to protect 
threatened lives. Third, ordinary citizens ought not to be expected to go 
to the same lengths or take the same risks as police officers are obliged 
to, since they do not occupy the police role, and therefore do not have a 
special institutional responsibility to protect the lives of others. So the 
moral obligation of ordinary citizens to kill to protect others is much less 
stringent than the special institutionally based moral duty of police offi-
cers to do so.
In addition to the justification for using lethal force to protect the right 
to life (whether in self- defense or in defense of the lives of others), there 
is the question of a wider justification in terms of the protection of rights 
other than the right to life. As was argued in Chapter 1, evidently the use 
of lethal force can be justified to protect moral rights other than the right 
to life. However, in speaking of using lethal force in defense of rights, 
one would obviously not want to include all moral rights, or at least all 
violations of all moral rights. For example, property rights are arguably 
moral rights, but for a police officer to shoot someone dead to prevent 
them stealing a handbag would be morally unacceptable. So the ques-
tion becomes:  Are there any moral rights, apart from the right to life, 
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the protection of which would justify police use of deadly force? As we 
saw in Chapter 1, candidates for such rights might include a right not to 
be severely physically or psychologically damaged. Perhaps rape, serious 
child molestation, and grievous bodily harm are actions the prevention of 
which might justify the use of deadly force. Maybe police, in particular, 
are justified in shooting a fleeing serial rapist if that is the only way to 
ensure his arrest.
A key distinction in this regard was introduced in Chapter 1; namely, 
the distinction between rights to things constitutive of the self and rights 
to things not constitutive of the self. Such latter rights include many insti-
tutional rights, such as property rights. I suggest that, at least in the first 
instance, police are justified in using lethal force to protect rights to things 
constitutive of selfhood, including life and autonomy. Indeed, these rights 
are typically enshrined in the criminal law. However, they are also justi-
fied in using lethal force to protect certain other rights, which are rights 
to things not constitutive of selfhood. Let us consider some putative cases.
What do we want to say of the policy of the shooting on sight of cattle 
rustlers in the old American Wild West, in circumstances under which the 
property crime of cattle rustling threatened ranchers’ livelihoods? Again, 
what are we to say about shooting looters? The shooting of looters in disaster 
zones or in conditions of civil unrest has been an accepted policy in many 
parts of the world over a long period of time. And there are the (alleged) 
shootings on sight of armed robber- murderers in South Africa by police. 
There has been a frightening increase in the robbery of businesses in South 
Africa by heavily armed gunmen, who sometimes shoot dead unarmed 
shopkeepers and others in the process of the robbery. While robbery is a 
property crime, it is unlike cattle rustling or looting, in that it is one which 
involves the deliberate use, or threat of the use, of lethal force as a means.
In relation to these cases of violations of rights not constitutive of self-
hood, we need to distinguish the question of the types of crime that might 
justify the use of lethal force from the question of the extent of crime that 
might justify it. So there might be a general breakdown of law and order in 
some part of an otherwise well- ordered and law- abiding community. This 
breakdown might consist in large- scale, serious violations of moral rights.
I suggest that the conception of the police use of force needs to be 
complicated, but not fundamentally altered, to accommodate public order 
policing, as in the case of riots or communal violence. As already noted, 
police use of force is justified by considerations of self- defense, defense of 
the lives and rights of others, and in order to uphold the law (of which, more 
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in the next section). Public order policing strategies can usefully be divided 
into two broad groups: (1) preemptive or proactive policing, and (2) reactive 
policing. An example of preemptive or proactive public order policing is that 
typically used in large, pre- organized election rallies addressed by the lead-
ers of political parties. Such occasions involve planned public- order policing 
arrangements. Accordingly, they can and should involve appropriate preset 
logistical arrangements, clear lines of authority and communication, experi-
enced supervisors, and a cohort of well- trained police officers to execute the 
arrangements on the ground.
Reactive public order policing is typically problematic in four 
respects: (1) police have little or no notice of impending events; (2) there 
is collective violence; (3)  the capacity of the police to exercise control by 
means of nonviolent strategies is much less than would otherwise be the 
case; and (4)  the use of force by the police is, correspondingly, both far 
more likely and (potentially) more justified. Naturally, even in reactive 
policing of collective violence situations, coercive force needs to be used 
judiciously and in tandem with nonviolent strategies. Moreover, the effec-
tiveness of reactive policing strategies is heavily dependent on the skills, 
experience, and leadership of the police involved.
In some instances of reactive policing of collective violence the violence 
is primarily directed at the police themselves (e.g., antigovernment violence). 
In other instances, the violence is primarily directed at another group within 
the community (e.g., religious violence). In all instances of reactive polic-
ing of collective violence, a crucial factor is the attitude of the community 
being policed to the police. Are the police seen as an occupying force or as an 
impartial enforcer of the law and protector of the community from criminal 
elements? If the latter, then there is the potential to mobilize the commu-
nity to restrain those elements engaged in violence, whether that violence is 
directed primarily at the police or at some other group within the commu-
nity. If the former, then the police face an ongoing uphill battle, especially 
when one considers their relatively small numbers in contexts of large- scale 
collective violence. Race riots in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, in the after-
math of the shooting dead of an unarmed black youth, Michael Brown, by 
a police officer, indicated that the police in many US jurisdictions are not 
necessarily viewed by black communities as impartial enforcers of the law.14
14. Jon Swain and Amanda Holpuch, “Ferguson Police:  A  Stark Illustration of Newly 
Militarised US Law Enforcement,” The Guardian, August 15, 2014, http:// www.theguardian.
com/ world/ 2014/ aug/ 14/ ferguson- police- military- restraints- violence- weaponry- missouri.
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Notwithstanding that there is a breakdown in police- community 
relations or even that the rioters and insurgents are otherwise intent on 
violence, the police response ought to be driven by the requirements to 
uphold the law, preserve the peace, and protect the moral rights (includ-
ing property rights) of the citizenry. Hence the aim of the police is to 
disperse violent crowds, and to do so with the minimum use of force and 
in a discriminating manner. Here the use of tear gas can be effective. 
Although tear gas is not discriminating it is also not particularly inju-
rious. Additional more discriminating methods are available to target 
specific individuals, such as ringleaders or those engaged in violent acts, 
such as missile throwers. These methods include firing nonlethal rounds 
that, nevertheless, incapacitate (e.g., plastic bullets).15 In this context, the 
apparent militarization of US law enforcement agencies in terms of their 
deployment of armored vehicles, machine guns, and other military hard-
ware is cause for concern.16
There are some instances of collective violence in which police use of 
lethal force may be required. For example, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India, 
in 2002, hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslims were killed by Hindus, 
and incited to do so by Hindu leaders; moreover, hundreds of Hindus 
were killed by Muslims.17 In these circumstances, police use of lethal 
force is justified both in terms of their own self- defense and in order to 
defend the lives of those being attacked. In such contexts, the distinc-
tion made in Chapter 2 between the police and the military use of force 
comes under some pressure. For example, effective use of lethal force by 
police in such circumstances might rely on a military- style authority rela-
tionship between police leaders and subordinate police officers, with the 
latter firing their weapons when instructed to do so by their superiors, 
rather than on the basis of their own individual judgments.18 On the other 
15. Plastic bullets can be lethal (e.g., if fired at very close range). However, they are, at 
least in principle, nonlethal weapons and, in any case, should not be used to disperse 
nonviolent crowds or against members of violent crowds not actually engaged in violent 
acts. See P. A. J. Waddington, The Strong Arm of the Law: Armed and Public Order Policing 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), Chapter 6.
16. Waddington, The Strong Arm of the Law, Chapter 6.
17. Rafiq Zakaria, Communal Rage in Secular India (Mumbai, India: Popular Prakasham, 
2002), 20– 24. See also Seumas Miller, Sankar Sen, Prakash Mishra, and John Blackler, 
Ethical Issues in Policing in India (Hyderabad, India: National Police Academy, 2008).
18. In fact, in India there is a sharp institutional division between ordinary police and the 
armed police used to quell community violence; the latter are a separate paramilitary force.
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hand, as will become evident from the discussion on military combat in 
Chapter 6, the principle of military necessity is not in play; so even in 
these extreme cases of collective violence, the justification for police use 
of lethal force does not collapse into the justification for the use of lethal 
force in military combat.
Some instances of serous and ongoing collective violence undermine 
the legitimate political order and constitute a threat to national internal 
security. Perhaps the riots in Thailand in 2014 directed at the democrati-
cally elected government of the day are an instance of this. At any rate, 
to unjustifiably undermine the legitimate political order in this manner 
is— among other things— to indirectly violate the political rights (insti-
tutionally based moral rights) of the citizenry. It is at this point that the 
institutional roles of the police and that of the military meet or perhaps 
overlap. Nevertheless, even in these kinds of situation I suggest that the 
distinction between the police and the military role can be, and should be, 
maintained. The demarcation in question can be maintained by an insti-
tutional demarcation between granting emergency powers to police and 
imposing martial law. In effect, the latter, but not the former, removes 
operational authority from the police and places it in the hands of the 
military.
The various above- described collective violence scenarios involving a 
general breakdown in public order could conceivably justify the use, or 
at least the threatened use, of lethal force by police that would otherwise 
not be justified (e.g., a policy of shooting looters on sight). However, the 
typical response to such scenarios would be one in which there was a dec-
laration of a state of emergency in a specified geographical area for a lim-
ited period of time, and the granting of special powers of enforcement to 
police by the government of the day, but only in that area for that period. 
Moreover, strict accountability measures would need to be introduced to 
ensure police did not abuse their new powers. However, the point to be 
stressed here is that the special powers in question are ones granted only 
to police, not to the citizenry in general. Accordingly, these special legal 
powers (institutional rights and duties) cannot be assimilated to natural 
moral rights and obligations to use lethal force.
The upshot of our discussion in this section is that the justification 
for the police use of lethal force in defense of the rights of others, while 
grounded in the natural right to use lethal force in defense of the rights 
of others, is nevertheless different from that right in some important 
respects. In the first place, individual police officers have, by virtue of 
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their institutional role, a special moral duty to use lethal force to defend 
the rights of others, and this duty is considerably more stringent than the 
natural obligation to do so. In the second place, the circumstances under 
which police officers are required to discharge this special institutional 
moral duty to use lethal force are considerably wider than those falling 
within the scope of the afore- mentioned natural moral obligation. For one 
thing, individual police officers are required at times to use lethal force to 
defend an array of institutional moral rights with respect to which there 
are no natural obligations to use lethal force, such as the right to hold 
political office. For another thing, the police as an institution can legiti-
mately be granted special emergency powers of enforcement by govern-
ments in the name of national internal security, albeit for limited periods, 
and, as a consequence, they can justifiably use an extent of lethal force 
that would otherwise not be justified (e.g., a policy of shoot on sight).
Having explicitly discussed police use of lethal force in self- defense 
and in defense of rights, including a right to things not constitutive of 
selfhood, let us now turn to the question of whether the existence of such 
rights could provide a third justification for police use of deadly force— 
the first two justifications being self- defense and the defense of the moral 
rights of others. In point of fact, this justification— police use of lethal 
force to enforce the law— has been implicit, if not explicit, in a good deal 
of the discussion thus far. However, conceptually at least, we can separate 
police use of lethal force in self- defense and in defense of the lives (and 
other properties constitutive of selfhood) of others, on the one hand, from 
police use of lethal force to enforce the law.
4.4  Police Use of Lethal Force to Enforce the Law
In order to provide an initial focus for our discussion, let us consider the 
following two kinds of scenarios. Instances of our first kind of scenario 
include an unarmed pickpocket who is fleeing a police officer with a wal-
let with a ten- dollar note in it, and an unarmed burglar who is making off 
with a million dollars’ worth of someone else’s goods. In both cases, the 
only way to prevent escape is by shooting the offender dead. Obviously, the 
officer is not morally entitled to shoot and kill the pickpocket for such a 
minor offense. Moreover, the police officer is arguably not morally entitled 
to shoot and kill the unarmed burglar, notwithstanding that his is a seri-
ous crime. So there are some cases in which the police are not morally 
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or, for that matter, legally entitled to use lethal force to uphold the law, 
notwithstanding that it is the only available means to do so.
However, evidently there are some cases in which the police are mor-
ally and legally entitled— and perhaps morally and legally obliged— to 
use lethal force in order to uphold the law. Some of these putative cases 
might reasonably be argued to be cases of killing in self- defense or in 
defense of others, notwithstanding that the police are legally entitled to 
use lethal force to uphold the law. So let us set these aside. However, other 
cases involve property crimes, notwithstanding the existence of the above 
instances of property crimes with respect to which the use of lethal force 
by police is not morally (or legally) justified. Consider the case of someone 
who has successfully robbed a bank and gotten away with millions of dol-
lars of other people’s savings. Assume that this person is hiding out, and 
is armed and prepared to shoot in order to avoid capture, though if left 
alone with his money, he will not shoot anyone. There are two moral ques-
tions here. First, if an arrest attempt is to be made, how should it be done, 
and second, whether an arrest attempt should be made at all.
If an attempt is to be made, it will be a matter of deciding on the 
most effective method— ideally one that will minimize the risk to life. 
Perhaps the police should opt for a policy of containment and negotia-
tion. Alternatively, the best option might be a surprise attack using forced 
entry. It may well be that in situations of this kind, police have often 
pursued the wrong options, and the nature of their training may come 
into this. Moreover, if the methods of police in some jurisdiction are not 
best practice, and if they should have known this, then they may well 
have been professionally negligent. Obviously, the negligence of a pro-
fessional group in relation to situations where lives are at risk is morally 
unacceptable.
Further, professional negligence may be a byproduct of the ethos or 
culture of an organization. Perhaps members of a particular police service 
have developed an ethos of individual physical courage at the expense of 
reflection, and of “machismo” rather than concern for the consequences, 
and this ethos has led to a tendency for early recourse to force rather than 
more considered methods such as negotiation. If so, then there would 
be cause for concern, as well as a reason to reconsider the organizational 
structure and the education and training of the police service in question, 
including, in particular, education in the ethical principles underlying 
the legitimate and illegitimate use of force by police officers.
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The Victorian coroner Hal Hallenstein has taken the view that in 
some of the police shootings and killings in Victoria in the 1980s and 
1990s, the wrong options were pursued. For example, Joshua Yap ended 
up in a wheelchair after being shot by a police officer, Constable Steven 
Tynan, when Yap— armed with a hunting knife— attempted to rob a TAB 
agency with an accomplice, Chee Ming Tsen— who was “armed” with an 
imitation revolver. Tynan had fired only after (a) he had called upon Yap 
and Tsen to surrender, and (b) Yap had lunged at Tynan with the knife. 
However, Hallenstein concluded that Tynan and fellow officer Constable 
Bodsworth ought not to have entered the TAB in the first place, but should 
have waited for assistance and opted for containment and negotiation. He 
said their actions were “arguably unnecessary, tactically unsound and 
in circumstances considered as acceptable breach of police force policy. 
A  more satisfactory basis of acknowledgment would have been non- 
exposure by police members, an active seeking of non- firearms resolution 
of the situation and taking into account the foreseeable risks.”19
An example where forced entry was used when containment and nego-
tiation were arguably the best option was the shooting by Victorian police 
of Gerhard Alfred Sader. Four police officers, led by Sergeant Watson, 
raided Sader’s Melbourne bungalow at dawn. Sader was wrongly sus-
pected of illegal possession of arms and drugs. The police had been 
issued with search warrants on the basis of false information from an 
informer known to be unreliable. As it turned out, the police used a 
sledgehammer to break open an external gate prior to even getting to the 
door of the house. This would certainly have alerted Sader. When they 
finally broke open Sader’s door, shouting “Police. Open up!,” they stared 
at a figure in the darkness who later turned out to be Sader. Watson shot 
three times at the figure in the dark, on the grounds that he believed the 
person to be armed and about to shoot him. Sader was at most armed with 
a baseball bat.20
In light of these kinds of cases, let us assume that the method most 
likely to minimize the risk to life is containment and negotiation. Let us 
also assume that this is, in fact, the method chosen. It remains true that 
the police are committed to apprehending the perpetrator. The police are 
19. Hal Hallenstein, Investigation into the Death of Hai Foong Yap:  Coroner’s Findings 
(Melbourne, Australia: State Coroner’s Office, 1994), 164.
20. Hal Hallenstein, Investigation into the Death of Gerhard Alfred Paul Sader (Melbourne, 
Australia: State Coroner’s Office, 1994).
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typically institutionally required— whether or not they ought to be— not 
to simply let a suspect go, and even in a situation of containment and 
negotiation, the use of lethal force may turn out to be necessary, albeit as 
a last resort.
Consider, in this connection, a gunman who, having killed his wife in 
their home, refuses to give himself up to police negotiators, and is prepar-
ing to escape, notwithstanding the presence of police snipers. Should he 
be allowed to escape, given that he is no longer a threat to anyone and the 
only reason not to leave him alone is that his crime will go unpunished? 
Martin Bryant— the man who went on a shooting spree in Port Arthur, 
Tasmania, on April 28, 1996, killing thirty- five innocent people with a 
semiautomatic rifle— should not have been allowed to escape. The above- 
mentioned armed professional burglar is quite different from both the 
wife killer and Martin Bryant. The burglar is guilty of property crimes 
and of seeking to avoid punishment for these crimes. In addition, he is 
prepared to use lethal force to prevent his arrest, but is not otherwise 
dangerous; if the police allow him to go free, no lives will be lost. Nor is 
it a matter of arresting him without loss of life at a later stage; perhaps he 
always carries his gun, or perhaps he is about to leave the country never 
to return (since extradition is not possible). In short, what is the moral 
justification for the use of deadly force in cases in which police confront a 
choice of either letting an offender go free or shooting that offender?
It might be argued that the police officer who comes upon the profes-
sional burglar should allow him to go scot- free. The police officer should 
do so on the grounds that by doing so his or her own life and that of the 
burglar will not be put at risk; and ensuring that no life is lost is more 
important than protecting property21 and seeing to it that justice is done 
by imprisoning the burglar for his crimes. Moreover, in a similar vein It 
might also be argued that the police officer should allow the wife- killer in 
our other scenario to go scot- free. The police officer should do so on the 
grounds that by doing so his or her own life and that of the wife- killer 
will not be put at risk; and ensuring that no additional life is lost is more 
important than ensuring justice is done by imprisoning the wife- killer for 
his crime of murder.
The arguments in favour of the police officers allowing the burglar 
and the wife- killer (respectively), to escape are not in my view compelling, 
21. I am assuming the theft of the items in question will not lead to the death or near death 
of the property owners, e.g. by depriving them of the means to buy food.
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but let us up the ante. Let us assume that in a certain police jurisdiction 
large numbers of offenders arm themselves and threaten to kill police 
officers who try to arrest them for their offences. The offences in question 
are serious property crimes (as in the burglar scenario) and one- off seri-
ous crimes of murder, grievous bodily harm and rape (as in the wife- killer 
scenario). Moreover, the armed offenders in question will kill or, at least, 
try to kill the police officers, if the latter try to arrest them, but not if these 
officers simply allow the offenders to escape.
One possible police response (let us assume) to this widespread law 
enforcement problem is to comply with the wishes of these offenders by 
allowing them to escape. However, such a police practice would surely 
be a gross dereliction of their institutional and moral duty; it would 
essentially consist of a failure to enforce the law on any occasion in 
which an offender was prepared to use lethal force to resist arrest (in 
circumstances in which allowing the offender to escape did not pose 
a risk to the lives or limbs of police officers or third parties). In the 
circumstances in question such a practice would render police officers 
impotent in relation to a very wide range of serious crimes; as such, it 
is not a sustainable law enforcement practice. Evidently, police officers 
need to retain as a last resort the use of lethal force to enforce the law, 
even in small- scale, police- offender confrontations in which their resort 
to lethal force is not necessary to prevent loss of life or limb (either their 
own or that of offenders or ordinary citizens).
In these sorts of case, the police are not necessarily engaged in self- 
defense. In many of these cases, the best thing for police officers— if 
they are simply acting in self- defense— would be for them to get back 
into their patrol cars and return to the police station. In this impor-
tant respect, police are different from ordinary citizens. It is expected, 
indeed, legally required in many jurisdictions, that ordinary citizens 
take the option of fleeing if it is available; however, for the police to do 
so would be an abrogation of their legal and moral duty. Nor are these 
sorts of case necessarily cases of killing in defense of others. The lives of 
ordinary citizens might not be at risk. For example, an offender— such 
as our armed burglar— might simply want to be left alone to spend his 
ill- gotten gains. Or the above- described husband who has killed his wife 
might cease to be a threat to anyone once he has killed his wife.
Against this it might now be argued that although the police are mor-
ally and, presumably, legally obliged to use lethal force against offenders 
prepared to use lethal force to avoid arrest (assuming it is necessary to do 
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so on pain of allowing the offenders to escape), the moral justification for 
such use of lethal force by the police is self- defense rather than, as I have 
suggested, to enforce the law.
Before proceeding to engage directly with this argument there are a 
couple of preliminary matters to be dealt with. Firstly, it is important not 
to conflate the type of scenario in question with a related type that is irrel-
evant to the argument. In these irrelevant scenarios the armed offenders 
will try to kill the police officers whose job it is to arrest them, even if these 
officers are prepared to allow the offenders to escape. In short, in this 
second type of scenario the officer’s life is at risk, irrespective of whether 
he or she proceeds to try and effect an arrest of the offender. A moral jus-
tification for police use of lethal force in this second type of scenario may 
well be self- defense; but this type of scenario is not in question here. In 
the scenarios in question here the police officer has the option of allowing 
the offender to escape without putting his own life (or that of the offender 
or, for that matter, any third party) at risk.
More generally, it is important not to conflate the type of case of inter-
est to us here with that of fleeing dangerous offenders (of which more 
below). Unlike the offenders of interest to us here, dangerous offenders in 
this sense are a threat to the life and limb of police officers and ordinary 
citizens, even if they are allowed to escape. So dangerous offenders are a 
standing threat to life and limb; the threat to life and limb that they pose 
cannot be removed by leaving them alone. Hence it is legally and, pre-
sumably, morally permissible to use lethal force against such dangerous 
offenders if they are trying to escape arrest; if they are so- called (danger-
ous) ‘fleeing felons’.
A second preliminary point is that the argument under consideration 
here (that the law enforcement justification for police use of lethal force 
collapses into the self- defense justification) should not be confused with 
a related argument involving the other- defense justification. According to 
the latter argument, in the scenarios in question the police, even if they 
are not engaged in killing in self- defense are, nevertheless, necessarily 
killing in defense of others. As we saw above, this may well be true of 
dangerous fleeing offenders (e.g. serial killers) or offenders who will try to 
kill would- be arresting police officers, even if the latter would allow them 
to escape. However, as our burglar and wife- killing scenarios (again) illus-
trate, neither the lives of police officers nor those of ordinary citizens need 
be at risk. So with respect to the scenarios in question the other- defense 
justification is not relevant.
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Let us now directly engage with the actual argument at issue; the argu-
ment that putative cases of police use of lethal force to enforce the law, 
such as our burglar and wife- killer scenarios, are simply cases of police 
using lethal force in self- defense. To reiterate: the type of case in question 
is that of fleeing offenders who only use lethal force, or threaten to use 
lethal force, to avoid arrest.
What if in these cases the police do their duty and choose not to allow 
such offenders to escape? So the police proceed to try to arrest these 
offenders, but in doing so they no longer have the option of using non- 
lethal means; so the police use lethal force. I  have suggested that the 
police are now using lethal force to enforce the law. The alternative sug-
gestion is that the police are using lethal force in self- defense. But at the 
point at which the police decide to enforce the law in the knowledge that 
the offender will use lethal force to resist arrest, the police are not engaged 
in an act of self- defense. After all, at this point the police have another 
option, if they are primarily interested in preserving their own lives and/ 
or that of the offender: get back into their patrol cars and return to the 
police station. Accordingly, at this point the self- defense justification is 
not available to the police officer. It is not available since it is not necessary 
for the police officer to use lethal force to protect his life (or that of his 
fellow officers or other third party); the option of flight is available to the 
officer(s). However, it is necessary for the police officer to use lethal force 
if the officer is to enforce the law. Therefore, in these scenarios the moral 
justification for the police officer using lethal force is that it is necessary 
to do so if the law is to be enforced.
Against this it might be argued as follows. It is agreed on all hands 
that the police officer in question is doing his legal and moral duty in try-
ing to arrest the offender and that the offender ought not to resist arrest. 
However, so the argument goes, if the offender does resist arrest by (say) 
shooting at the officer then the officer’s action of killing the offender is 
self defense. For at that point – the point at which the offender tries to kill 
the officer - the offender would have killed the officer if the officer had not 
killed the offender first.
This response is flawed in so far as the possibility of flight remains avail-
able to the police officer. Naturally, at some point in some scenarios the pos-
sibility of flight might not be available, e.g. the officer and the offender are 
exchanging fire and the officer is unable to flee because his leg is damaged 
(say) but is, nevertheless, blocking the offender’s exit path. At this point in 
these scenarios it may well be that the officer is not aiming at arresting the 
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offender or otherwise enforcing the law but is simply trying to preserve his 
own life. However, this does not vitiate the claim made above that prior to 
such a point being reached the police officers may well be using lethal force 
to enforce the law and not in self- defense, given that during this (earlier) 
period the option of flight remains available to the officer. Moreover, the 
option of officer flight or of allowing the offender to escape may well remain 
even after the officer and/ or the offender have fired their weapons. (See 
below for an actual instance of this.)
I have argued that in the kinds of case in question, the police are not 
simply engaged in self- defense or defense of others, either in the nar-
row sense of preservation of life, or the wider sense of preservation of 
self. Rather, there is some more complex set of moral considerations here. 
Let us pursue these further, initially by looking at the case of the police 
killing of Pavel Marinoff. Marinoff was a psychopathic Bulgarian army 
deserter who had shot and wounded a number of police officers before 
being confronted by Sergeant John Kapetanovski and Senior Constable 
Rod MacDonald on the Hume Highway outside Melbourne.22 They 
pulled a van over to the side of the road, rightly believing it to be driven by 
Marinoff. They ordered the driver to place his hands outside the car. The 
driver drew his pistol, fired several shots, and drove off. He wounded both 
officers. However, MacDonald fired two shots from his shotgun through 
the rear window of the escaping car, killing Marinoff. Perhaps this was 
a case of killing a fleeing offender, rather than of killing in self- defense 
or in defense of the lives of others. After all, presumably Marinoff was at 
this stage simply seeking to make good his escape. Accordingly, neither 
the lives of the police nor the lives of others were under immediate threat. 
Even if this were so, it was nevertheless a morally justifiable killing of 
a fleeing offender. Marinoff’s offenses included attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm. Further, Marinoff was armed and dangerous, and 
constituted a threat to the lives of others, and especially the lives of the 
police officers. Arguably, it was the duty of MacDonald to shoot Marinoff.
There are various other cases of shootings of dangerous fleeing felons 
that can be drawn from other police services and used for illustrative pur-
poses. For example, there are the shootings of fleeing suspected terrorists 
in Northern Ireland. And police have been held liable for not shooting at 
fleeing gunmen known to be terrorists. Another case is that of Hussein 
22. See John Silvester, Andrew Rule, and Owen Davies, The Silent War: Behind the Police 
Killings That Shook Australia (Sydney: Floradale, 1995), 3.
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Said, who attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in England. He 
fired one shot, which missed, and then his gun jammed. He then took 
flight. He was pursued by a bodyguard, who fired a warning shot and 
called upon Said to give himself up. When he continued to flee, he was 
shot and wounded. In the ensuing court case, the bodyguard’s action was 
held by the judge to have been illegal, since Said no longer constituted an 
immediate threat to the life of anyone. Evidently, bodyguards and police 
can find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They might be held 
liable for murder if they shoot, and for failure to discharge their duty if 
they do not.
In the United States, the fleeing felon rule under which lethal force 
could be used against a fleeing person suspected of a felony was curtailed 
by the US Supreme Court in 1985.23 Roughly speaking, under this rul-
ing, lethal force is legally justified only if it is necessary to prevent the 
escape of someone who is reasonably believed to pose a significant threat 
to the life or limb of the pursuing police officer or to others. Consider the 
recent case mentioned in the Introduction of the unarmed black youth 
Michael Brown. After stealing from a shop in Ferguson, Brown fled from 
police, was shot at by a police officer (and hit in the hand) and was finally 
shot dead by the police officer. Perhaps this use of lethal force might have 
been lawful prior to 1985, but prima facie it was unlawful thereafter, 
given that Brown was unarmed. On the other hand, there remains the 
issue as to whether or not the police officer might be held to have had a 
reasonable belief that Brown constituted a threat, since, arguably, he was 
moving toward the officer rather than surrendering when he was shot.24 
In the recent case of Walter Scott, shot dead by a police officer in North 
Charleston, South Carolina, there could not have been any such reason-
able belief. Scott was an unarmed black person stopped by the officer. The 
officer shot Scott in the back multiple times as he fled, and the incident 
was caught on video. The officer was charged with murder.
Let us now consider the killing of Ian William Turner by Constable 
Wayne Sherwell.25 Sherwell stopped a car driven by Turner for speeding 
23. See US Supreme Court, “Tennessee v.  Garner,” in (eds.) Daryl Close and N. Meier 
Morality in Criminal Justice: An Introduction to Ethics (Boston: Wadsworth, 1995), 366– 379.
24. “What happened in Ferguson?” International New  York Times http:// www.nytimes.
com/ interactive/ 2014/ 08/ 13/ us/ ferguson- missouri- town- under- siege- after- police- 
shooting.html?_ r=0
25. Silvester, Rule, and Davies, The Silent War, 125– 130.
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near St. Arnaud in Victoria. Turner had no identification, and in the 
course of conversation he aroused Sherwell’s suspicions. Turner said he 
would look for ID in his bag, but instead pulled a sawed- off .22 rifle 
on Sherwell. He then took Sherwell’s police revolver. Sherwell grabbed 
Turner’s hand and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, Turner called 
on Sherwell to give up and simply let him go free. Sherwell disarmed 
Turner and, now in possession of both weapons, ordered Turner to lie 
on the ground and allow himself to be handcuffed. He refused to do so, 
calling on Sherwell to let him go. When Sherwell refused his request and 
tried to radio for assistance, Turner blocked his way, calling on Sherwell 
to shoot him. Sherwell fired his gun in the air. Turner ran to his car 
while Sherwell called on his radio for assistance. Turner ran back to his 
car and produced a sawed- off shotgun, which he pointed at Sherwell. 
Sherwell fired a couple of shots. Both men hid behind their respective 
cars. Further shots were fired by Sherwell. Turner did not fire any shots 
at any time. When other officers arrived at the scene, they found one 
of Sherwell’s shots had killed Turner. Turner, it later emerged, was an 
armed robber.
At the point when Sherwell shot Turner, he was acting in self- defense, 
and his killing of Turner was justifiable on grounds of self- defense. 
However, I would like to consider a further issue that the case raises. It 
seems that throughout the whole episode, Turner had no desire to kill 
Sherwell, but rather acted in order to escape from Sherwell. Thus, Turner 
initially used the threat of deadly force preemptively in order to escape 
arrest, and subsequently he grabbed his shotgun because Sherwell was 
holding him prisoner and using the threat of deadly force to do so. So 
Turner essentially threatened, but never in fact used, deadly force in order 
to avoid arrest. For his part, Sherwell, while prepared to threaten to use 
deadly force to prevent Turner’s escape, only in fact seemed prepared to 
use deadly force in self- defense. In other words, if Turner had simply got 
into his car and driven off, Sherwell would quite possibly not have shot 
him. Moreover, if Turner had known that Sherwell would not have shot 
him other than in self- defense, Turner would not have pulled a gun on 
Sherwell in the first place, but would simply have driven off.
The case is an example of an offender who uses the threat of deadly 
force to avoid arrest. It also illustrates the distinction between killing in 
self- defense and killing in order to prevent an offender escaping. Moreover, 
it illustrates this distinction notwithstanding the fact that the offender is 
armed and is prepared to use deadly force to escape arrest.
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This distinction between killing in self- defense (or defense of others) 
and killing (or not killing) in order to prevent an offender escaping is fur-
ther illustrated in the case of passive noncompliance. Consider the case 
involving the dangerous criminal David Martin in an underground sub-
way in England in 1982. Cornered in the subway by armed police, Martin 
was persistently ordered by police to give himself up, but he refused to 
do so. However, he made no hostile movements against the police. The 
police were concerned that he might have a gun and might use it against 
them. Certainly his history indicated this might be so. Finally, the police 
decided not to shoot him, but to rush and disarm him. He was found to 
be unarmed.
Three points need to be noted here. First, the police risked their lives 
in rushing Martin. He might have been armed, and if so, he may well 
have shot dead one or more of the police officers. Second, if Martin had 
been shot dead by the police, then the police may well have been found 
guilty of culpable homicide. Third, if Martin had been allowed to escape, 
he might have harmed, even killed, innocent people, and if so, the police 
would have been held liable for these consequences of their action of 
allowing him to escape.
Let us now consider the police killing of Graeme Jensen. Victorian 
police sought to arrest Jensen for murder. In fact, he did not commit the 
murder. Nor did they have sufficient evidence to convict him of conspir-
ing to rob a bank— the other matter for which he was under investigation. 
At most he could have been convicted of illegal possession of a firearm. 
Moreover, Jensen probably believed the police were out to kill him. At any 
rate, he tried to escape the police when they tried to arrest him. Jensen 
was armed and allegedly pointed his gun at officers, who first warned him 
and then shot at him. It later turned out that Jensen’s gun was not loaded. 
Jensen was escaping by car when the second shot went through the rear 
window and killed him. By one account, Jensen was killed in self- defense. 
By a second account, it was not a case of self- defence but of shooting a 
fleeing offender, the offense being illegal possession of an (unloaded) 
weapon.26 On a third account, it was unlawful for police to even try to 
arrest him. If so, Jensen was murdered.27
26. Silvester, Rule and Davies, The Silent War, 37.
27. Police were in fact charged with his murder but were not convicted.
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At any rate, the Jensen killing raises at least two issues. In the case of 
Jensen, unlike Turner, the police initiated the threat of deadly force, and 
Jensen at most threatened deadly force for the purposes of making his 
escape. Moreover, the police used an extent of force that was dispropor-
tionate to the offense committed.
Let us now summarize the moral considerations that the above- 
described cases illustrate. First, there is the seriousness of the offense 
committed by the person shot dead by the police. In the case of a burglar, 
the crime is a violation of the right to property. While this is not a violation 
of a right to something constitutive of selfhood, it is a serious crime, and 
certainly far more serious than the petty theft involved in picking some-
one’s pocket. In the case of Marinoff, the offense is a violation of the right 
to life, and far more serious still. This raises the issue of the proportional-
ity of police use of deadly force.
Second, there is the question as to whether the offender is armed and 
prepared to kill in order to avoid imprisonment. Here we must distinguish 
between being prepared to kill to avoid arrest and, ultimately, imprison-
ment and being prepared to kill for other reasons, such as self- defense, 
revenge, or to become rich.
The following two considerations are evidently held in many liberal 
democratic societies to be jointly sufficient to morally justify the police 
use of deadly force as a last resort.28 First, the offense is serious in that it is 
a violation of a right to something constitutive of selfhood, or if not, it is a 
violation of some other right of an appropriately important kind. Second, 
the offender is prepared to use deadly force to avoid arrest and imprison-
ment. Some societies appear to take this view, while at the same time 
being opposed to capital punishment. There is no obvious inconsistency 
here. On the one hand, members of liberal democratic societies generally 
take the view that killing is not justified as a punishment for criminals 
who are imprisoned, and therefore no longer able to break its laws. On the 
other hand, members of these same societies generally hold that police 
use of deadly force is justified if this is the only way to ensure that the laws 
against serious crimes are upheld, and in particular, if the perpetrators of 
serious crimes are themselves prepared to kill in order to avoid imprison-
ment. This last point is in need of further elaboration.
28. However, this view is evidently controversial. It appears to be inconsistent with that 
advanced, for example, by Jerome Skolnick and J. Fyfe in Above the Law: Police and the 
Excessive Use of Force (New York: Free Press, 1993).
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In the kinds of cases under consideration, there are only two options 
confronting the police:  letting the perpetrator escape, or shooting the 
perpetrator dead. However, what has been omitted from the argument 
thus far is that the fact that these are the only options is due to the 
perpetrator— he is responsible for this situation, because he is forcing 
the choice— in our above- mentioned (Chapter 2.2) thick sense— between 
two evils.29 The armed burglar mentioned earlier refuses to surrender 
himself and his stolen goods. Thus he is intentionally ruling out the third 
option— the morally preferable option— namely, his peaceful surrender. 
In that case, the burglar is morally responsible for the choice between two 
evils confronting the police. That is, the burglar is not only responsible for 
violating people’s property rights, but he is also morally responsible for 
attempting to prevent the police from performing their duty, and, indeed, 
he is morally responsible for forcing the police to choose between two 
evils. The two evils in question are allowing the perpetrator of a serious 
crime to escape, or shooting and killing that perpetrator.
This consideration may be enough to tip the scales in favor of police 
use of deadly force in this kind of case. If so, how would this tipping of 
the scales be achieved? Presumably the perpetrator would now be held to 
be indirectly and in part responsible for his own death. When a police offi-
cer shoots dead an armed bank robber who is prepared to kill in order to 
prevent apprehension, the police officer’s choice situation has been know-
ingly chosen by the burglar. Accordingly, the armed bank robber is forc-
ing the choice in the thick sense and, this being so, can be held indirectly 
and in part responsible for his own death.
While police use of deadly force in these kinds of cases may well be, in 
principle, morally justifiable, the justification is nevertheless problematic 
in a number of ways. First, it places an enormous responsibility— and 
a corresponding opportunity for abuse— on individual members of the 
police force. For as we have seen, if police are entitled to kill in order to 
ensure that the law is upheld, then police may kill an armed bank robber 
even though he will not fire his gun if left alone. Moreover, in doing so 
they will kill this (alleged) bank robber prior to any considered judgement 
by a court of law that he has in fact broken the law. In such cases, it is the 
responsibility of the individual police officer, initially, to make the judge-
ment that the person is an armed burglar who will kill in order to avoid 
29. For discussion of the notion of forcing the choice, see Chapter 2.2.
Police Use of Lethal Force 135
   135
apprehension, and then to go on to shoot this person dead in order that 
he not escape.
Second, it needs to be determined which crimes committed by armed 
perpetrators are sufficiently serious to warrant police use of deadly force. 
I  have suggested that violations of rights to things constitutive of self-
hood are sufficiently serious. It still remains to be determined what other 
rights violations are sufficiently serious. Here it is not simply a matter of 
determining which rights are sufficiently morally important to warrant 
protection by recourse to deadly force, but also the extent of the rights 
violations. Perhaps a single armed shoplifter is not a legitimate target, but 
what about an army of armed looters threatening the economic well- being 
of an impoverished community?
This latter problem raises perplexing questions concerning the moral 
balance to be struck between, on the one hand, the right to life of a sus-
pect, and on the other, the rights of citizens to be protected by police 
from serious rights violations, which nevertheless stop short of threat-
ening their lives or elements constitutive of selfhood. Here there are a 
number of considerations. How extensive are these rights violations? Are 
these rights violations likely— if they go unchecked— to result in the vio-
lations of citizens’ rights to things which are constitutive of selfhood? 
What moral weight, if any, is to be attached to the threat posed by those 
who use arms to prevent their legitimate arrest, or to the possession by the 
state of overriding coercive power to uphold its morally legitimate laws?
Finally, these kind of “forcing the choice” situations raises the question 
as to whether or not the police— and not the offender— knowingly created 
a situation in which they would have to kill the offender in self- defense, 
or at least failed to act when they knew that their inaction would lead to a 
situation in which they had to kill the offender in self- defense. These lat-
ter sorts of cases need to be distinguished from the ones here under con-
sideration, namely ones in which an offender is forcing the choice upon 
the police of either using deadly force or allowing the offender to escape. 
Consider, in this connection, the following type of scenario involving the 
Special Investigation Section (SIS) of the Los Angeles Police Department, 
which targeted armed robbers during the period 1965– 1992: “The most 
controversial of the home- baked rules is the SIS practice of standing by 
and watching its surveillance subjects victimize innocent citizens, then 
confronting offenders as they leave the scene of their crime.”30 Here the 
30. Skolnick and Fyfe, Above the Law, p. 146.
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SIS provided known offenders with the opportunity to commit very seri-
ous crimes by failing to arrest them for the less serious crimes they had 
already committed. The SIS did so in order to enable the offenders to 
commit the more serious crimes, and thereby either receive longer prison 
sentences, or be shot by the police attempting to flee the crime scene or 
resisting arrest.31
4.5  Conclusion
Let me conclude this chapter by outlining the main general conditions 
under which police use of deadly force might be morally justified, or at 
least might be morally justified if adequate police accountability can be 
ensured so as to prevent abuse of police powers. Note that the first two 
conditions— self- defense and defense of others— are in essence the same 
conditions under which ordinary citizens are entitled to use deadly force. 
The use of deadly force under a and b of condition 3 below is particular to 
the police, and also problematic in various ways, some already mentioned. 
At any rate, the use of deadly force under conditions 3a and 3b make a 
number of implicit assumptions. One assumption is that the extent of 
reasonable suspicion is such as to justify making an arrest. However, kill-
ing an alleged offender to prevent his or her escape can presumably only 
be justified in situations in which there is certainty, or near certainty, that 
the alleged offender has in fact committed the offense. A standard of evi-
dence higher than reasonable suspicion is required. Another assumption 
is that there really are no possible ways of preventing escape other than by 
using deadly force. So, for example, letting the suspected offender escape 
in the knowledge that there is a reasonable chance that he or she can be 
arrested at a later date is not an option.
1. Self- Defense: A police officer is morally entitled to kill another person if 
that person is trying to kill, maim, or otherwise threaten the life of the 
31. The police might argue that in some of these situations they would be unable to con-
vict these offenders of any serious crimes, due to the difficulties of, for example, proving 
a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery, or even to prove attempted armed robbery. 
Accordingly— the argument might run— they had to choose between increasing the risk 
to life and limb (their chosen option), or allowing armed robbers to either get off scot- free 
(when they failed to be convicted of (say) conspiracy to conduct an armed robbery), or sim-
ply be convicted of minor offenses, such as, say, car theft.
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officer (or other constitutive features of his or her selfhood), and will 
succeed unless the officer kills the person first.
2. Defense of Others:  A  police officer is morally entitled— and may be 
morally obliged— to kill another person if that person is trying to kill, 
maim, or otherwise threaten the selfhood of some third person(s), and 
will succeed unless the officer kills the would- be offender first.
3. Uphold the Law: (a) Fleeing felons. A police officer is, or might be, mor-
ally entitled— and may be morally obliged— to kill another person if 
that person (whether armed or unarmed) is rightly and reasonably 
suspected of the crimes of killing, maiming, or otherwise threaten-
ing the selfhood of some third person(s), is attempting to avoid arrest, 
and if the only way to prevent the suspected offender escaping is to 
kill her or him. (b) Armed suspects. A police officer is, or might be, 
morally entitled— and may be morally obliged— to kill another person 
if that person is rightly and reasonably suspected of the crimes of seri-
ous rights violations, is attempting to avoid arrest, is armed and using 
those arms to avoid arrest, and if the only way to prevent the suspected 
offender from escaping is to kill him or her.
4. Deterrence in States of Emergency: A police officer is, or might be, mor-
ally entitled— and may be morally obliged— to kill another person if 
(a) that person is rightly and reasonably suspected of a type of crime 
that is so widespread in an existing state of emergency as to constitute 
a serious threat to fundamental rights of citizens; (b) deadly force is the 
only available deterrence in the circumstances of this particular state 
of emergency; (c) that person is attempting to avoid arrest; (d) the only 
way to prevent the suspected offender escaping is to kill her or him; 
(e) perpetrators of the type of crime in question have been warned that 
they will be shot dead under conditions a, c, and d; and (f) the policy 
specified in conditions a– e has been adopted under a state of emer-




Police Use of Lethal Force  
and Suicide Bombers
a s  w e  s a w  in the last chapter, the use of lethal force by police raises 
a wide range of moral problems. In this chapter the focus is on the use 
of lethal force by police in counterterrorism operations and, in particu-
lar, in relation to suicide bombers.1 Naturally, the range of permissible 
uses of lethal force by security agencies, such as police and military 
forces, in counterterrorist operations varies according to the nature and 
extent of the terrorist threat in the context in question. The concern in 
this chapter is restricted to police use of lethal force against terrorists 
in the context of well- ordered, liberal democratic states, as opposed to, 
for example, disorderly or failed states or theaters of war. I take it that 
the latter kinds of context imply a military or paramilitary response, 
even if it also involves the police. Accordingly, I deal with these con-
texts in later chapters concerned principally with the military use of 
lethal force.
The use of lethal force by police in many counterterrorism operations 
does not raise moral problems that are essentially different from those 
that arise in combating other kinds of violent crime. Nevertheless, there 
do seem to be some important differences when it comes to the use of 
lethal force against suicide bombers, in particular. In this chapter I focus 
on some of the moral problems arising from the use of lethal force against 
suspected suicide bombers operating in well- ordered, liberal democratic 
1. An earlier version of the material in this chapter appeared in Part 2 (written by Miller) of 
Gordon and Miller, “The Fatal Police Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.”
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states. I do so because these operations seem to require a less restrictive 
use of lethal force on the part of police than do other related and poten-
tially murderous criminal actions, such as, for example, an armed bank 
robber who has taken hostages and with whom police have entered into 
negotiations.
In the case of suspected suicide bombers, police are not able to 
issue a warning, since this would alert the bomber to their presence, 
and he or she would immediately set off the bomb. Moreover, in the 
case of suicide bombers, the harm to be done is both potentially very 
great (e.g., dozens or even hundreds of innocent lives) and perpetrated 
by a single action— unlike, for example, in the case of serial murder-
ers. Finally, there is typically the problem of uncertainty, which is 
an epistemic problem (to use the philosophical term for knowledge). 
There is often uncertainty, until it is too late, as to whether or not 
the suspect is in fact a suicide bomber about to set off a bomb. In 
this respect, suicide bombers are unlike, for example, lone gunmen 
shooting at passersby. Moreover, there is likely to be a potentially 
problematic division of labor in the case of police confronted by a 
suspected suicide bomber; the police firearms officer (the one who is 
to do the shooting) is heavily reliant on intelligence provided by other 
police officers that the person he is contemplating shooting is in fact 
a suicide bomber. The problem of mistaken identity leading to a fatal 
shooting by police of an innocent person wrongly suspected of being 
a suicide bomber was exemplified in the fatal shooting by police of an 
innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, in London in 2005— a 
case discussed in some detail below.
This particular conjunction of factors creates an especially acute set of 
moral problems for police contemplating whether or not to use lethal force 
against someone suspected to be a suicide bomber. Specifically, it raises 
the question of individual versus collective moral responsibility for police 
use of lethal force. If a police firearms officers shoots dead a suspected 
suicide bomber on the basis of intelligence provided by other police offi-
cers, and the suspect turns out not to be a suicide bomber, who, if anyone, 
is to be held morally responsible? Is it only the firearms officer who fired 
the fatal rounds? Is it the firearms officer as well as the members of the 
surveillance team who provided the incorrect intelligence with respect to 
the identity of the suspect? Or is no one morally responsible? Let us begin 
with an outline of the above- mentioned fatal shooting by police of the 
innocent Brazilian, Menezes.
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5.1  The Fatal Shooting of Jean Charles  
de Menezes
In London in July 2005, a day after a failed bomb attack, police shot dead a 
terrorist suspect who turned out to be an innocent, defenseless Brazilian 
electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes, going about his day- to- day business. 
Menezes was an innocent person wrongly suspected by police of being a 
terrorist suicide bomber, and he was intentionally killed by police in the 
belief that he was a mortal threat to the passengers in the London under-
ground station where he was shot dead. The ethical issue to be addressed 
in this chapter concerns the individual and/ or collective moral responsi-
bility, if any, for the killing of an innocent person.2
While the events that terminated in Menezes’s death involved a num-
ber of mistakes or errors of judgement on the part of police, I will focus 
on just three: (1) the failure of the surveillance team located at Scotia Road 
in London from where Menezes emerged to determine whether or not he 
was the terrorist suspect Hussain Osman, and to clearly communicate 
their determination to their commanding officer, Commander Cressida 
Dick, that Menezes was or was not Osman, or that they did not know or 
were otherwise uncertain of their subject’s identity; (2) the failure on the 
part of Commander Dick to see to it that Menezes was challenged and 
stopped at some point after leaving Scotia Road, but prior to his entering 
the underground railway station (i.e., at a location that would not have 
compromised the surveillance operation at Scotia Road), and in a man-
ner that would not have required killing him (he being at most a threat to 
himself, the arresting officers, and, perhaps, one or two passersby); (3) the 
failure on the part of the two officers who shot Menezes to provide them-
selves with adequate grounds for believing that they were shooting dead 
a suicide bomber who was at the time in question, a mortal threat to the 
train passengers. In relation to error 3, I note that the person shot dead was 
merely a suspected suicide bomber, and that the firearms officers had no 
clear evidence that he was carrying a bomb— because the operation had 
not been declared by Commander Dick to be a Kratos operation. A Kratos 
operation is one involving someone known to be a suicide bomber, and 
therefore calling for the use of lethal force to prevent the would- be bomber 
2. See Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), Stockwell One: Investigation 
into the Shooting of Jean Charlies de Menezes at Stockwell Underground Station (February 
2007), http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 20100908152737/ http:// www.ipcc.gov.
uk/ stockwell_ one.pdf
Police Use of Lethal Force and Suicide Bombers 141
   141
detonating his or her bomb and killing innocent persons. The firearms 
officers did not at any point perceive a bomb, nor were they otherwise pro-
vided with good evidence that the suspect was carrying a bomb.
In referring to these failures as mistakes or— especially in the case of 
Commander Dick and the firearms officers— errors of judgement, I am 
not ipso facto ascribing moral culpability to the police; mistakes, even 
ones in respect of morally significant actions, do not necessarily entail 
moral culpability. Whether or not there was moral culpability is a matter 
to be determined. Certainly, as stated above, there was no intention to 
kill an innocent person; indeed, police actions were carried out with the 
intention to save innocent lives. Moreover, the police obviously did not 
foresee that an innocent life would be taken.
A related moral issue concerns Kratos as a mode of police operations. 
Is Kratos a morally sustainable operational policy? If not, then a question 
arises in relation to the moral responsibility of those who put the policy in 
place for any untoward consequences that might emanate from its appli-
cation on the ground. In relation to the moral acceptability of Kratos, sup-
pose that the police shot dead a person under the same circumstances as 
they shot Menezes, except that the person turned out to be Osman; would 
their actions have been justified if, for example, Osman was not carrying 
a bomb with him at the time? Osman was, after all, only a suspected sui-
cide bomber; otherwise, why was the plan to “let him run” upon leaving 
Scotia Road? At no point was any good evidence provided that the person 
under surveillance was actually carrying a bomb.
Is it, therefore, morally justifiable for police to shoot dead a sus-
pect without warning, when the suspect is in a crowded location and 
they have good evidence that he is a would- be suicide bomber, that he 
intends at some point in the future to denote a bomb killing himself 
and others, but they do not know whether he has a bomb on him at 
this time? In short, they do not know whether his intended suicidal and 
murderous act is imminent. Arguably, if the police did have a policy to 
shoot known suicide bombers under these conditions, then they would 
have a shoot to kill on sight policy of the sort, for example, that is used 
by military forces in relation to combatants. Naturally, the additional 
problem, both in this and in the military scenario, is the epistemic one. 
The police do not know whether the suicide bomb attack is imminent. 
However, as will be argued in later chapters, while this is not necessar-
ily crucial in military contexts it is of the first importance in policing 
contexts.
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If shooting dead a person under these circumstances is not permis-
sible under Kratos, because it is not permissible under the relevant crimi-
nal laws, is it nevertheless not likely that under Kratos police will end up 
shooting suspect suicide bombers under these circumstances? Indeed, 
on one construal of events— a construal that is admittedly at odds with 
the testimony of the police and not found by the coroner to be correct 
by the standard of being beyond reasonable doubt— this is exactly what 
happened in the case of the shooting of Menezes. The firearms officers, 
rightly or wrongly, reasonably or unreasonably, believed the situation was 
a de facto Kratos operation and, therefore, did not give Menezes any warn-
ing, did not afford him the opportunity to be arrested without the use of 
force, and, for his part, Menezes did not fail to comply with any instruc-
tion from the police.
5.2  Moral Responsibility
We first need to distinguish some different senses of responsibility.3 
Sometimes to say that someone is responsible for an action is to say 
that the person had a reason, or reasons, to perform some action, then 
formed an intention to perform that action (or not to perform it), and 
finally acted (or refrained from acting) on that intention— and did so on 
the basis of that reason(s). Note that an important category of reasons for 
actions comprises ends, goals, or purposes; an agent’s reason for perform-
ing an action is often that the action realizes a person’s goal. Moreover, 
it is assumed that, in the course of all this, the person brought about or 
caused the action, at least in the sense that the mental state or states that 
constituted the reason for performing the action was causally efficacious 
(in the right way), and that the resulting intention was causally effica-
cious (in the right way). I will dub this sense of being responsible for an 
action “natural responsibility.” To say that someone had natural responsi-
bility for an action is to say, in essence, that an action of theirs was under 
their control. This sense of being responsible is relevant to the actions of 
the firearms officers in shooting Menezes, in that they intentionally per-
formed an action of shooting Menezes dead, and did so for the reason that 
they believed him to be a suicide bomber.
3. See, for example, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and 
Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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On other occasions, what is meant by the term “being responsible for 
an action” is that the person in question occupies a certain institutional 
role, and that the occupant of that role is the person to decide what is to 
be done in relation to certain matters, and to see to it that what ought 
to be done is in fact done. Here what ought to be done comprises one’s 
institutional duties. Moreover, a role occupant, A, has only discharged 
A’s responsibility with respect to A’s duties when A  intentionally does 
A’s duty. Note, however, that A’s motive for doing A’s duty is irrelevant 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.1). Thus the members of the surveillance team 
had the responsibility to identify Hussain Osman, video record anyone 
leaving the premises, and communicate information in a clear and pre-
cise manner to the control room, irrespective of whether or not they did 
so, or even contemplated doing so. This notion of institutional responsi-
bility is prospective (as opposed to retrospective). Clearly, they failed in 
respect of their institutional responsibility in this regard. Accordingly, 
they might be held to be institutionally responsible for this failure; that 
is, institutionally responsible in the retrospective sense. If they had suc-
ceeded, then they would have discharged their (prospective) institutional 
responsibility and, therefore, could be said to be institutionally respon-
sible in the retrospective sense— albeit, in this instance, responsible for 
a successful action.
A third sense of “being responsible” for an action is a species of our 
second sense. If the matters in respect of which the occupant of an insti-
tutional role has an institutionally determined duty to decide what is to 
be done include ordering other agents to perform, or not to perform, cer-
tain actions, then the occupant of the role is responsible for those actions 
performed by those other agents. We say of such a person that he is 
responsible for the actions of other persons in virtue of being the person 
in authority over them. Thus, as the person in authority, Commander 
Dick had a responsibility to see to it that the police on the ground inter-
dicted Menezes before he entered the underground station. Her failure 
in this respect was a failure to discharge her institutional responsibility 
as the person in authority. However, even if a person in authority fails 
to discharge his or her institutional responsibility to see to it that oth-
ers perform some set of individual actions or some joint action, it does 
not follow that the subordinates in question are not also institutionally 
responsible for their failure to do the action(s) in question. The person in 
authority and the subordinates might be jointly institutionally responsible 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.1).
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The fourth sense of responsibility is in fact the sense that we are prin-
cipally concerned with here; namely, moral responsibility. Roughly speak-
ing, an agent is held to be morally responsible for an action or omission 
if the agent was responsible for that action or omission in one of our first 
three senses of responsibility, and if that action is morally significant. An 
action or omission can be morally significant in a number of ways. The 
action or omission could be morally permissible, morally impermissible, 
morally obligatory, and so on. It could be intrinsically morally wrong, as 
in the case of a rights violation. Or the action or omission might have 
moral significance by virtue of the end that it was performed to serve, or 
because of the foreseen or reasonably foreseeable outcome that it actually 
had, such as the killing of an innocent person, as in the case of Menezes. 
We can now make the following preliminary claim concerning moral 
responsibility:
If an agent is responsible for an action or omission (or foreseen or 
reasonably foreseeable outcome of that action or omission) in the 
first, second, or third sense of being responsible, and the action, 
omission, or outcome is morally significant, then— other things 
being equal— the agent is morally responsible for that action, omis-
sion or outcome, and— again, other things being equal— ought to 
attract moral praise or blame and (possibly) punishment or reward 
for it.
Here the “other things being equal” clauses are intended to be inter-
preted in terms of a capacity for morally responsible action. For example, 
suppose the agent was a psychopath, or there were exculpatory conditions, 
either by way of justification or excuse. Thus, other things might not be 
equal if, for example, the agent was coerced, or there was some overrid-
ing moral justification for performing what would otherwise have been 
a morally wrong action. Note also that, contra some accounts of moral 
responsibility, I am distinguishing this notion from that of blameworthi-
ness or praiseworthiness.
Let us first consider Commander Cressida Dick. Given the moral stakes 
and the existence of a plan (namely, to stop any suspected suicide bomber 
before she or he got to an underground train station or similar locale) that 
she could reasonably have been expected to adhere to, she can be held mor-
ally responsible for failing to see to it that Menezes was interdicted prior 
to going into the underground. I say this notwithstanding the existence of 
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mitigating circumstances. Of course, in making this claim regarding her 
moral responsibility for the failure to interdict Menezes, I am not claiming 
that the Commander Dick is morally responsible for his death.
What of the firearms officers? I discuss their moral responsibility in 
more detail below. Suffice it to say here that if a firearms officer deliber-
ately shoots a suspect dead then the officer is morally responsible for the 
killing. However, it is a further question whether the officer was morally 
culpable. The answer to this latter question turns on the moral justifica-
tion the officer had for the killing.
5.3  Lethal Force and Individual  
Moral Responsibility
Police officers need to exercise authority on a daily basis; they have insti-
tutional responsibilities in the sense explained above. Historically, polic-
ing in the United Kingdom and Australia has made use of a distinctive 
notion of authority, so- called original authority. In relation to the concept 
of original authority, we need to distinguish compliance with laws from 
obedience to the directives of men and women, especially one’s superiors. 
Thus, according to the law, an investigating officer must not prosecute a 
fellow police officer if the latter is self- evidently innocent. On the other 
hand, the investigator might be ordered to do so by a superior officer. 
Now, individual police officers are held to be responsible to the law as well 
as their superiors in the police service. However, their first responsibility 
is to the law. So, a police officer should disobey a directive from a superior 
officer that is clearly unlawful. And yet the admittedly controversial doc-
trine of original authority does not end here. It implies further that there 
are at least some situations in which a police officer has a right to disobey 
a superior’s lawful command, if obeying it would prevent that officer from 
discharging the lawful obligation to uphold the law.4
4. Relevant legal cases here are the “Blackburn cases,” principally R v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (1968) 2 QB 118, cited in Keith Bryett, Arch Harrison, and 
John Shaw, An Introduction to Policing: The Role and Function of Police in Australia, Vol. 2 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1994), 43, in which Lord Denning considered the Commissioner 
of the London Metropolitan Police “to be answerable to the law and to the law alone” in 
response to a demand for mandamus from a plaintiff seeking to get the courts to require 
police intervention; and Fisher v. Oldham Corporation (1930) 2 KB 364, cited as above at 
42, in which the court found the police service was not vicariously liable in virtue of the 
original authority of the office of constable. Concerning the exercise of original author-
ity in decisions to arrest, in some jurisdictions, proceeding by summons has increased 
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According to the doctrine of original authority, there are at least some 
actions, including the decision to arrest or not arrest (at least in some 
contexts) or to shoot or not shoot, which are ultimately matters for the 
decision of the individual officer, and decisions for which the officer is, or 
might be, individually legally liable.5 The contexts in question are ones in 
which the lawful action of arresting a given person would, nevertheless, 
prevent the police officer from discharging his other lawful obligations to 
the law, such as his obligation to keep the peace. For example, arresting 
an unlawful protester might enrage an already volatile crowd and trigger 
a riot. If this is indeed the legal situation, then it reflects a commitment 
to something akin to professional autonomy. In the case of a surgeon, for 
example, it is up to the surgeon— and not the surgeon’s employer— to 
decide whether or not she or he will operate on a patient who might suffer 
complications if operated on (assuming, of course, the patient has given 
consent).6 It is not that the surgeon has the right to decide whether the 
patient will be operated on (the patient decides that), or even the right to 
decide who will be the one (i.e., the particular surgeon) to have the right to 
operate on the patient (presumably, that is the joint decision of the patient, 
the employer of the surgeon, and the surgeon). Rather, the surgeon may 
not simply be ordered, either by the employer or by the patient, to per-
form the operation; the right to operate is conferred on the surgeon by 
the patient (and the employer of the surgeon, supposing there to be one); 
being a right to operate, the surgeon may choose not to operate.
By way of illustration, consider a situation in which a police officer is 
confronted with passive noncompliance on the part of a criminal known 
to be dangerous and likely to be carrying a weapon. (See, for example, the 
case of David Martin, discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4). As we saw in 
Chapter  4, the criminal, in refusing to comply with the officer’s direc-
tives, creates a trilemma. If the officer shoots the criminal and he turns 
significantly and officers do not possess original authority in respect of any part of the 
summons process. To this extent, their original authority has diminished.
5. A concept very close to original authority is sometimes referred to as a species of discre-
tionary power, namely the concept of a discretionary decision that cannot be overridden 
or reversed by another official. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 32. Here we need to 
distinguish a decision that cannot, as a matter of fact, be overridden, such as the use of 
deadly force by a lone officer in the field, and a decision that cannot be overridden as a mat-
ter of law. Only the latter can be referred to as a species of authority.
6. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 186– 188.
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out to be unarmed, the officer might face a murder charge. Yet the officer 
puts his own life at risk if he approaches the criminal with a view to over-
powering him. Nor is the third option preferable: the option to let him go 
free. For the officer has a moral and a legal duty to apprehend dangerous 
persons. Indeed, if the officer simply allowed the criminal to go free, and 
that criminal went on to murder an innocent person, this neglect of duty 
might be held by a court to be criminal negligence. Let us now assume 
that the officer’s superior officer is present and issues a lawful directive 
to the officer to shoot the offender, on the grounds that the evidence indi-
cated that he was probably concealing a dangerous weapon and was highly 
likely to use it. In light of the doctrine of original authority, the subordi-
nate police officer might well be acting within his legal rights to refuse to 
do so. For he might reasonably disagree with the superior officer’s judge-
ment. In addition, he knows that he might find himself legally liable for 
wrongful killing if it turned out that the offender was unarmed.
The above- described individual civil and criminal liability of police 
officers, supposing it is correct, stands in some contrast with military 
combatants. A civilian would, in general, sue the military organization 
itself, rather than the soldier whose actions resulted in harm to the civil-
ian. Moreover, presumably soldiers do not reserve a general institutional 
right to refuse to shoot to kill when (lawfully) ordered to do so by their 
commanding officers. My understanding is that in keeping with the 
absence of such a general right, criminal liability in relation to negligence 
and many categories of wrongful killing is generally applied to the mili-
tary officer who issued the command, rather than his subordinates who 
were his instrument.
Whatever the legal situation a soldier has a natural discretionary right 
to use or not use lethal force, assuming it is morally permissible in the 
circumstances in question. In this respect soldiers are no different from 
police officers or ordinary civilians. Moreover, arguably, neither a soldier 
nor anyone else can transfer this natural right to others. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of waiver remains. Accordingly, I suggest that soldiers, but not 
ordinary civilians or police officers, waive their natural right to use lethal 
force in favor of their superiors. They do so when they accept the institu-
tional role of a military combatant and embark on a war. I note that being 
a natural right it is not conferred (as in the case of the surgeon’s right to 
operate). If this is correct, then it has two important implications. First, it 
entails an important difference between the basis for different elements 
of original authority (and, possibly, professional autonomy). One basis 
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derives from the nature of the relevant institution and its institutional 
purposes. If individual police officers have a right to refuse a lawful com-
mand by a superior to arrest someone in some circumstances, then this 
is because, speaking generally, their possession of this right makes for a 
more effective police service; so it is a conferred institutional and moral 
right derived from the collective good realized by the institutional role of 
police officers. Accordingly, matters might be different with regular sol-
diers, given the different institutional purposes of their role.
However, the second basis, as I have suggested above, is an inalienable 
natural moral right— it is a moral right with respect to one’s own lethal 
actions, as opposed to the lethal actions of others. Moreover, being an 
inalienable right, it cannot be transferred to others, such as one’s institu-
tional superiors. This right that a person, A, has with respect to A’s own 
lethal actions is logically consistent with A’s lethal action, x, being either 
morally obligatory or morally impermissible. The latter concerns the 
objective properties of A’s act or omission, whereas the former concerns 
the moral decision maker. It is one thing for a person to have the right to 
make a decision, and another for that person to make the right decision.
The second implication is that the above- mentioned contrast between 
the police and the military would be much less sharp. As we have seen, 
soldiers, like police, may well have a natural discretionary moral right 
with respect to the use of lethal force. However, a distinction between 
the military and the police might still be able to be drawn at the insti-
tutional level in terms of the notion of waiving one’s right. Perhaps by 
virtue of their institutional role individual soldiers, but not police, waive 
their natural right to decide whether or not to use lethal force in certain 
circumstances; specifically, in circumstance in which they were (lawfully 
i.e. in accordance with ius in bello principles, let us assume) directed by 
their superiors to use lethal force or to refrain from using lethal force. So, 
in effect, soldiers waive this natural right in favor of their superior offi-
cers. Of course, these soldiers retain this natural right qua human beings; 
so they are not transferring the right to their superiors. Accordingly, an 
individual soldier would not be the one to decide whether or not to shoot 
to kill in cases where he or she was directed by a superior to do so (or not 
to do so); rather, the superior would be the one to decide. In the case of 
police officers, this would not be the case; an individual police officer has 
not waived his or her right to decide whether or not to use lethal force 
in favor of a superior officer. Instead, the individual police officer— the 
shooter— would be the one to decide. The situation is further muddied 
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by the existence of paramilitary police roles, such as police snipers. Let 
us now return to the firearms officers involved in the shooting death of 
Menezes.
The first point is that it was the moral responsibility of each of the 
firearms officers to decide whether or not to shoot Menezes, irrespective 
of whether he had been ordered to do so; and, evidently, this is reflected 
in the law.7 The second point is that he had not been ordered to do so; the 
situation had not been declared to be a Kratos operation. So, for better or 
worse, individual moral responsibility can in principle be assigned to a 
firearms officer who kills an innocent person, depending, of course, on 
the facts of the case.
What of exculpatory conditions? Each of the firearms officers said that 
they believed that Menezes was a suicide bomber. Even supposing this to 
be true— and the jury did not accept it on the balance of probabilities— 
there remains the question of the justification for that belief. Did each 
have sufficient evidence to warrant that belief? Arguably, neither did, 
especially given that good and decisive evidence is required in a case 
where the taking of another human life is concerned. Nevertheless, there 
is another important moral consideration in play here. Each of the fire-
arms officers had a moral obligation to protect the lives of innocent train 
passengers. If the officers had failed to shoot the suspect dead, and he had 
turned out to be Osman carrying a bomb, then in all probability there 
would have been a far greater loss of life. This consideration has consider-
able moral weight, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the evidence for 
their individually held beliefs (or judgments) that Menezes was Osman 
and a mortal threat at the time.
So whatever the legal situation, and whatever any past failure to satisfy 
themselves with regard to the identity of Menezes, at the point of decision 
whether or not to shoot him, the firearms officers confronted what was in 
effect a moral dilemma: (1) shoot dead a person they believe is highly likely 
to be a suicide bomber about to detonate a bomb, though if he turns out 
not to have a bomb, they will have killed an innocent person; (2) refrain 
from shooting him, though if he turns out to be a suicide bomber about 
to detonate a bomb, numerous innocent passengers and the police officers 
themselves will be killed. In these circumstances it is difficult not to view 
the “other things being equal” as having application. Arguably, there was 
not a good and decisive reason in favor of either course of action. Rather, 
7. See Miller and Gordon, “The Fatal Police Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes,” Part 1.
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at the point of decision, great risks were attached to each of the available 
options, there was a moral balancing act to be performed, and a split sec-
ond decision had to be made. In these circumstances, each of the firearms 
officers might be held to be morally responsible for the death of an inno-
cent person, but surely neither can be held to be morally culpable for what 
they did; they were morally responsible but not morally blameworthy.
5.4  Collective Moral Responsibility
Above we distinguished four senses of responsibility, including moral 
responsibility. Let us now consider collective moral responsibility.8 As is 
the case with individual responsibility, we can distinguish four senses of 
collective responsibility. In the first instance I will do so in relation to joint 
actions. Thus the first sense of responsibility for a joint action is natu-
ral responsibility. Accordingly, to say that some persons are collectively 
responsible in this sense for a joint action is just to say that they delib-
erately performed the joint action. That is, each person had a collective 
end, each intentionally performed their contributory action (and having 
this end and this intention was under the person’s control, etc.) and each 
did so because each believed the others would perform their contributory 
action, and that therefore the collective end would be realized. So in the 
Menezes shooting scenario, the members of the surveillance team per-
formed the joint action of surveilling Scotia Road.
It is important to note here that each agent is individually (naturally) 
responsible for performing his contributory action, and responsible by 
virtue of the fact that he intentionally performs this action, and the action 
is not intentionally performed by anyone else. Of course the other agents 
(or agent) believe that he is performing, or is going to perform, the con-
tributory action in question. But mere possession of such a belief is not 
sufficient for the ascription of responsibility to the believer for perform-
ing the individual action in question. So what are the agents collectively 
(naturally) responsible for? The agents are collectively (naturally) respon-
sible for the realization of the (collective) end that results from their 
8. Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility.” For a related analysis, see Gregory Mellema, 
Individuals, Groups, and Shared Responsibility (New  York:  Peter Lang, 1988). See also 
Larry May, “Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 43 
(1983): 69– 82; and David Copp, “The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 38, no. 3 (2007): 369– 388. For criticisms of Copp, see Miller, “Against the Moral 
Autonomy Thesis.”
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contributory actions. Consider two agents jointly killing someone in a 
crowded setting, one by grabbing him and holding him fast, the other by 
shooting him in the head. Each is individually (naturally) responsible for 
his own action, and the two agents are collectively (naturally) responsible 
for bringing it about that the person is dead, given that the actions of both 
were necessary.
Again, if the occupants of institutional roles have institutional respon-
sibilities with respect to their performance of joint actions (or joint 
omissions) then these responsibilities are collective institutional respon-
sibilities. This is the second sense of collective responsibility. Note that in 
some cases these collective institutional responsibilities will be prospec-
tive, such as in cases where there is a joint institutional duty to realize the 
collective end of some joint action. Here the individual duty of each to per-
form his or her contributory action is interdependent with the individual 
duty of each of the others to perform theirs. (See Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.2, 
for an account of joint obligations.) On the other hand, as we saw in the 
case of individual institutional responsibility, collective institutional 
responsibility can also be retrospective, such as in cases where the insti-
tutional actors have failed to do their joint duty.
There is a third sense of collective responsibility that might be thought 
to correspond to the third sense of individual responsibility. The third 
sense of individual responsibility concerns those in authority. Suppose 
the members of the cabinet of country A (consisting of the prime minister 
and his or her cabinet ministers), or the members of the relevant police 
authority, collectively decide to exercise their institutionally determined 
right to introduce a counterterrorism measure, such as Kratos. The cabi-
net and/ or the relevant police authority (say, ACPO (Association of Chief 
Police Officers)) are then collectively responsible for this policy, and poten-
tially for the untoward consequences of its implementation.
There are a couple of things to keep in mind here. First, the notion of 
responsibility in question is, at least in the first instance, institutional— as 
opposed to moral— responsibility. Second, the “decisions” of committees, 
as opposed to the individual decisions of the members of committees, 
need to be analyzed in terms of the notion of a joint institutional mecha-
nism (introduced and analyzed in detail elsewhere9). So the “decision” of 
9. Miller, “Joint Action,” 291– 295; Miller, Social Action, 174– 179; Miller, Moral Foundations 
of Social Institutions, 50– 52; Seumas Miller, “Joint Epistemic Action: Some Applications,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy (online first, 2016).
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the cabinet, and also perhaps of the ACPO, can be analyzed as follows: At 
one level each member of the cabinet or the ACPO voted for or against 
Kratos. Let us assume some voted in the affirmative and others in the neg-
ative. But at another level, each member of the cabinet or ACPO (or both) 
agreed to abide by the outcome of the vote; each voted having as a collec-
tive end that the outcome with a majority of the votes in its favor would be 
realized. Accordingly, the members of the cabinet and/ or the ACPO were 
jointly institutionally responsible for the policy change; that is, the cabinet 
and/ or ACPO were collectively institutionally responsible for the change.
What of the fourth sense of collective responsibility, collective moral 
responsibility? Collective moral responsibility is a species of joint respon-
sibility. Accordingly, each agent is individually morally responsible, but 
this is conditional; it is based on the others being likewise individually 
morally responsible. (For more detail on this see Chapter 1.2.1.) There is 
interdependence in respect of moral responsibility. This account of collec-
tive moral responsibility arises naturally out of the account of joint actions. 
It also parallels the account given of individual moral responsibility.
Thus we can make our second preliminary claim about moral 
responsibility:
If agents are collectively responsible for a joint action or omission 
(or the realization of a foreseen or reasonably foreseeable outcome 
of that action or omission), in the first or second or third senses of 
collective responsibility, and if the joint action, omission, or out-
come is morally significant, then— other things being equal— the 
agents are collectively morally responsible for that action, omis-
sion, or outcome, and— other things being equal— ought to attract 
moral praise or blame, and (possibly) punishment or reward for 
bringing about the collective end of the action and/or its outcome.
As is the case with the parallel account of individual moral responsibil-
ity, there are crucial “other things being equal” clauses to provide for the 
possibilities that the agents in question either lack the requisite moral 
capacities— and so cannot be held morally responsible— or are possessed 
of moral capacities but in the circumstances in question have an excuse 
or justification for their joint actions and omissions, and for the outcomes 
of such actions and omissions.
Notice that there can be cases where the morally significant collec-
tive end of a joint action is realized, yet one individual (or a minority) 
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fails to successfully perform his contributory individual action, and cases 
where the morally significant collective end of a joint action is not realized 
because most fail to perform their contributory actions, yet one individual 
(or a minority) successfully performs his contributory individual action.
Consider the cases in which one individual (or a minority10) fails to 
successfully perform his contributory action. Assuming the individual (or 
minority) had the collective end in question (and, therefore, tried, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to perform his individual contributory action), the indi-
vidual shares in the collective moral responsibility for the realization of 
the collective end, notwithstanding his individual failure to perform his 
contributory action. For, as was the case with the other agents, the individ-
ual had the collective end in question. Moreover, as was also the case with 
the other agents, the individual (indirectly) causally contributed to the 
realization of the collective end, notwithstanding his failure to perform 
his contributory action. He made an indirect causal contribution since the 
other individuals acted in part on the basis of their beliefs that the individ-
ual in question would perform his contributory action. Nevertheless, the 
failure of such an individual to perform his individual contributory action 
reduces his share of the collective moral responsibility for the realization 
of the collective end.
Now consider cases in which the morally significant collective end is 
not realized due to the fact that most fail to perform contributory actions, 
yet one individual (or a minority) performs his. Once again, assuming all 
the individuals had the collective end in question (and, therefore, tried, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to perform their contributory actions), then the indi-
vidual shares in the collective moral responsibility for the failure to realize 
the collective end, notwithstanding his individual success in performing 
his contributory action. For, as was the case with the other agents, the 
individual had the collective end in question, and that end was not real-
ized; in short, each agent, including the individual in question, failed to 
realize an end each had (the collective end), and each failed to make a 
causal contribution to that end. Nevertheless, the success of such an indi-
vidual in performing his own individual contributory action reduces his 
share of the collective moral responsibility for the failure to realize the 
collective end. In response to this it might be argued that the individual 
10. Note that the arguments below are also valid in the case of minorities, as opposed to 
individuals. However, in order to reduce verbal clutter, I won’t refer to minorities on every 
occasion.
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cannot have a share in the collective moral responsibility for the failure 
because, after all, he had the collective end in question and performed his 
contributory action; he did all that he could reasonably have been expected 
to do. Certainly, he is not morally culpable or blameworthy, but then nei-
ther are the others morally culpable or blameworthy, given they tried to 
perform their own contributory actions. The theoretical conclusion to be 
drawn at this point is twofold: (1) moral responsibility, including collective 
moral responsibility, should not be equated with culpability/ nonculpabil-
ity or blameworthiness/ praiseworthiness; and (2) agents can be (individu-
ally or collectively) morally responsible for failing to realize an outcome, 
even if they did all that can be reasonably expected of them; responsibility 
is not simply a matter of possession of the relevant subjective states, such 
as intentions and ends.
It is consistent with this that if an individual (or minority) culpably 
failed to realize his or her individual end, yet knew that the collective 
end would nevertheless be realized, then that individual does not share 
in the collective moral responsibility for the successful outcome, since, 
for one thing, the individual did not, in fact, have the collective end. It is 
also consistent with the above that if an individual (or minority) culpably 
failed to realize his or her individual end in the knowledge that, as a con-
sequence of this culpable failure, the collective end would not be realized, 
then the individual (a) does not have the collective end, and (b) is individu-
ally morally responsible for the collective failure (of the others) to realize 
the collective end. So there is no collective moral responsibility, let alone 
collective moral culpability, for the failure.
5.5  Distributing Moral Responsibility
In light of our account of collective moral responsibility, what sense can we 
now make of the police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes? Before doing 
so, I note that institutional arrangements such as the one in question— in 
which there is a separation of sequentially performed roles and associated 
responsibilities (e.g., between members of the surveillance team and the 
firearms officers), but nevertheless a common further end, or collective 
end (e.g., prevention of a suicide bombing)— involve what I have referred 
to elsewhere as a “chain of institutional and moral responsibility.”11 In 
11. Seumas Miller, “Police Detectives, Criminal Investigations and Collective Moral 
Responsibility,” Criminal Justice Ethics 33, no. 1 (2014): 21– 39.
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chains of institutional and moral responsibility: (1) each participant aims 
at the collective end constitutive and distinctive of their particular insti-
tutional role (e.g., that of member of the surveillance team); (2) the occu-
pants of any given constitutive role (the links in the chain) perform their 
role- based actions sequentially with the actions of the occupants of the 
other roles (e.g., the actions of the surveillance team are performed prior 
to actions of the firearms officers), and; (3) in doing so, all the participants 
aim (or should be aiming) at a collective end (e.g., preventing the suicide 
bombing) that is an end further to those ends that are both constitutive 
and distinctive of their particular roles. Moreover, all the participants (at 
least, in principle) share in the collective responsibility for the realization of 
this end (or the failure to realize this end, as the case may be).
The first point is that, as noted already, collective moral responsibility 
for an outcome is consistent with individual moral responsibility for indi-
vidual actions that are in part constitutive of some joint action, omission, 
or outcome. As we have seen, the individual members of the surveillance 
team were collectively (jointly) morally responsible for failing to clearly 
communicate to the control room whether or not Menezes was Osman— 
or that they were uncertain in this regard. Moreover, Commander Dick is 
morally responsible for failing to see to it that Menezes was stopped prior 
to his entering the underground station. Finally, the two firearms officers 
were collectively (jointly) morally responsible for failing to provide them-
selves with good and decisive evidence for the proposition that Menezes 
was a suicide bomber and a mortal threat to the train passengers. Here 
I stress that these failures all had mitigating factors.
The second point is that each of these failures was a necessary condi-
tion for the outcome; that is, the outcome that may be described as the 
killing of an innocent person. This second point gives rise to the question 
of whether the members of the surveillance team, Commander Dick, and 
the firearms officers are collectively morally responsible for that outcome, 
albeit none individually intended the outcome and none individually fore-
saw the outcome. I suggest that, notwithstanding that the failure of each 
might have been a necessary condition for the outcome, this causal chain 
was not accompanied by a collective end (so there was no joint action or 
intentional joint omission). Moreover, the members of the group did not, 
as a group, foresee the outcome; indeed, not even one of these individuals 
foresaw the outcome.
Could the members of the group reasonably have foreseen that the con-
sequences of their actions would be the killing by police of an innocent 
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person, bearing in mind that they had, and ought to have had, as part of 
their collective end to avoid taking innocent life? Surely not all of them, 
or even most of them, could reasonably have foreseen this outcome. For 
example, the members of the surveillance team could not reasonably have 
foreseen that that an innocent person would be killed. Accordingly, the 
members of the team of police officers in question— members of the sur-
veillance team, Commander Dick, and the two firearms officers— were 
not collectively morally responsible for the death of an innocent person, 
Jean Charles de Menezes. Were the members of some subset of the team 
of police officers collectively morally responsible for the death of Menezes? 
The most obvious candidates for members of such a subset are the two 
firearms officers, since they did the shooting. Presumably, they were col-
lectively morally responsible for shooting Menezes dead, albeit, for the 
reasons given above, neither was morally culpable. However, the theoreti-
cal point to be made here is that they were only one link (the final link) 
in the chain of institutional and moral responsibility. So this collective 
moral responsibility of the two firearms officers does not embrace the 
other police involved in the death of Menezes.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the members of the team of police 
officers were not collectively morally responsible for killing Menezes, it 
could still be argued that they were collectively morally responsible for 
failing to ensure that an innocent person was not killed. After all, the 
members of the team had— as they ought to have had— the morally sig-
nificant collective end of avoiding or, at least, minimizing loss of innocent 
life.12 Obviously, this collective end was achievable, but in fact it was not 
achieved. Moreover, each (or, at least most, of the police officers appar-
ently failed in respect of some or other of his or her institutional and 
moral duties, and did so in a manner that contributed to the failure to 
realize this collective end— the avoidance of loss of innocent life. In this 
respect, the members of the surveillance team, Commander Dick, and 
the two firearms were collectively morally responsible, albeit not morally 
culpable. I further suggest that each had a share in this collective respon-
sibility; that is, each was partially responsible jointly with the others, but 
none was fully morally responsible.
12. They also had the collective end of killing a suicide bomber, if there was one and if it 
was necessary to do so. Given that, as it turned out, there was no suicide bomber, this col-
lective end was otiose.
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5.6  Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed the morality of the use of lethal force by 
police against a (potential) suicide bomber in a well- ordered jurisdiction 
in a liberal democratic state. Given that such operations involve a team 
or teams of police officers with different roles (e.g., surveillance officers 
and firearms officers), the question arises as to who is morally responsible 
for failures leading to loss of innocent life. Specifically, in the real- life 
scenario analyzed, the killing of Menezes by London police in 2005, the 
question arose as to who was responsible for this killing of an innocent 
person, mistakenly believed to be a suicide bomber. I have argued that 
such cases typically involve collective moral responsibility at various levels 
and in various respects. Three key theoretical claims relevant to this argu-
ment are: (1) the individual moral responsibility for deliberately killing or 
refraining from killing another human being cannot be alienated; (2) col-
lective moral responsibility, properly understood, is a species of relational 
individual moral responsibility— namely, joint moral responsibility; (3) 
police scenarios of the kind in question involve chains of institutional and 
moral responsibility, and the individual participants in such a chain are 
collectively morally responsible for its foreseeable and avoidable endpoint; 
(4) an individual participant in a morally required joint action (omission) 
scenario that fails is not morally culpable if she or he did all that could 
be reasonably be expected, but might, nevertheless, have a (diminished) 
share in the collective moral responsibility for the failure to realize the 
collective end she or he was aiming at; (5) Arguably, in the Menezes shoot-
ing, the members of the surveillance team, Commander Dick, and the 
two firearms officers were collectively morally responsible, albeit not mor-
ally culpable, for failing to avoid the loss of innocent life.
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Military Use of Lethal Force
a s  w e  s a w  in Chapter 3, the institutional role of the regular soldier 
can be defined in terms of (1) its collective end, namely, the collective 
good of national (external) security, and (2) the means by which this 
collective end is realized, namely, lethal force. Moreover, while there 
is a jointly held obligation on the part of all citizens to provide the 
collective good of external security, in contemporary liberal democra-
cies this obligation is typically discharged by establishing, in accor-
dance with a division of labor, a standing professional armed force(s) 
(sometimes supplemented in wartime by citizen conscripts). Further, 
it was noted that, unlike police services, military forces do not have 
a quasi- judicial role, but instead are essentially instruments of gov-
ernments in the service of national (external) security. In the case of 
democracies, both the government and the nation’s military forces are 
accountable to the citizenry, albeit the military forces indirectly via 
the government. Finally, it was argued in Chapter 3 that the individual 
soldier, unlike a police officer (or, for that matter, an ordinary civilian), 
waives his natural right to decide whether or not he will use lethal 
force against enemy soldiers, and waives it in favour of his superior 
officers. Thus in circumstances in which a solder receives a lawful 
order from his superiors to use lethal force (or not to use lethal force), 
the soldier is institutionally (and morally, other things being equal) 
required to do so (or to refrain from doing so). I note that it does not 
follow from this, and nor do I accept, that an individual soldier waives 
his right to decide whether or not to wage war in the first instance. I 
discuss this issue in section 6.3 below.
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In Chapter 3 I distinguished regular soldiers from irregular soldiers, 
such as mercenaries1 and terrorist combatants.2 I use the more general 
term “military combatant” to refer to both regular and irregular soldiers. 
Recall also that the term “regular soldier” refers to members of navies 
and air forces as well as land armies. Military combatants principally 
use lethal force in the context of ongoing armed conflicts between the 
armed forces of political entities, such as, but not restricted to, nation- 
states. Such armed conflicts between armed forces include wars between 
nation- states and wars involving nonstate actors. The latter include civil 
wars, wars of liberation, and nonconventional wars between state actors 
and terrorist groups. This is not to say that all insurrections or armed con-
flicts between state actors and nonstate actors, such as terrorists groups, 
are wars; perhaps most are not, but evidently some are.
Roughly speaking, an armed force in the sense in use here is an orga-
nization and, often, an institution (as defined in Chapter 3) comprising: (1) 
combatants with task- defined roles, notably the role of using lethal force 
against enemy combatants; (2) a command and control structure; and (3) 
a capacity to reproduce itself, (e.g., by means of recruitment and training 
processes), and, thereby, to continue to exist beyond the “life” (e.g., discon-
tinued participation due to death) of the current membership.
Further, armed conflict in the sense in use here is a collective enter-
prise and, typically, a multilayered structure of joint action (as defined 
in Chapter 3), consisting of armed conflict on the part of an armed force 
against another armed force in order to realize some military purpose (a 
species of collective end), such as to incapacitate the enemy armed force, 
and ultimately to realize some political purpose (also a species of collec-
tive end), such as protecting the territorial integrity of the nation- state. 
In this latter respect military combatants are unlike, for example, Mafia 
“soldiers” and the like, who use lethal force ultimately to realize criminal 
purposes.
Given this organizational character of military combat, the use of lethal 
force by military combatants is importantly different from that of the 
1. Mercenaries are military combatants defined in terms of the institution of the market. 
See Miller, “Police, Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries.”
2. Terrorist- combatants are terrorists who are members of an armed force fighting a war, 
as distinct from members of a terrorist organization that, while performing terrorist acts, 
is not actually fighting a war (irrespective of its claims to the contrary). For the distinction 
see Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism, Chapter 5.
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typically nonorganizational use of lethal force by individuals in personal 
self- defense or in defense of the lives of others (discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2). Moreover, wars involving armed forces comprising regular sol-
diers, in particular, are institutional in character. For regular armies are 
institutions constituted by the institutional role of regular soldiers. Here 
I am invoking the distinction made in Chapter 3 between mere organiza-
tions and institutions, the latter being normatively understood in terms 
of organizations defined in terms of collective ends that are also collective 
goods.3
In this work I have been operating with a threefold distinction between 
the use of lethal force by individuals in personal self- defense (and nonin-
stitutionally based defense of the lives of others), the use of lethal force 
by police officers, and the use of lethal force by regular soldiers. I have 
stressed that police officers and regular soldiers are institutional role 
occupants, and that this makes a difference to the morality of their use 
of lethal force. Accordingly, we need to distinguish between the moral-
ity of the use of lethal force by noninstitutional actors (as elaborated in 
Chapters 1 and 2), the use of lethal force by police (see Chapters 3, 4, and 
5) and the use of lethal force by regular soldiers (see Chapters 3 and 6– 10). 
Specifically, there are, I suggest, important differences in the application 
of the moral principles that govern the use of lethal force in these three 
different kinds of cases, notably the principles of imminence, necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination. Moreover, these differences are not 
simply ones explicable in terms of the differential numbers of defenders 
and attackers typically involved in personal self- defense and other- person 
defense, policing, and military conflict (respectively); specifically, the very 
large numbers of attackers and defenders engaged in wars. My concern in 
this chapter is with military use of lethal force. However, where appropri-
ate, I indicate some of the contrasts with the police use of lethal force and 
with the noninstitutional cases.
Normatively speaking, the conduct of war is regulated by so- called just 
war theory (JWT), or so I will assume here. JWT comprises jus ad bellum 
(JAB) and the jus in bello (JIB). JAB is a set of moral principles setting forth 
the conditions under which an armed force can go to war (e.g., in national 
self- defense). JIB is a set of principles under which an armed can pros-
ecute a war (e.g., combatants ought only to use the quantum of lethal force 
that is militarily necessary). While, ideally, an armed force will wage war 
3. Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapter 2.
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in accordance with JWT, this does not provide a sufficient condition for the 
use of lethal force by combatants, at least in many contexts of war. What is 
required in addition is rules of engagement (ROE). A combatant’s ROE pro-
vides further specification in relation to the use of lethal force. For example, 
an ROE might require that in a given area populated by civilians, combat-
ants are not to fire their weapons unless first fired upon. In section 6.1 of this 
chapter I provide an outline of JWT and, in particular, JAB; in section 6.2 I 
discuss the controversial doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants and 
in section 6.3 I address JIB and ROE and their relationship.
6.1  Just War Theory
In recent years, JWT has been receiving considerable attention by phi-
losophers both in respect of the question of its viability as a theory and as 
a means for determining the justifiability of particular armed conflicts.4 
Traditionally, JWT principally concerns itself with wars between states, 
as opposed to armed conflicts involving nonstate actors, and has as a con-
dition that the war be conducted under lawful authority, and therefore 
in effect under the authority of the state. Clearly such a condition would 
automatically rule out any internal war against the state (e.g., a revolution-
ary war) or other armed conflict involving a nonstate actor (e.g., armed 
conflicts against international terrorist groups), and for this reason ought 
not to be made a necessary condition of a general theory of just war.5 This 
is not to say that wars waged by nonstate actors against nation- states may 
not, for a variety of reasons, be especially difficult to justify, nor is it to 
deny that some suitably adjusted notion of legitimate authority might not 
be required for (morally legitimate) armed conflicts involving nonstate 
actors. It is to say, however, that, in principle, armed conflict conducted 
by a nonstate actor could be morally justified (e.g., the armed struggle of 
the African National Congress [ANC]6), and that therefore it cannot be a 
4. A good deal of the impetus for this was initially provided by Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars. See also Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (any edition); F. H. Russell, The 
Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); J. T. Johnson, 
Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War:  A  Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1981; Rodin, War and Self- Defense; McMahan, Killing in 
War; Frances Kamm, The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5. Miller, “On the Morality of Waging War against the State.”
6. Miller, “Just War Theory.”
162 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
162
necessary condition for a just war that it be fought under the authority 
of the state. In fact, historically many just war theorists allowed for the 
possibility of a just rebellion and for the possibility of removing a tyrant. 
Indeed political theory in general, including liberalism, admits of the 
moral possibility of a just internal war, and this is because there are limits 
to the obligation to obey the state, and because the state itself has obliga-
tions the discharging of which is part of the ground of its legitimacy.
Before presenting a version of JWT appropriate to armed conflict 
between nation- states as well as between nation- states and nonstate 
actors, there are a number of preliminary definitions and distinctions that 
need to be introduced. First, let us assume that wars are large- scale, ongo-
ing, armed conflicts involving the use of violence and waged between col-
lective entities. The violence in question would consist of destroying and 
damaging property (as well as perhaps the physical environment) and the 
injuring and killing by members of one collective entity of members of 
the other collective entity or entities— normally by the use of arms, arma-
ments, and so on. Hereafter I will simplify matters and refer to the use of 
lethal force rather than the wider notion of violence.7
Second, assume that the collective entities in question are organized 
political entities. More specifically, a collective entity is a group of individ-
uals such that: (a) they have a structure of practices, including convention, 
social norm, and law- governed practices, and a network of political beliefs 
held in common; (b) there is a set of interlocking political collective ends 
to which these practices are directed; (c) the individuals see themselves as 
owing allegiance to the group and its political ends as a whole, and per-
haps they actually belong to the group— or, if not, they at least view them-
selves as having to comply with the dictates of the leaders of the group.
Further, these political entities have armed forces, each of which con-
sists of a differentiated and hierarchically ordered set of roles for the con-
stitutive individual combatants and their leaders. These armed forces have 
been organized for the purpose of coordinated, ongoing, and (in princi-
ple) reciprocated acts of lethal force against the members of some other 
(at least notional) armed force of some political entity. Note that in the 
case of certain terrorist organizations with armed forces, the political and 
the military leadership may not be separate. Moreover, the organization of 
the armed force might be relatively loosely structured; indeed, it might be 
a network rather than an organization, as is the case with those terrorist 
7. Coady, Morality and Political Violence, Chapter 2.
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organizations affiliated with al- Qaeda or ISIS, such as Boko Haram or al- 
Shabab. A network, in this sense, comprises individuals or organizations 
and is defined in part, as is the case with organizations and joint actions, 
by reference to collective ends. But in the case of a network, the individual 
elements including sub- groups of the network have their own individual 
or collective ends, and these are primary, whereas the collective ends of 
the network per se are secondary. Here primary ends override second-
ary ones, supposing they conflict. Moreover, these (secondary) collective 
ends of the network are somewhat unspecified relative to the (primary) 
ones of the elements of the network.8 Further, the individual persons who 
make up the network do not have task- defined organizational roles qua 
members of the network, and, unlike organizations, the network does not 
reproduce itself, such as by recruiting and training individuals qua mem-
bers of the network (as opposed to qua members of one or other of the 
constitutive organizations).
Third, assume that for two (or more) collective political entities to be at 
war is for the armed forces of one collective entity to be actually perform-
ing acts of lethal force against the members of another collective entity; so 
war, in my sense, is de facto as opposed to being merely de jure. And in so 
acting these armed forces are (a) instruments of the leadership of the col-
lective entity to which they belong, (b) performing their actions on behalf 
of this collective entity, and (c) using lethal force against members of the 
opposing collective entity qua members of that opposing collective entity 
(and, typically, using lethal force predominantly, even exclusively, against 
the members of the armed forces of the opposing collective entity). On 
this account, the mob violence perpetrated by soccer hooligans is not war, 
since such violence, even if organized and lethal, is not political in char-
acter; on the other hand, an armed revolution may well be war, notwith-
standing that one of the protagonists is not a state.
Fourth, it seems that many wars are waged under a claim of legal 
right, and are fought in accordance with some (perhaps quite minimal) 
set of laws and conventions. But it is not necessary that conflict be con-
ducted under such a claim of right for it to be war, in my sense, nor is 
it necessary that one or both protagonists accept that there be at least 
some laws and conventions governing the conflict. Armed conflict con-
ducted by warriors who accepted that they were acting illegally and who 
refused to abide by any conventions governing the conduct of war (e.g., 
8. Miller, “Joint Actions, Organisations and Networks.”
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the convention or law not intentionally to kill innocent civilians) could 
still be war on this account. Consider, for example, the manner in which 
ISIS has waged war in Iraq and Syria. As a matter of policy, ISIS combat-
ants torture and kill (including by beheading) captured enemy combat-
ants and innocent civilians (both Christian and Muslim). On this account 
of war, an internal armed conflict (e.g., the English Civil War) could be a 
war, as could a revolutionary war (e.g., the American Revolution). Again, 
on this account, an armed conflict between a liberal democratic state and 
an international terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda, could be a war, and 
against ISIS, undoubtedly is a war.9
Let us then turn to the matter of constructing our generic account of 
JWT suitable for application to wars between nation- states as well as those 
between nation- states and nonstate actors. I provide an account that con-
sists of a set of conditions that are jointly (morally) sufficient for engaging 
in armed conflict; I do not offer a set that is jointly (morally) necessary. 
Moreover, my account only provides a set of conditions under which it is 
morally permissible for a collective entity to engage in armed conflict, as 
opposed to a set of conditions under which it is morally justified or mor-
ally obliged to do so.
The definition is as follows:10 It is morally permissible for a collective 
political entity, A (a liberal democratic state, let us assume) to engage in 
war (and thus use lethal force) against another collective political entity, B 
(a nation state or nonstate actor) in a context C— if (though not necessar-
ily, if and only if ):
1. B is seriously violating the moral rights of citizens of A on a large scale 
and using lethal force or the credible threat thereof in so doing (e.g. by 
engaging in a war of aggression).
2. There is no alternative nonlethal method by which A could prevent this 
violation.
3. A has a reasonable chance of ending this violation by using lethal force.
4. It is probable that if A uses lethal force, the consequences, all things 
considered, will be better than if A does not.
9. Jay Sekulow, Rise of ISIS (New York: Howard Books, 2014).
10. Seumas Miller, “Just War Theory and Counter- Terrorism,” in Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas 
Evans, and Adam Henschke, eds., Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2013), 226– 235.
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5. A uses lethal force only to the end of bringing about the cessation of B’s 
violation of the rights of citizens of A, meaning that A acts in collective 
self- defense (of the moral rights of citizens of A).
6. A  only uses lethal force:  (a)  of a type that is morally legitimate, 
(b)  that is necessary to the end in question, (c)  that is proportionate, 
and (d)  against members of B who are combatants or the leaders of 
combatants.
Note that collective self- defense, as I use the term, refers to using lethal 
force on the part of the members of some collective entity to protect the 
moral rights— including but not restricted to the rights to life— of the 
members of that collective entity. In the case of wars waged by collec-
tive political entities, we can discern three related levels of collective self- 
defense. At the highest level, there is the collective self- defense of the 
collective political entity itself (e.g., the liberal democratic state). The mem-
bers of the armed forces use lethal force to defense the moral rights (both 
natural and institutional) of the citizenry. Call this national self- defense. At 
a level below this there is the collective self- defense of the armed forces 
(e.g., the army, air force, and navy). Here the combatants of the armed 
forces and their leaders use lethal force to defend their own moral rights, 
notably their right to life, against the lethal force being deployed against 
them by enemy armed forces. Call this armed forces self- defense. At the low-
est level there is the collective self- defense of the unit (e.g., a battalion or 
a platoon or a mortar squad). Here the members of some unit within the 
armed forces defend their own moral rights, notably their rights to life, 
against the lethal force being deployed against them by some unit of the 
enemy’s armed forces. Call this unit self- defense.
Collective self- defense of the lives of an armed force as whole or of 
a unit is conceptually different from a one- off, individual self- contained 
act of personal self- defense or an aggregate thereof. This is so for the 
following reasons: Unlike a discrete, self- contained individual act of per-
sonal self- defense, the lethal action of a combatant on an occasion in the 
context of a war is typically performed jointly with the actions of other 
combatants at various levels (e.g., members of mortar squad, members of 
a platoon, members of a battalion). Taken in conjunction, these various 
joint actions constitute what I described above as a multilayered structure 
of joint actions. By virtue of consisting in interdependent layers of joint 
action, these macro joint lethal actions of, for example, fighting a battle, 
have a complex synchronic dimension.
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Moreover, the lethal action of a combatant on an occasion in the con-
text of a war is but one element of a causally and means/ end– connected, 
dynamic, and unpredictable unfolding series, indeed set of series, of 
lethal joint actions— including, but obviously not restricted to, the series 
of lethal actions performed by the combatant in question— directed at 
short- term, mid- term and long- term collective ends (e.g., winning this 
firefight, this battle, the war). By virtue of being a causally and means/ 
end– connected series of joint actions, these sets of lethal actions of, for 
example, fighting a battle, have a complex diachronic dimension, and each 
of these lethal action elements is a phase- element of the war.
Finally, the lethal action of a combatant on an occasion in the context 
of a war is performed qua organizational role occupant (i.e., qua combat-
ant meeting organizational standards, serving organizational goals, etc.). 
Moreover, by the lights of my normative teleological account, military 
institutions have as their raison d’être the provision of the collective good 
of external security. Further, as argued in Chapter 3, the institutional role 
of the regular soldier can be defined in terms of (1) the collective end of 
protecting the moral (natural and institutional) rights of fellow citizens 
from violation by persons from external communities or nations, (2) by 
means of the use of lethal force, and (3) the prior jointly held obligation 
of all citizens to protect fellow citizens from external threats.11 This insti-
tutional role is defined in terms of various institutional rights and duties 
that are also moral rights and duties, including ones that do not necessar-
ily mirror prior natural moral rights and duties. I note that the natural 
rights in question are (at the very least) moral rights to properties con-
stitutive of the selfhood of the citizens. The institutional moral rights in 
question are, at the very least, ones constitutive of the institutions that are 
necessary to ensure that the natural rights just mentioned are respected. 
For example, the exercise of basic subsistence rights requires viable eco-
nomic institutions, and the exercise of various rights to freedom requires 
appropriate political institutions.
As a consequence of the above features of their institutional role, the 
lethal actions of combatants are performed in order to realize the defense 
of multiple members of their unit, their armed force, and, ultimately, 
their citizenry. As such, these lethal actions of combatants are not nec-
essarily done in personal self- defense although, of course, they often are 
done in personal self- defense as well as in defense of their unit, armed 
11. Miller, “Police, Citizen- Soldiers and Mercenaries.”
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force and citizenry. Consider, for example, a drone operator firing mis-
siles from somewhere in the United States that strike enemy combatants 
in Afghanistan; this lethal action was not performed in personal self- 
defense. Nor are these lethal actions necessarily in defense of an imminent 
threat to oneself or other individual person. For example, combatants in a 
war routinely ambush enemy combatants. Ambushes are allowable in war 
in part because the threat from enemy combatants is a standing threat. 
Accordingly, preemptive strikes, such as ambushes of unsuspecting, per-
haps even unarmed, enemy combatants who do not pose an imminent 
threat, are morally permissible in war.12
The above described synchronic and diachronic features of war also 
have implications for the application of the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality (of which more below.) For example, since threat from enemy 
combatants is typically a joint lethal threat (i.e., the action of any single 
enemy combatant, such as that of a single crew- member on a battleship 
might not be either necessary or sufficient for one’s own death or the 
death of any single comrade in arms), it is morally permissible to kill an 
enemy combatant, notwithstanding that it is not necessary to do so to 
protect any lives (see chapter 1 sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2).
Let us now distinguish between three different contexts (based on 
context C in the above definition):  (C1) a theater of war; (C2) a liberal 
democracy under a state of emergency by virtue of an organized violent 
political threat, such as a terrorist group or a secessionist movement; (C3) 
a well- ordered liberal democracy enjoying peacetime conditions within 
its borders but confronting an organized violent political threat.13 I take it 
the JWT applies to C1 and perhaps C2, but not to C3. For the appropriate 
security response to C3 is that of the law enforcement framework; that is, 
it is a matter for the police. On the other hand, the appropriate security 
response to C1 is the application of the military framework; that is, it is a 
matter for the armed forces.
C2 is problematic in that while the application of a law enforcement 
framework is desirable, at a certain point it may not be sufficient to con-
tain the security problem, in which case the use of the armed forces may 
12. I am assuming that the unarmed combatants in question are merely unnamed at the 
specific time in question (e.g., they are asleep or resting and their weapons are not imme-
diately available to them). I am also assuming that the unarmed combatants in question 
have not surrendered.
13. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism Chapters 4 and 5
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be justified. However, if the law enforcement framework does justifiably 
give way to the JWT- governed military framework in C2 then the military 
framework ought to be applied only to an extent (e.g., with respect to a 
specific de facto theater of war), and over a period of time that is neces-
sary. Moreover, it is likely that even in such a theater of war, a highly 
restrictive ROE would be in place. These points are to a degree reflective 
of the intent of clause 2 in the above definition.
Further, the consequences mentioned in clause 4 are the overall con-
sequences of waging war— as opposed to the consequences attached to 
the option(s) of not doing so— and would include the loss of life, restric-
tions on freedoms, economic impact, and institutional damage. Arguably, 
for example, in the light of the rise of ISIS, the overall consequences 
would have been better if Iraq had not been invaded by US- led forces in 
the second Iraq War, notwithstanding that it removed Saddam Hussein’s 
murderous regime.
In addition, clause 6 refers to the standard conditions of the jus in 
bello, the principles of military necessity, proportionality, use of legitimate 
methods (e.g.’ not biological warfare), and restriction of targets in war 
(e.g., not innocent children— the principle of discrimination.
Finally, notice that on the basis of clause 1, and the assumption that a 
political authority must enforce and not violate rights if it is to be legiti-
mate, B is not a legitimate political authority. But we need to assume in 
respect of the above account that: (a) there is no additional corporate entity 
A1 which could count as the legitimate political authority of the citizens or 
other constituent members of A; and (b) A, or at least its political leader-
ship, is not itself illegitimate, as it would be if, for instance, it consistently 
violated the rights of its constituency, or if its constituency did not (at least 
tacitly) consent to this leadership.
6.2  Jus ad Bellum
Consistent with JAB, there will presumably be wars in which one side is 
morally justified in waging war and the other is not; wars in which both 
sides have a good, but not decisive, moral justification for waging war; 
and wars in which neither side has any moral justification for waging war. 
Moreover, the notion of a just or unjust war admits of degrees, depending 
in part on how many of the JAB conditions it fails and the extent of its fail-
ure in respect of any given condition. Further, if a war is unjust by virtue 
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of failing one or more JAB conditions, then evidently this has implications 
for the morality of the actions of the combatants fighting this unjust war. 
Specifically, other things being equal, combatants fighting an unjust war 
of, say, aggression, morally ought not to be killing anyone.14 For example, 
there is a clear moral difference between combatants fighting a just war 
against aggressors and the aggressors that they are fighting. Combatants 
fighting a just war may well have a decisive moral justification for killing 
their unjust aggressors. The aggressors, by contrast, do not have a decisive 
moral justification for killing the combatants fighting a just war against 
them. This is so notwithstanding the fact that once a war is under way, 
even the aggressors may at times find themselves in a situation in which 
they are justifiably (at least according to some theories of self- defense— 
see Chapter 2, section 2.3, on the Hobbesian rights- based approach), or 
at least excusably, killing in self- defense. For example, they might be in a 
situation in which they have no option of surrender, and must either kill 
or be killed.
The above claim regarding the moral difference between combatants 
fighting a just war and those fighting an unjust war is consistent with it 
being the case that the lethal actions of the combatants fighting an unjust 
war might be excusable in the light of, say, their reasonable, albeit false, 
belief that they are in fact fighting a just war. That there is this impor-
tant moral difference between soldiers fighting a just war and those on 
the other side fighting an unjust war is apparently inconsistent with the 
legalist paradigm associated with Michael Walzer and, specifically, the 
doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants.15 Here we need to distin-
guish between law and convention, on the one hand, and morality, on the 
other hand. Arguably, the laws and conventions governing the treatment 
of combatants in war are, and morally ought to be, such that combatants 
are treated as if they were morally equal, notwithstanding that they some-
times are not. Thus, as is the case with combatants who fight a just war, 
combatants who fight an unjust war, morally ought not to be criminally 
14. There is a longstanding tradition of argument on this issue which is often framed 
in terms of the doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants. See, for example, Igor 
Primoratz, “Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory:  Some Issues of Responsibility,” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 5 (2002): 221– 243, and a variety of essays relevant to this issue 
in (eds.) D. Rodin and H. Shue Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of 
Soldiers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapter 10.
15. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chapter 3. For criticisms see Coady, Morality and Political 
Violence, Chapter 9; and McMahan, Killing in War, Chapter 2.
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charged for so fighting, and if captured, morally ought to be released upon 
the termination of hostilities.
We also need to invoke the distinction I introduced in Chapter 1 
Section 1.2.1 between the individual and the collective levels. The collective 
level (or, in fact, levels) pertains to joint action, including organizational 
action. Thus, other things being equal, in so far as all (or most) of the 
soldiers in an army are jointly fighting a manifestly unjust war having as 
a collective to win that war, they are collectively i.e. jointly, morally respon-
sible for so doing and (again, other things being equal) are collectively, i.e. 
jointly, blameworthy. (Other things might not be equal if, for example, 
some of the soldiers were threatened with death if they refused to fight in 
the war, or many were deceived in respect of the causes of, and justifica-
tion for, the war.) At the collective level the ascription of moral responsibil-
ity and culpability may well be relatively unproblematic. (Note that on my 
account the collective level remains at the level of the joint actions, or in 
some cases aggregates of individual actions, of individual human actors; it 
does not refer to the ‘doings’ of collective entities per se16.) By contrast, the 
individual level pertains to the individual actions of single soldiers, e.g. the 
individual actions of Private Jones during the course of the war. We can 
assume that, as a typical soldier, Jones’ individual actions while they may 
well have been literally life- changing in themselves were, nevertheless, a 
very small contribution to the overall successful (let us assume) joint enter-
prise of winning the war.17 Nevertheless, it is the fact that Jones made this 
contribution in the service of the collective end, however insignificant his 
contribution was in the scale of things, that is the primary determinant 
of Jones’ moral responsibility in the war in question at the collective level. 
Thus the moral calibration of Jones’ degree of moral responsibility based 
on his actions at the individual level is typically of limited importance in 
this context. Perhaps, for example, during the course of the war Jones 
only fired his weapon on one occasion and did so in personal self- defense, 
whereas by contrast Private Smith shot dead numerous enemy soldiers and 
did so in defense of the members of his platoon. This is, of course, not to 
suggest that Jones’ actions at the individual level are not morally signifi-
cant in themselves or in some other more limited collective context (e.g. 
16. Such collective entities include an aggregate of actions conceived as a single entity as 
opposed to a plurality of individual actions.
17. In order to avoid unnecessary complications let us also assume that Jones was morally 
responsible for his actions and that he did not commit any war crimes.
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at the level of Jones’ platoon). Far from it. Rather it is simply to make the 
claim that at the collective level of the armed forces of a polity fighting a 
war there is a moral equality of sorts among all (or most) of the soldiers in 
those armed forces i.e. qua members of those armed forces fighting that 
war (whether it be a just or unjust war, or neither).
Moreover, there is another kind of moral equality among the soldiers 
fighting a war on one side by virtue of having waived their right to use 
lethal force in favor of their superior officers. Indeed, in this respect the 
soldiers on one side in a war are the moral equals of the soldiers fight-
ing that war on the other side. However, the point remains that the sol-
diers fighting a manifestly just war are evidently not morally equal to the 
soldiers on the other side fighting a manifestly unjust war. That is, the 
doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants conceived as an inherently 
moral principle appears to be false. What of moral justification for the 
doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants conceived as a convention 
or law?
The moral justification for the Moral Equality of Combatants con-
ceived as a convention or law is ultimately based, I suggest, on a number 
of considerations. The considerations in question are as follows:
1. Determining whether or not waging war is morally justified is often— 
though by no means always— an inherently complex matter, even for 
those with access to the requisite information and possessed of a well- 
developed capacity to make morally informed judgments in relation to 
security policy, let alone for regular soldiers. Even if we assume that the 
principles of the jus ad bellum are both clear and correct— a highly con-
troversial assumption— there remain prodigious difficulties in respect 
of their application, such as determining whether the consequences, 
all things considered, will be better if war is embarked on than if it is 
not. (For more on this point see below.) Accordingly, the situation of 
a regular soldier deciding to participate in a war of, say, self- defense 
is quite unlike that of an ordinary citizen deciding to kill an attacker 
in self- defense. For one thing, the principle of self- defense is often 
unclear as it applies to nation- states confronting terrorist groups, such 
as al- Qaeda, or aggressive nation- states making claims in respect of 
disputed territory occupied in large part by members of the aggres-
sor nation (e.g., Ukraine confronting Russia in relation to Crimea). For 
another, an ordinary citizen confronting an attacker is typically epis-
temically well placed to determine the nature of the threat and the likely 
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consequences of a lethal, as opposed to a nonlethal, response, which is 
not the case for an individual soldier deciding on whether or not to go 
to war.
2. Military combatants are members of organizations and, as such, 
engaged in multilayered structures of (morally significant) joint action. 
Therefore, as we have seen, they can ( at least in principle), be held col-
lectively, or jointly, morally responsible for engaging in the large- scale 
collective enterprise of waging war, and praised or blamed depending 
on whether it was a just or unjust war. Nevertheless, in such contexts, 
decision making is necessarily joint,18 and therefore required to be 
binding on all or most if it is to be effective. For example, no single 
Australian citizen, whether that person be a prime minister, a chief of 
the armed forces, or merely a low- ranking regular soldier or civilian, 
can unilaterally decide whether Australia will wage war or refrain from 
doing so. Thus, a prime minister seeking to go to war can be thwarted 
by the other members of the government or by popular opposition.19 
Likewise, disengaging from a war that is underway requires a joint 
decision. Accordingly, there is a presumption in favor of an individual 
citizen in a liberal democracy who disagrees with a generally accepted 
joint decision nevertheless going along with that decision.20 In the case 
of a military combatant, going along with the joint decision typically 
implies participating in actual war- fighting (or, in the case of a joint 
decision not to wage war, refraining from doing so). Moreover, individ-
ual nonparticipation in a collective enterprise such as war in respect of 
which there is joint commitment on the part of most, may be extremely 
costly, (e.g., social ostracism), and exiting from the community in ques-
tion may not be a realistic option.
3. Both regular and conscripted soldiers in liberal democracies are not 
only legally but also (pro tanto) morally required to obey a directive of 
their military commanders and, ultimately, their legitimate political 
leaders to wage war, unless doing so would be self- evidently a breach of 
18. Such a joint “decision” is both explicit and implicit. Moreover, in democracies it involves 
not simply the joint assent of members of the political and military leadership, but also of 
other influential members of the community, and probably of substantial sections of the 
general population (at least implicitly).
19. I don’t mean to imply that all the various individuals, individually or jointly, influenc-
ing the decision to go to war can be thought as participating in a joint decision. Nor am I 
disputing the existence in some cases of an institutional joint decision- making body.
20. Miller, “Joint Epistemic Action.”
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their domestic law or of international law. As stated above, this is not to 
say that they have transferred their natural right to decide whether or 
not to use lethal force. Rather their decision to wage war by joining or 
remaining in the armed forces constitutes the waiving of that natural 
right. Moreover, any refusal to obey a lawful directive to go to war is 
likely to, and indeed should (other things being equal), lead to legal 
sanctions. So individual noncompliance with such a directive is likely 
to be extremely costly (e.g., result in incarceration).
4. The actions of nation- states and, specifically, the nationally (or more 
narrowly sectional) self- interested decisions of political leaders to wage 
war, are not effectively regulated by enforceable international law adju-
dicated by an authority with sufficient power and legitimacy to ensure 
that its adjudications are consistently adhered to by all, and especially 
by all of the powerful nation- states. The UN Security Council is an 
attempt to establish such an authority but, at least thus far, it is far from 
being an entirely successful attempt, given the willingness of power-
ful nation- states to ignore its determinations when it suits them. Thus 
whether or not waging a particular war is morally justified is not com-
prehensively specified and concretized in law in the manner in which, 
for example, commercial conflicts between rival firms engaged in 
attempted takeovers in a domestic economic setting or fights between 
rival street gangs are. Crucially, there is no independent supranational 
legal authority to which rival armies or individual military combatants 
might appeal in circumstances in which waging war is not obviously in 
breach of domestic or international law. Accordingly, there is no de facto 
higher authority than their national governments for citizens, includ-
ing military personnel, to turn to in the decision- making in respect of 
waging war. Moreover, in these circumstances the potentially malign 
influence of narrow and partisan political interests is likely to be very 
much greater than it ought to be.
5. Once hostilities have commenced, it is morally problematic, absent 
defeat on the battlefield, for individual combatants engaged in an 
unjust war (let alone a morally ambiguous war or, obviously, a just 
war) to refuse to comply with lawful orders from their superiors to kill 
enemy combatants. For, as we have seen, in embarking on a war indi-
vidual military combatants have waived their right to decide to use 
lethal force against enemy combatants and done so in favor of their 
superior officers and, ultimately, the political leadership of the polity on 
behalf of which they are waging war. This is, of course, not to say that 
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circumstances could not arise that would override their obligation 
to use lethal force as directed by their superiors. I know of no moral 
rights or obligations that are absolute and certainly obligations based 
on a waiver of this natural right are not absolute. Moreover, the 
waiver of this natural right is revocable; military combatants can and, 
under certain conditions, may abandon their armies even in war-
time. However, there is a strong moral presumption against revoking 
one’s waiver of a right. An additional consideration is that desertion 
is typically a very serious legal offence to which severe penalties are 
attached. In short, individual combatants fighting an unjust war are 
in a moral bind not typically encountered by individuals engaged in 
non- institutional, interpersonal, unjust conflict. For unlike the latter 
individuals, military combatants have, in effect, waived their moral 
right to stop fighting. Accordingly, if we assume, as in many cases 
we should, that the injustice of the war that they fighting overrides 
the (lawful) command of their superiors to continue fighting, nev-
ertheless, military combatants typically have a moral excuse if they 
continue to fight.
6. Other things being equal, it is morally permissible for military combat-
ants (say, members of A) to deliberately use lethal force against enemy 
combatants (members of B) in circumstances in which these enemy 
combatants are deliberately using lethal force against them. (For my 
purposes here, I take it that the military leaders of combatants can 
be understood to be combatants, even if they do not actually do any 
direct killing themselves.) Naturally, other things might not be equal. 
In particular, the enemy combatants (members of B) might be the ones 
fighting a just war, and the members of A may be fighting an unjust 
war. Nevertheless, there is a moral difference between these enemy 
combatants fighting a just war and innocent civilians. For innocent 
civilians are not a lethal threat to anyone, whereas the enemy combat-
ants are an intentional lethal threat to members of A, even if justifiably 
so. In short, the fact that combatants are an intentional lethal threat 
and innocent civilians are not is grounds for granting immunity to the 
latter, but not the former. It does not follow from this that members 
of A are morally justified in killing members of B, for members of A 
are fighting an unjust war and members of B a just war; rather, only 
the lethal actions of members of B are morally justified. Nevertheless, 
members of A might be excused for killing members of B, since mem-
bers of B are deliberately trying to kill members of A, and members of 
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A, let us assume, believe— and have good reasons for believing— that 
they are fighting a just war (and thus may retain their right not to be 
killed).
In this context the doctrine of the Moral Equality of combatants is evi-
dently morally justified. Considerations 1, 2, 3, and 4, taken jointly, cre-
ate a presumption in favor of regular soldiers waging war, if directed to 
do so by their own (legitimate) political leaders, and if doing so is not 
manifestly unlawful (either in terms of domestic or international law). 
Considerations 5 and 6 demonstrate the moral difficulties confronting 
combatants already engaged in fighting an unjust war who might con-
template refraining from using lethal force against enemy combatants. 
Consideration 6 also restricts combatants’ intentional use of lethal force 
to enemy combatants; noncombatants have immunity. In doing so, it 
eliminates a fundamental moral objection to combatants’ use of lethal 
force. There remains the moral issue of the justification of waging a par-
ticular war. However, in light of the above four considerations, for the 
regular soldiers there is a moral and legal presumption to be overridden. 
Moreover, since the doctrine of the Moral Equality of Combatants is mor-
ally justified, albeit not as an inherent moral principle, the institutional 
role of a military combatant will comprise the institutional rights and 
duties constitutive of that doctrine, including the institutional right to 
use lethal force against an enemy combatant in a theater of war. But since 
these institutional rights and duties are morally significant and morally 
justified, they are also special moral rights and duties. However, these 
institutional rights and duties are only prima facie (special) moral rights 
and duties. A prima facie moral right or duty is only presumptively an 
actual moral right or duty. Thus prima facie moral rights and duties con-
trast with pro tanto moral rights and duties. The latter are actual moral 
rights and duties, albeit ones that can be overridden.
In short, regular soldiers have an institutionally based, prima facie 
(special) moral right to use lethal force against enemy combatants in a 
theater of war, and they have that prima facie moral right even if they are 
fighting an unjust war. I emphasize here, as elsewhere, that special moral 
rights and duties are to be distinguished from natural rights and duties. 
So the special right of a military combatant to use lethal force against an 
enemy combatant is not to be confused with the natural right of personal 
self- defense, the natural right to defend the lives of others or even the 
natural right to decide whether or not to use lethal force, although these 
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natural rights are implicated (in the manner described in this chapter and 
in Chapter 3).
The above (complex) argument is offered to morally justify the doc-
trine of the Moral Equality of Combatants and the associated prima facie 
(special) moral rights and duties of military combatants. However, I now 
need to present a number of caveats. First, the argument is offered in 
a particular historical and institutional context— namely, that of regu-
lar soldiers acting on behalf of nation- states in an international context 
in which there is no reliably enforceable international law. In a different 
institutional context, such as that in which there was a world government, 
these conventions and laws might not be justified and combatants might 
not have the associated prima facie (special) moral rights and duties. 
Rather, they might have special moral rights and duties akin to those 
currently attaching to the role of a police officer (see Chapter 4). Second, 
the argument does not remove the moral difference between combatants 
fighting a just war and those fighting an unjust one. Combatants fight-
ing an unjust war have a prima facie (special) moral right to use lethal 
force against enemy combatants, but not an actual one; indeed, all things 
considered, they should not be fighting in an unjust war. Nevertheless, 
as argued above, they may well be morally excused for fighting an unjust 
war. On the other hand, it may well be that in the case of a manifestly, 
egregiously unjust war, combatants not only morally ought not to be fight-
ing in it, but their doing so may also be morally blameworthy (i.e., they 
have no acceptable excuse). Third, as argued in Chapter 4, the moral right 
to use lethal force is an inalienable right, albeit one waived by regular 
soldiers in favor of their superiors in theatres of war. Accordingly, while 
there is a presumption in favor of military combatants using lethal force 
in a theater of war, if they are given a lawful command to do so by a supe-
rior officer in the context of a lawful (democratically supported) war, this 
presumption can be overridden if the war is unjust, and such a command 
does not absolve individual combatants from moral responsibility for their 
lethal actions. Nevertheless, if subordinate combatants comply with law-
ful commands to use lethal force in an unjust war, they may well have 
diminished moral responsibility for their actions.
The important moral difference between combatants fighting a just 
war and those fighting an unjust one is reflected in their respective col-
lective moral responsibilities. As argued above, armed forces engaged in 
war are best understood as multilayered structures of morally significant 
joint action. Therefore, the individual members of these armed forces are 
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collectively (i.e., jointly), morally responsible for fighting, respectively, 
a just and an unjust war. As argued above, in such morally significant, 
layered structures of joint action, each individual organizational actor is 
morally responsibility for his or her own actions, yet each also has a share, 
jointly with the others, of the moral responsibility for the larger organi-
zational goals (collective ends, in my parlance) and their outcomes. So if 
Corporal Jones shoots dead an enemy combatant, he is morally respon-
sible for this, albeit, as noted above, he may have diminished responsibil-
ity. In addition, Jones has a share in the collective moral responsibility of 
the members of his unit for winning (or losing) the battle in the context 
of which he killed the enemy combatant, and, ultimately, in the collec-
tive moral responsibility of the members of his army for winning (or los-
ing) the war (just or unjust) war. Naturally, the contributions of different 
military personnel will be variable. Perhaps the contribution, for better 
or worse, of military leaders will be greater than their subordinates, and 
therefore their share of collective moral responsibility will be correspond-
ingly larger.
A further point is that the fundamental moral difference between 
combatants fighting a just war and those fighting an unjust war is consis-
tent with important moral differences between combatants fighting one 
unjust war and combatants fighting a second unjust war. Clearly, combat-
ants fighting an unjust war who, for instance, respect civilian immunity 
and do not torture enemy combatants are morally superior— other things 
being equal— than combatants fighting an unjust war who do not respect 
civilian immunity and who follow the practice of torturing enemy com-
batants. Consider in this connection the combatants fighting on behalf of 
ISIS in Iraq who regularly torture and kill, including by beheading, war 
prisoners and civilians alike. Clearly, the moral acceptability or unaccept-
ability of actions within a war is not fully determined by the overall justice 
of the war (i.e., by JAB alone and without recourse to the JIB consider-
ations). Indeed, it is appropriate simply to build the JIB requirement into 
the definition of JAB, as I have done.
As things stand in this definition, each condition must be met, and 
thus each condition is given, in effect, equal weight. To require that each 
condition be more or less met is a stringent, and perhaps ultimately prob-
lematic, requirement. But to require that each condition be fully met, 
generates immediate and obvious problems. What if, for example, there 
is the probability of enormous good following on waging a successful 
war, yet success hinges on torturing certain key personnel— actions 
178 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
178
ruled out by clause 7? Would such a war be obviously less just than one 
that met  all the conditions, but in which a marginal amount of good 
was the outcome? Or what of cases in which nonviolent strategies are 
completely ineffectual, but in which violent strategies are not likely to 
bring about cessation of rights violations, except in the very long term 
and with very considerable cost in terms of lives; and yet the rights viola-
tions taking place are massive? It is difficult to see how prior theoreti-
cal conditions could be articulated that would entirely and satisfactorily 
determine all such cases.
Such cases point to an area in which judgments that outrun prior the-
ory will have to be made. In short, just war theory cannot settle all such 
cases one way or another, although it offers general guidelines. Moreover, 
they also point to the gradations of moral rightness and wrongness, the 
pervasive presence of lose- lose situations in war, and the consequent need 
to make judgments based on a balance of moral considerations. In these 
respects, war is no different from many other areas of human decision, 
save that the moral stakes in relation to war are typically higher than else-
where. So much for JAB, let us now turn to JIB and ROE.
6.3  Jus in Bello and Rules of Engagement
As noted above, JIB pertains to the use of lethal force within a war and, 
most importantly, of three principles:  military necessity, proportional-
ity, and discrimination. The principle of discrimination provides for the 
immunity against lethal attack by combatants of noncombatant innocent 
civilians.21 I discuss this principle in the next chapter. Here my discus-
sion of JIB will focus only on the principles of military necessity and, to a 
much lesser extent, the principle of proportionality (and in doing so I take 
the principle of discrimination as a given— and also as straightforward in 
its application— which, of course, in reality it is not). Moreover, I provide 
a moral rather than a legal rendering of these principles. My discussion 
will also focus on ROE and its relation to JIB.
I note that the principles of necessity and proportionality are part of 
JAB as well as JIB. A nation ought not to go to war unless it is necessary, 
and it ought not do so if doing so will involve engaging in a war in which 
the quantum of lives lost will be disproportionately large relative to the 
21. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chapters 8 and 9.
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rights violations it is seeking to defend itself against. Thus my treatment 
of these principles will reflect this.
The principle of military necessity implicitly invokes a number of 
nested collective ends. Ultimately, the use of lethal force by a combatant 
or by a unit of the armed forces or by the armed forces as a whole is jus-
tified by whether or not it contributes to the realization of the collective 
end of winning the war. This military end is itself justified by recourse to 
the JAB collective end of the cessation of the rights violations of the citi-
zenry (i.e., successful national self- defense). However, the collective end 
of winning the war depends on the realisation of various other middle- 
level collective ends (e.g., winning various battles), and the latter in turn 
depend on the realization of various low level collective ends, e.g. winning 
various firefights. As we saw above, there is a multilayered structure of 
joint actions. Moreover, at each of these levels we can usefully distinguish 
between a military unit’s collective self- defense and its realization of the 
collective end (notably so- called mission accomplishment) that ultimately 
contributes to winning the war. Thus the members of a platoon might 
successfully defend themselves against an enemy attack without neces-
sarily achieving their military objective of (say) taking and holding a hill- 
top. Naturally, if the members of a unit of an armed force, or the entire 
armed force itself, fail to successfully defend themselves, then they will 
not be able to achieve their other military objectives. So the collective end 
of unit and force- wide self- defense is both an end in itself and typically, 
albeit not invariably in the case of units, a means to the ultimate collective 
end of winning the war.
As we also saw above, the realization of the lowest level collective ends 
(i.e., the successful performance of the lowest level joint actions) depends 
on the realization of various individual actions of individual combatants, 
albeit typically taken in aggregate, such as combatant Smith’s lethal shoot-
ing of enemy combatant E1, combatant Jones’s lethal shooting of enemy 
combatant E2, and so on. Moreover, whereas these single lethal acts of 
individual combatants are severely spatially and temporally circum-
scribed, (e.g., assume combatant John Smith of the US Marine Corps 
fired a round killing an enemy German combatant at 12 noon on June 
6th, 1944, on the beach at Normandy in France), as we ascend the vari-
ous levels of joint activity, the temporal and spatial parameters of the joint 
actions in question expand. Thus a firefight might take place over a couple 
of square kilometers and last for a number of hours; a battle might rage 
over an entire large sprawling city over many weeks; a war might have a 
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number of theaters in different countries and last for years. Accordingly, to 
determine whether or not the use of lethal force complies with the princi-
ple of military necessity a number of prior determinations must be made 
with respect to: (i) (nested) collective ends, (ii) lethal force as a means, and 
(iii) the costs of lethal force in terms of lives lost.
With respect to nested collective ends: In the overall context of the 
necessity to realise the collective end of winning the war and, therefore, of 
winning particular battles, the winning of which is necessary to win the 
war, and so on, it must be determined whether or not the collective end 
being contemplated (e.g., to destroy an enemy gun emplacement in order 
to win a firefight, to win the battle of Stalingrad in order to defeat the 
invading German army) is in fact a collective end that must be realized. In 
short, is realizing the collective end in question a military necessity? Here 
the notion of necessity in play is somewhat fluid; in probabilistic terms, 
there might be (say) a 60 or a 90 percent chance that if the enemy gun 
emplacement is not destroyed the firefight will be lost. I note that judg-
ments regarding military necessity in the context of nested collective ends 
are not ones likely to be able to be competently made by individual lower- 
echelon combatants. Typically lower- echelon combatants do not have the 
necessary information or the tactical and strategic competence and, in any 
case, they are inevitably focused on their own highly localized encounters. 
This feature of military conflict provides an important justification for 
the requirement that military combatants waive their discretionary right 
to use lethal force. This is not to say that individual combatants do not 
at times have to make their own discretionary judgments based on the 
principle of necessity in, for instance, one- off, localized, actual or poten-
tial lethal encounters. This is perhaps especially the case in waging war 
against terrorist armed forces, such as ISIS. Is a woman in long robes 
approaching a military checkpoint without permission a suicide bomber 
or merely a confused, innocent civilian? There being no time to consult 
a superior, Private Jones must make the decision to shoot or not and take 
full responsibility for his decision.22
With respect to the use of lethal force as a means: It must be deter-
mined whether or not the contemplated lethal force is an effective means, 
or part thereof, to achieve its proximate collective end and, thereby, its 
22. As discussed below, the ROE specify further the ius in bello principles. However, 
even quite specific rules cannot eliminate the requirement for discretionary judgments 
on some occasions.
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further collective ends. Moreover, it must be determined whether or not 
there is some other more effective or more efficient lethal (or, preferably, 
nonlethal) means to achieve the collective end in question. For example, 
firing mortars at a small camouflaged enemy gun emplacement in order 
to destroy it might be the most effective and efficient means available; 
perhaps a bomber strike might miss the target and be hugely expensive 
both in terms of resources expended and in terms of the opportunity cost 
vis- a- vis some other more appropriate target. Further the rules of engage-
ment or ROE are relevant here in so far as they are dictated by mission 
accomplishment considerations (collective ends, in my parlance). Under 
some circumstances, it may be judged efficacious to permit the use of cer-
tain weapons systems or tactics rather than alternatives in a given theater 
of war.
With respect to the costs of lethal force in terms of lives lost: It must be 
determined whether or not the use of lethal force being contemplated is 
minimally necessary to achieve the proximate end of, say, winning a battle 
in terms of overall costs as measured by lives lost on one’s own side, civil-
ian lives lost, and perhaps even enemy lives lost (supposing there to be, 
for instance, the possibility of capturing rather than killing enemy com-
batants). For example— and assuming it was a military necessity in terms 
of defeating the German army in the First World War that the British, 
French, and their allies win the Battle of the Somme— was the loss of 
most of the hundreds of thousands of lives lost in this battle minimally 
necessary to win it?
The principle of proportionality pertains to the relative quantum of 
harm done, and also to the relative seriousness of the wrong done. Here, 
as elsewhere, we need to distinguish between these two notions of harm-
ing someone and wronging them. For example, I might violate a billion-
aire’s property rights by defrauding him of, say, $1,000. Having violated 
his property right, I have wronged him; however, the amount in question 
might be too small to cause him any harm. Moreover, in war there are 
multiple forms of both harm and other wrongdoing, and multiple catego-
ries of persons harmed or wronged. To simplify, I shall restrict myself 
in what follows to intentional and unintentional killings by combatants 
of other combatants and of noncombatant civilians. Naturally, there will 
be a distinction in play between, for example, killing someone who has 
a moral right not to be killed (the person is both harmed and wronged) 
and killing someone in justified self- defense (the person is harmed but 
arguably not wronged).
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As we have seen with the principle of necessity, the principle of pro-
portionality operates at a number of levels; namely, national self- defense, 
defense of the armed forces, unit self- defense, and individual self- defense 
(and defense of the life of another). At the level of national self- defense, a cen-
tral question to be asked is whether the cost in terms of the loss of human 
life among armed forces and civilian populations on both sides incurred by 
waging this war is disproportionately large relative to the cessation of rights 
violations winning the war will bring about. Here the value of some lives 
might be discounted relative to others, such as the lives of the rights violators 
(including the enemy combatants), relative to the lives of the noncombatant 
citizenry whose rights have been violated. I return to this issue in the next 
chapter.
At the level of armed forces self- defense, some central questions to be 
asked are: Is the cost in terms of the loss of human life of members of the 
defending armed forces in question disproportionately large relative to 
the cessation of rights violations winning the war will bring about? Is the 
killing by means of concentrated aerial bombing of most of the members 
of the attacking armed force— and thereby winning the battle— with no 
reciprocal loss of life among the defending armed forces disproportion-
ate, given the alternative of winning the battle by using a mix of aerial 
bombing and ground troops, with the consequence that while most of the 
enemy troops will surrender and be captured, there will be a small num-
ber of casualties among the defending ground troops?
At the level of unit self- defense, some questions to be asked are: Is the 
cost in terms of the loss of human life of all members of the defending 
unit in question disproportionately large relative to the contribution the 
unit makes to the cessation of rights violations winning the war will bring 
about? Is it disproportionate for the unit to be denied aerial support in 
order to minimize civilian casualties, if it has the consequence that all or 
most of the members of the unit will likely be killed by enemy fire?
At the level of individual self- defense, and individual defense of the 
life of another, some questions are as follows: Is the cost in terms of the 
loss of my human life disproportionately large relative to the contribution 
I make to the cessation of rights violations winning the war will bring 
about? Is the cost in terms of the loss of my human life disproportionately 
large relative to saving the life of my comrade in arms? Is my firing of a 
rocket from a hand- held launcher at a large number of enemy combatants 
disproportionate, if there is a good chance a small number of nearby civil-
ians will be killed by the blast?
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In the light of these various different, but interdependent, levels (the 
synchronic structure of war), and of the unfolding, dynamic, and largely 
unpredictable series of causally and means/ end connected lethal actions 
over an extended period of time (the diachronic structure of war)— as well 
as distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, and between 
defenders and rights violators— we can immediately see that the appli-
cation of the principle of proportionality is a complex affair. Moreover, 
the principle of proportionality interacts with the principle of military 
necessity such that, at times, one cannot determine what is proportion-
ate unless one knows what is necessary, and vice versa. Obviously, if it 
is not necessary to take out a gun emplacement and there will be a large 
loss of life— including among one’s own ranks— if one does so, then one 
ought not to do so. On the other hand, if there is a high probability that 
destruction of the gun emplacement will cause the (unintended) deaths of 
a large number of civilians, then the destruction of the gun emplacement 
might be ruled out, notwithstanding that it would otherwise be necessary 
Perhaps it is necessary for the small unit to destroy the gun emplacement, 
if it is to avoid very high casualties, but not necessary for the unit to avoid 
high casualties for the battle to be won by the larger force of which the 
unit is a component.
This complexity of decision making in relation to the JIB (i.e., in 
respect of the application of the principles of military necessity and 
proportionality, not to mention discrimination) in the context of the 
synchronic and diachronic structure of war could not be managed in 
the absence of more specific, precise, and detailed rules: the rules of 
engagement. The ROE are, at least in theory, consistent with the more 
general principles of JIB. However, they relativize the JIB to specific con-
texts of war, and in so doing provide further specification of the JIB in 
those contexts. Accordingly, the ROE can be more restrictive in certain 
respects, and perhaps even more permissive in other respects (or other 
contexts), than a context- independent or pre- ROE interpretation of JIB 
might allow. For example, the ROE in a theater of war in which there 
are many civilians at risk might be very restrictive (e.g., “Do not shoot 
unless shot at.” On the other hand, in a theater of war in which there 
is no capacity to hold prisoners of war, and enemy combatants pose an 
immediate and grave threat if released unarmed (perhaps other weap-
onry and their fellow combatants are near at hand), the ROE might be 
more permissive (e.g., “Use maximum firepower when engaging the 
enemy”).
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6.4  Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined just war theory, including jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello, and offered a version of this theory— a version that accommo-
dates wars fought by and against nonstate actors, as well as between state 
actors. I have framed the concept of war in terms of theoretical notions 
developed in earlier chapters, such as joint actions, multilayered struc-
tures of joint action, institutional roles, and so on. Some more specific 
claims argued for include the following:  (1) Notwithstanding the moral 
difference between combatants fighting a just war and those fighting 
an unjust war, compliance with the doctrine of the Moral Equality of 
Combatants is morally justified and, as a consequence, military combat-
ants not only have the institutional rights and duties constitutive of that 
doctrine, but these rights and duties are prima facie (special) moral rights 
and duties. (2) The principle of military necessity is to be understood in 
terms of nested collective ends; thus the collective end of winning the 
war depends on the realization of various other middle level collective 
ends (e.g., winning various battles), and the latter in turn depend on the 
realization of various low level collective ends (e.g., winning various fire- 
fights. (3) The application of the principles of military necessity (and pro-
portionality and discrimination) involves in turn the application of more 
specific, precise, and detailed rules: the rules of engagement.
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Civilian Immunity
i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I explore the principle of discrimination and, in 
particular, the closely related notion of civilian immunity in war.1 I do 
so in the context of (1) the rights- based just war theoretical account of 
the moral justification for waging war elaborated in Chapter 6, and (2) 
the contrasting moral duties to innocent bystanders that police offi-
cers contemplating the use of lethal force have. Of course, innocent 
bystanders have a natural right not to be killed. This right can be over-
ridden under certain circumstances. However, as is the case with ordi-
nary citizens, and as was argued in Chapters 2 and 3, a police officer’s 
use of lethal force should not put the lives of innocent third parties 
at risk of serious harm other than in exceptional circumstances. In 
the case of police officers this requirement derives not only from the 
natural right of innocent third parties not to be killed but also in part 
from the primary institutional role of police officers to protect citizens 
from serious harm; and this latter (in part) institutional- based require-
ment typically trumps police officers’ other primary institutional 
role of arresting offenders. By contrast with both ordinary citizens 
and police officers, military combatants can justifiably put the lives 
of innocent citizens at considerable risk; they can do so on grounds 
of military necessity. So the principle of discrimination in play is far 
more permissive. In section 7.1 I address the issue of moral differences 
between combatants and civilians and, in particular, engage with a 
1. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chapter  9; Igor Primoratz, ed., Civilian Immunity 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007); Larry May, War Crimes and Just War 
(New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapters  5 and 8; Coady, Morality and 
Political Violence, Chapters 6 and 7.
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novel argument of Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin that, contrary to the 
standard view, the lives of one’s own combatants ought to be given 
priority over the lives of noncombatants of the enemy state or other 
collective political entity.2
In section 7.2 my focus is on the killing of innocent civilians in war. I 
discuss a number of putative moral justifications for the killing of inno-
cent civilians by combatants who are fighting an otherwise just war. The 
most influential of these justifications relies on the moral difference 
between intentions and foreseen consequences, on the one hand, and the 
application of the principles of military necessity and proportionality, on 
the other. Roughly speaking, the idea is that it is morally permissible for 
combatants to kill innocent civilians, if: (1) these civilian deaths were fore-
seen, but not intended; (2) the collective end being pursued by the com-
batants was militarily necessary; and (3) the number of civilian deaths 
was not disproportionate.
In sections 7.3 and 7.4 I  shift my focus to a moral issue that has 
received little attention to date:  civilians (noncombatants) who are not 
innocent. I argue that there are two neglected categories of civilians that 
should not enjoy civilian immunity in war.3 The first category (discussed 
in 7.3) consists of the members of civilian groups who have a share in 
the collective moral responsibility for non- life- threatening rights viola-
tions, yet are not morally responsible for the enforcement of these rights 
violations. Such persons are neither combatants nor their leaders; nor do 
they necessarily assist combatants qua combatants, as do, for instance, 
munitions workers. The second category (discussed in 7.4) consists of 
the members of civilian groups who are collectively morally responsible 
for culpably refraining from assisting those who have a moral right to 
assistance from them. Once again, such persons are neither combatants 
nor their leaders; nor do they necessarily assist combatants qua combat-
ants. Note that these two categories overlap insofar as they are members 
of civilian groups who are guilty of certain non- life- threatening rights 
violations by virtue of culpably refraining from assisting the rights bear-
ers in question.
2. An earlier version of the material in this section is in Miller, Terrorism and Counter- 
Terrorism, 142– 145.
3. An earlier version of the material in this section is in Miller, “Civilian Immunity, 
Forcing the Choice and Collective Responsibility.”
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7.1  Prioritizing the Lives of One’s Own 
Combatants over the Lives of Noncombatants 
of the Enemy
Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin have put forward an argument that, if sound, 
would reduce the moral benefits of targeted (as opposed to nontargeted) 
killing of terrorists. Kasher and Yadlin argue as follows. Military acts and 
activities carried out in discharging the duty of the state to defend its 
citizens against terror acts or activities while at the same time protecting 
human dignity, should be carried out according to the following priori-
ties, which reflect the order of duties the state has toward certain groups:
1. Minimum injury to the lives of members of the state who are not com-
batants during combat.
3. Minimum injury to the lives of the combatants of the state in the course 
of their combat operations.
4. Minimum injury to the lives of other persons (outside the state) who 
are not involved in terror, when they are not under the effective control 
of the state.
6. Injury as required to the liberties or lives of other persons (outside the 
state) who are directly involved in terror acts or activities.4
My concern here is only with Kasher and Yadlin’s prioritization of priority 
3 over 4. (Hence I have omitted a couple of categories that are irrelevant 
to this issue.) The group identified by priority 3 comprises the combatants 
targeting the terrorists (e.g., soldiers of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
targeting Hamas terrorists). The group identified by priority 4 comprises 
noncombatant innocents who are not members of (or otherwise under 
the effective control of) the state whose combatants are targeting the ter-
rorists (e.g., innocent Palestinians who happen to be in the vicinity of the 
terrorists).
In effect, this view of Kasher and Yadlin puts the moral value of the 
lives of innocent, noncombatant Palestinians at a discount, both vis- à- vis 
Israeli innocent noncombatants and vis- à- vis Israeli combatants. What is 
Kasher and Yadlin’s argument for this prioritization? Essentially, their 
claim is that the state has a special moral duty to protect the rights of its 
4. Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, “Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective,” 
Journal of Military Ethics 4, no. 1 (2005): 14– 15.
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own citizens— including its citizens who are combatants— and it does not 
have this duty to noncitizens. This special duty, they argue, is compatible 
with the general moral obligation on the part of the state to respect the 
human dignity of all.
Bashshar Haydar claims that there is a flaw in Kasher and Yadlin’s 
argument at this point.5 From the proposition that the state ought to give 
more weight to the interests of its citizens— and, specifically, the propo-
sition that it has a special moral duty to prevent harm to its citizens— it 
does not follow that the state is morally permitted to cause harm to non-
citizens for the sake of preventing harm to its citizens. This is correct; 
it does not follow. Presumably, what does follow is that if members of 
the armed forces have to choose between discharging their special duty 
to prevent harm to their fellow citizens and discharging their general 
moral obligation to prevent harm to noncitizens, they ought to choose 
the former (other things being equal). I  have argued this, in effect, in 
Chapters  3 and 6.  However, the question remains whether the special 
moral duty to prevent harm to its citizens overrides the duty not to harm 
noncitizens. Haydar disputes this, claiming that the moral permissibility 
of giving more weight to special ties (in this case the ties between a state 
and its own citizens) when it comes to helping or preventing injury does 
not apply when it comes to harming or causing injury. So the state might 
have a duty to rescue its own citizens that it does not have to the citizens 
of other states, so that the United States, for example, has a duty to rescue 
US citizens taken hostage by Hezbollah, but China, arguably, has no such 
duty to US citizens under any circumstances. (See Chapter 8 for further 
discussion of this general issue.) However, from this it would not follow 
that that US Special Forces personnel are morally entitled to throw gre-
nades at gunmen positioned on the balcony of a Hezbollah safe house 
as a prelude to rescuing US hostages being held in the basement, if the 
exploding grenades would likely also kill Chinese tourists standing on the 
adjoining balcony of a hotel.
I find Haydar’s argument compelling up to this point, though per-
haps not beyond it. My main reason for accepting his argument is that, 
as argued in Chapter  1, refraining from assisting those one has a duty 
to assist is not morally equivalent to killing them6; other things being 
5. Bashshar Haydar, “The Ethics of Fighting Terror and the Priority of Citizens,” Journal of 
Military Ethics 4, no. 1 (2005): 52– 59.
6. Kasher and Yadlin, “Military Ethics of Fighting Terror,” 20.
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equal, it is morally worse to kill someone than to fail to assist them, sup-
posing one has a duty to assist. I return to this issue in the next section. 
Here, however, I want to press a somewhat different point.7 As already 
mentioned, an important respect in which Kasher and Yadlin’s view is 
distinctive pertains to their putting of the lives of noncombatant (entirely 
innocent) noncitizens at a discount vis- à- vis the lives of combatant citi-
zens. I want to argue against this claim.
Let us grant that combatants have a special duty to protect the lives 
of their fellow citizens, and that they do not have this duty in respect 
of noncitizens (or, at least, in respect of persons who are not under the 
effective control of the state). Moreover, let us assume that there is an 
important difference between combatants and noncombatants in rela-
tion to this duty. Specifically, combatants have an institutionally based 
moral duty to put themselves in harm’s way— indeed, to risk their own 
lives— in order to protect the lives of their noncombatant fellow citizens. 
(I have argued for this proposition in Chapters 3 and 6.) Obviously, non-
combatant noncitizens (of the state in question) do not have either of these 
duties. For example, noncombatant (innocent) Palestinians living outside 
Israeli- controlled areas in the Middle East do not have a moral duty to pro-
tect the lives of Israeli noncombatants; much less do they have a duty to 
put themselves in harm’s way (indeed, risk their lives) in order to protect 
Israeli noncombatants.
Now consider the following two options confronting Israeli soldiers. 
They can intentionally fire a rocket into a building known to house 
Hamas terrorists, and thereby intentionally put the lives of noncomba-
tant (innocent) Palestinians, including children who attend an adjoining 
kindergarten, in harm’s way (i.e., there is a reasonable chance that some 
of these innocent Palestinian children will be killed). Alternatively, they 
can send in a group of soldiers to storm the building and kill the Hamas 
terrorists by using small arms at close range. The latter option puts the 
Israeli soldiers in harm’s way, since there is a reasonable chance that 
some of them will be killed by the terrorists. On the other hand, the lives 
of the innocent children will not be put at risk. Kasher and Yadlin are 
7. No doubt the distinction collapses in certain extreme cases. But in this respect, it is 
no different from many morally significant distinctions. The distinction, for example, 
between intentions and foreseen consequences is morally significant. However, in some 
extreme cases, it collapses. I take it that firing a lethal missile into a school building in 
which one knows there to be children and, thereby, causing their deaths is in effect to 
intentionally kill those children.
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committed to the first option, that of intentionally putting the lives of 
innocent children in harm’s way in order to avoid putting Israeli soldiers 
in harm’s way.
This conclusion is strongly counterintuitive. Let me explain why. The 
Israeli soldiers have a moral duty to put themselves in harm’s way in order 
to protect the lives of noncombatant Israelis. The Palestinian children 
have no such moral duty. However, the Israeli soldiers are, in effect, inten-
tionally bringing it about that the Palestinian children (unintentionally) 
discharge part of the Israeli soldiers’ duty for them— the part that involves 
putting themselves in harm’s way.
It might be argued against this that the Israeli soldiers’ duty to put 
themselves in harm’s way (in order to protect fellow Israeli citizens) is 
a duty that must be discharged only if it is necessary to do so; in this case 
it is not necessary to put themselves in harm’s way, since the Palestinian 
children are available to (unintentionally) discharge this role for them. 
However, the necessity in play here is relativized to the institutional role 
(and attendant duties) of the Israeli soldiers. It would not be necessary for 
the Israeli soldiers to put themselves in harm’s way if either one of two 
salient conditions obtained. The first condition is that it is not necessary 
for any person (other than the terrorists) to be to be put in harm’s way in 
order for Israeli soldiers to protect the lives of the Israeli citizens. This 
condition does not obtain; either the Palestinian children or the Israeli 
soldiers themselves will have to be put in harm’s way. The second condi-
tion is that someone else (other than the Israeli soldiers) has the duty to 
protect the Israeli citizens by putting him or herself in harm’s way, or, at 
least, someone else is able and willing (has consented) to discharge the 
soldiers’ duty for them. As we have seen, the Palestinian children have 
no duty to protect Israeli citizens, much less any duty to put themselves 
in harm’s way to do so; moreover, the Palestinian children did not con-
sent to be put in harm’s way, thereby relieving the Israeli soldiers of their 
own duty.
Let us now assume, as has been claimed, that Palestinian noncom-
batants are given the opportunity by the IDF of evacuating an area in 
which the IDF is targeting Hamas terrorists by, for example, dropping 
leaflets warning of impending attacks. If there is a realistic option for the 
Palestinian noncombatants in question to evacuate the area, then this is a 
morally relevant consideration, for in this circumstance they have chosen 
to remain in harm’s way. However, it is disputed by some commentators 
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that this is in fact a realistic option, at least in the case of Gaza, on the 
grounds that there is typically no safe and secure location for them to 
go to within a reasonable time frame.8 At any rate, let us assume that it 
is a realistic option for the Palestinians to evacuate. Naturally, if the IDF 
is going to engage in air strikes, irrespective of whether the Palestinian 
noncombatants remain in situ or evacuate, then it may well be in the self- 
interest of the Palestinians to evacuate. But arguably they are not morally 
required to do so; it is morally permissible for them to remain in occupa-
tion of their own homes, the danger notwithstanding. Supposing they do 
so remain, is it morally permissible for the Israelis to proceed with their 
air strikes, knowing that they will kill innocent Palestinians? Arguably, it 
is morally permissible for the Israelis to engage in air strikes on military 
targets notwithstanding the possibility of collateral damage, assuming 
these air strikes are a military necessity and the loss of innocent lives is 
not disproportionate.
However, the problem that arises at this point is that the buildings 
being bombed are frequently civilian dwellings; they are not military 
installations, as that term is conventionally understood. Rather, the 
proposition is that the dwellings are ones that are (a) occupied by non-
combatant civilians who are not in a position to relocate because, for 
example, they are children; but also (b) used by terrorist combatants as 
safe havens, weapons stashes, and the like. Accordingly, any air strike 
on such a building will not only involve the foreseeable death of civil-
ians, it will also involve the intentional killing of those civilians. If, for 
example as happened in Gaza, a one- ton bomb is dropped on a house 
full of children, as well as terrorist- combatants, it is difficult to see how 
the deaths of the children was not intended.9 If this is correct, then 
the Israeli air strike is evidently in breach of the principle of civilian 
immunity.
8. Steven Erlanger and Fares Alkram “Israel warns Gaza targets by phone and leaflet” 
International New  York Times July 8 2014 www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 07/ by- phone- and- 
leaflet- israeli- attackers- warn- gazans.htm
9. Yuli Novak “When I served, the Israeli military was the most moral in the world. No 
more” The Guardian 28 July 2014 http:// www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/ 2014/ jul/ 
28/ israeli- military- most- moral- no- more- outrage- indifference Here the assumption would 
be that the military officers knew, or believed that there was a reasonable chance that there 
were children in the building.
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7.2  Moral Justification for Killing  
Innocent Civilians
In this section I discuss the moral justifications for killing innocent civil-
ians; in the two sections following this one, I consider moral justifications 
for killing culpable citizens (noncombatants). Here we need to keep in 
mind a number of moral considerations identified in the previous section 
and in previous chapters. In each case, the considerations are subject to the 
condition of other things being equal. The moral considerations are: (1) it is 
morally wrong to deliberately kill innocent persons; (2) it is morally worse 
to deliberately kill innocent persons than it is to unintentionally, but fore-
seeably, kill them; (3) it is a greater evil to kill n+1 innocent persons than 
to kill n innocent persons, and it is a greater evil to fail to preserve the 
lives of n+1 innocent persons that to fail to preserve the lives of n persons 
(supposing that in each case one has a moral obligation to preserve the 
lives in question); and (4)  regular soldiers (including navy and air force 
personnel) have a special institutional and moral duty to protect the lives 
of their own citizens. Of these moral considerations, I take 1 and 3 to be 
self- evidently true, and 2 to be controversial. Accordingly, I discuss 2 in 
the last subsection of this section. In the meantime, I assume it to be true. 
What of consideration 4? I have argued for the truth of this consideration 
in Chapter 3. However, a brief discussion here for the purposes of clarifica-
tion is in order.
As I argued in Chapter 3, regular soldiers have a jointly held special 
institutional and moral duty to protect the moral and institutional rights10 
of their fellow citizens, but not necessarily the citizens of other countries. 
This joint special duty is in part based on a partialist joint moral obliga-
tion; namely, the joint moral obligation that all the members of a politi-
cal community have to provide for the security of the members of that 
community. This partialism in respect of joint positive moral rights and 
obligations is an extension of three forms of more basic moral partialism; 
namely, to oneself, to one’s family, and to one’s friends. The extension 
derives in part from the fact that oneself and one’s family and friends 
are typically part of one’s political community, and in part from the fact 
that one’s life typically consists in large part in participation in joint 
enterprises constitutive of one’s community (e.g., educational, health, 
10. Or, at least, those moral rights to properties constitutive of their selfhood and those 
institutional rights derived therefrom.
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economic, social, and political enterprises)— enterprises productive of 
collective goods enjoyed principally by members of one’s community. 
Needless to say, this partialism is weakened in the context of globaliza-
tion, since friends and relatives are increasingly globally dispersed, as are 
joint economic enterprises, in particular. Nevertheless, the continuing 
existence of an international order composed of nation- states underpins 
this particular partialist model, as well as the structure of joint special 
moral and institutional rights of military combatants that it gives rise to.
7.2.1  Justifiably Killing Innocent Civilians
To facilitate the discussion of the moral justifications for killing inno-
cent civilians, let us consider a scenario in which the air force of a liberal 
democracy, A, might be ordered by its political authority to shoot down an 
airplane with 100 innocent civilians (citizens of A) aboard that is being 
piloted by enemy combatants of a political entity, B, who are intent on fly-
ing it into a building housing 1,000 innocent civilians (also citizens of A). 
Here the dilemma is whether intentionally to refrain from protecting the 
lives of the innocent many (office workers in the building) or intentionally 
to kill the innocent few (the passengers in the plane) to protect the lives 
of the innocent many (and given the passengers are almost certain to be 
killed in any case).
Here we first need to distinguish between institutional rights and 
duties, on the one hand, and moral ones, on the other. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that these may come apart; specifically, it may be morally per-
missible to perform actions that are, and ought to be, unlawful.11 At any 
rate, arguably, prime ministers, presidents, senior security personnel, and 
other government officials in liberal democracies ought never to have the 
legal power to authorize the deliberate killing of their own citizens in 
order to save the lives of other people (whether they be their own citizens 
or not)— or indeed for any other “larger” purpose. A reason for this might 
be that the moral legitimacy of governments— liberal democratic govern-
ments in particular— derives in large part from, and crucially depends 
on, respecting the fundamental natural rights of autonomous human 
persons considered individually, and not simply in aggregate. Put simply, 
11. For example, in relation to torture. Torture ought never to be legalized, but it may 
well be morally justified in some extreme circumstance. Seumas Miller, “Is Torture Ever 
Morally Justifiable,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2005): 179– 192.
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individual citizens in liberal democratic polities, or in other polities for 
that matter, have not relinquished, and indeed cannot relinquish, their 
natural and inalienable right not to be killed, including their right not to 
be killed by governments. Rather the only general condition under which 
it is institutionally and morally permissible for governments intention-
ally to take the lives of their citizens are ones in which the right not to be 
killed of the citizens in question has been suspended by virtue of their 
own rights violations (e.g., these citizens are themselves unjustifiably 
attacking other citizens).12 It might be argued that citizens can at least 
waive their right not to be killed. However, this seems doubtful, given 
that waiving one’s right not to be killed would be, in effect, to relinquish 
it; assuming the dead cannot return to life.13 At any rate, if this line of 
reasoning is correct, then military combatants who deliberately kill their 
own citizens, even for good moral reasons (of which more below), cannot 
be discharging their special institutional rights and, therefore, their moral 
right qua special institutional moral rights. Or, at least, these military 
combatants cannot be discharging their special rights in so far as these 
rights have been legitimately authorized by the citizenry, as is presumably 
required in a liberal democracy. It could, nevertheless, be argued that the 
intentional killing of a small number of innocent persons can sometimes 
be justified in order to save the lives of a much greater number. Perhaps 
so, but it would not follow from this that a special institutional and moral 
right should exist to enable this. In particular, such a special right would 
depend on appropriate authorization from the citizenry but, as already 
stated, such authorization would require the citizenry to do what they can-
not do, i.e. relinquish or waive their right not to be killed.
Even if the government officials of liberal democracies— and perhaps 
of any morally legitimate system of government— are not, and could not 
be, justifiably authorized to intentionally take the lives of their own inno-
cent citizens, scenarios like the one just described give rise to acute moral 
dilemmas for any human agent who has the opportunity to intervene; 
generally, such human agents will be, in fact, senior political, military, 
12. Perhaps the right to life of innocent citizens has been suspended if these citizens con-
sent to their lives being taken in order to save the lives of a much larger number of fellow 
citizens.
13. But see Joel Feinberg “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life” The 
Tanner Lecture on Human Values, University of Michigan, April 1 1977.
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or police personnel. Accordingly, let us proceed with the analysis on this 
basis, and in effect, therefore, bracket their institutional rights and duties.
Other things being equal, deliberately killing one innocent human 
being in order to save the life of another is morally wrong. However, in 
the plane scenario, the number of persons to be deliberately killed is 
small relative to the number of lives to be saved. No doubt, deliberately 
killing a few innocents in order to save the lives of many innocents 
is inherently morally problematic; it necessarily involves doing what 
is morally wrong, given the undiminished moral value that attaches 
to the life of an innocent person. For deliberately killing one or more 
innocent persons is morally wrong, irrespective of whether it is done 
in order to save the life of one or more innocent persons. On the other 
hand, arguably, deliberately refraining from saving the life of one or 
more innocent persons is also morally wrong, albeit a lesser wrong, 
irrespective of whether or not it is done in order to avoid the morally 
wrong action of deliberately killing some other innocent person or per-
sons. So the dilemma resolves itself into a choice between a greater and 
a lesser evil.
At any rate, at some point in this kind of scenario, the choice will surely 
need to be made in favor of killing rather than refraining from saving. 
Suppose, for example, that the choice is between deliberately killing one 
person and refraining from saving 1,000? Arguably, to kill one and save 
1,000 is the lesser evil, and thus morally preferable. As it happens, in the 
plane scenario, there is a further consideration in play that is, I suggest, 
decisive. In this scenario, the innocent persons to be deliberately killed 
will die whatever option is chosen, for they are in plane about to crash into 
the building housing the other innocent people. Accordingly, the mor-
ally preferable option is to shoot down the plane and, thereby, save the 
innocent people in the building, and to do so in the knowledge that the 
innocent people in the plane will die whatever one does, since they can-
not be saved. This “solution” to the dilemma does not imply that delib-
erately killing the innocent persons in the plane is not a morally wrong 
act; it implies merely that the pro tanto wrongful act of deliberately kill-
ing them is overridden by other moral considerations. Nor does it imply 
that the proportionately larger number of innocent lives to be saved is the 
only moral consideration that could override or, at least, make a decisive 
moral difference to the moral wrongness of deliberate killing of the inno-
cent. For it may be that partialist considerations could also make a moral 
difference.
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Consider a scenario in which an agent, A, has to choose between killing 
a few innocent persons (say, n) in order to save a larger number of innocents 
(say, N) or doing nothing, in which case N innocents die because they are 
not saved, but n remain alive because they are not killed. On the basis of the 
argument made above, assume that it is morally required to kill n innocents 
in order to save N, but morally impermissible to kill n + n* innocents in order 
to save N (where n* is less than n, and n + n* is less than N). Thus far, the two 
moral considerations discussed above are in play; namely, consideration 1, the 
lesser or greater evil consideration based purely on the number of innocent 
lives to be preserved or lost (lesser evil principle); and 2, the intention/ fore-
seen consequences principle. What of the third kind of moral consideration, 
the partialist ones? Can they make a moral difference? The partialist consid-
erations in question are natural in character, as opposed to institutional.
Here there are two salient propositions:  (A)  Partialist considerations 
transform the impartialist moral obligation to kill n innocents in order to 
save N innocents into a moral permission (if not a requirement) not to kill 
n innocents in order to save N innocents, because the n innocents consist of 
oneself and one’s close relatives (i.e., one’s parents, siblings, and children), 
whereas the N innocents are all complete strangers. (B) Partialist consid-
erations transform the impartialist moral requirement not to kill n + n* 
innocents in order to save N innocents into a moral permission (if not a 
requirement) to kill n + n* innocents in order to save N innocents, because 
the N innocents consist of oneself and one’s close relatives (i.e., one’s parents, 
siblings, and children) and the n + n* innocents are all complete strangers. 
I take proposition (A) to be self- evidently correct, but what of proposition (B)?
The argument for proposition B might go as follows: The truth of prop-
osition A demonstrates that moral consideration 3 (natural partialist con-
siderations) can, at least in principle, transform a moral requirement to 
kill into a permission not to kill (given the only other moral considerations 
in play are 1 (lesser evil principle) and 2 (intention/ foreseen consequences 
principle). But if consideration 3 can transform a moral requirement to 
kill into a permission not to kill, why can it not transform a requirement 
not to kill into a permission to kill (given that in both cases, 1 and 2 are the 
only other moral considerations in play)?
Let us consider the matter further. The truth of proposition A seems 
to rest on the proposition (proposition C) that it is morally worse to delib-
erately kill (say) one’s innocent mother than it is to deliberately kill an 
innocent stranger. If this is so, then it is surely morally worse not to save 
one’s innocent mother than it is not to save an innocent stranger. Indeed, 
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the latter proposition (proposition D) seems to be independently true. But in 
that case, proposition B is evidently correct, since it can rest on the truth of 
proposition D. To see this, consider the following: We accepted above that it 
is morally permissible to kill n innocents in order to save N innocents, but 
that it is impermissible to kill n + n* innocents in order to save N innocents. 
For instance, it is morally permissible to kill two innocent persons in order to 
save four innocent persons, but not in order to save three innocent persons. 
Now assume that your mother is one of the latter three innocent persons. 
Arguably, it is morally permissible for you to kill the two innocents in order 
to save the three innocents of which your mother is one.
I conclude that partialist considerations can, at least in principle, make 
a moral difference, in that they can add weight to other moral consider-
ations in a manner that enables them to transform a moral obligation to 
kill innocents in order to save innocents into a moral permission not to 
kill innocents in order to save innocents, and to transform a moral obliga-
tion not to kill innocents in order to save innocents into a moral permis-
sion to kill innocents in order to save innocents.
Since the partialist considerations discussed above are natural rather 
than institutional in character, it does not necessarily follow that the spe-
cial institutional (moral) duties of regular soldiers can likewise make a 
moral difference. On the other hand, these natural partialist consider-
ations partly underpin the special duties of military combatants. This 
suggests that the special duties of regular soldiers may well make this 
kind of moral difference. Here much turns on the nature of the partialist 
considerations inherent in the joint enterprises that also partly underpin 
the special duties of military combatants.
7.2.2  The Moral Significance of the Intention/ Foreseen 
Consequences Distinction
In the above discussion, I have assumed that the intended/ foreseen con-
sequences distinction is morally significant. Specifically, other things 
being equal, if the death of innocent victims is intended, then the action 
causing the deaths is morally impermissible, whereas if the deaths were 
merely foreseen, then the action may well be morally permissible. This 
has been disputed by some theorists, notably Frances Kamm.14 Kamm 
14. F. M. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture and War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).
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argues that “when an act is otherwise morally permissible despite the 
harm and terror it produces, intending the harm and terror as a means or 
ends need not affect the permissibility of the act.”15
Kamm offers the example of Baby Killer Nation (BKN).16 BKN inten-
tionally kills and terrorizes children (innocent civilians) as an end in 
itself, and also as a means to protest pro- natalism. However, BKN only 
kills when it has a justified (moral and legal) pretext to do so in order 
to escape punishment. For example, BKN bombs a building housing 
Nazi combatants, with the consequence that the objectives of the just 
war against the Nazis are furthered, albeit at the cost of the lives of 
some children who reside nearby (they are collateral damage). However, 
these civilian deaths are a morally acceptable cost by the lights of just 
war theory (specifically, the principles of necessity and proportional-
ity). Accordingly, the building would be a legitimate military target (in 
terms of international law and, presumably, morality) of some armed 
resistance group engaged in morally justified armed conflict against 
the Nazis. However, BKN bombs the building only as a means to kill 
the nearby children, whereas the resistance would do so without this 
intention (though the death of the children would be an unintended but 
foreseen consequence).
BKN is akin to a homicidal maniac who goes to war in order to kill 
people as an end in itself, but who conforms to the laws of war in order 
to escape punishment; the laws, therefore, constrain his killing. On 
Kamm’s view, the homicidal- maniac- soldier would not be guilty of mur-
der. Assuming murder is unlawful killing, and the law in question mir-
rors the relevant moral principles, this seems right.
Kamm goes on to make the normative theoretical claim that when an 
act is otherwise morally permissible (notwithstanding the harm it pro-
duces), intending the harm need not affect the permissibility of the act. 
However, I am not sure that Kamm succeeds in adequately justifying the 
claim that when an act is otherwise morally permissible (notwithstanding 
the harm it produces), intending the harm need not affect the permissibil-
ity of the act— at least insofar as she relies on BKN for this justification.17 
15. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies, 78.
16. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies, 79.
17. I do not have the space to deal with her interesting non- case- based justification (Kamm, 
Ethics for Enemies, 82– 83).
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For there is a further relevant feature of BKN that has thus far escaped her 
and others’ notice; namely, a certain second- order, good intention.
The first point to be made here is that BKN intends to, or is other-
wise aiming at, escaping punishment, and has as a means to this end its 
compliance with legally enshrined just war principles. The question is 
whether BKN complies intentionally or merely as a foreseen consequence 
of its action of bombing the building. It seems to me that compliance 
with the just war principles is not adequately described as a mere fore-
seen side effect of the bombing. (By the way, this [at least in theory, if 
not in practice] might be consistent with Kamm’s claim that the death of 
the Nazi occupants of the building was foreseen but not intended). For 
these principles are accepted by BKN as a constraint on its activities, and 
BKN surely scrutinized its planned actions and their consequences, and, 
if necessary, would have adjusted its actions to ensure that they com-
plied with these principles (albeit in order to escape punishment), by, 
for example, ensuring that the bomb would not kill more civilians than 
would be justified under the principles. Moreover, if the principles were 
more permissive, then BKN would no doubt have taken advantage of this 
to, say, explode a bigger bomb that would have killed even more civil-
ians (assuming a bigger bomb was the only one available). Accordingly, it 
seems to me that BKN intentionally complies with the principles in order 
to escape punishment, or, at least, that if is far from clear that this is not 
so. If this is right, then the bad terroristic intention is constrained by 
this good, just war theoretic intention— the latter being a second- order 
intention with respect to the former. In this respect, BKN is akin to our 
homicidal- maniac- soldier.
This suggests that Kamm is right in thinking that the intention to 
kill (innocent) civilians does not, in her example, make a difference to 
the moral permissibility of the action of BKN. However, it also suggests 
that she is wrong about the reason for this. The intention to kill innocent 
civilians fails to make a difference to the (all things considered) moral 
permissibility of BKN’s action, not for the reason that this bad intention 
does not in itself make any (pro tanto) moral difference, but rather for the 
reason that there is another intention in play that neutralizes its moral 
effect:  the above- described second- order, good intention with respect to 
this bad intention. This second- order good intention acts as a constraint 
on the bad intention in question (and, therefore, on the bad intentional 
actions— acts of terrorism [or genocide]— that would otherwise be per-
formed by BKN).
200 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
200
7.3  Civilian Immunity and Rights Violations
In this section I explore the moral notion of civilian immunity in rela-
tion to the category of civilians who are morally responsible for the rights 
violations that, in large part, justify the waging of war. Specifically, I want 
to focus on non- life- threatening rights violations. In the section following 
this one, I turn to a category of civilians who are culpable, but who are 
not morally responsible for actions that constitute rights violations; their 
sins are sins of omission rather than sins of commission. It will turn out 
that these two categories overlap insofar as there are members of civilian 
groups who are guilty of certain non- life- threatening rights violations by 
virtue of culpably refraining from assisting the rights bearers in question. 
However, for ease of exposition, my focus in this section will be on rights 
violations that are acts, as opposed to omissions.
In a just war, enemy combatants can be legitimate targets on at least 
two grounds. First, they might be a subset of the perpetrators of rights 
violations that provide the casus belli. This would be the case in a war 
of self- defense against an enemy hell- bent on genocide (e.g., the Allied 
forces fighting against the Nazi SS in the Second World War, or the largely 
Tutsi army fighting against the Hutu army and its militias in Rwanda in 
1996),18 or on the imposition of a political arrangement characterized by 
egregious rights violations, such as enslavement (e.g., the Iraqi, US, and 
other armed forces fighting against ISIS in Iraq).
Second, enemy combatants are legitimate targets, if they are attempt-
ing to enforce a policy of rights violations. For example, the government 
in apartheid South Africa embarked on a policy of removal of so- called 
black spots; that is, moving black people out of designated white areas into 
impoverished black “homelands.”19 This policy was a form of racial or eth-
nic “cleansing,” and as such was a violation of human rights.20 However, 
the role of police and military personnel was one of enforcement of the 
policy; the policy in itself did not necessarily consist of the use of coer-
cive, including lethal, force, for it is conceivable that such a policy could 
18. See Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (London: Viking, 1995).
19. Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty:  The South African 
Challenge (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1988).
20. The policy did not necessarily, or in fact, involve large- scale murder of the persons 
being removed, as happened in, for example, Bosnia in the days of Milosevic and his 
Bosnian Serb allies.
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have been implemented by some means other than coercive force (e.g., by 
fraud) .
Accordingly, on the above outlined rights- based theoretical account of 
the just war (Chapter 6), civilians— as opposed to combatants— are legiti-
mate targets, if (but not necessarily only if): (a) they are morally respon-
sible for (natural and institutional) moral rights violations, or threatened 
rights violations, that justify the waging of war; and/ or (b) they are mor-
ally responsible for the enforcement of such rights violations.
The civilians in question would include politicians, or other nonmili-
tary leaders, who are responsible for the rights violations, or the enforce-
ment thereof, in the sense that in the context of a chain of command they 
were the relevant authority that directed that the human rights violations 
be carried out, or that they be enforced.21 Such civilians would also include 
persons who, while not necessarily part of any formal chain of command, 
were nevertheless responsible for the rights violations (or the enforce-
ment thereof), in that they planned them, and saw to it that other persons 
performed the rights violations (or the enforcement thereof). Here, the 
latter are instruments, but not necessarily subordinates, of the former. 
For while the former are the principal agents, they are not necessarily in 
a position of political or military authority. For example, a political leader 
might pay a group of foreign mercenaries to engage in ethnic cleansing 
without being in a relation of political or, indeed, military authority to the 
mercenaries. Rather, the relationship might be an essentially economic or 
commercial one, such as that of employer to employee or client to service 
provider.
Four categories of persons responsible for rights violators can now be 
derived; namely (1)  direct rights violators; (2)  direct enforcers of rights 
violations; (3) political or military authorities, or other principal agents, 
indirectly (via their directives, payments, etc., to others) responsible for 
rights violations; and (4) political or military authorities, or other principal 
agents, indirectly (via their directives, payments, etc., to others) respon-
sible for the enforcement of rights violations. Moreover, I take it that civil-
ians who belong to either of these four categories of persons (directly or 
indirectly) responsible for rights violations (or their enforcement) are, at 
least in principle, legitimate targets, meaning that lethal force can justifi-
ably be used against them under certain circumstances.
21. Jeffrie Murphy, “Killing of the Innocent,” The Monist 57, no. 4 (1973): 532f.
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Thus far I  have distinguished between rights violations and the 
enforcement of rights violations. Moreover, we can distinguish between 
positive rights and negative rights, and between life- threatening rights 
violations and non- life- threatening rights violations. Some violations of 
negative rights, such as the right to freedom, might not be life threaten-
ing. And some violations of positive rights, such as the right to subsis-
tence, might be life- threatening.
It is easy to see why the use of lethal force in response to life- threat-
ening rights violations might be morally justified. However, the use of 
lethal force in response to non- life- threatening rights violations is more 
problematic— especially when such use of lethal force is on a scale 
properly describable as engaging in war. For it is typically assumed 
that life is more important than other goods to which people have 
rights. So it is harder to justify the use of lethal force in relation to non- 
life- threatening rights violations than it is in relation to life- threaten-
ing rights violations. On the other hand, as argued in Chapters 1 and 3, 
we can distinguish between moral rights to properties constitutive of 
selfhood and rights to properties not so constitutive. Violations of the 
former category of rights (e.g., torture, enslavement), at least, are espe-
cially serious rights violations, and as such may well warrant a lethal 
response, if this is necessary to bring about their cessation. In speak-
ing of non- life- threatening rights violations, I have in mind especially 
violations of rights to properties constitutive of selfhood other than the 
right to life. However, I will make it clear when the non- life- threaten-
ing rights violations under discussion are not of this kind (i.e., when 
they are not per se violations of rights to properties constitutive of 
selfhood). At any rate, I will now address the question of the legiti-
macy of directing lethal force at a particular class of civilians; namely, 
persons responsible for non- life- threatening rights violations. So I am 
not speaking of persons responsible for life- threatening rights viola-
tions. Nor am I speaking of persons responsible for enforcing non- life- 
threatening rights violations (or for enforcing life- threatening rights 
violations).
The use of lethal force against persons responsible for life- threatening 
rights violations is typically self- defense or defense of the lives of oth-
ers. (In the case of life- threatening rights violations that are violations of 
positive rights, it is self- preservation, or preservation of the lives of oth-
ers.) But what of the use of lethal force in response to non- life- threatening 
rights violations?
Civilian Immunity 203
   203
The use of lethal force in response to those who are enforcing non- 
life- threatening rights violations seems straightforward enough. For such 
enforcers are themselves using, or are threatening to use, lethal force in 
response to any attempt on the part of those whose rights are being vio-
lated to escape their fate. So the morally unjustified use of lethal force 
is being met with lethal force. This is not primarily or, at least, exclu-
sively killing in self- defense in the sense of killing in defense of one’s 
life; rather, it is killing in defense of rights other than the right to life.22 
Nevertheless, it is the use of lethal force against combatants— combatants 
seeking to enforce non- life- threatening rights violations. And I  take it 
that, historically, in wars of conquest, combatants fighting on behalf of 
the aggressor nation- state are seeking to enforce non- life- threatening 
rights violations, such as violations of the right to freedom (e.g., the right 
not to be enslaved). Accordingly, if the members of the state whose rights 
to freedom are under threat were to cease to resist, then their lives might 
well cease to be under threat.
At any rate, the use of lethal force against such combatants seems jus-
tified on the basis of the accumulated moral weight of three consider-
ations: (1) the lethal force is used in order to bring about the cessation of 
non- life- threatening rights violations, or the removal of the threat thereof 
(e.g., rights of freedom); (2)  the lethal force is used in response to the 
morally unjustified use of lethal force by the would- be enforcers of these 
non- life- threatening rights violations; (3) the lethal response is necessary 
in order to bring about the cessation of the (non- life- threatening) rights 
violations in question. Moreover, in the light of our earlier discussion, the 
use of lethal force against civilians who have authority over such com-
batants enforcing rights violations, or with respect to whom the combat-
ants are otherwise instruments, also seems morally justifiable, at least in 
principle.
However, this does not settle the question of whether it would be mor-
ally justifiable to use lethal force against civilians who are responsible for 
non- life- threatening rights violations, and yet who are not responsible for 
the enforcement of these rights violations. Consider in this connection 
public officials who plan and administer a policy of forced removals (racial 
or ethnic “cleansing”) or of enslavement, but who might not have any role 
22. Naturally, it may result in killing in defense of one’s life if the person whose rights 
(other than right to life) are being violated resists the enforcer of these rights violations and 
the two parties engage in lethal combat.
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or authority in relation to the enforcement of the policy. Are such officials 
legitimate targets?
Here it is important to distinguish types of cases. The typical situa-
tion involves the existence of some collective end,23 such as the removal 
of people from their homes to an impoverished tract of land, or the occu-
pancy of some other nation- state and the enslavement of its population. 
This is a collective end, since its realization requires a large number of dif-
ferent individual persons to perform distinct tasks in the service of a com-
mon end— indeed, it requires a number of different persons to occupy 
a variety of different institutional roles in the service of a common end. 
There are planners, administrators, enforcers (combatants), leaders, and 
so on, engaged in a collective project (e.g., to dispossess a people, or to win 
a war of conquest). Given that the collective end in question constitutes 
a violation of rights (albeit non- life- threatening rights), the participants 
in this collective project are morally culpable; they are collectively mor-
ally responsible for wrongdoing. More precisely, each individual person 
is individually morally responsible for his or her contributory action that 
is part of the means to the collective end, and each individual is jointly 
morally responsible with the other individuals for the realization of the 
collective end (or, at least, its joint pursuit).24
In many cases, enforcement is not only a means to the collective end— 
to the violation of non- life- threatening rights— it is integral to that end. 
This is obviously the case in wars of conquests, both past and present. 
Consider in this connection the war being fought by ISIS in Iraq. ISIS has 
enslaved thousands of Yazidis and Christians in Iraq, especially women 
(often provided to ISIS fighters as sex slaves) and children (and murdered 
many others, including many of their menfolk).25 But it is also the case in 
the South African forcible removal example mentioned above. The policy 
of the elimination of “black spots” in apartheid South Africa was a policy 
that in part consisted of enforcement (i.e., of use of force, or the threat 
thereof). Therefore, non- enforcers such as public officials who planned 
and administered this policy are not only morally responsible (jointly with 
others) for the non- life- threatening rights violations, they are also morally 
23. In Miller, “Joint Action,” I offer an account of the notion of a collective end.
24. So collective moral responsibility can be understood in these cases as joint moral respon-
sibility. See Chapters 3 and 5 above, and also Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility.”
25. Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (London: HarperCollins, 2015), 
215– 217.
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responsible (jointly with the enforcers) for the use of force. To this extent, 
they are analogous to military planners in respect of a war of conquest. 
Naturally, the degree of morally responsibility may differ. For example, 
combatants might have a greater share of the collective responsibility 
than those who merely assist combatants qua combatants (e.g., munitions 
workers).
However, arguably, there are cases in which enforcement is not inte-
gral to the collective end that consists of a violation of non- life- threatening 
rights. Consider a variation on our forcible removal example. In our new 
scenario, blacks in apartheid South Africa are falsely told that they are 
being transported to a land of freedom and material well- being, when 
in fact they are going to an impoverished “homeland.” Assume further 
that when some groups of blacks disbelieve these claims, they are forc-
ibly made to board the transport vehicles; indeed, lethal force is used on a 
number of occasions. However, enforcement is only used as a supplement 
to fraud. Now suppose the civilians who planned this policy of removal 
to “homelands” by fraud did not know— and could not reasonably have 
been expected to know— that lethal force would be used, and neither did 
the civilians who organized and time- tabled the transport. So in post- 
apartheid South Africa, these civilians claim that whereas they have a 
share in the collective moral responsibility for violating the rights of the 
blacks, including their property rights, they are in no way responsible for 
the use of lethal force that took place from time to time to further this col-
lective end. In short, they acknowledge their guilt in relation to perpetrat-
ing non- life- threatening rights violations, but deny that they were guilty 
of enforcing these violations (and deny, therefore, any guilt in relation to 
life- threatening rights violations). Their moral claim seems reasonable, 
assuming the facts are as they describe them.
The upshot of this discussion is that there may well be civilian groups 
who have a share in the collective moral responsibility for the violation of 
non- life- threatening rights violations without necessarily being morally 
responsible for the enforcement of these rights violations. Arguably, such 
civilians do not have a moral right to immunity in war. After all, they are 
not innocent civilians, but rather rights violators.
Notwithstanding their lack of a moral right to immunity, these civil-
ians might justifiably expect an extent of protection not afforded to 
combatants. For the argument in favor of using lethal force against 
these civilians has less moral weight than it has in the case of those— 
especially combatants— who are not only collectively responsible for 
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the non- life- threatening rights violations, but also for the enforcement 
thereof. Accordingly, other things being equal, such civilians might justi-
fiably be afforded civilian immunity in some wars, such as ones in which 
it was not necessary to target both combatants and civilian rights violators 
who were not enforcers.
In this section I have not considered a number of familiar arguments 
pertaining to civilian immunity. Let me simply note that there may be 
other grounds, such as consequentialist or contractarian grounds, for 
restricting the use of lethal force against civilians.26 For example, con-
ventions may have been set in place to prohibit the use of lethal force 
against civilian administrative personnel, and the abandonment of these 
conventions may bring about a situation that is morally worse, all things 
considered, than respecting them. Or the policy of violence may lead to 
counterviolence and a general escalation in violence that is morally less 
acceptable than the state of affairs in which legitimate targets were left 
unharmed. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which directing 
lethal force at combatants and their leaders alone is not sufficient to ter-
minate the rights violations, and in which widening the set of targets so 
as to include civilian non- life- threatening rights violators is necessary to 
terminate the rights violations, and in which such widening is not over-
ridden by consequentialist or contractarian considerations. In such situ-
ations, these categories of civilians may become legitimate targets, given 
that they lack a moral right to immunity.
7.4  Civilian Immunity and Culpable Omissions
Thus far we have mainly been concerned with civilians who are indi-
vidually and collectively morally responsible for moral rights violations, 
implicitly understood as violations of negative rights, such as a war of 
conquest or an active and sustained policy of slavery or of forcible removal 
(ethnic or racial “cleansing”). We have not been concerned, at least explic-
itly, with positive rights and duties to assist as such. So our focus has not 
been on culpable omissions. That said, I have already acknowledged that 
the category of non- life- threatening rights violations includes violations 
of some positive rights. At any rate, in this section I will discuss the col-
lective moral responsibility of certain categories of culpable non- attackers.
26. George I. Mavrodes, “Conventions and the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 4, no. 2 (1975): 117– 131.
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In Chapter 1 I suggested that deadly force may well in principle be used 
to enforce some positive rights, as well as to enforce negative rights. These 
positive rights include rights to goods other than life; they include rights 
that can be unrealized, even when the right to life is realized. Moreover, as 
is the case with negative rights, third parties— at least in principle— have 
moral rights, and indeed moral obligations, to use lethal force to ensure 
that some positive rights are respected, such as enforcement rights and 
obligations.
This point has clear implications for certain civilian members of gov-
ernments who intentionally refrain from respecting the positive rights, 
including subsistence rights, of their citizens. For governments have a 
clear institutional responsibility to provide for the minimum material 
well- being of their citizens; or at least this is so if the governments in 
question have the capacity to do so. Accordingly, the moral responsibil-
ity based on need— and the fact that those in government could assist, if 
they chose to— is buttressed by this institutional responsibility that they 
have voluntarily taken on. Consider Saddam Hussein’s refusal to distrib-
ute much- needed food and medicine to his own citizens, albeit in the 
context of UN- sponsored sanctions.27 Citizens in such states may well be 
entitled to use lethal force against the government officials in question, 
notwithstanding the fact that these officials are neither combatants nor 
the leaders of combatants. Perhaps such use of lethal force, including 
assassination, is to be regarded as terrorism, on the grounds that the vic-
tims of terrorism are not themselves attackers.28 If so, then terrorism can 
be morally justified in some circumstances. However, the civilian victims 
in this kind of scenario are not innocent; their intentional acts of omis-
sion constitute violations of the positive rights of their citizens.
Some of these rights or duties to use lethal force to enforce positive 
rights might be exercised against certain categories of people with dimin-
ished responsibility. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that there 
is a pharmaceutical company that has a policy of not providing cheap 
drugs to HIV/ AIDS sufferers whose lives are at risk, notwithstanding 
27. Sandra Mackey, The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein (London: Norton, 
2002), 363. There was moral complexity here in that, given that Saddam was refusing 
to dispense food and medicines under the oil for food program— citing sanctions as his 
reason— then almost certainly sanctions should not have continued to be applied. But this 
does not relieve Saddam of culpability.
28. This depends on the definition of a terrorist. See Miller, Terrorism and Counter- 
Terrorism, Chapter 2.
208 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
208
that it could do so and remain profitable. The company prefers to inflate 
its profits by selling its drugs far above cost; it refuses to sell the drugs 
cheaply, and is able to do this, let us assume, because of its monopolistic 
position in the market. Suppose that one of the employees of the company 
is not actually responsible for the company policy, but is nevertheless the 
person who is refusing to provide sufferers with the drug when they come 
to procure it.29 Assume also that the AIDS sufferer is not in a position 
to credibly threaten the company managers who are responsible for the 
policy. Although the employee seems to have diminished responsibility 
for failing to respect the AIDS sufferer’s right to the life- preserving drug, 
it is nevertheless, arguably, morally permissible for the AIDS sufferer to 
shoot the employee dead, if that is the only means by which he can pre-
serve his own life.
By analogy, government employees, such as administrators who delib-
erately refrain from assisting those in need because they are instructed 
to do so by their government, might well be legitimate targets of “terror-
ists.” Consider our above described example of blacks in apartheid South 
Africa who were forcibly removed into desolate “homelands,” such as Qua 
Qua, and once there found they could not provide themselves with a basic 
level of subsistence, and malnutrition and disease were rampant. Now 
suppose South African politicians declare such homelands to be indepen-
dent states— as in fact happened— and thereby try to absolve themselves 
and their administrators of their preexisting institutional responsibility 
for the minimum material needs of the “citizens” of these alleged new 
states. Since the “states” were not legitimate— and were not in fact inter-
nationally recognized as legitimate— these politicians and other officials 
did not succeed in absolving themselves of their institutional responsibil-
ity. Accordingly, the South African government officials who refrained 
from assisting the relocated people were conceivably legitimate targets, 
on the assumption that killing these officials was necessary in order to 
ensure that the subsistence rights of these people would be realized. This 
might be so, even if the officials in question were not the same officials 
who planned and implemented the policy of forcible removals. Perhaps by 
this time the latter officials had retired, and were replaced by a new cohort 
of politicians and administrators. If so, these new or succeeding officials 
29. Assume also that he does not have an adequate reason for refusing to provide the drug, 
(e.g., if he provides the drug he will be fired and unable to get another job, with the conse-
quence that his young children will be brought up in abject poverty).
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would simply have inherited the collective institutional and moral (pro-
spective) responsibility to provide for the minimal material needs of the 
“citizens” of these alleged new states.
Let us focus on the collective responsibility of the members of a group 
who intentionally refrain from assisting their needy fellows. Here we need 
some theoretical account of collective responsibility for omissions (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.4). I offer the following account of collective moral 
responsibility for omissions, though it provides only a rough approxima-
tion30 of a sufficient condition for such responsibility. Members of some 
group, A, are collectively morally responsible for failing to assist mem-
bers of some group, B, who are in extreme need. (i.e., members of A are 
collectively morally responsible for a serious positive rights violation) if 
(1) the assistance was not provided and, as a consequence, the members 
of B died (or otherwise underwent extreme suffering); (2) the members 
of A deliberately refrained from so assisting; (3) each or most of the mem-
bers of A  intervening having as a collective end the (joint) provision of 
assistance would have saved the lives of members of B (or relieved their 
suffering); (4) each of the members of A would have deliberately refrained 
from intervening— and intervening having as a collective end the saving 
of the lives of members of B (or relief of their suffering)— even if the oth-
ers, or most of the others, had intervened (in order to realize that end); and 
(5) each of the members of A had an institutional responsibility— jointly 
with the others— to intervene and, thereby, realize the collective end in 
question.
Complications arise when the intervention in question has to be per-
formed on a very large scale, or indirectly via representatives of a com-
munity. Specifically, the nature and scale of the assistance might require 
appropriately authorized, organized assistance by members of trained 
occupational groups, such as medical personnel. Thus, in representa-
tive democracies, practically speaking, the members of the government 
may have to enact policies and authorize funding, and the membership 
of relevant organized groups may have to be mobilized, if the interven-
tion is to efficiently and effectively relieve the large- scale deprivations in 
question. Here the notion of a multilayered structure of joint action and 
that of a joint institutional mechanism are relevant (see Chapter 2)— as 
argued above, the former notion enables collective institutional and moral 
30. For example, I have not bothered to spell out the conditions for moral responsibility, 
(e.g., that the agents were not under the influence of drugs).
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responsibility to be ascribed to organizational actions and omissions, and 
the latter to the decision making of centralized bodies, such as the prime 
minister and his or her cabinet.
I note that large voting populations in contemporary democracies 
cannot be assimilated to organizational structures, such as an army, 
or to small- scale directly participatory bodies, such as the cabinet in a 
Westminster- type system of government. Therefore, notions of collec-
tive responsibility that might apply to such organizations, or to such 
small- structured groups, do not apply to large populations. Accordingly, 
the failure of the members of democratic government to discharge their 
collective institutional and moral responsibility and ensure appropriate 
humanitarian intervention does not generate a moral justification for the 
wholesale targeting of the civilian voting population by, say, terrorists, 
much less the targeting of a civilian population living in an authoritarian 
state that fails to do its duty in this regard.31
Nevertheless, in the light of this above definition, it might well be the 
case that civilian members of governments and their administrations— 
such as Iraqi politicians and administrators who failed to meet their 
responsibilities to distribute food and medicine to their own citizens, and 
South African politicians and administrators who failed to adequately 
assist destitute blacks in the “homelands”— are collectively morally 
responsible for omissions of a kind that might justify the use of lethal 
force on the part of their citizens to ensure that the rights to assistance in 
question are realized. In short, members of civilian groups who culpably 
refrain from assisting those who have a human right to assistance from 
them might thereby forfeit their right to immunity in the context of a 
conventional war or armed struggle.
7.5  Conclusion
My concern in this chapter has been with the principle of discrimination 
and, therefore, with civilian immunity in war. While I accept that mili-
tary combatants have special moral duties to protect the members of their 
own citizenry— duties that they do not have in relation to the citizens of 
other communities— I deny that the lives of military combatants can be 
given priority over the lives of innocent civilians of an enemy state. This is 
31. But see Primoratz, “Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory,” 232f; and Michael Green, “War, 
Innocence, and Theories of Sovereignty,” Social Theory and Practice 18, no. 1 (1992): 39– 62.
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congruent with the standard understanding of the principle of discrimi-
nation. However, I have argued that partialist considerations can make a 
moral difference in relation to the permissibility of the use of lethal force 
in war under some circumstances. Partialist considerations (e.g., between 
members of the same family or community) make a difference insofar as 
they underpin special moral rights and duties.
I have also argued that intentions— as opposed to foreseen 
consequences— make a moral difference, but the intentions in question 
are not necessarily first- order intentions; in some cases they are second- 
order intentions that constrain first- order intentions.
Finally, I have argued that the category of innocent civilians does not 
include rights violators, including non- life- threatening rights violators 
and those who culpably fail to discharge obligations to positive rights 
holders (culpable refrainers). Accordingly, some categories of noncomba-
tants do not have the moral right to immunity in war.
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Humanitarian Armed  
Intervention
i n  r e c e n t  d e c a d e s  there have been a number of humanitarian armed 
interventions1 by nation- states in conflicts taking place within the borders of 
other nation- states.2 One thinks of Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Rwanda, East Timor, Libya, and, most recently, Iraq (against ISIS). In some 
instances, such as Rwanda, armed intervention was evidently morally jus-
tified; however, the armed forces deployed were inadequate and/ or arrived 
far too late. In other instances, such as Kosovo, armed intervention might 
have been justified and timely, but the force deployed was arguably exces-
sive, or at least of the wrong form.3 In still other cases, such as in response 
to the large- scale atrocities being committed by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, it 
1. The material in this chapter is based on two earlier published papers: Miller, “Collective 
Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide”; and Seumas Miller, 
“Collective Responsibility and Armed Humanitarian Intervention,” in Tony Coady and 
Michale O’Keefe, eds., Righteous Violence (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 
2005), 51– 71.
2. For useful discussions of these issues, see Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Inquiry into Law and Morality (New  York:  Transnational Publishers, 1988); Oliver 
Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Cambridge:  Polity Press, 1996); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers:  Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and, more 
recently, James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who 
Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3. See Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig, The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in 
Europe? (London: Pearson Education, 2001).
 
Humanitarian Armed Intervention 213
   213
is unclear what form humanitarian armed intervention should take and 
who should take it, but it is indisputable that humanitarian intervention is 
required, and that it needs to be an armed intervention if it is to succeed.
8.1 Justifiable Humanitarian Armed Intervention
The first general point to be made here is that at least some humanitarian 
armed interventions are morally justified. Consider the case of Rwanda. 
According to Fergal Keane, in Rwanda, after the deaths in a plane crash of 
the Rwandan and Burundian presidents on April 6, 1994, an orchestrated 
program of genocide took place: “In the ensuing 100 days up to one mil-
lion people were hacked, straggled, clubbed and burned to death.”4 The 
genocide in Rwanda— and like cases— constitutes a decisive objection to 
the claim that humanitarian armed intervention is never morally justified. 
Moreover, cases such as East Timor appear to demonstrate that humani-
tarian armed intervention can be successful. On the other hand, the expe-
rience of cases such as Bosnia shows that even if armed intervention is 
justified, the situation on the ground needs to be adequately understood if 
that intervention is to be successful. Evidently, the United Nations failed to 
understand that the war in Bosnia was in large part genocidal and directed 
at the civilian population. So interventionist methods aimed only at keep-
ing groups of combatants from getting at one another were inadequate; 
such methods cannot and did not protect the civilian populations.5
The second general point concerns the nature of the justification. The 
fundamental justification for humanitarian armed intervention is that 
genocide, or other large- scale human rights violations, are taking place, 
and armed intervention is the only way to put an end to it. This is a moral 
justification. So also are the justifications offered by the United States 
and its allies in relation to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, namely the so- called 
“weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and “regime change” arguments.6 
The prevention of the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is 
self- evidently a moral imperative. But the “regime change” argument was 
4. Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (London: Viking Press, 1995), 29.
5. See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1999), 64.
6. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random 
House, 2002).
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presented principally in terms of the cessation of Saddam Hussein’s ongo-
ing violation of the moral rights of the Iraqi people.
Perhaps there can be decisive political or military justifications for 
armed interventions. Moreover, such nonmoral justifications are not 
necessarily inconsistent with moral justifications. Indeed, in some cases 
the political and military justifications are themselves ultimately under-
pinned by moral justifications. For example, arguably, the nature of the 
polity being put in place by ISIS in its so- called caliphate is in itself so 
morally repugnant in human rights terms as to warrant humanitarian 
armed intervention independent of considerations of the narrow political 
and purely self- defense interests (e.g., in respect of ISIS- inspired terror-
ism) of the extant Iraqi state, the United States, the Gulf states, and so on. 
In still other cases, armed intervention might be politically expedient as 
well as being morally justified. Some have argued as much in relation to 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.7 
In practice, armed interventions are likely to be motivated by a complex 
mix of moral, political, military, economic, and other considerations. 
However, my point pertains to good and decisive justifications:  I claim 
that the fundamental (good and decisive) justification for humanitarian 
armed interventions, in particular, is a moral justification.
Here, as elsewhere, moral justifications can be weakened or strength-
ened by legal considerations. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that 
an action can be morally justified, all things considered, notwithstanding 
that it is unlawful. Many types of unlawful activity aimed at undermin-
ing authoritarian states, such as peaceful demonstrations or supporting 
banned political organizations, illustrate this point. And I  take it that 
humanitarian armed intervention in Rwanda, for example, was morally 
justified— if not morally obligatory— even if it would have been in breach 
of international law (as in fact was presumably not the case). As it hap-
pens, I take it that post- 2001, the so- called doctrine of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) has strengthened the legal hand of would- be interveners 
at the expense of state sovereignty, albeit the legal issues here are complex 
and outside the scope of this work.8
Granted the existence of an acceptable general moral justification for 
humanitarian armed intervention in terms of the prevention of large- scale 
7. Pollack, The Threatening Storm.
8. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, Chapter 2.
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violation of human rights (notably, genocide), at least four further ques-
tions arise. First, should the armed intervention be undertaken by any 
nation- state or states that happen to have the wherewithal to prosecute 
it successfully, or should it be undertaken only with the participation, 
or at least consent, of the international community? Second, should the 
notion of large- scale human rights violations be a very narrow notion, and 
therefore restricted to, say, genocide, or should it be relatively wide, and 
embrace, say, authoritarian rule? Third, should the intervention go only 
so far as to terminate the rights violations that triggered it, or should it 
involve taking preventative measures in relation to possible future rights 
violations by the perpetrators, or indeed by the erstwhile victims?9 Fourth, 
what form should the armed intervention take? For example, should aerial 
bombing— as opposed to, say, the use of ground troops— be the principal 
tactic?
My own view in relation to the first question is as follows: The moral 
responsibility to intervene is a collective moral responsibility. In particu-
lar, it is the collective responsibility of members of the international com-
munity, and therefore of the members of their governments and of other 
relevant individual human actors, to combat large- scale human rights 
violations taking place inside states whose governments are unwilling or 
unable to terminate those rights violations. Indeed, the internal govern-
ment might be the one perpetrating the rights violations, as in the case 
of the Assad government in Syria at the time of this writing. Moreover, 
broad- based, multilateral interventions are less likely to serve the interests 
of any one nation- state, or small group of states, and are therefore more 
likely to be motivated by genuine humanitarian, rather than purely politi-
cal, considerations. Nevertheless, since the moral priority is to bring about 
the cessation of the rights violations— rather than merely determine who 
ought to be the one or ones to terminate it— unilateral intervention might 
be justified in cases in which the international community is unwilling 
to act. Here I am setting aside the admittedly relevant issue of the legality 
of unilateral interventions, which is a central concern in relation to, for 
example, the invasion by US- led force of Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
In relation to the second question, I hold that the understanding of 
large- scale human rights violations should be narrow, in that it should 
9. Evidently in Kosovo the Albanians were the object of ethnic cleansing by the Serb 
armed forces, but the Serbs themselves became the object of ethnic cleansing by some of 
Albanian armed forces (KLA). See Weymouth and Henig, The Kosovo Crisis, 239.
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involve only large- scale moral rights violations of the most morally egre-
gious kind; specifically, large- scale violations of rights to properties con-
stitutive of selfhood. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and enslavement of 
populations are perhaps the most obvious examples of this. Here I dis-
tinguish, first, between rights violations and injustice. Injustice does 
not, I suggest, provide an adequate justification for armed intervention. 
Second, I distinguish— admittedly somewhat arbitrarily— between viola-
tions of rights to properties constitutive of selfhood (e.g., right to life) 
and violations of rights to properties not thus constitutive (e.g., voting 
rights). The former, but not necessarily the latter, justify armed interven-
tion. Thus genocide, but not necessarily authoritarian governance, justi-
fies armed intervention.10
However, the appropriate notion of large- scale human rights violations 
is wide in the sense that it should not be restricted to violations of so- called 
negative rights, such as the right not to be killed, but also some positive 
rights, such as the right to a basic subsistence. Consider the case of an 
autocrat who, for political purposes, was deliberately refraining from the 
provision of basic medicine and foodstuffs to some needy element in his 
country.11 In such a case, there might be an in- principle justification for 
armed intervention. Why armed intervention? Because the nation- state 
in question is refraining from providing for the subsistence rights of its 
citizens.
In relation to the third question, I hold that interventions, where pos-
sible, should be preventative, and therefore should not necessarily be 
restricted to the termination of occurrent rights violations. I acknowledge 
the dangers attendant upon permitting intervention in relation to future, 
and therefore only potential, human rights violations. The 2003 US- led 
invasion of Iraq under Saddam Hussein proved to be a telling example 
of such dangers. For it turned out that Saddam Hussein did not have the 
arsenal of WMDs that the United States and United Kingdom leadership 
led the world to believe he had.
10. For a contrary view, see Teson, Humanitarian Intervention.
11. For an insight into Saddam Hussein’s strategies and policies in this regard, see Richard 
Butler, Saddam Defiant (London: Phoenix, 2000). Of course, Saddam Hussein’s policies 
took place as a response to, and in the context of, the sanctions imposed by the United 
States and its allies. Given Saddam’s response, the continued imposition of sanctions was 
surely both ineffective and immoral.
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Nevertheless, where a process of large- scale human rights violations 
has commenced, then intervention is justified, at least in principle. 
Moreover, where it is clear, post- intervention, that the process of rights 
violations would recommence, were the intervening armed forces to 
retire, then the continued presence of the intervening armed forces— 
jointly acting with civilians engaged in a program of reconciliation and 
reconstitution of civil society— might also be justified.
I cannot here give a definitive answer to the fourth question beyond 
endorsing in general terms the jus in bello principles of just war theory. 
These principles posit that the armed force used should be the minimum 
necessary force, that it should be proportionate, and that it should be 
effective.12 It has been argued that if North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) had used ground troops in Kosovo, then some of those ground 
troops would have been killed, but the extent of the death of civilians and 
the destruction of property would have been much less. If so, from the 
perspective of just war theory, NATO should have used ground troops— 
assuming armed intervention in some form was justified, because the 
lives of one’s own soldiers do not have a greater moral value than the lives 
of the innocent people one’s armed forces have been deployed to protect.13 
A similar point might be made in respect of the armed intervention by the 
United States and its allies in the war against ISIS in Iraq and in respect of 
the civil war in Syria. Here I am assuming that providing combat troops 
in large numbers, or “boots on the ground,” would be effective, and that 
the prior question of the moral requirement to intervene militarily has 
been settled, bearing in mind that— as argued in Chapters 3 and 6— the 
institutional purpose, or at least the primary institutional purpose, of reg-
ular soldiers is to protect their own citizenry. I return to this issue below.
In this chapter I explore the notion of collective moral responsibility as 
it pertains to nation- states that are or ought to be engaged in humanitar-
ian armed intervention in a variety of settings involving states or groups 
perpetrating large- scale human rights violations. I do so on the assump-
tion that such interventions are the collective moral responsibility of 
the community of nation- states, and therefore of the members of their 
12. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.
13. On the other hand, it could be argued that the media spectacle of significant numbers 
of body bags containing dead NATO combatants might have created public pressure in 
the United States, in particular, not to continue with the intervention, and thereby left the 
Albanian Kosovars to the mercy of their murderous Serbian enemies.
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governments and of other relevant individual human actors. I  further 
assume that humanitarian armed intervention is a cross- border use of 
armed forces, or the threat of such use, by a state or states primarily for 
the purpose (though not necessarily the sole purpose) of protecting basic 
moral rights. So cross- border armed interventions undertaken primarily 
in order to, for example, expand one’s territory or sphere of political influ-
ence are not humanitarian armed interventions. Russia’s recent invasion 
of Crimea is a case of the latter, notwithstanding its claim to be protecting 
the rights of members of the Russian community therein.14
The current armed intervention against ISIS in support of Iraqi gov-
ernment forces on the part of the United States, Iran, and others is, or at 
least ought to be, a case of an humanitarian armed intervention, given 
that ISIS is intent on engaging in large- scale human rights violations, not 
only in the course of waging war, but also as an inherent feature of the 
form of governance it is seeking to impose in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere.15
Humanitarian armed intervention can be undertaken with or without 
the consent of the government of the state whose border is to be crossed, 
and it can include direct attacks on the armed forces of that government, 
as well as the deployment of armed forces to protect safe havens, ensure 
that food or other aid is distributed properly, and so on.
8.2  Collective Moral Responsibility  
and Human Rights Violations
For my purposes here, I need to clarify the key notion of collective moral 
responsibility as it pertains to humanitarian armed intervention, build-
ing on the notion of collective moral responsibility introduced in earlier 
chapters. Let us remind ourselves what that or those notions were.16 As 
argued in Chapter 5, the basic suggestion is that collective moral respon-
sibility can be regarded as a species of joint responsibility for actions and 
omissions; specifically, it is joint (prospective or retrospective) moral 
14. Armed interventions that are not humanitarian armed interventions are not necessar-
ily morally unjustified, albeit a good and decisive moral justification is likely to be hard to 
come by in such cases.
15. Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror.
16. For an earlier and more detailed application of this notion of collective responsibility 
to genocide, see Miller, “Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan 
Genocide.”
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responsibility for morally significant joint actions and omissions and 
their foreseeable and avoidable morally significant outcomes. In this con-
nection I distinguished between natural, institutional, and moral respon-
sibility. Moreover, the joint “actions” in question can operate at a number 
of individual and collective levels. Here the notion of a layered structure 
of joint actions introduced in Chapter 3 is salient. Let us work through 
some examples of humanitarian armed intervention, beginning with the 
collective (retrospective) moral responsibility of perpetrators of large- scale 
serious rights violations.
Consider the perpetrators of basic rights violations against the Tutsis 
in Rwanda, the so- called Interahamwe and the Rwandan army. According 
to Fergal Keane, the genocide in Rwanda was a premeditated collective 
enterprise.17 From 1990, thousands of ordinary Hutus were organized 
into citizen militias (Interahamwe) by the Rwandan army under the 
directions of Rwandan Hutu government leaders, including President 
Juvénal  Habyarimana. (Rwanda was a one- party state governed by the 
MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development), led by the 
president. Lists of Hutus were compiled on the basis of identity cards; an 
identity card system having been put in place in 1926 during the Belgian 
colonial period. At a prearranged moment— the above- mentioned shooting 
down of the plane transporting the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in 
1994— the Interahamwe went on their genocidal rampage against Tutsis.
Clearly, each individual who committed murder is individually mor-
ally responsible for that murder. However, there is an additional dimen-
sion of collective moral responsibility. This dimension arises in virtue of 
the overall (morally significant) collective end of the organized murder of 
Tutsis; namely, genocide. Evidently, many, if not most, of the individual 
murders were committed (at least in part) as a means to an overall collec-
tive end— the elimination of all Tutsis in Rwanda. Moreover, the geno-
cide, or, at least, partially successful genocide, relied on the coordinated 
action of organized groups, each group realizing some proximate collec-
tive end in the service of the larger collective end of genocide, so that there 
was a layered structure of joint action. Accordingly, perpetrators were 
jointly, and therefore collectively, morally responsible for genocide (or 
near- genocide). The nature and extent of the contributions of individual 
members of the Interahamwe, and their leadership, to this collective end 
of genocide varied. For example, some assisted by identifying individuals 
17. Keane, Season of Blood.
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as Tutsis, but without actually taking anyone’s life. Perhaps those in sub-
ordinate positions have diminished moral responsibility relative to their 
superiors. Moreover, no single individual member of the Interahamwe, 
with the possible exception of the key members of the leadership, can be 
held fully morally responsible for the genocide. Nevertheless, none can 
escape some share and degree of moral responsibility for the realization 
of the collective end to which they intentionally contributed. As for the 
key members of the leadership, each might be held fully morally respon-
sible (jointly with the others) for the genocide depending on the degree 
of control they exercised over the membership.
Again, consider the murder of 8,000 Muslim men by Serbian soldiers 
in the UN designated “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995.18 The 
Serbian forces bombed and then took the town of Srebrenica, after NATO 
had failed to support the UN force “protecting” the town. The Serbian sol-
diers then hunted down and murdered any Muslim men that they could 
find. Here was planned and orchestrated ethnic cleansing and mass mur-
der in the service of ethnically pure territorial units and Serbian national-
ism. There was joint action at a number of levels; indeed, there was a layered 
structure of joint action. However, let us consider the alleged actions of the 
members of a group of soldiers on the ground, who were allegedly dressed 
as UN peacekeepers and driving stolen white UN vehicles. These Serbian 
soldiers guaranteed the Muslim’s safety. They would then shoot them.19 
This is joint action. Some soldiers are driving the vehicle, while others are 
looking for Muslims; then some of the Serbian soldiers are talking to the 
Muslims to convince them that they are safe. Finally, some of the Serbian 
soldiers shoot the Muslims dead. The soldiers coordinated their individual 
actions in the service of a collective end. Each performed a contributory 
action, or actions, in the service of the collective end of bringing about the 
death of the Muslim men.
Here again, it is important to note that each agent is individually (nat-
urally) responsible for performing his contributory action, and respon-
sible by virtue of the fact that he intentionally performed this action, and 
the action was not intentionally performed by anyone else.20 Since the 
18. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin, 1997), 
345– 350.
19. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 350.
20. For an earlier and more detailed application of this notion of collective responsibil-
ity to ethnic cleansing, see Miller, “Collective Responsibility and Armed Humanitarian 
Intervention.”
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individual actions in question were morally significant, each agent is mor-
ally responsible for his action. Moreover, on my account, to say that they 
are collectively (naturally) responsible for the realization of the collective 
end of a joint action is to say that they are jointly responsible for the realiza-
tion of that end. Again, since the collective end in question was morally 
significant, the agents who realized it were collectively morally responsible 
for this outcome.
What of institutional responsibility (both individual and collective), as 
opposed to natural and moral responsibility? The members of military 
and police organizations do not have an institutional, let alone a moral, 
responsibility to engage in large- scale human rights violations, even if they 
are directed by those in authority to do so. It might be argued against this 
that that some large- scale human rights violations have been institution-
alized, and are even lawful, and that therefore the relevant institutional 
actors had an institutional obligation to perpetrate them. For example, 
some of the large- scale human rights violations perpetrated by members 
of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and some of those perpetrated 
by the Nazis under Hitler, were lawful. The case of ISIS in Iraq and Syria 
is less clear- cut, notwithstanding the claim of members of ISIS to have 
established a legitimate state under Sharia law: the so- called caliphate. 
For, unlike South African under apartheid and Germany under the Nazis, 
ISIS is at this time essentially a nonstate actor, albeit one occupying terri-
tory and attempting to set up a new state (or quasi- state). However, there 
is no question that ISIS has organizationally embedded practices consist-
ing of large- scale human rights violations (e.g., enslavement of women, 
murder of Christians).
Arguably, the various rights- violating laws enacted by the South 
African apartheid regime and by the Nazi regime in Germany were 
inconsistent with the underlying institutional purposes of, respectively, 
the South African and German military and police forces in question. 
If so, then arguably the institutional actors in question did not have an 
institutional responsibility or obligation to perpetrate these human rights 
violations. Or perhaps they simply had competing organizational respon-
sibilities. Moreover, it is presumably the case that the egregious rights vio-
lating practices of ISIS are inconsistent with Islamic law (Sharia),21 and, 
therefore, with the institutional purposes of military and police forces 
that are properly compliant with Islamic law.
21. This is certainly the view of the majority of Islamic authorities worldwide.
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At any rate, on the normative teleological theory of institutions (adum-
brated in Chapter  3), there is a distinction between organizations and 
institutions.22 Organizations might have as a de facto, indeed defining, 
purpose to engage in human rights violations, but institutions, properly 
understood, do not have a defining institutional purpose to do so. This 
is because institutions, unlike organizations, are normatively defined in 
terms of collective ends, which are collective goods on my normative tele-
ological account.
As was argued in earlier chapters, if the occupants of an institutional 
role (or roles) have an institutionally determined obligation to perform 
some joint action, then those individuals are collectively responsible for 
its performance, in the sense of bearing collective institutional respon-
sibility. Moreover, as is the case with individual responsibility, collective 
responsibility has a prospective or forward- looking sense and a retro-
spective or backward- looking sense (see Chapter 5). Since collective insti-
tutional responsibility is a species of joint responsibility, it implies the 
existence of a joint institutional obligation— an institutional obligation 
each individual has jointly with the others. If each individual discharges 
his or her institutional obligation, then the joint institutional obligation 
will have been discharged and the corresponding joint action performed. 
Moreover, if this institutional determined joint action is morally signifi-
cant, then those who performed the joint action are, at least in principle, 
collectively morally responsible for the action (and, for that matter, its 
foreseeable and avoidable morally significant outcomes).
As emphasized above, institutional responsibility sometimes exists in 
the context of a relation of authority. If the occupant of an institutional 
role has an institutionally determined right or obligation to command 
other agents to perform certain actions, and the actions in question 
are joint actions, then the occupant of the role may well be individually 
(institutionally) responsible for those joint actions performed by his or 
her subordinates, and the subordinates might not have any institutional 
responsibility. If so, this is not an instance of collective institutional 
responsibility per se. On the other hand, as we saw above (Chapter 3, sec-
tion 3.1) the relationship between a superior and subordinates may involve 
a second- order joint action that consists in coordination of the first- order 
joint action of the subordinates. In such cases, the superior and the sub-
ordinates act jointly in order to realize a collective end (coordination of 
22. See Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, Chapter 2.
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the subordinates’ first- order joint action). Moreover, if the collective end is 
morally significant (e.g., by virtue of the coordinated first- level joint action 
being morally significant), then the superior and the subordinates may 
have collective moral responsibility for the realization of the collective end 
of the first- order joint action. Nevertheless, it does not follow that they 
have collective institutional responsibility for realizing this end.
Instances in which the institutional actions of those in authority 
are themselves joint actions belong to a somewhat different category. 
Consider the case of the members of NATO collectively deciding to exer-
cise their institutionally determined right to direct NATO forces to bomb 
Kosovo and not to use ground troops. The British wanted to use ground 
troops, the Americans and others did not. The Greeks did not want the 
bombing of Serbian civilian targets. At any rate, “there was a clear and 
powerful majority in favor of air strikes.”23 Moreover, NATO ordered this 
action in the absence of a positive ruling from the UN Security Council. 
Accordingly, NATO forces bombed Kosovo. Hence the members of NATO 
are collectively institutionally and morally— given the moral significance 
of this joint action— responsible for the bombing of Kosovo, and pre-
sumably, therefore, for untoward consequences in terms of loss of inno-
cent civilian lives. They are also collectively (institutionally and morally) 
responsible for ignoring UN protocols.
There are a number of things to keep in mind here. First, the notion of 
responsibility in question is, at least in the first instance, institutional— as 
opposed to moral— responsibility. Second, the institutional responsibility 
in question is both prospective and retrospective. Third, the “decisions” 
of committees, as opposed to any given individual decision of a mem-
ber of a committee considered on its own, need to be analyzed in terms 
of the notion of a joint institutional mechanism (see Chapter 5, section 
5.4). So the “decision” of NATO can be analyzed as follows: At one level, 
each member of the relevant NATO committee voted for or against the 
bombing of Kosovo; let us assume that some voted in the affirmative and 
others in the negative. But at another level, each member of the NATO 
committee agreed to abide by the outcome of the vote; each voted hav-
ing as a collective end that the outcome with a majority of the votes in 
its favor would be respected, and that the action voted for would be car-
ried out. At still another level, if we presume that each member of the 
NATO committee had the institutional authority to bind the government 
23. Weymouth and Henig, The Kosovo Crisis, 192.
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that each represented to a given course of action,24 then the members of 
the NATO committee were acting as representatives of their respective 
governments, and these governments, in turn, acted as representatives 
of their respective nation- states. Accordingly, not only the members of 
the NATO committee, but also the members of their respective govern-
ments, were jointly institutionally responsible for the decision to order the 
NATO forces to bomb Kosovo. NATO was thus collectively institutionally 
responsible for bombing Kosovo, and the sense of collective responsibility 
in question is joint (institutional) responsibility.25
This analysis reveals a number of layers of institutional responsibil-
ity: the institutional responsibility of the human members of the com-
mittee, of the various governments, and of the NATO armed forces who 
carried out the bombing operations. Moreover, since the bombing of 
Kosovo was manifestly morally significant, these various human mem-
bers of NATO were collectively morally responsible for it. However, we 
need to be careful here, since moral responsibility, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, does not precisely track institutional responsibility. In par-
ticular, institutional responsibility, including legal responsibility, can 
be properly ascribed to collective entities, such as governments, nation- 
states, and NATO per se; not so moral responsibility. As I have argued 
in detail elsewhere,26 the latter attaches only to human beings, whether 
merely individually or jointly.
At this point the notion of a layered structure of joint actions needs 
to be utilized again. Let us work with another military scenario involv-
ing NATO to illustrate this. Consider the Croat forces attacking the Serbs 
in Knin in Croatia in Operation Storm on August 4, 1995. This was the 
24. This is so whether or not the decision maker was a military leader, a senior govern-
ment official (such as the minister of defense in the United Kingdom) or, in fact, the 
national leader (such as the president of the United States). For in each of these cases, insti-
tutionally speaking, the individual in question was acting on behalf of the government as 
a whole and, indeed, the nation- state per se.
25. This mode of analysis is also available to handle examples in which an institutional 
entity has a representative who makes an individual decision, but it is an individual deci-
sion that has the joint backing of the members of the institutional entity (e.g., an industrial 
union’s representative in relation to wage negotiations with a company). It can also handle 
examples such as the firing squad in which only one real bullet is used, and it is not known 
which member is firing the real bullet and which merely blanks. The soldier with the real 
bullet is individually directly causally responsible for shooting the person dead. The mem-
bers of the firing squad are jointly institutionally and morally (and indirectly causally) 
responsible for its being the case that the person has been shot dead.
26. Miller, “Collective Moral Responsibility.”
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turning point in the Croat- Serbian confrontation.27 The Croat forces 
included artillery as well as ground troops. However, they were supported 
by the NATO air force that bombed Serbian communications systems, 
thereby greatly facilitating the progress of the Croat ground forces. So 
there was the Croat artillery, the Croat troops, and the NATO air force, 
and each performed a different joint action; namely, the actions of shell-
ing the town (the artillery), overrunning and occupying the town (the 
ground forces), and destroying the communication systems (the air force). 
However, each of these joint actions is describable as an “individual” action 
that is a constitutive element of the larger joint action directed to the col-
lective end of winning the battle against the Serbian forces. Moreover, 
winning this battle was a morally significant action by virtue of its collec-
tive end presumably being a moral good (even if not an unqualified good). 
Accordingly, we can, at least in principle, ascribe collective (joint) moral 
responsibility for winning the battle to the individual pilots of the NATO 
air force and to the individual members of the Croat army.28
As we saw above, a similar analysis in terms of a multilayered struc-
ture of joint action is available in relation to the organized genocidal attack 
of the Interahamwe in Rwanda. However, unlike in the Croat- NATO sce-
nario, the members of the Interahamwe were collectively morally respon-
sible for evil rather than good.
The upshot of this discussion is that human agents involved in com-
plex morally significant cooperative enterprises involving large numbers 
of agents, such as military campaigns or orchestrated programs of geno-
cide and ethnic cleansing, can at least in principle be ascribed collective 
(i.e., joint) moral responsibility for the outcomes aimed at by those enter-
prises. This conclusion depends on the possibility of analyzing these 
enterprises in terms of the notion of multilayered structures of joint action 
and, in some cases, joint institutional mechanisms. Moreover, it follows 
27. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 360. Arguably— if somewhat implausibly— the NATO 
bombing was not intentional support for the Croats. If not, then the example was not a 
paradigmatic case of joint action.
28. The cooperation between Croat land forces and NATO air power against Serbian forces 
is in sharp contrast to what happened in Kosovo. NATO forces were in some sense in 
alliance with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was engaged in fighting Serbian 
forces. The KLA was supposedly operating on behalf of the Albanian majority in Kosovo in 
their conflict with the Serbian forces controlled from Belgrade, but supposedly acting on 
behalf of the Serbian minority in Kosovo. However, NATO relied more or less exclusively 
on its own air power to destroy, or seek the capitulation of, the Serbian forces.
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that there is no need to ascribe moral responsibility to collective entities, 
such as institutions, per se. However, as already mentioned, institutional 
responsibility can be ascribed to collective entities per se, (e.g., the legal 
responsibilities of nation- states). Accordingly, I am not claiming that the 
notions of multilayered structures of joint action and joint institutional 
mechanisms ensure that all institutional responsibilities, as such, attach 
directly to individual human beings rather than collective entities.
8.3  Collective Moral Responsibility to Intervene
Let us now turn to the collective moral responsibility to intervene, and 
specifically to intervene in cases of egregious moral rights violations con-
ducted on a large scale. As already noted (see Chapter 1), Shue has argued 
for the existence of what he terms basic moral rights.29 These include the 
right to security, and certain so- called positive rights, such as the right 
to subsistence. Shue argues that these basic rights generate rights to pro-
tection and assistance. In essence, they are a subset of natural rights 
and closely align with what I have been referring to as rights to proper-
ties constitutive of selfhood, so I will refer to them in what follows as 
basic natural rights or just basic rights. At any rate, let us accept Shue’s 
arguments.
As we saw in Chapter  3, with the establishment of the nation- state, 
and specifically of policing institutions, the responsibility for protecting 
the natural rights of citizens and others within a polity has to a large 
extent devolved to the police. When these natural rights are threatened on 
a large scale by organized armed forces external to the polity, it is princi-
pally the military institutions of the state that bear the responsibility. So 
the members of the relevant state agencies— governments, police organi-
zations, and military forces— have a collective (special) institutional and 
moral responsibility to protect and assist their own citizens when there 
are either internal or external threats to their basic natural rights. So far, 
so good, but what are we to say about cases in which the state is no lon-
ger willing or able to protect the rights to security of its citizens. Indeed, 
in some of these cases, the state is itself the source of the threat. The 
Rwandan genocide is one such clear case, the Assad government in Syria 
at the time of writing is another, albeit it is somewhat less clear, given 
29. Shue, Basic Rights.
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that the Assad government was responding to an insurrection demand-
ing political rights primarily.
Shue has persuasively argued that the state has obligations other than 
the obligation to promote the interests of its citizens.30 Specifically, the state 
has an obligation not to unduly harm citizens of other states. Examples of 
such obligations include the obligation not to attack other states purely for 
economic gain, the obligation not to deplete the ozone layer by destroying 
forests, and so on. Surely, this is correct. States or, at least, the human 
members of governments, security agencies, and, for that matter, ordi-
nary citizens have qua human beings, individually and in aggregate, natu-
ral moral obligations not to unduly harm citizens of other states by virtue 
of the general natural obligation of all human beings not to unduly harm 
other human beings. However, I want to go further and suggest that the 
state or, at least, the members of its relevant security agencies not only 
have moral obligations (joint moral obligations) not to harm citizens of 
other states, but they also have collective (i.e., joint) moral responsibilities 
to protect the basic natural rights of citizens (and residents, etc.) of other 
states. These collective moral responsibilities give rise to particular joint 
moral obligations to assist when four general conditions are met: (1) the 
moral rights in question are rights to properties constitutive of selfhood, 
such as the right to life (i.e., they are basic natural rights); (2) the rights 
violations are occurring on a large scale; (3) the state in which rights vio-
lations are occurring is not willing or able to protect these rights and, 
indeed, in some cases may be the perpetrator of violations of these rights; 
(4) the members of the security agencies of the external state (or states) 
in question are able to protect these rights, whether by unilateral organi-
zational intervention, or jointly with the security agencies of other states 
and/ or local or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).31 
Moreover, these joint moral obligations are, in the first instance, simply 
the natural obligations writ large of third parties to bring about the ces-
sation of rights violations (see Chapter 1). That is, they are not, at least 
in the first instance, institutional obligations of these institutional actors. 
Nevertheless, these individual institutional actors are human beings and, 
30. Henry Shue, “Eroding Sovereignty: The Advance of Principle,” in Robert McKim and 
Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
340– 359.
31. The intervention may require assistance other than military assistance, such as food 
and medical supplies.
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as such, have natural moral obligations. Importantly, the security orga-
nizations to which these individuals belong are, in fact, the only avail-
able means by which the cessation of the rights violations in question 
can be brought about. Hence they are the ones obligated. Naturally, these 
joint natural obligations need to be institutionalized if they are to be dis-
charged efficiently and effectively. I take it that the establishment of UN 
peacekeeping forces and the enactment of legislation, such as RP2, are 
attempts at institutionalization in this sense. Such processes of institu-
tionalization can specify prior natural (moral) obligations and transform 
them into institutional (moral) obligations (see Chapters 1 and 3).
I suggest that when conditions 1 and 2 are met, the persons whose basic 
rights are being violated have a collective (i.e., joint) moral right to assis-
tance.32 Moreover, if conditions 1– 4 are met, then the persons in question 
may well have a collective moral right to cross- border intervention by the 
members of the security agencies of external states, and, in particular, to 
foreign military intervention, supposing unarmed intervention to be inef-
fective. Consider the Rwandan genocide. Each individual Tutsi had a basic 
moral right not to be killed. But the threat of the killing of a single Tutsi 
would not generate a right to foreign armed intervention to protect that 
right, even in the absence of adequate domestic police protection. There 
would need to be some reasonably large number of Tutsi lives at risk. Let 
us assume that that threshold is reached. But in that case it is the total-
ity of the persons in question who jointly have a right to foreign military 
intervention. It is not as if each possesses that right independently of the 
others. So the moral right to foreign military intervention is, after all, a 
collective right, albeit one based on the individual moral right of each 
of those Tutsis not to be killed. Under certain conditions, therefore, the 
basic moral rights of the members of a given nation- state constitute col-
lective moral rights that generate moral responsibilities— collective moral 
responsibilities— on the part of the relevant members of other nation- 
states to intervene in the affairs of the state in question. These collec-
tive moral responsibilities give rise to joint moral obligations to assist in 
particular ways, and, ideally, these collective (joint) moral responsibilities 
and obligations will become, in fact, the institutional responsibilities and 
duties of the members of relevant governments and security agencies.
32. Elsewhere I have provided and defended an analysis of collective rights as joint rights. 
See Seumas Miller, “Collective Rights,” Public Affairs Quarterly 1, no. 4 (1999): 331– 346, 
and Social Action, Chapter 7.
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In Chapter 1 I suggested that basic natural rights are not restricted to 
negative rights, for they include some positive rights, such as subsistence 
rights. Accordingly, humanitarian armed intervention might be morally 
justified in a case in which a state is refraining from providing for the 
basic material needs of its citizens, or more likely a substantial section 
of its citizenry. That is, lethal force can in principle be used to enforce 
positive rights, such as subsistence rights, as well as to enforce negative 
rights— or, at least, this is the case when the positive rights violations in 
question are egregious and on a large scale. Moreover, as is the case with 
negative rights, third parties— at least in principle— have moral rights, 
and indeed moral obligations, to use lethal force to ensure that positive 
rights are respected, depending on which positive rights are in question 
and the scale of the rights violations.
This point has implications for governments who intentionally refrain 
from respecting the positive rights, including subsistence rights, of their 
citizens. Governments have a clear institutional responsibility to provide 
for the well- being of their citizens. Accordingly, the moral responsibil-
ity based on need— and the fact that those in government could assist if 
they chose to— is buttressed by this institutional responsibility that these 
officials have voluntarily taken on. Consider the example discussed in 
Chapter 7 of hundreds of thousands of blacks in apartheid South Africa 
who were forcibly removed into desolate “homelands,” which were then 
declared by South African politicians to be independent nation- states. 
These politicians did not, thereby, succeed in absolving themselves of 
their institutional responsibility for the resulting poverty, deaths from 
malnutrition, rights violations on the part of the surrogate authoritar-
ian “governments” established by the South African state, and so on. 
Accordingly, other things being equal, humanitarian armed intervention 
might well have been justified, presumably in cooperation with the local 
resistance movement, the ANC. This is, of course, not to say that it was 
in fact morally justified; in particular, it might not have been justified 
because it was not necessary.
Notwithstanding some important moral differences, the in- principle 
justification for armed intervention in the South African case and the 
in- principle justification for armed intervention to prevent genocidal 
slaughter in Rwanda were similar in at least one respect. In both cases 
the in- principle justification for armed intervention was to bring about 
the cessation of large- scale human rights violations orchestrated by those 
wielding political power, if not political authority. Evidently, in the case 
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of Rwanda, the violations were predominantly of negative rights (e.g., the 
right not to be killed), whereas in South Africa the violations were pre-
dominantly of positive rights (e.g., subsistence rights). And, doubtless, 
other things being equal, the violation of negative rights is a greater evil 
than the violation of positive rights. However, this difference in moral 
weight is not of an order of magnitude such that armed intervention can 
be morally justified in many of the former kinds of cases, but never in the 
latter kinds of cases.
The situation in the civil war in Syria presents a number of some-
what different kinds of case. For instance, according to Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, “For the past two years, the bulk of international humanitar-
ian aid— provided by the UN and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC)— has been channelled through Damascus and distributed 
according to the whim of the government. This same government pro-
hibits the provision of medical assistance to people living in opposition- 
held areas. These areas are subject to intense bombing, targeting health 
centers as well as all those people— from bakers to doctors— who are try-
ing to help the population. Just a few days ago, a field hospital in al Bab, 
northern Syria, was bombed by the Syrian air force, killing nine patients 
and two medical staff.”33 The people being deprived of this aid have a posi-
tive right to it. Moreover, members of the Assad government have both a 
collective institutional responsibility and a collective moral responsibility 
to see to it that the aid is provided. Nevertheless, the Assad government is 
preventing others from providing this aid. That is, members of the Assad 
government and its armed forces are collectively morally responsible for 
the negative rights violation of using lethal force to prevent others from 
discharging their collective institutional and moral responsibility to pro-
vide assistance to the people in question.34 The members of the Assad gov-
ernment are thus doubly morally culpable. Evidently, lethal force against 
relevant members of the Assad government and its armed forces to bring 
about the cessation of these large- scale serious violations of positive rights 
is morally justified, at least in principle, including by external states.
33. Robin Meldrum, “Syria: Lift the Humanitarian Blockade,” Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
September 19, 2013, http:// www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ news- stories/ op- ed/ 
syria- lift- humanitarian- blockade.
34. I assume the relevant members of international organizations have this collective insti-
tutional and moral responsibility, given the relevant members of the Assad government 
and its welfare organizations are not discharging their prior collective institutional and 
moral responsibilities to assist the people in question.
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In the light of this discussion, let us assume that, under certain condi-
tions, large- scale violations of basic rights, including violations of some 
positive rights, generate a moral responsibility— and perhaps an institu-
tional responsibility— on the part of relevant members of external states 
to intervene militarily to terminate those rights violations. Why is this 
moral responsibility a collective moral responsibility? It is a collective 
moral responsibility because, first, a state that engages in armed inter-
vention is simply an organization composed of individual government 
officials and individual members of a military force. Thus, its “action” of 
armed intervention can be understood as a multilayered structure of joint 
actions (as discussed above). Second, such armed intervention— or, more 
to the point, failure to intervene— is morally significant. Accordingly, the 
members of the government and of the military force in question can, at 
least in principle, be held collectively morally responsible for their failure 
to intervene.
At this point a further question arises: Does the community of nation- 
states have a collective moral responsibility to intervene in cases of 
genocide and the like? In light of our above analysis of collective respon-
sibility, at the initial level of analysis, this question amounts to asking 
whether or not each member of the community of nation- states has an 
in- principle moral responsibility to intervene militarily in cases of large- 
scale basic rights violations, and this responsibility is possessed jointly 
with the other nation- states. As we have already seen, at the next level of 
analysis— the level of a single nation- state’s military organization35— our 
above- described account of such organizations as composed of individual 
members of a military force, including its political and military leaders, 
applies; that is, our account in terms of a layered structure of joint action 
applies. As argued above, that account enables us to ascribe collective 
moral responsibility to the individual members of the organization in 
question, albeit jointly. However, the notion of a layered structure of joint 
action is now applicable to the community of nation- states, construed as 
a set of jointly acting organizations engaged in a multistate humanitar-
ian armed intervention. That is, by the lights of our account, the required 
actions of the community of nation- states, or at least of their governments 
and security agencies, are simply the required actions of an organization 
of organizations and, as such, simply constitute an additional layer to 
35. Or, at least, multiple organizations within the same nation- state (e.g., an army, an air 
force, a navy, and a government).
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the preexisting layered structures of joint action at the level of the single 
organization. Accordingly, the individual members of the various orga-
nizations (i.e., the membership of the various military forces and their 
political leadership) can now be held collectively morally responsible for 
the military intervention— or rather, given our concerns at this juncture, 
for the failure to intervene militarily.
Let us now take a closer look at the collective moral responsibility to 
intervene to terminate, reduce, or prevent large- scale serious basic rights 
violations. The failure to discharge such a collective moral responsibility 
constitutes a morally culpable joint act of omission. This is because the 
following three conditions obtain: (1) the basic rights being violated and, 
therefore, the wrong being done, or about to be done, is such that some 
aggregate of persons can, and morally ought to, intervene, and those on 
whom the collective moral responsibility to intervene falls are in a posi-
tion to successfully intervene; (2)  those who have the collective moral 
responsibility to intervene have that responsibility by virtue of the nature 
and extent of the rights violations taking place, as well as, at least in some 
instances, by virtue of their collective institutional responsibility (e.g., in 
accordance with R2P); (3)  the cost to be incurred by them as a conse-
quence of their intervention is not prohibitively high.
Here we need some theoretical account of collective moral responsibil-
ity for joint omissions on the part of the members of large organizations 
and of organizations of organizations (meta- organizations). Elsewhere I 
have elaborated such an account.36 Here, for reasons of space, I restrict 
myself to a few salient points, bearing in mind that my general account of 
collective moral responsibility is an individualist relational account based 
on the notion of a morally significant joint action (or multilayered struc-
ture of joint actions). On this account, participating agents intentionally 
perform a contributory action that makes a (possibly very small) causal 
contribution to the collective end at which they are aiming. Roughly 
speaking, in the case of a joint omission, the participating agents inten-
tionally refrain from performing their contributory individual actions 
and, therefore, fail to contribute causally to the collective end that they 
have or, at least, ought to have had. (See also Chapter 5, section 5.4.)
36. Seumas Miller, “Collective Responsibility, Epistemic Action and Climate Change,” in 
Nicole Vincent, Ibo van de Poel, and Jeroen van den Hoven, eds., Moral Responsibility: Beyond 
Free Will and Determinism (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2011), 219– 246.
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I suggest that the conditions under which members of some organiza-
tion (or organization of organizations) are collectively morally responsible 
for failing to perform a layered structure of joint actions to bring about 
the cessation of large- scale rights violations include the following: (1) the 
rights violations took place or are taking place; (2) all or most of the mem-
bers of the organization, individually or jointly, intentionally refrained 
from performing the morally required layered structure of joint action; 
(3)  if each or most of the members had performed their contributory 
individual actions having as a (collective) end the cessation of the rights 
violations, it is likely that the collective end would have been realized; 
(4) The cost of this joint intervention would not have been prohibitively 
high, either to the members of this organization or to third parties; (5) the 
members of the organization had a collective institutional responsibil-
ity to intervene; (6) with respect to some set comprising most members 
of the organization, each member of that set would have intentionally 
refrained from performing his or her contributory action (having as an 
end the cessation of the rights violations), even if the others, or most of the 
others, had performed theirs (with that collective end); (7) If a member of 
the organization would have performed his or her contributory action had 
the others performed theirs, but done so only because the others did, (i.e., 
not because she or he had as an end the cessation of the rights violations), 
then the member would still be morally responsible, jointly with the oth-
ers, for failing to intervene (given conditions 1– 5).
There are a couple of things to note in relation to this account of collec-
tive moral responsibility for omissions. First, the collective moral respon-
sibility for the unrealized collective end might be distributed in a manner 
such that the degree of moral responsibility that attaches to any individual 
participant for the unrealized collective end might be very small indeed, 
given that their individual omission might have made little or no differ-
ence to the realization of the collective end. Second, the account presup-
poses an organization (or set of organizations), within an institutional 
framework, and therefore presupposes a structured, albeit large, group 
of persons who can act together, if they choose to do so, in order to real-
ize the collective end of bringing about the cessation of large- scale basic 
rights violations.
Armed with this account of collective moral responsibility for joint 
omissions on the part of the members of large organizations, and of orga-
nizations of organizations, let me now briefly consider the collective moral 
responsibility of relevant members of national governments, security 
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forces, and international agencies (e.g., the UN) for the failure to conduct 
humanitarian armed interventions in order to bring about the cessation 
of large- scale serious basic rights violations. I suggest that the conditions 
under which the members in question can, at least in principle, be held 
collectively morally responsible for such failures do obtain.
First, there a high level of mutual awareness, including by way of the 
international mass media, and through the work of international groups, 
such as Amnesty International, that monitor large scale violations of 
basic rights violations. So the relevant persons in each nation- state are, or 
should be, aware of most episodes of large- scale violation of basic rights, 
and each set of members is aware that the members of every other set is 
aware, and so on. Thus there is mutual awareness among relevant govern-
ment officials and members of security agencies.
Second, the relevant members of governments and of military forces 
(especially those in leadership positions) have the economic, military, and 
diplomatic wherewithal to engage in successful humanitarian armed 
interventions, at least in many instances. Rwanda is an obvious case in 
point. Moreover, various nation- states have cooperated in the past, includ-
ing under the auspices of the UN. So the required cooperative action 
among the members of relevant governments and security agencies is 
entirely practically possible.
Third, a set of international institutions has been developed in rela-
tion to the collective action of nation- states, and therefore the joint action 
of the members of the relevant government and security organizations of 
those nation- states is entirely institutionally possible. These include the 
UN, the Security Council, and various pieces of international legislation 
(e.g., RP2) and associated international courts. Indeed, there are rules and 
international institutional mechanisms for armed intervention (e.g., in 
relation to genocide).
Let me now address the issue of unilateral humanitarian armed inter-
vention. As argued above, there is a collective moral responsibility on the 
part of relevant government and military personnel across the interna-
tional community to engage in humanitarian armed intervention in cases 
of large- scale serious basic rights violations in which there is no internal 
solution and intervention without arms cannot succeed. Humanitarian 
armed intervention by a UN- led multistate military force is one way in 
which this collective moral responsibility might be discharged. I  have 
suggested above that in the contemporary world there are very few cases 
in which the collective moral responsibilities of the relevant government 
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and military personnel across the international community to engage in 
humanitarian armed intervention cannot be discharged. However, there 
are quite a few cases in which these collective moral responsibilities are 
not in fact discharged. In such cases, the responsibility to intervene may 
fall to the relevant political and military members of a single nation- state, 
or small group of states. Arguably, this is much less preferable. Given the 
costs of armed intervention to the party or parties intervening, broad- 
based, multilateral armed intervention is preferable to unilateral armed 
intervention. For one thing, the costs borne by a state intervening uni-
laterally are likely to be greater than if the burden is shared, so that the 
individual state needs a greater incentive, in terms of its self- interest, than 
it might if it were part of a broad- based group engaged in multilateral 
intervention. For another thing, if a state intervenes unilaterally it might 
feel entitled, and have a greater capacity, to make peace more in confor-
mity with its own interests than in conformity with the needs of the vic-
tims it has rescued. This is precisely the charge that was made against the 
United States by its political enemies in relation to its invasion of Iraq. At 
any rate, broad- based, multilateral, humanitarian armed interventions are 
more likely than unilateral ones to be motivated by humanitarian, rather 
than purely political, considerations, if only because the self- interest of 
one state can often be kept in check by the self- interests of the others.
Finally, I have suggested that if the members of a group, A, are being 
subjected to large- scale positive rights violations at the hands of the mem-
bers of another group, B, then (1) the members of A may well have a joint 
right to use lethal force to bring about the cessation of those rights viola-
tion, and (2) the members of some other third party, C, may well have a 
collective moral responsibility to engage in humanitarian armed inter-
vention, supposing the members of A are unable to bring about the cessa-
tion. However, it would not follow from this that the members of A would 
have a joint moral right to use lethal force against the members of C to 
ensure that the members of C in fact discharged their collective moral 
responsibility to engage in humanitarian armed intervention. Not all 
those who fail to discharge their collective moral responsibilities in rela-
tion to large- scale rights violations are themselves rights violators. This 
is especially the case in relation to third parties. It would not have been 
morally justified for the ANC to conduct its armed struggle against, say, 
the Reagan administration when the administration decided to pursue a 
policy of “constructive engagement” in relation to the apartheid govern-
ment of the day. Similarly, it would not have been morally justified for 
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Bosnian Muslims to use deadly force against UN personnel or officials 
of the European Community when the latter groups failed to discharge 
their collective moral responsibility to intervene and protect the Bosnian 
Muslims— indeed to arm them— in the face of the genocidal “ethnic 
cleansing” operations being conducted by the Serbian forces.
8.4  Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that humanitarian armed intervention in 
relation to large- scale human rights violations is in some cases morally 
justified (e.g., in the case of the Rwanda genocide), and that, if so, inter-
vention is best understood as a collective moral responsibility. Moreover, 
collective moral responsibility is to be understood as the joint moral 
responsibility of individual human actors. Here I  utilized two notions 
described in earlier chapters; namely, multilayered structures of joint 
actions and joint institutional mechanisms. I  have further argued that 
humanitarian armed intervention can, at least in principle, be morally 
justified in cases where there is large- scale violation of (basic) positive 
rights, such as subsistence rights. This is the case, even if it is held that 
a single individual would not be morally justified in using lethal force 
against someone violating his or her (basic) positive rights. The critical 
difference lies in the scale of the rights violations.
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Targeted Killing
t a r g e t e d  k i l l i n g  i s  a controversial practice. Indeed, it is sometimes 
referred to as extrajudicial killing, thereby implying it is unlawful. 
Moreover, targeted killing needs to be distinguished from assassination, 
a practice that is typically unlawful. Further, the contexts in which tar-
geted killing takes place need to be distinguished, as do the nature of 
the targets. For example, targeted killing of civilians by police officers is 
both unlawful and morally impermissible. But what of targeted killing of 
combatants by combatants in a theater of war? Surely this is both lawful 
and morally permissible. This chapter seeks to provide answers to these 
and related questions.
Two relatively recent events have placed the ethics of assassination and 
targeted killing at the fore: the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan 
and the bombing by NATO forces of Colonel Gaddafi’s compound in 
Tripoli in the context of the civil war in Libya. In May 2011, Osama bin 
Laden was killed by US Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. US 
officials said bin Laden resisted and was shot in the head; it has also 
emerged that he was unarmed. US officials also said that three other 
men were killed during the raid, one believed to be bin Laden’s son and 
the other two his couriers; in addition, a woman was killed when she 
was used as a shield by a male combatant. There were no American 
casualties. Bin Laden’s death came nearly ten years after al- Qaeda terror-
ists hijacked and crashed American passenger airplanes into the World 
Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside Washington, kill-
ing some three thousand people. Since Abbotabad is a medium- sized 
city, fairly close to Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, and home to a large 
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Pakistani military base, questions have been raised as to how bin Laden 
could have lived there undiscovered for so many years without alerting 
the Pakistan security agencies. Significantly, the US operation to kill bin 
Laden was evidently carried out without the knowledge of the Pakistani 
government.
What of the bombing of Colonel Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli? 
In February 2011, major political protests broke out in Libya against 
Gaddafi’s government. Subsequently, these turned into a civil war in 
which evidently Gaddafi was responsible for the killing of unarmed 
civilians by Libyan forces loyal to him. In March 2011 the United 
Nations declared a no- fly zone in Libya and authorized air strikes by 
NATO forces to be undertaken for the purpose of protecting the civil-
ian population of Libya. A NATO air strike in April in Tripoli appar-
ently killed the youngest son of Gaddafi and three of his grandsons. 
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that NATO was not targeting 
Gaddafi specifically, but rather his command- and- control facilities— 
including a facility inside Gaddafi’s sprawling Tripoli compound. 
However, it remains unclear whether or not NATO was attempting to 
kill Gaddafi; this is especially so given that Gaddafi was a key element 
of the Libyan government’s armed forces command- and- control center. 
It is also unclear whether under UN resolution 1973 it is permissible 
for NATO forces to bomb command- and- control facilities in order to 
protect civilians; the wording of the resolution is vague, speaking as it 
does of using “all necessary measures to protect civilians.” Certainly, it 
did not authorize Gaddafi’s removal from power by military means. On 
the other hand, the destruction by NATO of Gaddafi’s military forces in 
the course of NATO’s efforts to protect the civilian population, if this 
is a correct account of what happened, did lead to Gaddafi’s demise. 
I note that in addition to being responsible for civilian deaths in this 
conflict, Gaddafi had a long history of human rights violations to his 
name. Moreover, Gaddafi was responsible for the assassination of doz-
ens of his “enemies” around the world. In May 2011 the International 
Criminal Court issued a request for an arrest warrant against Gaddafi 
for “crimes against humanity.”
Having outlined the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden and the (pos-
sible) attempted targeted killing of Colonel Gaddafi by way of introducing 
my topic, I now turn directly to the ethics of assassination and targeted 
killing.
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9.1  Assassination
Targeted killings and assassinations are closely related, but not identi-
cal, phenomena; moreover, neither has a precise and accepted definition.1 
Further, both are to be distinguished from extrajudicial killings. Extra-
judicial killing is a legal or quasi- legal notion. First, it implies that the 
killings in question were carried out by state operatives (or by persons 
acting on behalf of the state), and that these actions were authorized (or 
at least sanctioned) by the nation- state (or its security agencies). Second, 
it entails that these killings were in violation of appropriate judicial pro-
cedures and, specifically, the procedure of a fair trial conducted by a prop-
erly constituted court of law.
Other things being equal, the killing, and therefore the targeted kill-
ing, of another human being is morally wrong. (Naturally, other things 
might not be equal; the killing might be done in self- defense, for example.) 
However, extrajudicial killing has an additional, and morally problematic, 
feature: it is done in violation of appropriate judicial procedure. So targeted 
killing is not necessarily extrajudicial killing. Moreover, targeted killings 
are not necessarily unlawful in a more general sense. For example, tar-
geted killing of the enemy’s military commanders in wartime is lawful. To 
this extent, providing an acceptable justification for targeted killings is a 
less demanding undertaking than providing one for extrajudicial killings.
What of assassinations? Roughly speaking, assassination is “the 
deliberate killing, without trial, of a political figure,”2 and, we might add, 
“for political reasons.”3 So assassinations are freely performed, or unco-
erced, intentional killings undertaken to serve a larger political purpose.4 
Likewise, targeted killings (and, for that matter, extrajudicial killings) 
are freely performed, intentional killings undertaken in the service of a 
larger purpose. Moreover, assassinations can be conducted by nonstate 
1. An earlier version of this section appeared in Seumas Miller, “The Ethics of Assassination 
and Targeted Killing,” Annual Review of Law and Ethics 19 (2011): 15– 22.
2. Douglas Lackey, “Assassination, Responsibility and Retribution,” in Harold Zellner, ed., 
Assassination (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1974), 57.
3. Haig Khatchadourian, “Is Political Assassination ever Morally Justifed?,” in Harold 
Zellner, ed., Assassination (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1975), 41.
4. So they are reflective or premeditated actions.
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operatives who are not acting on behalf of any state5 (e.g., the assassina-
tion of John F. Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald). In this respect, as we 
have seen, assassinations are unlike extrajudicial killings. It is intuitively 
unclear whether the notion of a targeted killing is akin to the notion of 
assassination in this regard. Further, only particular uniquely identified 
individuals (so to speak) can be the objects of assassination. A  homi-
cidal maniac who is shooting at any and all government officials because 
he is opposed to the “system” is not engaged in a series of assassina-
tion attempts. This is because this shooter does not have any particular 
uniquely identified individual person in mind.
Here we can distinguish between a named individual, such as Barack 
Obama, and the individual who happens to meet a definite description, 
such as the Admiral of the Fleet. However, the notion of a uniquely identi-
fied individual in this context is in need of further elaboration. Roughly 
speaking, two conditions need to be met for there to be an attempted assas-
sination or targeted killing of a uniquely identified individual in the sense in 
question. First, there is (or is believed to be) one, and only one, person who 
meets a prior, complex, description, which includes, crucially, a descrip-
tion of the person’s military or political significance (e.g., the Taliban com-
mander in Khost province in eastern Afghanistan who has ordered various 
specific terrorist attacks). Second, some individual has been identified as 
the person who meets the description in question (presumably on the basis 
of some credible evidence), and this individual is the subject of a tracking 
operation. Naturally, there is the possibility of error because of, for example, 
unreliable informants who are seeking to settle scores with their enemies 
rather than further the cause of US counterterrorism.
Evidently, there is not only the possibility, but the actuality, of error 
in Afghanistan. The US military has on a number of occasions admitted 
such error. There are other cases that are disputed by the US military but 
which, nevertheless, look to be cases in which innocents may well have 
been targeted and killed. Thus in September 2010 in Takhar Province in 
Afghanistan, Zabet Amanullah and various others were killed by a US 
unmanned drone because Amanullah was believed by the US military 
to be the terrorist Muhammad Amin. However, it is claimed by others, 
including the Afghan Intelligence Network, that Amanullah is not Amin, 
and that Amin is still alive. It is further claimed that the others killed in 
5. I am assuming that the relevant legally constituted, political entities in questions are 
nation- states, but in theory there are other possibilities (e.g., city- states).
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the drone attack were innocent election workers. This raises the moral 
issue of collateral damage from targeted killings and assassinations. It 
has been estimated that 40 percent of targeted killings undertaken by the 
Israelis, for example, have involved collateral damages (i.e., the unintended 
death of innocent civilians, including children).6 On the other hand, it is 
presumably the case— and is typically maintained by its advocates— that 
assassinations and targeted killings involve much less loss of innocent life 
that many, if not most, conventional methods of war, such as aerial bomb-
ing, and are, to this extent, morally preferable.
Additional conditions definitional of assassination might include the 
use of treachery. And, as noted above, assassinations can be conducted by 
persons who are not state operatives and not acting on behalf of the state, 
as well as by state operatives acting on behalf of the state (e.g., the assas-
sination of foreign heads of government).
Assassination has a very long history.7 It has been a practice of politi-
cal leaders gaining and retaining political power within a polity, such as 
the assassination of political rivals by Cesare Borgia (famously described in 
Machiavelli’s The Prince in 1532). Assassination has taken place in the context 
of wars, including guerilla wars, such as the assassination by the Vietcong of 
South Vietnamese officials during the Vietnam War. It has been a tool of ter-
rorist groups in peacetime. For example, in the nineteenth century, Russian 
revolutionaries endorsed assassination as an instrument of political change, 
which included the assassination of Alexander II in 1881.8 And assassination 
has also been practiced by individuals acting alone (e.g., the assassination of 
US president John Kennedy). Assassination of one’s political enemies in the 
context of a well- ordered, liberal democratic state is murder and, given the 
potentially destabilizing effects, a very serious political crime. Accordingly, 
it cannot be tolerated; it is both unlawful in such nation- states and generally 
regarded as morally unjustifiable. However, the legality, and certainly the 
morality, of assassination in other contexts is less clear.9
6. Daniel Byman, “Taliban vs. Predator:  Are Targeted Killings inside Pakistan a Good 
Idea?,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2009.
7. Franklin L. Ford, Political Murders:  From Tyrannicide to Terrorism (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
8. Georgi V. Plekhanov, The Role of the Individual in History (New  York:  International 
Publishers, 1940).
9. Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, “From Humanitarian Intervention 
to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence,” Ethics 118, no. 2 (2008): 228– 257.
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During peacetime, the assassination of the political leaders of foreign 
states is unlawful under various treaties and conventions, such as the 1937 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, the UN 
Charter, and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents. Moreover, it is a violation of the right to life enshrined in such 
documents as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The prohibition of assassination in international law was originally 
intended to protect heads of state— not leaders of terrorist movement. The 
point here is the possibly radically destabilizing political effects of killing 
a head of state, as opposed to (say) a senior military commander (assum-
ing these to be two numerically different individuals). Thus George Bush 
Sr. refrained from killing or otherwise removing Saddam Hussein as the 
Iraqi head of state during the first Gulf War. At any rate, whereas in 1976 
President Gerald Ford had signed an executive order banning assassina-
tion, the events of 9/ 11 led President George W. Bush in 2001 to authorize 
the CIA to carry out missions to kill Osama bin Laden. President Obama 
maintained that policy.
In theory at least, the targeted killing of bin Laden by the United States 
was not inconsistent with the prohibition on the assassination of heads of 
state; for bin Laden was not a head of state. For the same reason, it might 
be far more difficult to legally— as opposed to morally— justify killing 
Colonel Gaddafi, who was a head of state. From the fact that bin Laden was 
not a head of state it follows that he was not protected by those laws and 
treaties that prohibit the assassination of heads of state. But it does not fol-
low from this that it was lawful to kill him. From a legal, and a widely held 
moral, perspective, the right to life is not an absolute right. Importantly 
for our discussion here, it is legally and morally permissible for combat-
ants to use lethal force against enemy combatants in the context of war. 
This raises the question of whether assassination in the context of a war is 
legally justifiable.
Evidently, assassination in war is normally unlawful.10 Under the norms 
of international humanitarian law, for example, killings are only lawful 
if those killed are combatants— but political actors are not necessarily 
combatants. On the other hand, Steven David (quoting military lawyer 
10. David Kretzmer, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra- Judicial Executions 
or Legitimate Means of Defence?” European Journal of International Law 16, no. 2 
(2005): 171– 212.
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Charles Dunlap) argues that neither US nor international law prohibits 
the killing of those directing armed forces in war.11 Moreover, it has been 
argued that the principle of reciprocity has application in international 
law and might provide a legal justification for countermeasures such as 
tit- for- tat assassination.12 Arguably, bin Laden was leading a campaign of 
violence against the United States and its allies; so he was, or was akin to, 
a military leader, and since military leaders are not legally protected from 
being killed in time of war, perhaps the targeted killing of bin Laden was 
lawful.
Let me now turn to the morality of assassination? Arguably the assas-
sination of Hitler by Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and his 
co- conspirators in 1944 during the course of Second World War would 
have been morally justifiable, even if not legally allowed. For one thing, 
military and political leaders who direct the combatants under their com-
mand to commit atrocities, such as genocide, are morally responsible for 
these actions of their subordinates; pacifism aside, these leaders do not 
have a moral right not to be killed in these circumstances, any more than 
the combatants they command have any such right. For another thing, 
pragmatic arguments based on, for example, the untoward outcomes of 
“leaderless” defeated nations do not necessarily apply, and certainly not in 
the case of totalitarian regimes such as that of Nazi Germany or the Soviet 
Union under Stalin. On the other hand, the argument might apply that it 
would make no difference because the leader will be replaced by someone 
equally as bad. This was probably not so in the case of Hitler, but it might 
have been so in the case of Stalin, since Beria might well have taken over 
(depending on when Stalin was to have been assassinated).13 Moreover, 
even if assassinating leader A  would lead to equally bad replacement 
leader B, it would not follow that leader A should not be killed, given the 
possibility of killing leader A and then killing leader B. Naturally, if there 
is an indefinitely long series of equally bad replacement leaders (C, D etc.), 
then the argument against killing the incumbent leader will not have 
been met. Further, a policy of killing a large number of political leaders 
in a given polity in order to, for example, render the polity ungovernable, 
11. Steven R. David, “If Not Combatants, Certainly Not Civilians,” Ethics & International 
Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 138– 140.
12. Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity:  Terror, Torture, and the Law of War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
13. Lackey, “Assassination, Responsibility and Retribution.”
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starts to look less like assassination and more like targeted killing (see 
below).14 This is because the notion of assassination seems more closely 
tied to fulfilling a political purpose by killing an individual person rather 
than by killing a set of individuals.
Here we need to be careful, since it is a standard military objective to 
inflict heavy casualties on an enemy force and, thereby, disable it. To do 
so is to achieve a military purpose (and, ultimately, a political purpose) 
by killing a set of individuals. However, this is not targeted killing; far 
from it. This raises the question of what conceptual space, if any, exists 
between assassination, on the one hand, and the killing of combatants in 
a theater of war, on the other. Specifically, what conceptual space is occu-
pied by targeted killing of a long list of identified individuals— the sort 
of targeted killings being undertaken in the tribal areas of Pakistan (e.g., 
Quetta and North Waziristan) and in Afghanistan by US drone or UAV 
(unmanned aerial vehicles) attacks?
What of the morality of assassinating Colonel Gaddafi? From a ret-
rospective moral perspective, killing the despot and human rights viola-
tor, Gaddafi, might be held to be an act of substantive justice. However, 
procedural justice, at least as it is conceived in criminal justice contexts, 
requires arrest based on prima facie evidence of wrongdoing and a fair 
trial. If so, procedural justice is likely to be denied at least until such time 
as Gaddafi is removed from power (and remains alive, as in fact did not 
happen). From a prospective moral perspective, were NATO forces to kill 
Gaddafi it would arguably be an act of killing in defense of others, since 
evidently he continued to constitute an immediate threat to the lives of 
unarmed Libyan civilians. Moreover, his removal from power might well 
have been thought to be likely to lead to a better state of affairs for the 
Libyan people. It was far from obvious that he would be replaced by some-
one equally as bad; indeed, the prospects for some form of democracy 
in a post- Gaddafi Libya might have seemed to be reasonably good. And 
perhaps the least costly way to achieve his removal— in terms of loss of 
human life— might have been by killing him. As it happens, Libya post- 
Gaddafi is in a state of civil war.
The upshot of this discussion is that although assassination is unlaw-
ful, it is, conceivably, at least in some extreme cases (e.g., that of Hitler, 
if not Gaddafi), morally justifiable (from the prospective, if not the retro-
spective, perspective). Does it follow from this that the law ought to reflect 
14. Or, for that matter, extrajudicial killing.
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morality? That is, should the law be adjusted to admit of exceptions? If so, 
perhaps the law and morality should always be strictly in accord when it 
comes to the practice of assassination. Let us now consider the possibility 
that assassination might be morally justifiable (or at least morally excus-
able) in some extreme circumstances, but that, nevertheless, it ought not 
to be lawful. This kind of claim is sometimes made in the context of a 
discussion of the so- called problem of dirty hands. Here it is important 
to first note some conceptual differences between the concept of dirty 
hands and the concept of noble cause corruption. The idea of dirty hands 
is that political leaders, and perhaps the members of some other occupa-
tions, such as soldiers and police officers, necessarily perform actions that 
infringe central or important principles of common morality, and that 
this is because of some inherent feature of these occupations. Such dirty 
actions include lying, betrayal, and especially the use of violence, includ-
ing assassination.
The first point to be made here is that it is far from clear that such 
acts are necessarily acts of corruption, and hence necessarily acts of noble 
cause corruption. (Noble cause corruption is corruption in the service of 
a good end, such as the police fabricating evidence against a known drug 
dealer in order to ensure his conviction.) In particular, it is not clear that 
all such acts undermine to any degree institutional processes, roles, or 
ends. (This is compatible with such acts having a corrupting effect on 
the moral character of the persons who perform them, albeit not on those 
traits of their moral character necessary for the discharging of their insti-
tutional role responsibilities as, say, politicians, police, or soldiers.)
The second and related point is that some putatively dirty actions are 
indeed definitive of political roles, as they are of police and military roles. 
For example, it is evidently a defining feature of police work that it uses 
harmful and normally immoral methods, such as deceit and violence, 
in the service of the protection of (among other things) human rights.15 
Clearly, a similar definition is required for the role of soldier. And since 
political leaders necessarily exercise power and— among other things— 
lead and direct police and soldiers, they too will participate in dirty actions 
in this sense. However, such use of deceit, violence, and so on, can be, 
and typically is, morally justified in terms of the publicly sanctioned, 
legally enshrined, ethical principles underlying police and military use 
of harmful and normally immoral methods, including the use of deadly 
15. Miller and Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing, Chapter 1.
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force. In short, some putatively dirty actions are publicly endorsed, mor-
ally legitimate, defining practices of what most people take to be mor-
ally legitimate institutions, such as government and police and military 
institutions. However, the advocates of dirty hands intend to draw atten-
tion to a phenomenon above and beyond such publicly endorsed, legally 
enshrined, and morally legitimate practices. But what is this alleged phe-
nomenon? According to Michael Walzer,16 politicians necessarily get their 
hands dirty, and in his influential article on the topic, he offers examples 
such as the political leader who must order the torture of a high- ranking 
terrorist if he is to discover the whereabouts of bombs planted by the lat-
ter and set to go off, killing innocent people. These examples consist of 
scenarios in which politicians are not acting in accordance with publicly 
endorsed, legally enshrined, morally legitimate practices; indeed, they are 
infringing moral and legal requirements. However, the torture scenario 
is hardly an example of what politicians in liberal democracies routinely 
face; indeed, it is evident that even in the context of the “war on terrorism” 
such cases only arise very occasionally, if at all.
There might in fact be some political contexts in which central or 
important moral principles do need to be infringed on a routine basis, 
albeit for a limited time period. Such contexts might include ones in which 
fundamental political institutions had collapsed or were under threat of 
collapse. Consider the case of the Colombian drug baron Pablo Escobar.17 
Escobar was apparently executed in 1993 by police after he was cornered 
at the end of a large- scale manhunt. However, Escobar was no ordinary 
criminal. He headed the largest cocaine cartel in Colombia, accounting 
for up to 80 percent of the multibillion- dollar export of Colombian cocaine 
to the United States. Such was the scale of Escobar’s operation, and the 
ruthlessness by which he maintained it, that by the time of his death he 
was responsible for the deaths of literally hundreds of people, including 
many innocent civilians, foreign citizens, police officers, judges, lawyers, 
government ministers, presidential candidates, and newspaper editors. 
Indeed, the Colombian state, with the technical, military, and intelligence 
support of the United States, was fighting a de facto war against Escobar, 
and fighting for its very survival. Accordingly, it might be argued that 
16. Michael Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 2, no. 2 (1973): 164– 167.
17. Seumas Miller, Peter Roberts, and Edward Spence, Corruption and Anti- 
corruption: A Study in Applied Philosophy (Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2005), 27.
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Escobar’s execution was a politically motivated act, and that Escobar was 
both a criminal and, by virtue of his explicit attacks on the political sys-
tem, a political figure. That is, Escobar’s execution was an assassination 
on our definition of assassination.
Clearly, Escobar’s execution was unlawful. Moreover, it is plausible 
that such executions should never be made lawful. What of the morality 
of the execution? The first point to be made here is that even if such dirty 
methods are morally justified, it is in the context of an argument to the 
effect that their use was necessary in order to re- establish political and 
other institutions in which the use of such dirty methods would presum-
ably not be permitted. Accordingly, such scenarios do not demonstrate 
that the use of dirty methods is a necessary feature of political leader-
ship, and certainly not in the context of a well- ordered liberal democracy 
at peace.
The above situation is one of emergency, however it is institutional 
emergency that is in question. It is not a one- off, terrorist attack that 
threatens lives but not institutions. Nor is it the kind of extreme emer-
gency posed by totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany under Hitler 
and which (allegedly, but doubtfully, given their strategic ineffectiveness) 
justified the use of such “dirty hands” tactics as the aerial bombing dur-
ing World War II by Allied forces of civilian areas in German cities such 
as Dresden.18
So even if one wanted to support all or some of the methods used 
by the Colombian authorities, one would not be entitled to generalize to 
other states of emergency in which there is no threat to institutions per 
se. Moreover, there are reasons to think that many relevant dirty methods, 
such as execution and the use of criminals to combat criminals, are in fact 
counterproductive. For example, the use of other criminal groups (such as 
competing drug lords) against Escobar tended to empower those groups. 
Further, such methods, although dirty, are not as dirty as can be. In par-
ticular, methods such as execution of drug lords are directed at morally 
culpable persons, as opposed to innocent persons. At the dirty end of the 
spectrum of dirty methods that might be used in politics are those meth-
ods that involve the intentional harming of innocent persons.
While the killing of Gaddafi should not be assimilated to the killing 
of Escobar, there are some similarities. For Gaddafi had been accused of 
18. See Igor Primoratz, ed., Terror from the Sky: The Bombing of German Cities in World War 
II (New York: Berghahn, 2010) for useful discussions of these issues.
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“hollowing out” Libyan institutions, albeit from his position as head of state 
(unlike Escobar, who operated from outside the government). Accordingly, 
an additional justification for the targeted killing of Gaddafi— additional 
to the above- mentioned “justice” and “defense of others” justifications— 
might be the imperative to protect, or perhaps rebuild, Libyan institu-
tions, notably institutions of governance.
9.2  Definitions: Terrorism, Targeted Killing
Roughly speaking, terrorism is a political and/ or military strategy that
1. consists in deliberately performing violent actions of killing, maiming, 
torturing or otherwise seriously harming, or threatening to seriously 
harm innocent civilians;
2. is a means of terrorizing, individually or collectively, the members of 
some social or political group in order to achieve political purposes 
(possibly indirectly via achieving a military purpose);
3. relies on the killings— or other serious harms inflicted— receiving a 
high degree of publicity, at least to the extent necessary to engender 
widespread fear in the target political or social group.
Elsewhere19 I  have offered a more nuanced definition of terrorism that 
involved an indirect strategy for demarcating terrorist actions from other 
violent acts; namely, one that involves a list of well- established violent 
crimes (that are crimes and morally justifiably so) that (1) meet the above 
conditions for being acts of terrorism, notably that they are politically 
motivated (whereas most violent crimes are not); and (2)  distinguish, 
as in law, between terrorism in civil society and terrorism in war. This 
strategy yields two sets of violent crimes describable as acts of terrorism; 
namely, terrorism- as- crime (ordinary violent crimes that are also acts of 
terrorism), and terrorism- as- war- crime (war crimes that are also acts of 
terrorism). More generally, this strategy comports with the familiar dual 
framework for categorizing terrorist actions and campaigns; namely, 
terrorism- as- crime and terrorism- as- war.20 Naturally, we can distinguish 
19. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism. See also Nathanson Terrorism and the Ethics of 
War Chapters 1 and 2.
20. Kretzmer, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists”; Miller, Terrorism and 
Counter- Terrorism.
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between a war fought against a terrorist group (terrorism- as- war) and 
ad hoc terrorist actions within a war that is not otherwise appropriately 
framed as terrorism- as- war because neither side is a terrorist organization 
per se.
I take it that the terrorism- as- crime model— as opposed to the 
terrorism- as- war model— is the preferred and, therefore, default frame-
work for a liberal democratic state when it is suffering lethal attacks from 
a terrorist organization. More precisely, the terrorism- as- war framework 
should be applied only under the following general conditions21:  (1)  the 
terrorism- as- crime framework cannot adequately contain serious and 
ongoing terrorist attacks; (2)  the application of the terrorism- as- war 
framework is likely to be able adequately to contain the terrorist attacks; 
(3) the application of the terrorism- as- war framework is proportionate to 
the terrorist threat; (4) the terrorism- as- war framework is applied only to 
an extent, (e.g., with respect to a specific theater of war, but not necessar-
ily to all areas that have suffered, or might suffer, a terrorist attack), and 
over a period of time, that is necessary; (5) all things considered, the appli-
cation of the terrorism- as- war framework will have good consequences in 
terms of security, and better overall consequences (e.g., in terms of lives 
lost, freedoms curtailed, economic impact, institutional damage) than the 
available alternatives.
Accordingly, it is only when the liberal democratic state cannot ade-
quately contain the terrorist activity of a specific terrorist organization 
that the terrorism- as- war model might need to be applied, as in a the-
ater of war involving ongoing, large- scale terrorist attacks and military 
counterstrikes by government security forces. The Israeli- Hezbollah 
conflict during 200622 is arguably an instance of this.23 Moreover, even 
if the terrorist- as- war model is to be applied in a given theater of war, 
it would not follow that it should be applied outside that theater of war. 
Thus, even if it is desirable and necessary to apply the terrorism- as- war 
model to the armed conflict between al- Qaeda combatants and US forces 
in Afghanistan seeking to destroy al- Qaeda military bases and personnel, 
21. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
22. Uzi Rubin, The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War (Ramat 
Gan: Begin- Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar- Ilan University, 2007), 12.
23. The Israeli aerial bombing response to rockets fired by Hamas from Gaza since 2005 
might also be thought to be a candidate. However, this is doubtful, given the appar-
ent inability of civilians in Gaza to vacate the areas being bombed, Israeli warnings 
notwithstanding.
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it would not follow that it was desirable or necessary to apply it to al- Qaeda 
operatives functioning in the US homeland.
This way of proceeding presupposes that the distinction between well- 
ordered civil societies and theaters of war can adequately be drawn. The 
concept of war is, of course, somewhat vague; the point at which a violent 
attack, or set or attacks, on one armed force by another armed force con-
stitutes a war is indeterminate. Moreover, the concept of war is especially 
vague in its application to armed conflict between nation- states and non-
state actors. Nevertheless, I assume that a liberal democratic nation- state 
can engage in wars with nonstate actors (e.g., a civil war, a revolutionary 
war, or a war against an armed, organized, belligerent, external, nonstate 
entity). For example, I  take it that the United States is at war with ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria.24 On the other hand, as noted above, from the fact that 
two states (or a state and a nonstate actor) are at war, it does not follow 
that all or any of their respective territories are theaters of war (i.e., are 
battlefields).25 Moreover, areas with a high density of civilian populations 
with no means of escape from those areas morally ought not to be turned 
into battlefields, as happened in the case of the bombing of civilian popu-
lations in German cities such as Dresden during World War II.26 Here 
24. It goes without saying that in claiming that such and such liberal democratic state is 
waging an internal or an external war, I am not eo ipso claiming that the war is morally 
justified. Liberal democratic states can engage and have engaged in wars that, for example, 
fail to comply with the conditions of just war theory; the 2003 Iraq War is arguably a case 
in point.
25. Carl von Clausewitz famously offered this definition in his book On War 
(1989): “Denotes properly such a portion of the space over which war prevails as has its 
boundaries protected, and thus possesses a kind of independence. This protection may 
consist in fortresses, or important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even in 
its being separated by a considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the 
war. Such a portion is not a mere piece of the whole, but a small whole complete in itself; 
and consequently it is more or less in such a condition that changes which take place at 
other points in the seat of war have only an indirect and no direct influence upon it. To 
give an adequate idea of this, we may suppose that on this portion an advance is made, 
whilst in another quarter a retreat is taking place, or that upon the one an army is acting 
defensively, whilst an offensive is being carried on upon the other. Such a clearly defined 
idea as this is not capable of universal application; it is here used merely to indicate the 
line of distinction.”
26. See Primoratz, Terror from the Sky, for useful discussions of these issues. The Israeli 
aerial bombing response to rockets fired by Hamas from Gaza mentioned at note 23 might 
be thought to be akin to the bombing of Dresden in so far as there is thought to be insuf-
ficient regard for the lives of civilians. However, the fact that Hamas is apparently delib-
erately using civilians as, in effect, human shields would serve to differentiate the Gaza 
scenario from the Dresden one.
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there are analogies between the lethal use of drones in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Importantly, some of the areas in which there is a lethal use of 
drones are not theaters of war and ought not to be transformed into such. 
On the other hand, presumably in some of these areas that are not the-
aters of war, it is possible on some occasions to engage in targeted killing, 
whether by drones, snipers, or other means, in a manner that does not 
put the lives of innocent bystanders at serious risk. I assume that wars 
waged by liberal democratic states can be either external or internal wars. 
India, for example, has been fighting an internal war in Kashmir against 
a variety of terrorist and separatist groups. In this conflict, India has at 
times deployed hundreds of thousands of military and police personnel, 
and tens of thousands of civilians, soldiers, police, insurgents, and terror-
ists have lost their lives.27
There are various problems posed by terrorism for the duality of the 
terrorism- as- crime framework and the terrorism- as- war framework that 
I have discussed in detail elsewhere.28 For our purposes here, it is impor-
tant to invoke the following threefold distinction between contexts: (1) well- 
ordered jurisdictions, or jurisdictions in which there is law and order and, 
in particular, there is effective enforcement of the laws against terrorism; 
(2) disorderly jurisdictions, or jurisdictions in which there is a degree of 
law and order— they are not simply theaters of war— but the authorities 
are unable to enforce adequately laws against terrorists;29 (3)  theaters of 
war (whether in the context of a declared or undeclared30 war between 
states, or a declared or undeclared war between a state and a nonstate 
actor).
Finally, on this account, while a terrorist is not necessarily a com-
batant, the members of terrorist organizations that have armed forces 
engaged in armed conflicts may nevertheless be combatants (e.g., if they 
are members of such an armed force engaged in armed conflict and are 
currently deployed in a theater of war). If so, then these terrorists can 
27. Kirpal Dhillon, Police and Politics in India:  Colonial Concepts, Democratic 
Compulsions: Indian Police 1947– 2002 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), Chapter 13.
28. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
29. In some cases these might be under a state of emergency (e.g., martial law), in other 
cases not.
30. My concern in this work is only with de facto armed conflicts, whether they be declared 
or undeclared. De facto is, of course, to be contrasted with de jure. See note 254 for a defini-
tion of a theater of war.
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reasonably be referred to as terrorist- combatants, problematic legal con-
notations notwithstanding.31
Targeted killing has been variously defined.32 Here I provide, in sum-
marized form, a definition set forth and defended in detail elsewhere.33 By 
definition, targeted killing is the premeditated, freely performed, inten-
tional killing of a uniquely identified individual person.34 Moreover, at 
the time of the killing the person in question does not pose an imminent 
threat to life or limb. Further, the killing takes place in the overall context 
of an armed conflict in which both the targeter and the person targeted 
are participants. The protagonists in the armed conflicts in question are 
the armed forces of political entities (see below).
In relation to this definition, I  make the following points, which 
are made elsewhere but are also necessary to make here for purposes 
of clarification. First, unlike the shooting by combatants, including by 
snipers, of enemy combatants in a theater of war, the targets in targeted 
killing are uniquely identified; they are not simply anonymous enemy 
combatants identified by their uniform. A uniquely identified individual 
in this sense is someone about whom there is prior detailed information 
in respect of his or her role in the armed conflict, and someone who can 
be reliably identified as such at the time of their killing. Second, unlike 
in the standard cases of justified use of deadly force by police officers 
in law enforcement contexts, the targets in targeted killing do not pose 
an imminent threat at the time of their killing. For example, Osama 
bin Laden was killed in his domicile during the night, Mahmoud al- 
Mabhouh was killed in a hotel room in neutral Dubai, and so on.35 
31. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
32. For recent articles on the ethics of targeted killing, see Finkelstein, Ohlin, and 
Altman, Targeted Killing. See also Anna Goppel, Killing Terrorists:  A  Moral and Legal 
Analysis (Berlin:  De Gruyter, 2013), and Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani, and Saskia 
Hufnagel, eds., Shooting to Kill:  Socio- Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force 
(Oxford: Hart, 2012).
33. Miller, “The Ethics of Assassination and Targeted Killing.”
34. Michael L. Gross emphasizes the idea of a legal prohibition on the killing of named 
individual in his “Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self- 
Defense?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2006): 323– 335.
35. Contra my definition here, the US Department of Justice, in a recent white paper, 
“Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a US Citizen Who Is a Senior 
Operational Leader of Al Qaeda or an Associated Force,” has sought to characterize the 
targets of targeted killings as imminent threats if there is only a limited (and present) 
opportunity to eliminate it. However, this is either incorrect or at best a highly novel 
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Third, unlike assassinations,36 such as that of President Kennedy, tar-
geted killings take place in the overall context of armed conflict. Fourth, 
I note that armed conflicts include conventional wars, nonconventional 
(so- called) wars of liberation, and armed conflicts involving terrorist 
groups.37 Fifth, the potentially large- scale killing of individuals who 
merely exhibit a pattern of suspicious behavior is not targeted killing 
in this sense. Thus the use of drones by the United States to inflict 
relatively heavy casualties on the Taliban and al- Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and FATA is not targeted killing, notwithstanding the US government’s 
use of terms such as “targeted killing” and “surgical strike” in relation 
to their use of drones.38 I return to this issue in detail below. Sixth, and 
finally, I note that my definitional restriction on targeted killings that 
they take place only in contexts of armed conflict is nonarbitrary. The 
killings that are of interest to us in this paper take place in the context of 
armed conflicts, such as that between the United States and al- Qaeda, 
and that between Israel and Hamas. Moreover, to remove this restriction 
would muddy the moral waters and bring into play phenomena that are 
importantly morally different, such as one- off assassinations of political 
leaders by malevolent “lone- wolf” individuals with idiosyncratic politi-
cal motives.
rendering of the term “imminent,” according to which a threat becomes imminent if 
there is only a limited window of opportunity to remove it. This novel rendering has the 
untoward consequence that a threat in the far distant future becomes imminent if there 
is unlikely to be an opportunity to remove it in the far distant future when the threat 
becomes active. This collapses the distinction between defense against an imminent 
threat and a preemptive strike against a future threat, and for this reason should be 
rejected.
36. For definitions of assassination, see Harold Zellner, ed., Assassination (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Schenkman, 1974). The other term in use in relation to this issue is extrajudicial 
killings. I find this unhelpful for my purposes here, since my concerns are with the moral-
ity rather than the legality of targeted killing, and, in any case, the legality of targeted 
killings is hotly contested. The CIA has evidently carried out a number of assassinations 
over the years, although a number of these would not be assassinations but rather tar-
geted killings on my account (see below). See the Church Committee’s Report on Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing 
Office, 1975).
37. I elaborate and defend this notion of armed conflicts in Miller, “On the Morality of 
Waging War against the State.”
38. Amnesty International, “Will I  Be Next?”:  US Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
(London:  Amnesty International, 2013), http:// www.amnestyusa.org/ research/ reports/ 
will- i- be- next- us- drone- strikes- in- pakistan.
254 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
254
As argued in earlier chapters, the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality are far more permissive in military conflict than in law enforce-
ment contexts. For example, the use of lethal force by a military combatant 
is not necessarily in defense of an imminent threat to that combatant, his 
fellow combatants in that encounter, or, for that matter, any other indi-
vidual person present at that time and place. Thus it is morally permis-
sible in military conflict, but not in law enforcement, to use the tactic of 
ambush, whereby enemy soldiers are attacked and killed without warning 
and notwithstanding the fact that they do not constitute an imminent 
threat to anyone at that time and place.39 At the risk of overstating the 
point, in a theater of war there is a presumption in favor of using lethal 
force against enemy combatants, if it serves a military purpose, whereas, 
as we saw above, in law enforcement there is a presumption in favor of 
arresting offenders.
The implications of this for targeted killing are clear. If armed force 
A is acting in justified collective self- defense against armed force B, then 
it may well be morally permissible— in accordance with the principles 
of military necessity and proportionality— for members of A  to engage 
in the targeted killing of members of B, such as the killing of B’s com-
manders. Such action might well be morally justified self- defense at the 
collective level(s) in the context of ongoing armed conflict even though, at 
the individual level,
1. the aim is to kill (rather than capture or arrest);
2. there is no imminent deadly threat from the target to any individual 
(e.g., target is asleep or unarmed); and
3. it is not necessary for personal self- defense or defense of other indi-
vidual person in that place at that time to kill the target (e.g., an attempt 
to poison Hitler when he was eating his food).
Indeed, consistent with the above- mentioned description of military 
necessity, it may well be morally permissible to engage in such targeted 
killing, notwithstanding that even at the collective level it is not strictly 
necessary to do so in order to further the immediate, medium, or long- 
term military goals in question.
39. This is not to say that there is never any imminence requirement at the collective level 
(e.g., since Germany’s invasion of Poland is imminent, war is justified).
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9.3  The Morality of Targeted Killing of Terrorists
Given this description of targeted killing in the context of armed conflict— 
and the earlier definitions of targeted killing and of terrorism— let me 
now turn to the moral considerations in play in the use of targeted kill-
ing by the security forces of liberal democratic states in counterterrorism 
operations. The targeted killing in question takes place in either (1) a the-
ater of war, albeit war against a nonstate actor; (2) a jurisdictional setting 
in which there is not effective enforcement of the law in relation to ter-
rorists perpetrating ongoing, serious terrorist attacks against the liberal 
democratic state in question; (3) a well- ordered, liberal democratic state in 
peacetime or, indeed, in wartime if the territory in question is enjoying 
effective law enforcement against terrorism.40
In relation to type 2 jurisdictional settings, we can distinguish two 
kinds of cases. There are those settings that are more or less well- ordered, 
but in which the authorities are nevertheless unable or unwilling to suc-
cessfully enforce the law against the terrorists in question. The killing of 
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan by US Special Forces illus-
trates this kind of case. I discuss this issue in section 9.4 below. The other 
kind of type 2 jurisdictional setting is one that is not well- ordered. The 
FATA in Pakistan is a case in point. The FATA are nominally under the 
authority of Pakistan, but in fact Pakistani law enforcement agencies have 
not been able to effectively exercise their authority. Moreover, Pakistan 
security agencies have evidently engaged in military— as opposed to 
law enforcement— operations in these areas, creating at times de facto 
theaters of war.41 Of particular importance to us here, Pakistani security 
agencies have been unable to dislodge al- Qaeda from its bases in these 
areas. Hence the United States has resorted to military action— apparently 
with the tacit consent of the Pakistan government— and the extensive 
lethal use of drones in particular.42 I discuss the US drone attack in the 
FATA below.
Let us briefly consider type 3 settings. As I have argued elsewhere,43 
other things being equal, targeted killing cannot be morally justified in 
40. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
41. See Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next?”, 15– 16.
42. Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next?”, 53. This is a matter of dispute.
43. Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
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such contexts. For in these settings the law enforcement option is avail-
able, and, as argued above, the law enforcement option is the default option 
when it comes to combating terrorism. This is not to say that moral dilem-
mas in relation to the use of lethal force might not arise for police engaged 
in counterterrorist operations against suicide bombers in particular. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, for example, in 2005 Jean Charles de Menezes— 
an innocent Brazilian student— was shot dead by members of a UK coun-
terterrorism squad in a London underground station.44 This was a case 
of mistaken identity in which the police falsely believed Menezes was a 
suicide bomber about to trigger a bomb. The dilemma arose because the 
normally available option of arresting Menezes was highly problematic. 
What if he triggered the bomb, killing dozens of innocent commuters, as 
soon as he realized he was about to be arrested? Importantly, this was not 
a case of targeted killing, since the threat or, at least, believed threat was 
imminent. The point to be stressed here is that police use of lethal force, 
even against suicide bombers, in well- ordered liberal democratic states is 
rightly constrained by the above- mentioned principles of necessity and 
imminent threat to life constitutive of the law enforcement model.45
What, finally, of type 1 settings? It is surely apparent from the dis-
cussion in section 9.2 above that the targeted killing of known combat-
ants or their leaders in theaters of war is morally permissible, at least in 
principle. Arguably, the armed conflict that provides the overall context in 
which such killings takes place needs to be morally justified— perhaps by 
recourse to some appropriately revised version of the jus ad bellum of just 
war theory applicable to such conflicts. Indeed, I have argued as much 
elsewhere.46
Further, it may well be that the principles of jus in bello need to be com-
plied with if such targeted killing is to be morally justified. But there does 
not seem to be any in- principle reason why the principles of necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination could not be complied with. Indeed, it 
would be a good deal easier for targeted killings in theaters of war to comply 
with the principles of discrimination and proportionality than for nontar-
geted killings to do so— a point often made by supporters of targeted kill-
ing. Targeted killings, other things being equal, are more discriminating 
44. Gordon and Miller, “The Fatal Police Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.”
45. Whether or not the police complied with all the relevant legal and moral principles on 
this occasion is another matter.
46. Miller “Just War Theory and Counter- Terrorism”
Targeted Killing 257
   257
than nontargeted killings, and, for the same reason, they are less likely 
to require justification on the grounds of proportionality, there being less 
loss of innocent life. Naturally, it is important to ensure that lethal actions 
being called targeted killings by those performing them are in fact tar-
geted killings. Israeli aerial bombing of buildings in Gaza known to house 
children as well as members of Hamas is not targeted killing. As for the 
principle of necessity, again compliance is eminently possible, at least in 
principle. Surely the killing of “high value” terrorist leaders in a theater of 
war might well be justified on grounds of military necessity.
Notwithstanding the above arguments of mine in favor, at least in prin-
ciple, of the moral permissibility of targeted killings in theaters of war in 
the overall context of ongoing armed conflict between liberal democra-
cies and nonstate terrorist groups, various other considerations have been 
offered against such targeted killings. Since I have dealt with these else-
where,47 I will be quite brief in my treatment of them here.
Targeted killings are sometimes referred to as extrajudicial killings. 
Here the assumption is not only that they are unlawful, but that, being 
unlawful, they are morally impermissible.48 No doubt some targeted kill-
ings are unlawful in some jurisdictions and, moreover, morally ought to 
be unlawful, notably those that take place in well- ordered jurisdictions. 
Since I discuss such type 2 settings below, I set this possibility aside here. 
The question to be answered at this point is different; it is whether or not 
targeted killing in theaters of war morally ought to be lawful. The answer 
is evidently not only that targeted killing in theaters of war ought to be 
lawful, but that in fact it is.49
That said, the killing of terrorists in theaters of war does give rise to 
moral problems not necessarily present in killing conventional combat-
ants in such theaters. One important problem arises from the difficulty of 
distinguishing terrorist combatants from innocent civilians.50 However, 
47. Miller, “Just War Theory and Counter- Terrorism.”
48. Relatedly, it is sometimes argued that since there is no arrest and trial in the case of 
targeted killing, it cannot be lawful. See, for example, Yael Stein, “By Any Name Illegal and 
Immoral,” Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 127– 137. See also Miller, Terrorism 
and Counter- Terrorism.
49. Kretzmer, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists”
50. Another possibility is that it takes place in a jurisdiction which is operating under mar-
tial law. This is a complication that I do not have the space to deal with here. See Miller, 
Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
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in the case of targeted killing, as opposed to, say, combatants responding 
with lethal force to a current terrorist attack in a firefight in a civilian 
area, there has been a prior investigative process that has resulted in a 
description of the role of the target in the terrorist organization and a 
unique identifying description of the target. Moreover, the target is to be 
killed only if he or she can be reliably identified as such at the time of the 
killing. Further, the targeted killing is discriminating— only the target is 
to be killed. It follows, therefore, that, at least in principle, the problem of 
distinguishing terrorists from innocent civilians is substantially reduced 
by the tactic of targeted killing. This is, of course, not to say that some 
investigations are not sloppy, that mistaken identity does not happen, or 
that all targeted killings are as discriminating as they ought to be. Far 
from it. For example, there is evidence of faulty intelligence in relation to 
the targeted killing of Taliban leaders in Afghanistan by NATO forces.51 
But it is to say that the tactic of targeted killing, insofar as it lives up to its 
own standards, is not morally impermissible— and, therefore, ought not 
to be legally impermissible— on the general grounds of the difficulty of 
distinguishing terrorists from innocent civilians.
Further arguments against targeted killing rely on appeals to various 
practical and essentially consequentialist considerations, such as ineffec-
tiveness. For example, it can be argued that the targeted killing of some 
terrorists might not reduce terrorist attacks, since others take their place. 
However, these kinds of arguments rely on the truth of empirical claims 
that might turn out to be false under certain circumstances. Accordingly, 
they do not show that targeted killing is necessarily morally unjustified.
I conclude that the targeted killing of terrorists is, in principle, mor-
ally permissible. This is consistent, of course, with the actual policies and 
practices of targeted killing on the part of, for example, the United States 
and Israel in specific contexts being morally impermissible. Let me now 
turn to the two sorts of hard cases mentioned above.
9.4  Targeted Killing of Osama bin Laden
As mentioned above, Osama bin Laden was killed by US Special Forces 
outside a theater of war in a well- ordered, urban setting in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan, in 2011. While Pakistan was, and remains, an ally of the United 
51. Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next?”
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States, for some reason it was not enforcing its own laws in respect of 
bin Laden. This presented the United States with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, bin Laden was a terrorist responsible, directly or indirectly, for 
murdering thousands of US citizens. On the other hand, it would be a 
violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty to enter Pakistan territory without per-
mission and kill or capture bin Laden.
Elsewhere I have argued that the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden 
was probably not morally permissible by the lights of just war theory.52 Here 
I am bracketing just war theory and simply considering the moral permissi-
bility of killing bin Laden independently of just war theory. And, indeed, my 
conclusion is different; for my argument here, supposing it is sound, shows 
that the killing of bin Laden was probably morally permissible. Naturally, 
I will need to help myself in passing to some of the principles constitutive 
of just war theory, and I also briefly summarize some of the arguments can-
vassed by myself and others elsewhere. However, my intention is to present 
a novel and more complex argument to my conclusion, albeit one that takes 
off from earlier arguments. In short, I seek to extend the deliberative pro-
cess for and against the killing of bid Laden with a view to bringing it to a 
conclusion, at least from the perspective of the application of moral theory. 
I do so in the knowledge that unforeseen empirical consequences have the 
potential to undermine any such conclusion thought to be definitive.
Let me summarize the basic arguments in play. The basic moral per-
spectives in play are retrospective and prospective, and procedural and 
substantive. At the risk of oversimplification, those who regard the kill-
ing of bin Laden as morally permissible tend to offer considerations of 
retrospective and substantive justice, and these considerations coalesce 
around a principle of retribution.53 Given that he murdered numerous 
US and other citizens, so the argument goes, he deserved to die. On the 
other hand, those who disagree tend to offer proceduralist considerations, 
especially of a legalistic kind. Some argue that even though Pakistan was 
evidently unwilling to hand over bin Laden to the United States, it was an 
unacceptable violation of its sovereignty to enter Pakistan without per-
mission to kill or capture him. Others have recourse to the criminal law; 
procedural justice requires arrest and a fair trial, and, evidently, bin Laden 
52. Miller, “Just War Theory and Counter- Terrorism.”
53. If so, then the justifying principle is not the related instrumentalist principle of tit- for- 
tat in the service of restoring symmetry of risk in armed conflict.
260 s h o o t i n g  t o   k i l l
260
could have been captured and tried. By contrast with retrospective, proce-
duralist, and substantive moral considerations, prospective considerations 
evidently cut both ways. Hence both the pro- kill bin Laden and the anti- 
kill bin Laden groups help themselves to these, albeit to different ones. 
Thus the anti- kill group argues that violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and 
killing bin Laden will simply inflame anti- US sentiment and exacerbate 
the problem of terrorism both for Pakistan and the United States. By con-
trast, the pro- kill group emphasizes considerations of deterrence: “others 
will think twice about murdering US citizens.”
Further arguments in play include (on the pro- kill view) that procedural 
justice is merely a means to realize substantive justice, and that in the case 
of bin Laden there was not the same need for a formal evidential process as 
in standard criminal justice cases— after all, there could be no reasonable 
doubt among the authorities or the general public that bin Laden was cul-
pable. Moreover, a due process of sorts was followed in that the killing was 
authorized at the highest level and only after appropriate weighing of rel-
evant considerations, including, presumably, legal considerations. This is, 
of course, not to say that existing institutional arrangements in the United 
States in respect of targeted killings are adequate. Here there are three 
elements in play: (1) the decision maker and the decision- making process 
(e.g., the president of the United States on advice from military person-
nel and legal advisors); (2) the criteria used in the decisions themselves, 
including, crucially, moral criteria such as the principles of necessity, dis-
crimination, and proportionality; and (3) oversight of this process (e.g., by 
an independent judicial entity). However, if these arrangements are not 
adequate, there does not seem to be any in- principle reason why they could 
not be renovated in a manner that rendered them adequate.54 Another 
argument invokes the principle of necessity, as it applies in law enforce-
ment contexts. For it might be claimed that bin Laden resisted arrest, and 
deadly force can be justifiably used against those resisting arrest for very 
serious offenses, such as murder, if it is necessary to do so.55
54. There is an important issue here with respect to the nature of both kinds of mecha-
nisms and their relationship to one another.
55. US officials said bin Laden resisted and was shot in the head, and, as already men-
tioned, it has also emerged that he was unarmed. US officials also said that three other 
men were killed during the raid, one believed to be bin Laden’s son and the other two his 
couriers; in addition, a woman was killed when she was used as a shield by a male combat-
ant. There were no American casualties.
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One problem with the “procedure as a means to substantive justice” 
claim is that such exceptionalism may well undermine the integrity 
of criminal justice processes. A  problem with the “due process” claim 
is that, arguably, the institutional process actually operative in the bin 
Laden killing was not adequate, notwithstanding that it could be reno-
vated. A problem with the necessity claim is that bin Laden was appar-
ently unarmed when cornered, and it therefore seems unlikely that the 
use of lethal force was necessary. Moreover, if the intention was actually 
to capture bin Laden, and lethal force was only used when he resisted in 
a manner that removed all nonlethal options, then killing him was not in 
fact a case of targeted killing, as we are using that term.
What are we to make of these various arguments, some in favor of kill-
ing bin Laden, others against it? I suggest that, weighing one set against 
the other, they are inconclusive, that they fail to be decisive one way or 
another. My response is twofold. First, the issue needs to be framed in 
terms of the conflict between the law enforcement model and the mili-
tary combat model. Essentially, as already argued, neither model can be 
straightforwardly applied, but both remain relevant. The military combat 
model cannot be straightforwardly applied because Abbottabad was not 
a theater of war; it was a well- ordered jurisdiction. But neither can the 
law enforcement model be straightforwardly applied, because it was not 
a jurisdiction in which the laws against terrorists, specifically bin Laden, 
were being effectively applied. Second, in the context of framing the issue 
in this manner, I suggest a further argument that is capable of breaking 
the deadlock. This is based on a notion discussed in Chapter 6.1 and 6.3 
in particular; namely, collective self- defense. What is meant by collective 
self- defense in this context? (What is not meant is the legal idea of mul-
tiple nation- states acting collectively, as opposed to unilaterally.56)
Evidently, killing bin Laden was not an act of individual self- defense. 
As already noted, it is highly unlikely that the US Special Forces person-
nel killed bin Laden because he constituted an imminent threat to their 
lives. Therefore, the principle of necessity operative in law enforcement 
contexts is probably not relevant (see section 9.2 above). Similarly, the 
principle of proportionality, as it applies in law enforcement contexts, is 
not relevant (see Chapters 4 and 6 and section 9.2). Notwithstanding 
that killing bin Laden was not an act of individual self- defense against 
56. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 2nd ed. (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2004), Chapter 5.
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an imminent threat, it could well have been an act done in collective self- 
defense. Arguably, the United States— a collective entity— was defending 
itself against another collective entity, al- Qaeda, in the context of an ongo-
ing armed conflict. Here I need to rely on the discussion in section 9.2 
regarding the differences between collective self- defense in the context of 
an ongoing armed conflict between collective entities and the use of lethal 
force by police officers in discrete, self- contained encounters with crimi-
nals; more specifically, the differences with respect to the application of 
the principles of necessity and proportionality.
As elaborated in section 9.2, in the case of collective self- defense, but 
not individual self- defense, the ends in play are medium and long- term 
(military) collective ends, and the principles of necessity and proportion-
ality apply at this collective level. So the appropriate set of questions to 
be asked in relation to bin Laden were: (1) Is he an active member of the 
enemy organization (al- Qaeda)? (2) Would killing him be disproportion-
ate in terms of foreseeable loss of civilian life? (3) Is killing him a neces-
sary means to a medium or long- term collective end in the armed conflict 
with al- Qaeda? Question 1 must obviously receive an affirmative answer. 
But what of questions 2 and 3?
Question 2 is ambiguous insofar as it could apply to a theater of war 
or to an area outside a theater of war. Clearly, in the case of the bin Laden 
killing, it is the latter that is relevant. Abbottabad is a well- ordered jurisdic-
tion, albeit one in which the laws against the terrorist, bin Laden, were, for 
whatever reason, not being enforced effectively. Accordingly, the argument 
from collective self- defense faces a serious obstacle. What of question 3? 
If bin Laden was encountered on a battlefield in Afghanistan rather than 
in Abbottabad, then it would have been fairly obviously morally permis-
sible to kill him, assuming doing so did not put innocent civilians at a 
disproportionate risk of harm; in short, the principles of military necessity 
and proportionality would straightforwardly apply and, hence, the argu-
ment from collective self- defense would be decisive. However, this was not 
the case. So while the answer to question 3 is affirmative, compliance with 
the principle of necessity nevertheless remains problematic, given he was 
killed outside a theater of war.
My response to this conundrum is to construct a further argument 
that is derivable from the argument from collective self- defense. This 
argument seeks to make the best of the moral considerations constitu-
tive of both the law enforcement model and the military combat model 
in a context in which neither can be straightforwardly applied. According 
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to this argument, collective self- defense would justify the killing of bin 
Laden in a well- ordered jurisdiction under three conditions: (1) the laws 
against terrorism were ineffective— the default law enforcement model 
was not available; (2) the lives of innocent civilians were not put at seri-
ous risk— the principle of discrimination as it applies in law enforcement 
contexts rather than the more permissive one applicable in military com-
bat contexts was applied; and (3) bin Laden was a high value target— so 
the fact that it would have been morally permissible to kill bin Laden in 
a theater of war merely on the grounds of being a member of al- Qaeda is 
not in itself sufficient to justify killing him in a well- ordered jurisdiction, 
even one in which the laws against terrorism are not effectively enforced. 
Evidently, conditions 1 and 2 obtained, what of 3?
I take it that the US strategy in relation to al- Qaeda consists in large 
part in degrading its capability by “neutralizing” “high value” targets, 
notably by killing them. Assuming this strategy is rationally defensible in 
the context of the collective military ends of the United States, the ques-
tion to be asked is whether or not bin Laden is or, at least, was a high- value 
target at the time he was killed. I suggest that the answer is in the affirma-
tive. How so? Presumably, bin Laden continued to be useful to al- Qaeda 
in an advisory role. However, his importance to al- Qaeda at the time of 
his death was principally symbolic; he is the person the world most asso-
ciates with al- Qaeda and 9/ 11 and, apparently, he had got away scot- free. 
Moreover, symbolism is far from being inconsequential to terrorists and, 
therefore, to those engaged in counterterrorism. Consider, for example, 
the symbolic importance to al- Qaeda of its successful attack on the Twin 
Towers in New York in 2001. Accordingly, in the context of the ongoing 
armed conflict between the United States and al- Qaeda, the United States 
is diminished, and al- Qaeda is corresponding enhanced, so long as bin 
Laden has neither been killed nor captured. For this reason, bin Laden 
was a very high- value target. It follows that killing bin Laden was a sig-
nificant symbolic victory for the United States and its allies in the overall 
context of their counterterrorist campaign of collective self- defense.
I conclude that, other things being equal, the killing of bin Laden was 
justified on the basis of the argument from collective self- defense appro-
priately adjusted (as described above). But are other things equal? As we 
saw above, there are a number of retrospective (especially retribution), 
proceduralist, and prospective moral considerations in play. However, 
it was concluded that these were not decisive one way or another; there 
was a deadlock. It seems, therefore, that the (adjusted) argument from 
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collective self- defense breaks the deadlock. I  conclude that killing bin 
Laden was morally permissible, at least by the lights of the moral consid-
erations canvassed here.
Naturally, from this it does not follow that, all things considered, kill-
ing bin Laden was morally permissible. To arrive at that conclusion one 
would have to authoritatively weigh up a number of consequentialist 
moral considerations (taking collective self- defense to be a deontological 
consideration), including ones mentioned above. However, I do not have 
the relevant expertise to assess these. Here I simply reiterate that while 
some of these weighed against killing him (e.g., the negative impact on 
US- Pakistan relations and an upsurge in anti- US sentiment in Pakistan), 
others weighed in favor of killing him (e.g., if incarcerated for a lengthy 
period, bin Laden may well have continued to serve as an important rally-
ing point for pro- terrorist activity.
9.5  Lethal Use of Drones in Counterterrorist 
Operations
In Afghanistan and in the so- called tribal areas of Pakistan (the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA— especially North Waziristan) and 
in Afghanistan, the US military and the CIA57 have engaged in a sus-
tained campaign of killing by means of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
or drones.58 Here I note that drones are a weapons system that can be used 
for targeted killing but also for nontargeted indiscriminate killing. For 
example, a drone operator could deliberately activate a drone to destroy 
school buildings known to be occupied by children. Moreover, even when 
carried out with the best of intentions, drone strikes have killed innocent 
bystanders. Accordingly, while the moral controversy in relation to tar-
geted killing overlaps with the moral controversy over the use of drones, 
it is different in important respects. One might, therefore, support the 
targeted killing of terrorists under certain circumstances but argue that 
the use of drones in counterterrorism operations should be banned.
57. I will not in this work address the important question of intelligence agencies, such as 
the CIA— as opposed to the military— carrying out targeted killing operations.
58. For example, General Atomics’ MQ- 1 Predator and MQ- 9 Reaper. For the purposes 
of this chapter I will assume that the drones in question are not so- called autonomous 
drones— ones in which humans are (to use the jargon) out of the loop. This raises impor-
tantly different issues of moral responsibility, dealt with in Chapter 10.
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There are a variety of circumstances in which the targeted killing of 
terrorists by liberal democratic states might take place and which bear on 
its legality and morality. For the sake of simplicity in this section I invoke 
distinctions made earlier and assume that the targeted killings in ques-
tion take place either (1)  in a de facto theater of war, albeit war against 
a nonstate actor, or (2)  in a jurisdictional setting in which there is not 
effective enforcement of the law in relation to terrorists perpetrating 
ongoing, serious terrorist attacks against the liberal democratic state in 
question. (If 2, this is because the authorities are either unable or unwill-
ing to enforce the relevant laws.) Accordingly, as mentioned above, I am 
not considering the targeted killing of terrorist suspects by state security 
forces in the well- ordered, liberal democratic states of those security agen-
cies in peacetime, or, indeed, in wartime if the territory in question is 
enjoying effective law enforcement against terrorism.59 Here my focus is 
on the targeted killing of terrorists by state security agencies in disorderly 
jurisdictions and, specifically, US drone attacks in the FATA of Pakistan.
Perhaps the firing of a rocket by a US unmanned aircraft in Yemen in 
200260 that killed six al- Qaeda operatives is an instance of targeted killing 
in a context that is a relatively sparsely populated geographical location (so 
that there is little or no chance of collateral damage) and a jurisdiction in 
which there is no effective law enforcement in relation to terrorists con-
ducting attacks on liberal democratic states.
I will assume in the ensuing discussion of the morality of targeted 
killing that targeted killings in our sense are constrained by minimal 
moral, or morally informed, principles strictly applied. Naturally, here 
I  am excluding those principles the application of which are ruled out 
by my definition of targeted killing, notably the principle of imminent 
threat; as noted above, the targets of targeted killing are, by my defini-
tion, not imminent threats. The principles to be strictly applied include 
the following: (1) it has been well- confirmed that the target is a terrorist; 
(2) the decision has been authorized at an appropriately high political level 
(e.g., by the US president or the Israeli prime minister), and (3) the deci-
sion is subject to effective accountability mechanisms, (e.g., judicial over-
sight). Importantly, these principles also include: (4) the targeted killing 
59. For more on these distinctions, see Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
60. “CIA killed Al- Qaeda suspects in Yemen” BBC News: World Edition, November 5, 2002 
http:// news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/ hi/ 2402479.stm
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is principally undertaken for purposes of (collective) self- defense (e.g., to 
prevent future lethal terrorist attacks, as opposed to, for example, as ret-
ribution) and is militarily necessary and proportionate. That is, I assume 
for our purposes that the required justification is essentially prospective 
in character.
I take it that while the lethal use of drones in a well- ordered jurisdic-
tion is morally impermissible, there is no good in principle moral objec-
tion against the lethal use of drones in a theater of war in the context of 
a just war.61 B. J. Strawser provides a sustained argument to this effect.62 
Drones have been used by the United States, in particular, to conduct tar-
geted killings in Afghanistan, the FATA of Pakistan, and Yemen. By the 
lights of the argument of section 9.3 above, insofar as these drone strikes 
have been genuine cases of targeted killing in a theater of war and have 
not violated the principles of jus in bello, then, other things being equal, 
they are morally permissible.
However, as already mentioned, the term “targeted killing” has been 
used by US government officials, the media, and others somewhat loosely. 
Sometimes it is used to refer to so- called surgical strikes on high value 
targets as part of a decapitation strategy (targeting “the brain”). Other 
times it has been used to refer to the use of drones by US armed forces 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan to inflict relatively heavy casualties on the 
enemy and, thereby, disable it (targeting “the body”). Moreover, this strat-
egy has evidently led to significant civilian casualties— an issue I discuss 
below. According to a recent Stanford/ NYU report, “The best currently 
available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by The Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization. 
TBIJ reports that from June 2004 through mid- September 2012, available 
61. But for general arguments against the use of drones, see Medea Benjamin Drone 
Warfare: Killing by Remote Control (London: Verso, 2013) and Amnesty International, “Will 
I Be Next”
62. Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators:  The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 342– 368. Strawser argues for the stron-
ger claim that use of drones is morally obligatory in a just war. The anti- drone arguments 
include the claim that asymmetrical warfare is unfair, and the so- called “threshold effect” 
argument. According to the former argument, the fact that drone operators are safe but the 
terrorist- combatants are at risk is unfair. No doubt this is true, but surely a just war does 
not need to be fair in this sense. According to the latter argument, since the enemy does 
not have drones and does not have the means to target one’s own drone operators, then one 
is more likely to resort to drones, and so the total quantum of innocent lives lost is likely to 
increase notwithstanding that in any given drone strike, considered on its own, the likeli-
hood of innocent loss of live is reduced. This is, of course, a disputable empirical claim.
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data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562– 3,325 people in Pakistan, of 
whom 474– 881 were civilians, including 176 children.”63
As mentioned earlier, drones have also been used to conduct so- called 
signature strikes, or strikes on individuals who have not been uniquely 
identified in our sense but who exhibit a pattern of suspicious behavior. 
Moreover, signature strikes are also frequently referred to as targeted kill-
ings. Here there are a number of points to be made. First, using drones 
to inflict heavy casualties in this manner is, as already mentioned, not 
targeted killing in our sense— which is, of course, not to say that it is not 
morally permissible in a theater of war. Accordingly, the use of drones for 
targeting “the body” lies outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say 
here that, given the scale of such killings, the opportunities for mistaken 
identity and the lack of precision attaching to the weaponry deployed 
(including by the use of surgical drone strikes— see below), it is extremely 
doubtful that such a strategy could be morally justified outside a theater 
of war.
Second, and following on this first point, we need to invoke the dis-
tinction between targeted killing of terrorists, on the one hand, and signa-
ture strikes and surgical strikes against terrorists, on the other. Signature 
strikes are morally problematic because, in effect, the definitions on 
which they rely are far too permissive and inevitably lead to the deaths 
of innocent civilians. The notion of suspicious behavior is far too weak to 
underpin a moral justification to take the life of a person otherwise only 
known to be a civilian in an area in which there is terrorist activity. This 
problem is compounded by the fact that these definitions are inherently 
vague and, as such, susceptible to indefinite expansion. For example, evi-
dently, the definition of the targets in question expanded under President 
Obama so that it “in effect counts all military- age males in a strike zone as 
combatants . . . unless there is specific intelligence posthumously proving 
them innocent.”64
Surgical strikes are frequently lethal drone strikes against combat-
ants living among innocent civilians and not readily distinguishable 
63. International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and 
Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma 
to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan (September 2012), vi, http:// law.stanford.
edu/ wp- content/ uploads/ sites/ default/ files/ publication/ 313671/ doc/ slspublic/ Stanford_ 
NYU_ LIVING_ UNDER_ DRONES.pdf.
64. Quoted in Micah Zenko, Reforming US Drone Strike Policies, Council on Foreign 
Relations Special Report No. 65 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 12.
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from those civilians. Notwithstanding that they are, at least by definition, 
intended to minimize innocent civilian deaths (collateral damage), surgi-
cal strikes bring with them the distinct possibility of collateral damage, 
and given multiple surgical strikes, there is the likelihood of significant 
loss of innocent human life. By contrast, targeted killings, as we are using 
the term, do not necessarily imply any loss of innocent human life on any 
occasion, or, indeed, on multiple occasions taken in aggregate. Naturally, 
a targeted killing could be planned in such a way as to allow rather than 
remove the possibility of collateral damage. However, the point to be 
stressed here is that in the case of targeted killings of terrorists, but not 
surgical strikes against terrorists, loss of innocent human life is typi-
cally avoidable. Accordingly, surgical strikes can only be morally justified 
in a military conflict in which the principles of military necessity and 
proportionality— rather than more restrictive principles, such as those 
governing the use of lethal force by police— are applicable. Therefore, sur-
gical strikes are morally permissible in theaters of war but not, at least pro 
tanto, elsewhere.
Third, and relatedly, notwithstanding their renowned capacity to carry 
out surgical strikes, drones are a relatively blunt instrument when it comes 
to targeted killing. Compare, for example, a drone strike on a terrorist- 
combatant walking in a village to shooting the terrorist with a handgun at 
point- blank range (or, more likely, a sniper shooting the terrorist). Hence 
the significant loss of innocent human life arising from drone strikes in, 
for example and as mentioned above, the FATA of Pakistan.
Fourth, our concern in this section is with the moral permissibility of 
the use of drone strikes to kill terrorists embedded in a civilian popula-
tion in a disorderly jurisdiction as opposed to a theater of war or a well- 
ordered jurisdiction. Our example here is the FATA of Pakistan.
In light of these four points, let us get clear on the moral problem 
presented by the lethal use of drones to kill terrorists embedded in a civil-
ian population in the disorderly jurisdiction of FATA. Here there is the 
following dilemma: On the one hand, al- Qaeda has important bases in 
these areas from which it conducts terrorist attacks against the United 
States (among others), so there is a need to engage in counterterrorist 
operations. On the other hand, the areas in question are neither theaters 
of war65 nor a well- ordered jurisdiction in which laws against terrorists 
65. Naturally, heavily populated areas such as towns and cities could become theaters of 
war if they come under sustained bombardment (e.g., by drones), as happened to German 
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could be enforced. So, evidently, the two salient options— the military 
conflict model and the law enforcement model— are both ruled out.
Evidently, there is a solution to this moral problem:  targeted kill-
ing. Genuine targeted killing is, as we have seen, a potential solution, 
since under certain circumstances it may be morally permissible to kill 
terrorist- combatants who are unable to be arrested and tried, notwith-
standing that the killing takes place outside a theater of war. Our discus-
sion of bin Laden demonstrated as much. Moreover, the case for targeted 
killing of terrorists in a disorderly jurisdiction is even stronger than it was 
in the case of bin Laden. For in a disorderly jurisdiction, the argument 
that it is a violation of sovereignty is considerably weaker.
Unfortunately, however, the lethal use of drones in the FATA is fre-
quently not targeted killing in our sense, but rather the much less dis-
criminatory tactics of surgical strikes or signature strikes. As we have 
seen, whatever the strategic virtues of these tactics, they come at a heavy 
moral cost in terms of the loss of innocent human life. Indeed, in the 
FATA, commensurate with the increase in the numbers of surgical and 
signature strikes by drones, the quantum of collateral damage did sharply 
increase.
As we have seen, if drones are used for surgical strikes in a theater of 
war— and the war in question is morally justifiable— then what counts 
as an acceptable risk to, and indeed acceptable loss of life among, inno-
cent bystanders is governed by the relevant principles of just war theory; 
namely, military necessity and proportionality.66 But the FATA are not per 
se a theater of war. Accordingly, it is not the relatively morally permissive 
principles of military necessity and proportionality that are applicable.
Nor can we invoke the argument made in sections 9.3 and 9.4 above 
for the moral permissibility of targeted killing in the context of the failure 
of the law enforcement model to deal with the terrorist threat. For that 
argument relied on either the context being a theater of war or, if not— as 
in the case of bin Laden— there being no foreseen loss of innocent human 
life (and, arguably, no substantial risk of loss of innocent human life). So 
the crucial relevant moral requirement justifying targeted killing outside 
cities during World War II. Moreover, some areas of FATA are relatively sparsely populated 
(e.g., areas well away from villages) and could serve as appropriate locations for targeted 
killings. Moreover, these areas are potentially theaters of war.
66. Note that signature strikes are problematic even in theaters of war, since in these 
strikes terrorist- combatants are only identified as such by their suspicious behavior.
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theaters of war is, at the very least, that there is no foreseen loss of inno-
cent human life. But it is precisely this requirement that, as we have seen, 
cannot be met in the case of surgical or signature strikes by drones.
I conclude that, pro tanto at least, the use of drones to conduct surgi-
cal strikes and signature strikes to kill terrorists embedded in a civilian 
population in a disorderly jurisdiction is not morally permissible. This is 
consistent, of course, with my claim that targeted killing of such terror-
ists, including by means of drones, may well be morally permissible in, 
for example, areas well away from civilian populations.
Naturally, it might be countered that this does not demonstrate that 
the use of drones to conduct surgical strikes or signature strikes in these 
areas is not morally permissible, all things considered. This is correct, 
but it needs to be borne in mind that such lethal strikes would not be 
rendered morally permissible merely because they were a military neces-
sity from the US perspective, for this maneuver would be tantamount to 
a reintroduction of the already rejected military model. The moral con-
siderations invoked would have to be different from, and weightier than, 
this. It is not entirely clear what they could be, especially given the long- 
held view that the main aim of counterinsurgency, including operations 
against terrorists embedded in civilian populations, is to win over the 
“hearts and minds” of those populations and not increase the threat by 
further radicalizing these populations.67
9.6  Conclusion
In this chapter I have defined targeted killing and distinguished it from 
assassination and from extrajudicial killing. I have argued that targeted 
killing of combatants in theaters of war is morally permissible. I have fur-
ther argued that while targeted killing of terrorists is morally impermis-
sible in well- ordered jurisdictions— since the law enforcement model is 
applicable— it may be permissible under certain circumstances in disor-
derly states, given that the law enforcement model is unable to be applied. 
If so, it would need to be conducted in a manner that ensures the lives of 
innocent civilians are not put at risk.
67. Naturally, notions such as so- called extreme emergencies could be invoked. But this 
seems farfetched.
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Autonomous Weapons  
and Moral Responsibility
s c i e n c e  f i c t i o n  m o v i e s ,  such as the Terminator series, have accus-
tomed us to images of armed computerized robots led by leader robots 
fighting wars against human combatants and their human leaders. 
Moreover, by virtue of developments in artificial intelligence, the robots 
have superior calculative and memory capacity— after all, they are com-
puters. In addition, robots are utterly fearless in battle, since they don’t 
have emotions and care nothing for life over death. Does the human race, 
then, face robopocalypse? The short answer is no. Computers, robotic or 
otherwise, are not minded agents, steadfast intentional stances toward 
them notwithstanding.1 Rather, these images are fanciful anthropo-
morphisms of machines; and the military reality is quite different. 
Nevertheless, the specter of robopocalypse persists, especially in the 
context of new and emerging (so- called) autonomous robotic weaponry. 
Consider, for example, the Samsung stationary robot that functions as a 
sentry in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Once 
programmed and activated, it has the capability to track, identify, and fire 
its machine guns at human targets without the further intervention of a 
human operator. Predator drones are used in Afghanistan and the tribal 
areas of Pakistan to kill suspected terrorists. While the ones currently in 
use are not autonomous weapons, they could be, given this capability, in 
which case, once programmed and activated, they could track, identify, 
and destroy human and other targets without the further intervention of 
1. Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). 
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a human operator. Moreover, more advanced autonomous weapons sys-
tems, including robotic ones, are in the pipeline.
In this chapter I explore the implications of autonomous robotic weap-
ons, and related military weaponry, for the individual and collective moral 
responsibility of human beings engaged in war. Do such weapons nec-
essarily compromise the moral responsibility of human combatants and 
their leaders, and, if so, in what manner and to what extent? In order 
to answer these questions I  rely on serviceable theoretical descriptions 
of the key notions of war (Chapter 6, section 6.1) and military necessity, 
and individual and collective moral responsibility (Chapter 5, sections 5.2 
and 5.3). In respect of the questions arising for individual and collective 
moral responsibility in respect of autonomous robotic weaponry, I provide 
what I refer to as the moral ramification argument. The conclusion of this 
argument is that it is highly improbable that moral jus in bello principles 
of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality could ever be 
programmed into robots.
10.1  War, Collective Action, and the Principles 
of Necessity and Proportionality
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, waging war is typically morally justi-
fied by recourse to some notion of collective self- defense, such as defense 
of the nation- state against the armed aggression of another nation- state 
or of a nonstate actor such as a terrorist group. This ultimate end of col-
lective self- defense and, relatedly, winning the war is necessarily under-
specified prior to its realization. For example, the United States did not 
know when it declared war on Japan as a result of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor that victory over Japan would ultimately result from drop-
ping atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Moreover, the ins and 
outs of the evolving route leading to victory is also necessarily underspeci-
fied prior to its actually being taken; after all, it largely turns on what the 
enemy does, including by way of response to one’s own armed attacks. 
So war is quite unlike programming a destination into a robot- driven car 
with a detailed and fixed roadmap, or, for that matter, a flight path into a 
computer- controlled jet aircraft. Nor is it even like playing a game such 
as chess, albeit it is analogous in some ways. For unlike in war, in chess 
there is a single, definite, unchanging, and mutually known “theater of 
war” (the chessboard), a resource base that cannot reproduce itself (the 
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chess pieces), a sharply defined set of rules and contexts of application, 
and a fixed, finite, and knowable (at least in principle) set of possible 
moves and countermoves.
As we have seen, the actual conduct of war is governed by moral prin-
ciples (the so- called jus in bello of just war theory), notably the principles of 
(1) military necessity, (2) proportionality, and (3) discrimination.2 As will 
become evident, these are quite unlike the sharply defined rules and con-
texts of application in chess.3 For the moment I note that these principles 
have to be applied in very different military contexts, such as conventional 
theaters of war and counterterrorism operations, and that, as I  argue 
below, their application is radically context dependent— so the conditions 
in which they ought to be applied cannot be comprehensively specified in 
advance of those conditions coming into existence. Importantly, unlike in 
the case of law enforcement, these principles apply at the collective level, 
as opposed to merely at the individual level. So the context of any, or at 
least most, applications of these principles is multileveled.
As we have seen, there is the individual level of a one- to- one encoun-
ter between a combatant and an enemy combatant, a firefight involving 
multiple combatants on both sides, and a battle involving possibly thou-
sands of combatants over an extended period of time. Nor is this the end 
of the matter, for, as we all know, any given battle is merely a phase ele-
ment in the overall war. So there are further collective levels governed by, 
for example, the collective end of winning the war, as opposed to merely 
winning one of the battles. Perhaps winning the war is describable as a 
level- three joint action.
The point to be stressed now is that, as argued in Chapter 6, the prin-
ciple of military necessity, in particular, but also the principles of pro-
portionality and discrimination, apply at the various conceptually distinct 
collective levels (e.g., the level of a battle or ongoing war fought by a mili-
tary organization), and not simply at the level of an individual combat-
ant’s lethal action considered as a discrete, self- contained action (e.g., the 
2. There are various different possible formulations of and complications arising from 
these moral principles. For example, I will be concerned with proportionality as it pertains 
to civilian deaths. See Miller, Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism.
3. This point is not vitiated by the fact that these ius in bello principles are further specified 
by the ROE. For the problem remains, both at the level of the ‘derivation’ of the ROE from 
the ius in bello principles and in the application of the ROE themselves. In order to avoid 
unnecessary complications in this chapter I discuss the issues purely in terms of the ius 
in bello principles.
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necessity to kill an enemy combatant who will otherwise kill oneself). 
Accordingly, the context for the application of these moral principles is a 
multilevel (individual and collective end) context. In essence, the princi-
ple of military necessity ultimately pertains to the long- term, necessarily 
underspecified collective end of winning the war, which generates in turn 
a nested, dynamic series of medium- and short- term collective ends, such 
as winning particular battles or firefights. These short- and medium- term 
collective ends are means to the long- term collective end of winning the 
war, albeit means in need of further specification, adjustment, or even 
abandonment in light of the responses to them of the enemy armed forces.
Accordingly, the principle of military necessity is to be understood, 
first, in terms of short- , medium- , and long- term means and ends— that 
is, in diachronic terms. Something is necessary in this sense if, compar-
atively speaking, it is both an efficient and effective means to an end, 
and there is no obviously superior means available. If it is the only means 
then it is strictly necessary. However, this is frequently not the case, and 
so to this extent “necessity” is correspondingly less strict. Second, the 
strength of the necessity to deploy a given quantum of lethal military 
force in, say, the context of a battle turns in large part on the moral weight 
to be accorded to the winning of that battle in light of its likely contribu-
tion to the ultimate (necessarily underspecified) collective end of winning 
the war (and, of course, the somewhat indeterminate moral weight to be 
attached to the latter). In the case of a crucial battle in the context of a war 
of collective self- defense, the military necessity to deploy a large quantum 
of lethal military force might be both strong (there is much at stake) and 
strict (it is the only available means).
What of the principles of proportionality and discrimination? These 
principles are obviously also to be applied at all levels collective and indi-
vidual levels: whether it is a brief one- combatant- to- one- enemy- combatant 
exchange of fire, a firefight involving multiple combatants on both sides, 
a battle, or the war as a whole that is under consideration, it is morally 
impermissible to intentionally kill innocent civilians, to put their lives at 
unnecessary risk, or to knowingly cause disproportionate large numbers 
of civilian deaths. Naturally, what is at stake at each of these different 
levels, including the quantum of lives, can vary greatly but this does not 
affect the applicability of the principles.
The principles of military necessity, discrimination, and proportional-
ity are conceptually interdependent, so that one cannot be correctly applied 
without attending to the requirements of the others. Roughly speaking, 
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the principle of discrimination forbids intentional targeting of innocent 
civilians4 and foreseeably and avoidably putting their lives at unnecessary 
risk. The latter clause conceptually implicates the principle of military 
necessity, for a risk to civilians is unnecessary if the use of lethal military 
force that constitutes this risk is not militarily necessary. Thus the prin-
ciples of military necessity and discrimination are conceptually interde-
pendent. Moreover, as we saw above, both principles must be applied at 
all individual and collective levels. Since these levels are interconnected 
by virtue of nested collective ends, the application of the principle of dis-
crimination may well be a complex matter necessarily involving taking 
into account (1) the risks to civilians at these various levels and (possibly) 
adjudicating between them; (2) military necessity at these various levels 
and (possibly) adjudicating between them; and (3) adjudicating between 
points 1 and 2. For example, pursuing tactic A (aerial bombing) to real-
ize the collective end of winning a battle might lead to many more civil-
ian casualties in this present battle than pursuing tactic B (taking and 
holding ground without aerial bombing). However, pursuing A  might 
be a more efficient and effective means of decisively winning the battle 
(because, say, of the much heavier enemy casualties inflicted prior to the 
enemy’s retreat), and might, therefore, reduce the number of future civil-
ian casualties in future battles joined in further pursuit of the collective 
end of winning war.
The principle of proportionately arises in contexts in which both the 
principle of military necessity and the principle of discrimination are 
applicable. Roughly speaking, the legal principle requires that that the 
quantum of (unintended) civilian deaths resulting from the deployment 
of lethal military force should not be disproportionate to the strategic 
value, and the corresponding moral weight, of the collective military ends 
to be realized by that deployment. However, morally, as opposed to legally, 
there are three cohorts of potential lost lives to consider: civilians, one’s 
own combatants, and enemy combatants. Naturally, military goals often 
involve maximizing enemy casualties in order to degrade enemy military 
capacity. So the means/ end equation is in part to calculate the likely loss 
of life among one’s own combatants (the cost) relative to the desired goal 
4. Arguably, the component clause of the principle of discrimination— the impermissibil-
ity of intentionally killing innocent civilians— is logically independent of its second clause 
and of the other principles. This does not affect my argument. The principle of discrimi-
nation also applies to the kind of weaponry used. For example, biological weapons are 
indiscriminate.
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to be achieved (maximum enemy casualties). But this calculation of mili-
tary necessity is already one involving the application of a principle of 
proportionality. As such, the principle of proportionality (in our moral 
sense) is logically interdependent with the principle of military necessity.5 
Moreover, as we saw above, the principle of proportionality applies at both 
the individual and collective levels. So the application of the principle of 
proportionality is complex in the manner of the other two principles.
This combination of logical interdependence between the three jus in 
bello principles and their applicability at all interconnected individual and 
collective levels in the overall context of a just war waged in collective self- 
defense gives rise to the phenomenon I refer to as moral ramification, and 
to the associated need for complex decision making of the kind described 
above. In short, in general one cannot simply apply one of these principles 
in a discrete, self- contained context (proportionality, for example, given 
the likelihood of heavy civilian casualties in a firefight), without taking 
into account the other principles and other contexts at other levels (e.g., 
the military necessity to win the battle in which the firefight is an impor-
tant constitutive element).
Finally, I note that the moral considerations that arise from collective 
military ends at the collective level often outweigh, or otherwise render 
irrelevant, the moral considerations that arise at the individual level. In 
this respect, the deployment of lethal force by the military in war is quite 
different from the use of lethal force by police in law enforcement (see 
Chapters 3, 4, and 6).
10.2  Autonomous Robotic Weaponry  
and Human Moral Responsibility
Autonomous weapons are weapons system that, once programed and 
activated by a human operator, can— and, if used, do in fact— identify, 
track, and deliver lethal force without further intervention by a human 
operator. By “programmed” I mean, at least, that the individual target or 
type of target has been selected and programmed into the weapons sys-
tem. By “activated” I mean, at least, that the process culminating in the 
already programmed weapon delivering lethal force has been initiated. 
5. I am not arguing that the principle of proportionality as it applies in standard cases of 
personal self- defense is logically interdependent with the principle of necessity as that 
principle applies in such cases.
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This weaponry includes weapons used in nontargeted killing, such as 
autonomous antiaircraft weapons systems used against multiple attack-
ing aircraft, or, more futuristically, against swarm technology (e.g., mul-
tiple lethal miniature attack drones operating as a swarm so as to inhibit 
effective defensive measures); as well as ones used or, at least, capable of 
being used in targeted killing (e.g., a predator drone with face- recognition 
technology and no human operator to confirm a match).
We need to distinguish between so- called “human- in- the- loop,” 
“human- on- the- loop,” and “human- out- of- the- loop” weaponry. It is only 
human- out- of- the- loop weapons that are autonomous in the required 
sense. In the case of human- in- the- loop weapons, the final delivery of 
lethal force (e.g., by a predator drone), cannot be done without the deci-
sion to do so by the human operator. In the case of human- on- the- loop 
weapons, the final delivery of lethal force can be done without the deci-
sion to do so by the human operator; however, the human operator can 
override the weapon system’s triggering mechanism. In the case of 
human- out- of- the- loop weapons, the human operator cannot override 
the weapon system’s triggering mechanism, so once the weapon system 
is programmed and activated there is not, and cannot be, any further 
human intervention.
The lethal use of a human- in- the- loop weapon is a standard case of 
killing by a human combatant, and as such is presumably, at least in 
principle, morally permissible. Moreover, other things being equal, 
the combatant is morally responsible for the killing. The lethal use of 
a human- on- the- loop weapon is also, in principle, morally permissible. 
Moreover, the human operator is, perhaps jointly with others, morally 
responsible, at least in principle, for the use of lethal force and its foresee-
able consequences. However, these two propositions concerning human- 
on- the- loop weaponry rely on the following assumptions:
1. The weapon system is programmed and activated by its human opera-
tor and either:
2. (a) on each and every occasion of use, the final delivery of lethal force 
can be overridden by the human operator, and (b)  this operator has 
sufficient time and sufficient information to make a morally informed, 
reasonably reliable judgment about whether or not to deliver lethal 
force, or
3. (a) on each and every occasion of use, the final delivery of lethal force 
can be overridden by the human operator, and (b)  there is no moral 
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requirement for a morally informed, reasonably reliable judgment on 
each and every occasion of the final delivery of force.
A scenario illustrating 3b might be an antiaircraft weapons system being 
used on a naval vessel under attack from a squadron of manned aircraft in 
a theater of war at sea, in which there are no civilians present.6
What of human- out- of- the- loop weapons?7 Consider the following sce-
nario, which I contend is analogous to the use of human- out- of- the- loop 
weaponry: There is a villain who has trained his dogs to kill on his com-
mand, and an innocent victim on the run from the villain. The villain 
gives the scent of the victim to the killer dogs by way of an item of the vic-
tim’s clothing, and then commands the dogs to kill. The dogs pursue the 
victim deep into the forest, so that the villain is now unable to intervene. 
The dogs then kill the victim. The villain is legally and morally responsible 
for murder. However, the killer dogs are not, although they may need to be 
destroyed on the grounds of the risk they pose to human life. Hence the 
villain is morally responsible for murdering the victim, notwithstanding 
the indirect nature of the causal chain from the villain to the dead vic-
tim; the chain is indirect, since it crucially depends on the dogs doing the 
actual physical killing. Moreover, the villain would also have been legally 
and morally responsible for the killing if the “scent” was generic and, 
therefore, carried by a whole class of potential victims, and if the dogs had 
killed one of these individuals. In this second version of the scenario, the 
villain does not intend to kill a uniquely identifiable individual,8 but rather 
one (or perhaps multiple) members of a class of individuals.9
6. There are various other possible such scenarios. Consider a scenario in which there 
is a single attacker on a single occasion in which there is insufficient time for a reason-
ably reliable, morally informed judgment. Such scenarios might include ones involving a 
kamikaze pilot or a suicide bomber. If autonomous weapons were to be morally permis-
sible, the following conditions at least would need to be met: (1) prior clear- cut criteria for 
identification and delivery of lethal force to be designed into the weapon, and used only in 
narrowly circumscribed circumstances; (2) prior morally informed judgment regarding 
criteria and circumstances; and (3) ability of operator to override the system. Here there is 
also the implicit assumption that the weapon system can be “switched off,” which is not 
the case with biological agents released by a bioweapon.
7. See Ronald Arkin, “The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems,” Journal 
of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 332– 341. Arkin has argued in favor of the use of such 
weapons.
8. It is not a targeted killing.
9. Further, the villain is legally and morally responsible for foreseeable but unintended kill-
ing done by the killer dogs in the forest, if they had happened upon one of the birdwatchers 
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By analogy, human- out- of- the- loop weapons— called “killer- robots”— 
are not morally responsible for any killings they cause.10 Consider the case 
of a human- in- the- loop or human- on- the- loop weapon. Assume that the 
programmer/ activator of the weapon and the operator of the weapon at 
the point of delivery are two different human agents. If so, then, other 
things being equal, they are jointly (that is, collectively) morally respon-
sible for the killing done by the weapon (whether it be of a uniquely iden-
tified individual or an individual qua member of a class).11 No one thinks 
the weapon is morally or other than causally responsible for the killing. 
Now assume this weapon is converted to a human- out- of- the- loop weapon 
by the human programmer- activator. Surely this human programmer- 
activator now has full individual moral responsibility for the killing, as 
the villain does in (both versions of) our killer dog scenario. To be sure, 
there is no human intervention in the causal process after programming 
and activation. But the weapon has not been magically transformed from 
an entity only with causal responsibility to one which now has moral or 
other than causal responsibility for the killing.
It might be argued that the analogy does not work because killer dogs 
are unlike killer robots in the relevant respects. Dogs are minded crea-
tures, whereas computers are not; dogs have some degree of conscious-
ness and can experience, for example, pain. However, this difference 
would not favor ascribing moral responsibility to computers rather than 
dogs; rather, if anything, the reverse is true. Clearly, computers do not 
have consciousness, cannot experience pain or pleasure, do not care about 
anyone or anything (including themselves), and cannot recognize moral 
properties, such as courage, moral innocence, moral responsibility, sym-
pathy, or justice. Therefore, they cannot act for the sake of moral ends or 
principles understood as moral in character, such as the principle of dis-
crimination. Given the nonreducibility of moral concepts and properties 
well- known to frequent the forest and mistakenly killed him instead of the intended vic-
tim. (Perhaps the birdwatcher carried the scent of birds often attacked by the killer dogs).
10. Rob Sparrow, “Killer Robots,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2007):  63– 77. 
For criticisms, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Killing Them Safely:  Extreme Asymmetry and Its 
Discontents,” in Strawser, ed., Killing By Remote Control 179– 209.
11. Moreover, each is fully morally responsible; not all cases of collective moral respon-
sibility involve a distribution of the quantum (so to speak) of responsibility. See Miller, 
“Collective Moral Responsibility.”
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to nonmoral ones and, specifically, physical ones,12 at best computers can 
be programmed to comply with some nonmoral proxy for moral require-
ments. For example, “Do not intentionally kill morally innocent human 
beings” might be rendered as “Do not fire at bipeds if they are not carry-
ing a weapon or they are not wearing a uniform of the following descrip-
tion . . .” I return to this issue below.
Notwithstanding the above, some have insisted that robots are minded 
agents; after all, it is argued, they can detect and respond to features 
of their environment, and in many cases they have impressive storage, 
retrieval, and calculative capacities. However, this argument relies essen-
tially on two moves that should be resisted and are, in any case, highly con-
troversial. First, rational human thought (notably rational decisions and 
judgments) is downgraded to the status of mere causally connected states 
or causal roles, for example via functionalist theories of mental states. 
Second, and simultaneously, the workings of computers are upgraded to 
the status of mental states, for example via the same functionalist theo-
ries of mental states. For reasons of space I cannot here pursue this issue 
further. Rather, I simply note that this simultaneous downgrade/ upgrade 
faces prodigious problems when it comes to the ascription of (even non-
moral) autonomous agency. For one thing, autonomous agency involves 
the capacity for non- algorithmic inferential thinking, such as the gen-
eration of novel ideas. For another, computers do not have interests or 
desires, do not pursue ends in themselves, and cannot choose their own 
ends. At best they can select between different means to the ends pro-
grammed into them. Accordingly, they are not autonomous agents, even 
nonmoral ones. For this reason alone, robopocalypse is evidently an illu-
sion. Robotic weapons are morally problematic, but not for the reason that 
they are autonomous agents in their own right.
Granted that “autonomous” human- out- of- the- loop weapons are not 
autonomous (morally or otherwise), it has nevertheless been argued that 
there is no in- principle reason why they should not be used. (Moreover, 
they are held to have certain advantages over human- in- the- loop and 
human- on- the- loop systems— for example, being machines, they are not 
subject to psychological fear and associated stress.13) A key claim on which 
12. The physical properties in question would not only be detectable in the environment, 
but also be able to be subjected to various formal processes of quantification and so on.
13. Arkin, “The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems.”
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this argument is based is that moral principles, such as military necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination, can be reduced to rules, and these 
rules can be programmed in to computers.14 However, I suggest that the 
phenomenon of moral ramification presents a critical, if not insurmount-
able, problem at this point. To recap this phenomenon: the combination of 
logical interdependence between the three jus in bello principles and their 
applicability at all interconnected individual and collective levels gives 
rise to moral ramification and the associated need for complex decision 
making, such that one cannot simply apply one of these principles in a 
given conceptually discrete and self- contained context involving the use 
of lethal force without taking into account the other principles and other 
contexts at other levels.
Let us revisit what this might mean in practice. Appropriate applica-
tions of, say, the principle of military necessity involves reasonably reliable, 
morally informed, contextually dependent judgments at the various col-
lective levels, as well as at the individual level, and at the various centers of 
individual and collective responsibility. However, given the nested char-
acter of the individual and collective ends in play, their necessarily under-
specified content, and the need to be responsive to the actions, including 
countermeasures, of enemy combatants and their leaders, there is a con-
stant interplay between the various collective and individual levels (e.g., 
strategic commanders at headquarters and combatants in a firefight), and 
across centers (e.g., different theaters of war). Further, the various appli-
cations of the principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination 
are logically interdependent; for example, the application of the principle 
of proportionality depends on considerations of military necessity, and 
vice versa. Accordingly, there is a need to adjudicate not only between 
the means to given ends, but also with respect to the moral weight to be 
accorded different competing ends at different levels. For example, the 
individual end to advance to assist a comrade- in- arms coming under heavy 
fire might compete with the collective end of one’s platoon or company to 
14. Arkin, “The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems.” This claim has been 
countered by various critics, but not, in my view, decisively. For these critics have, as far as 
I am aware, relied on piecemeal objections (so to speak), such as the difficulty an autono-
mous weapon would have in distinguishing innocent civilians from terrorists in civilian 
dress. See, for example, Noel Sharkey, “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics,” in 
Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey, eds., Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social 
Implications of Robotics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012), 111– 128. However, a more 
decisive, and by contrast, holistic objection can be made to the application of these prin-
ciples: the moral ramification argument.
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make a tactical retreat to avoid heavy losses. Again, the collective military 
end to win firefights might be facilitated by relatively permissive rules 
of engagement (ROE), but perhaps this end competes with the collective 
end to avoid large- scale casualties among civilians, and the latter end is 
facilitated by relatively restrictive ROE. Further, at the macro- collective 
level, the collective end of the military leadership to win an internecine 
war might compete with the collective end of the political leadership not 
to inflict losses of a magnitude that would undermine the prospects for a 
sustainable peace.
In the light of this, let us see what it implies for the project to reduce the 
three jus in bello principles to rules and program them into armed robots. 
First, each moral principle needs to be expressible in a sharply defined 
rule couched in nonmoral descriptive terms. Given the nonreducibility of 
the moral to the nonmoral (physical?), it is extremely doubtful that this 
can be done for moral principles, especially ones that are relatively vague 
and quite general in form, as are the ones in question. Moreover, even if 
it could be done, the principles are logically interdependent, and this would 
need somehow to be accommodated; logically independent rule specifi-
cations, for example, would not work. Second, many, if not most, of the 
uses of lethal force in question are joint actions, and joint actions are not 
reducible to aggregations of individual actions (see Chapter 1). So the rules 
in question would need somehow to accommodate this; the mere aggre-
gation of instructions for single actors, for example, would not suffice. 
Third, the sharply defined rules in question would presumably be appli-
cable to sharply defined, discrete, self- contained contexts involving the 
use of lethal force; otherwise the robot would not be able to comply with 
them. Here the phenomenon of moral ramification comes fully into its 
own. For, as our above examples demonstrated, in any such conceptually 
discrete and self- contained context, be it a one- against- one encounter, a 
firefight, an air strike, or a battle, there will inevitably be moral consider-
ations emanating from some other context (for example, another battle) 
or some larger context of which the discrete, self- contained context is an 
element (for example, the war as a whole), which bear upon it in a manner 
that morally overrides or qualifies compliance with the sharply defined 
rule in question (or set of rules, for that matter15). Given that each war 
15. The sharply defined computerized rule conception could be complicated by adding 
meta- rules, for example. However, this would not make any material difference to the 
problems; it would simply elevate things to a higher level of complexity.
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taken in its totality, is unique, this interplay of contexts has the effect of 
making decisions in accordance with the jus in bello highly, indeed, radi-
cally, contextually dependent, and particular in character. As such, these 
decisions are beyond the reach of rules, however sharply defined; for rules 
are necessarily general in character and defined prior to their application 
in particular contexts. I conclude that this “computerized” conception of 
the application of fundamental moral principles in war faces prodigious, 
if not insurmountable, problems. In short, evidently robopocalypse is 
doubly an illusion.
An important consequence of this is that the design, construction, and 
use of human- out- of- the- loop weapons are highly morally problematic. 
Such weapons cannot be programmed to comply with the moral princi-
ples of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. Moreover, 
their use would seriously impede the capacity of their human operators 
to adequately comply with these moral principles, and, to this extent, it 
would be an abnegation of moral responsibility on the part of the mili-
tary. Finally, the use of these human- out- of- the- loop weapons is evidently 
unnecessary, since, as we saw above, for the combat situations in which 
human- in- the- loop weapons are inadequate, human- on- the- loop weapons 
are available, and I conclude that human- out- of- the- loop weapons morally 
ought not to be used.
10.3  Conclusion
In this chapter I  have addressed the question of whether autonomous 
robotic weapons necessarily compromise the moral responsibility of 
human combatants and their leaders. In order to answer this question, 
I have developed a novel argument: the moral ramification argument. The 
conclusion of this argument is that it is highly improbable that moral jus in 
bello principles of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality 
could ever be programmed into robots. The argument utilizes theoretical 
descriptions of the key notions of war and military necessity (Chapter 6), 
and individual and collective moral responsibility (Chapters  2 and 5). 




i n  t h i s  w o r k  I have analyzed the underlying moral justifications and 
moral responsibilities in play in the use of lethal force by ordinary citi-
zens, police officers, and military personnel. In doing so, I  have relied 
on my normative teleological account of social institutions. On the one 
hand, police and military use of lethal force is morally justified in part by 
recourse to fundamental natural moral rights and obligations, especially 
the right to personal self- defense and the moral obligation to defend the 
lives of innocent others under imminent threat, if one can do so without 
risking one’s own life. On the other hand, the moral justification for police 
and military use of lethal force is to some extent role- specific. Both police 
officers and military combatants evidently have an institutionally based 
moral duty to put themselves in harm’s way to protect others. However, 
police, under some circumstances, evidently have an institutionally based 
moral duty to use lethal force to uphold the law, and military combatants 
evidently have an institutionally based moral duty to use lethal force to 
win wars.
Two fundamental notions upon which this work relies are joint action 
and the natural right to self- defense. I  provide my individualist collec-
tive end theory of joint actions and use it to construct the notion of mul-
tilayered structures of joint action to understand organizational action. 
I develop a novel theory of justifiable killing in self- defense; namely, the 
fault- based internalist suspendable- rights theory (FIST). FIST is a fault- 
and rights- based account with two distinctive features. First, it is a partial-
ist account: the rights not to be killed are such that when one member of 
the set of rights is suspended, the other rights (and concomitant obliga-
tions) remain in force. Thus, if A’s right not to be killed by B is suspended, 
then B no longer has an obligation not to kill A. However, A still has a 
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right not to be killed by C, and thus C’s obligation not to kill A remains 
in force. This condition is restrictive in that it has the effect of curtailing 
the putative right of third parties to kill in defense of the lives of others. 
Second, according to FIST, a culpable attacker suspends his right not to 
be killed by a defender even in cases in which it is not necessary for the 
defender to kill the attacker to save his own life. This condition is permis-
sive in that it has the effect of strengthening the right to self- defense.
Social institutions, such as police and military organizations, presup-
pose natural rights and obligations but are established to realize collec-
tive goods, such as the protection of aggregate natural rights, such as the 
right to life. In this process, institutional roles are created and defined 
in terms of institutional rights and duties that are also moral rights and 
duties. Moreover, the latter do not entirely mirror prior natural rights and 
duties. Hence there is a divergence between the moral justification for 
the use of lethal force by ordinary citizens, police officers, and military 
combatants. Thus, unlike ordinary citizens, police officers are justified 
in using lethal force to uphold the law. On the other hand, military com-
batants, but not police officers or ordinary citizens, are morally justified 
in ambushing and killing an enemy. So although the institutional roles 
of police officers and regular soldiers are similar in some respects, they 
are also importantly different. In general terms, military forces, unlike 
police forces, do not have as a defining moral purpose to enforce the law, 
but they do have as a defining purpose to win wars. Accordingly, soldiers 
use lethal force with far less moral constraints than do police officers. 
Moreover, unlike police officers, soldiers waive their natural discretionary 
right to use lethal force, and do so in favor of their superiors. That said, 
the advent of international terrorism has blurred the distinction between 
the police and military roles. The practice of targeted killing is a case in 
point. I have argued that targeted killing may be permissible in disorderly 
states, given that the law enforcement model is unable to be applied and 
the lives of innocent civilians are not put at serious risk.
A central moral notion deployed throughout the work is that of collec-
tive moral responsibility. I have proffered a novel individualist relational 
account of this notion and deployed it in respect of the members of an 
army fighting a war, use of lethal force by police against suicide bomb-
ers, humanitarian armed intervention, and autonomous weapons. This 
notion of collective moral responsibility presupposes my individualist the-
ory of joint action and comports with my theory of organizational action 
as multilayered structures of joint action. Accordingly, I have reframed 
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the Moral Equality of Combatants debate between so- called traditional-
ists, such as Walzer, and so- called revisionists, such as McMahan, in 
terms of the collective, or joint, moral responsibility of actors engaged in 
multilayered structures of joint action. This provides, I suggest, a more 
nuanced and realistic model of individual moral responsibility in large- 
scale collective enterprises, such as armies fighting (just or unjust) wars. 
In such contexts, decision making is necessarily joint, and is therefore 
required to be binding on all, or most, if it is to be effective. Accordingly, 
there is a presumption in favor of an individual who disagrees with such 
joint decisions to nevertheless go along with them. That said, each indi-
vidual organizational actor is morally responsibility for his or her own 
actions, yet each also has a share, jointly with the others, of the moral 
responsibility for the larger organizational goals (collective ends, in my 
parlance). Importantly, this conception of moral responsibility enables, 
indeed requires, me to ascribe moral responsibility only to human beings, 
whether acting individually or jointly. Accordingly, I eschew the ascription 
of moral responsibility to collective entities per se, such as police institu-
tions, armies, terrorist organizations, governments, or nation- states, or 
for that matter to computers and other machines; moral responsibility for 
the use of lethal force rests squarely with human beings.
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